

100
YEARS OF
ANZAC
THE SPIRIT LIVES
2014 - 2018

100th Anniversary Tribute

GALLIPOLI

1915 – 2015



**SPIRIT OF
THE NATION**

A CRITICAL ROLE

While the role of the Army in the Gallipoli campaign is embedded in the Australian psyche, the role of the Navy is less well known. **Dr David Stevens** provides some insight.

FOR today's ADF, and indeed all Australians, an aspect of the Gallipoli campaign that demands a better understanding is the role played by Allied naval forces. After all, the original Anzacs were safely transported to Gallipoli by sea, sustained from the sea while they were there and then safely evacuated by sea at the end of the campaign.

At its peak, the naval operation involved more than 250 British and French warships of all sizes, from battleships to trawlers. The Australian Navy was also there, the submarine *AE2* taking an active and important role at the outset of the campaign and the 1st RAN Bridging Train later committed in support of engineering operations at Suvla Bay.

Often forgotten is that the campaign had originally been planned as a purely naval effort; a breathtaking, but unrealistic proposal to send a fleet of battleships sweeping up the Dardanelles to bombard Constantinople and force Turkey to surrender.

It was only after Turkish minefields, shore batteries and field artillery foiled the initial attempts by the combined Allied fleet to force a passage through the Narrows that naval commanders contemplated operations in conjunction with the Army. Thereafter the intended role of the troops was to secure the Gallipoli Peninsula so the enemy's minefields could be cleared without interference.

Only with Allied naval supremacy could the amphibious assaults of April 25, 1915, even be contemplated.

Afterwards and throughout the eight-month campaign, sea-based forces mounted a complex succession of direct and indirect support operations, involving not only the ferrying of troops and supplies, but also interdiction of the enemy at sea and ashore, naval air support and blockade enforcement.

Although the Allied military leadership at Gallipoli is often criticised for its organisational and cultural failings, these should not mask the many successes that were achieved. It should also be remembered that, like many aspects of the Great War, the combatants faced a novel situation and progress often came only through trial and error.

Despite Britain's long history of amphibious operations, the scale of the Gallipoli campaign was unprecedented. Planning for the close integration of land, sea and air assets had not previously been undertaken and original solutions would be required. Adaptation and innovation were the keys and, although seldom recalled, the level of joint service cooperation eventually attained at Gallipoli was far beyond anything contemplated before the war. With its structure and disposition continuously tailored to meet developing circumstances, the inherent flexibility of the fleet ensured that support for the forces engaged in the difficult struggle ashore never faltered.

As in every amphibious operation, control of the sea remained critical throughout, allowing the Allied force to use the sea for its own purposes, while preventing the enemy from doing the same. Thus, the heavy guns of the Allied battleships could be used for both friendly fire support and as an effective deterrent to any Turkish attempt to use their warships in support of their own troops or against Allied positions. Using aerial spotting to fire over the peninsula from the Aegean Sea, it would usually take only one or two big-gun salvos to force enemy ships to withdraw up the Narrows.

Secure logistics is essential to any campaign and everything required by the Allied expedition came and went by sea – the men, mules, guns and ammunition, the wire and timber supports for the construction of fortifications and trenches and, of course, fresh water and provisions.

Most importantly, because it could rely on sea control, the Allied command always retained the option of evacuating their forces from the peninsula. What might have happened should this control be lost is best illustrated by the fall of Singapore in February 1942, when more than 15,000 Australian soldiers marched into Japanese captivity during World War II.

Conversely, Allied sea power acted to disrupt Turkish communications and counter their efforts to dislodge the Allied land forces. There was no railway to Gallipoli and the nearest station was 80km from the northern end of the isthmus. Allied battleships and monitors shelled the main road and single access bridge to disrupt Turkish

transport arrangements, while naval aircraft demonstrated their reach by attacking the enemy's railhead.

Meanwhile, the exploits of Allied submarines in the Sea of Marmara – a classic sea denial operation and one of the few undisputed successes of the campaign – practically stopped sea communications between Constantinople and Gallipoli. By July 1915, the Turks had been forced to abandon the sea route for the transport of troops. By the end of December only one large steamer was left operating and the lack of alternative routes had forced the enemy to bring almost everything into Gallipoli by land at night; troops on foot and supplies by camels and oxcarts.

Farther afield, Allied destroyers maintained patrols to prevent contraband from reaching Turkey through Greek or Bulgarian ports. Other warships escorted friendly transports, hunted for enemy submarines in the lower Aegean and blocked their passage in the Sea of Crete. Rather than taking place on a small Turkish peninsula, from the joint perspective the Gallipoli campaign is better understood by looking at the entire Eastern Mediterranean.

The lasting legacy of Gallipoli should not be seen in terms of the slaughter between the trenches. Though ultimately a strategic failure, the campaign provided a wealth of shared experience. Joint operations techniques and procedures, ranging from improved command and control to common terminology, were learned the hard way in 1915, but the fundamentals of modern maritime power projection were established.

Informing the development of amphibious tactics and equipment between the wars, Gallipoli provided a wealth of invaluable lessons. "We are far from being beaten", wrote the Allied naval commander, Admiral John de Roebeck, at the time of the evacuation, "...in fact we have learned a great deal and will know what to do in the future".

The successful amphibious assaults that brought victory to the Allies in the European and Pacific theatres in 1945 stand as testament to de Roebeck's words.



Left, Australian Army Medical Corps personnel and Royal Navy sailors transfer a stretcher bearing a wounded Australian soldier from a long boat to a hospital ship. The long boat evacuated a number of wounded Australian soldiers from Gallipoli in 1915.

Right, Able Seaman Driver Percy William Smith, of the RAN Bridging Train, sits outside his dugout at Suvla Bay.

Photos courtesy Australian War Memorial

KEEPING THINGS MOVING

The 1st Royal Australian Navy Bridging Train played a key logistics role in the Gallipoli campaign, **John Perryman** and **Commander Greg Swinden** explain.

Conception

THE 1st Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train (1st RANBT) was formed in Melbourne on February 28, 1915, and was intended to be a horse-drawn engineering unit attached to the Royal Naval Division, then serving as infantry on the Western Front.

The term 'train' was a direct reference to the horse-drawn wagons that would, in theory, form and move 'in train' to carry the unit's heavy lumber, building materials and engineering equipment to the front.

The unit was manned by members of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve for whom there were no available billets in seagoing RAN ships.

Many of the sailors serving in the 1st RANBT were rated 'drivers' and, again, this refers to wagon drivers as opposed to motor vehicle drivers. Other seamen were rated as 'artificers' or 'sappers', the latter being a military term traditionally used to describe army engineers.

Appointed in command of the 1st RANBT was Lieutenant Commander Leighton Seymour Bracegirdle. Bracegirdle was ideally suited to command the unit, having seen active service with the NSW Naval Brigade during the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900, as well as serving as a military officer in the South African Irregular Horse during the Boer War in 1901. He had also recently returned from German New Guinea where he had served as a staff officer in the joint Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (ANMEF) responsible for the capture of the German colonies in the Pacific in September 1914.

Three hundred naval reservists, including 50 men who had recently served in New Guinea, were selected for the 1st RANBT. They began their training in horsemanship, engineering and pontoon bridging at the Domain in Melbourne. By late May 1915, a decision was made to send the unit to Britain to complete its

training and then to join the Royal Naval Division on the Western Front. The plan, however, never eventuated.

Deployment

ON JUNE 4, 1915, the 1st RANBT sailed from Melbourne in the troopship *Port MacQuarie* bound for active service.

While crossing the Indian Ocean, new orders were received diverting the ship to Bombay where their horses were disembarked because of an outbreak of illness.

The 1st RANBT was then sent to Egypt, arriving at Port Said on July 17, where its men were instructed to stand-by for new orders. A few days later the unit embarked in the troopship *Itria* with instructions to proceed to Mudros, on the Greek island of Lemnos.

On arrival, Bracegirdle learned that he and his men were to provide engineering support in connection with the British landings at Suvla Bay to the north of Anzac Cove on the Gallipoli Peninsula. During that time they were to be under British command and control. From Mudros the 1st RANBT transferred to the island of Imbros, which was used as a staging area for the landings at Suvla Bay.

Service at Gallipoli

EARLY on the morning of August 7, 1915, the 1st RANBT landed under fire at Suvla Bay.

Its first task was to construct a pontoon pier to enable supplies and reinforcements to be brought quickly ashore.

The campaign ashore at Suvla was ill-conceived and poorly led with the advance soon becoming bogged down and dissolving into trench warfare, similar to that experienced at Anzac Cove and Cape Helles.

The 1st RANBT set up its camp at what became known as Kangaroo Beach. It was responsible for a wide variety of tasks,

including building and maintaining wharves and piers, unloading stores from lighters, controlling the supply of fresh water to frontline troops, stock-piling engineering equipment, building a light railway for stores movements and carrying out repairs in an open-air workshop.

Engineering materials were scarce on the Gallipoli Peninsula and, faced with a lack of suitable bolts and iron dowels essential for pier construction, the men turned to a wrecked sand dredge to acquire the necessary material. Artificers removed guard rails and rungs cut from steel ladders to fashion their own fasteners using a portable forge.

These activities took place under frequent enemy artillery fire and occasional air raids which, during their five months at Suvla Bay, killed two and wounded more than 30. Two more men succumbed to disease and many others became sick or were injured in the course of their duties. Despite the regular arrival of reinforcements from Australia, the unit was always under strength due to illness or casualties.

In December 1915 the decision to abandon the Gallipoli Peninsula was made and Allied troops were soon being evacuated from the beaches under the cover of darkness. The operation required the wharves to be in constant use and the men of the 1st RANBT were kept busy repairing damage caused by enemy artillery, the elements, normal use and accidents.

The bulk of the men of the 1st RANBT were evacuated from Suvla Bay on the nights of December 16-17, 1915, but a small group of 50, under the command of Sub Lieutenant Charles William Hicks, remained behind at Lala Baba Beach, in the southern part of Suvla Bay, to maintain the wharf from which the British rearguard would leave.

These men were kept busy maintaining the wharf, often damaged by shell fire, and were not evacuated until 4.30am on the morning of December 20, 1915. The sailors of the 1st RANBT became the last Australians to leave the Gallipoli Peninsula. The last AIF troops left Anzac Cove at 4am the same day.

1ST RANBT UNIFORM

OWING to the nature of their work ashore, the men of the 1st RANBT were dressed in the khaki uniform worn by soldiers of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF).

Special badges were adopted to distinguish them as a naval unit, which included oxidised brass anchors that were worn on the hats, caps, sleeves and collars of ratings' tunics. Chief petty officers retained the normal naval pattern cap badge worn at that time. Varying patterns of AIF-styled colour patches, depicting a red anchor on a navy blue background, were also sewn to the shoulders of tunics and army badges of rank (chevrons) were sometimes used on sleeves to denote rank if naval equivalents were not available:

- Three chevrons – chief petty officers
- Two chevrons – petty officers
- One chevron – leading seamen

The adoption of these distinguishing marks was approved by the Naval Secretary on May 28, 1915. Officers attached to the 1st RANBT continued to wear naval pattern badges on their caps coupled with naval pattern shoulder boards, worn on khaki, military-style tunics.



Members of the 1st Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train. Photo courtesy Sea Power Centre

VOICES FROM THE FRONT

As battles raged throughout the Dardanelles, many Australians kept diaries as a way of dealing with fear, grief and boredom. What they didn't realise in 1915 was that they were giving future generations of Australians a generous gift – a first-hand account of the war that defines our national spirit.

In the distance one can just discern the Dardanelles opening up – the thunder of the guns is much clearer – the weather this morning is beautiful ... I can now see fire from the guns. I wonder which of the men round me has been chosen by Death. I do not feel the least fear, only a sincere hope that I may not fail at the critical moment.



– Signaller Ellis Silas,
16th Battalion, AIF,
April 25, 1915

As the order to run amok in the Narrows precluded all possibility of making the passage unseen, I decided to hold on the surface as far as possible ... at about 4.30am ... a gun opened fire at about one and a half miles' range ... I immediately dived and ... proceeded through the minefield.



– Lieutenant Commander Henry Stoker,
Commanding Officer AE2,
April 25, 1915

Shrapnel shells began to explode in large numbers lower down the gully over the hundreds of troops sheltering there in reserve and casualties were fairly numerous. We expected to receive orders any minute to proceed to some part of the line where our services were required, but hours passed and none came, we began to get anxious, particularly over the inactivity of the situation, there was little shelter and every minute large howitzer shells were exploding in our vicinity showering masses of earth over us as they crashed and exploded in the ground at times only a few yards away, one actually crashed among a dozen or more of us, the explosion tossing us in all directions ...



Private Herbert Vincent Reynolds,
1st Australian Field Ambulance,
August 6, 1915

[The dead] were lying everywhere, on top of the parapet ... in dugouts and communication trenches and saps, and it was impossible to avoid treading on them.

– Private William Bendrey,
2nd Battalion, AIF

In the Lone Pine the moving of the dead goes steadily on. All hope of getting them out for burial is given up and they are being dragged into saps and recesses, which will be filled up. The bottom of the trench is fairly clear, you have not to stand on any as you walk along and the bottom of the trench is not springy, nor do gurgling sounds come from under your feet as you walk on something soft. The men are feeling worn out but are sticking [to] it like Britons. The stench you get used to after a bit unless a body is moved. In all this the men eat, drink and try to sleep. Smoking is their salvation and a drop of rum works wonders ... Had a funeral at 6pm. One is obsessed with dead men and burials and I am beginning to dream of them. I suppose it is because I am so tired.

– Chaplain Walter Ernest Dexter,
AIF, August 10, 1915

I write on board the hospital ship with a bullet through the bone of my right foot and another through my right shoulder, the latter only an inconvenience and the former a clean hole which ought to heal in about six weeks. Truly we have been through the valley of the shadow of death as our regiment has been cut to pieces and all our officers killed or wounded except two, out of 18 officers present 12 were killed and four wounded.



– Captain Leslie Hore,
8th Light Horse Regiment, AIF

Soldiers of the 1st Battalion await orders from the southern edge below Plugge's Plateau. Photos and diary extracts courtesy Australian War Memorial

FROM THE DEPTHS

In February 1915, the Australian submarine *AE2* joined a Royal Navy squadron based on the island of Tenedos in the Aegean Sea. From there her crew of 35 operated in support of the unfolding Dardanelles campaign.

BEFORE April 25, 1915, *AE2*'s part in operations was minimal, but that changed when Vice Admiral John de Robeck, the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet, approved plans presented to him by the submarine's Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Henry Stoker, to attempt to force a passage through the 60km-long, heavily fortified Dardanelles Strait and enter the Sea of Marmara. If this could be achieved, enemy shipping transiting between the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles could be prevented from reinforcing and re-supplying Turkish troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

All previous attempts by Allied submarines to pass through the strait had failed due to an effective sea denial operation mounted by the enemy. Minefields, fixed and mobile gun batteries, searchlight surveillance and patrolling Turkish warships, coupled with natural navigational hazards, had made the Dardanelles seemingly impenetrable. The Commander-in-Chief remarked that if Stoker and his crew were successful there would be "no calculating the result it will cause, and it may well be that you will have done more to finish the war than any other act accomplished".

On the morning of April 24, 1915, the attempt began. However, the mission was soon abandoned when one of the submarine's forward hydroplanes failed, necessitating *AE2* returning to Tenedos to conduct repairs. With repairs complete, and with a heightened sense of tension among her crew, *AE2* set off to try again the following day.

April 25, 1915

Lieutenant Commander Stoker takes up the story:

"Having proceeded from the anchorage off Tenedos, I lay at the entrance off the Dardanelles until moonset and at about 2.30am on April 25, entered the straits at 8 knots. Weather calm and clear. As the order to run amok in the Narrows precluded all possibility of passing through unseen, I decided to travel on the surface as far as possible."

The Allied landings at Gallipoli were scheduled to begin before dawn.

Throughout *AE2*'s passage, searchlights continually swept the strait but she continued unmolested until 4.30am, when gun batteries opened fire from the northern shore. Stoker immediately dived, beginning an underwater passage through the minefields. Mooring wires tethering the mines continually scraped along *AE2*'s sides for the next half hour. Twice Stoker surfaced in the minefield to make navigational observations and at 6am *AE2* was within 3.5km of the Narrows at Chanak, submerged at periscope depth with the sea flat and calm. Forts on both sides of the Narrows then sighted her and soon opened heavy fire. Meanwhile, Stoker, watching through his periscope, observed a number of ships and quickly determined to attack what he thought to be a small cruiser of the Peik e Shetrek type.

"At a range of 3-400 yards I fired the bow torpedo, at the same moment ordering 70ft in order to avoid a T.B.D. [torpedo boat destroyer], which was attempting to ram on the port side. As the vessel descended the T.B.D. passed overhead close, and the torpedo was heard to hit. As the cruiser, dead ahead, might be expected to sink almost immediately, I altered course a point to starboard to avoid becoming entangled with her. At the time I believed the vessel to be in the centre of the strait. About four minutes later I altered back to the original course, and ordered 20ft. As the vessel was rising she hit bottom and slid up on the bank to a

depth of 10ft, at which depth a considerable portion of the conning tower was above water. Through the periscope I saw that the position was immediately under Fort Anatoli Medjidieh."

The fort opened fire and for some minutes shells fell on all sides until efforts to refloat her succeeded. *AE2* then slid back into the safety of deep water. The relief on board the submarine was palpable but short-lived, for *AE2* then grounded on the Gallipoli shore, again exposing herself to the enemy.

"Through the periscope I judged the position to be immediately under Serina Burnu, and further observed two T.B.D.s, a gunboat, and several small craft standing close off in [the] strait firing heavily and a cluster of small boats which I judged to be picking up survivors of the cruiser. In this position we remained for five minutes."

"As my vessel was lying with inclination down by the bows I went full speed ahead. Shortly afterwards she began to move down the bank, gave a slight bump, gathered way and then bumped very heavily. She, however, continued to descend and at 80ft I dived off the bank. The last bump was calculated to considerably injure the vessel, and probably impaired the fighting efficiency, but as I considered my chief duty was to prove the passage through the strait to be possible, I decided to continue on course."

"In connection with these two groundings, I have to report that the behaviour of the crew was exemplary. In these two highly dangerous situations it was only their cool and intelligent performance of their duties which enabled the vessel to be refloated."

Shortly afterwards, *AE2* again rose to periscope depth where Stoker established his position as approaching Nagara Point. On all sides he was surrounded by pursuit craft and each time he showed *AE2*'s periscope the pursuing destroyers turned to ram. Consequently, in an attempt to shake off the enemy, Stoker botomed the submarine on the Asiatic shore to await developments.

Throughout April 25, *AE2* lay in 80ft of water while enemy ships continually searched overhead. Those of her crew who could be spared were ordered to rest but most found sleep impossible. On one occasion the *AE2*'s casing was struck by a heavy object being trailed along the bottom by one of the vessels above but fortunately it did not snag or critically damage the submarine.

About 9pm, Stoker blew ballast tanks and surfaced, having been submerged for more than 16 hours. All signs of shipping had vanished and the opportunity was taken to recharge the submarine's batteries and to send a signal to the Commander-in-Chief notifying him of the successful passage through the Narrows and past Nagara Point.

By then, the air inside the submarine was foul and her crew swarmed on deck "eager to breathe the cool night air". About 11pm, cloud cover shaded the moon, providing *AE2* with an additional layer of concealment, and in the early hours of the morning it began to rain, reducing visibility further.

April 26, 1915

By 3am the weather began to clear as Stoker and his crew continued their passage on the surface toward the Sea of Marmara before diving before dawn. As soon as light permitted, Stoker observed through his periscope, "two ships approaching, obviously men-of-war, one in front of the other". Steering a parallel and opposite course to the enemy he approached before firing his port torpedo.

Only after making the attack did Stoker realise he had fired at the smaller leading ship, a cruiser, which successfully evaded his torpedo. Finding it impossible to bring another torpedo tube to

bear on the second ship, which he judged to be a battleship of the Barbarossa class, a further attempt was abandoned.

"I continued on course through [the] strait, examined the Gallipoli anchorage, found no ship worthy of attack and so proceeded in the Sea of Marmara, which was entered about 9am."

At 9.30am *AE2* sighted four ships but since only six of her eight torpedoes remained, Stoker decided not to fire unless he was certain his target was a troop transport.

"With this intention I dived close to the foremost ship – a tramp of about 2000 tons. Passing about 200 yards ahead of her I could see no sign of troops or ammunition; but as I passed under her stern she ran up colours and opened rifle fire at [the] periscope. I then dived over to the next ship and attacked at 400 yards with starboard beam torpedo. The torpedo failed to hit. I was unable to get within range of the other two ships."

The remainder of that day was spent on the surface recharging batteries and fixing defects.

Shortly after dark, *AE2* was attacked by a small Turkish vessel while again attempting to establish wireless communications with the fleet. The attacks continued whenever the submarine attempted to surface during the night of April 26-27.

April 27-30, 1915

At dawn on April 27, while still dived, Stoker sighted a ship escorted by two torpedo boat destroyers. Evading the escort, he manoeuvred into a firing position at 275m but this time the torpedo refused to leave the tube, possibly due to a faulty engine. In response, one of the destroyers turned to ram, forcing a hurried dive. Nothing else was sighted that day and, in order to give the crew some rest, the night of April 27 was spent on the bottom in Artaki Bay.

In the early hours of the morning of April 28, in dead calm weather, *AE2* attacked another small ship escorted by two small destroyers. Again the torpedo missed its intended target and retaliatory manoeuvres by the Turkish warships precluded a second attempt.


At dawn on April 29, Stoker shaped course towards Gallipoli observing a gunboat patrolling the head of the strait off Eski Farnar Point.

"Dived under gunboat down strait, and returned up strait showing periscope to give the impression that another submarine had come through. T.B.D.s and T.B.s [torpedo boats] came out in pursuit, and having led them all up towards Sea of Marmara, I dived back and examined Gallipoli anchorage but found nothing to attack."

AE2 then returned to the Sea of Marmara where Stoker later fired on a Turkish gunboat, narrowly missing her. Later that afternoon, he rendezvoused with HMS *E14*, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Edward Boyle, the second Allied submarine to successfully pass through the Dardanelles. The two submarines met at 5pm off Kara Burnu Point and, following a brief conference between the two captains, a subsequent rendezvous was arranged for 10am the following day. On the night of April 29-30, *AE2* lay on the bottom, north of Marmara Island.

Arriving at the rendezvous at 10am on April 30, Stoker sighted a torpedo boat approaching at high speed.

"Dived to avoid torpedo boat; whilst diving sighted smoke in Artaki Bay, so steered south to investigate. About 10.30am the boat's nose suddenly rose and broke surface about one mile from T.B. Blew water forward but could not get boat to dive. T.B. firing, got very close, and ship from Artaki bay, a gunboat also firing; flooded a forward tank and boat suddenly took big



Lieutenant Commander Geoffrey Haggard (left) and Lieutenant Commander Henry Stoker in 1919. Photo courtesy Sea Power Centre



inclination down by bows and dived rapidly. AE2 was only fitted with 100ft depth gauges. This depth was quickly reached and passed. Went full speed astern and commenced to blow main ballast. After some interval boat came back to 100ft depth, so reflooded and went ahead, but boat broke surface stern first."

"Within a few seconds the engine room was hit, and holed in three places. Owing to the great inclination down by the bow, it was impossible to see the T.B. through the periscope and I considered that any attempt to ram would be useless. I therefore blew main ballast and ordered all hands on deck. Assisted by Lieutenant Haggard, I then opened the tanks to flood and went on deck. The boat sank in a few minutes in about 55 fathoms, in approximate position four degrees north of Kara Burnu Point at 10.45am. All hands were picked up by the torpedo boat and no lives lost."

Thus *AE2*'s game of hide and seek was brought to an end, and her CO and crew were on their way to spend the next three-and-a-half years in a Turkish prison camp. Four ratings died in captivity and the remainder were released following the Armistice in 1918.

In 1998, Mr Selçuk Kolay, director of the Rahmi Koç Museum in Istanbul, discovered *AE2*'s wreck lying at a depth of 72m. Discussions concerning the long-term preservation of *AE2* continue between Australian and Turkish authorities.

– Information courtesy Sea Power Centre



Above, the crew of *AE2* on the submarine's deck, likely off the Gallipoli coast.

Left, *AE2* escorts the second contingent of soldiers to Alexandria. Photos courtesy Australian War Memorial

GALLANTRY IN ACTION

FOLLOWING their release from Turkish prison camps at the end of the war, the following members of *AE2*'s crew were recognised for their gallantry in action in the Gallipoli campaign:

Lieutenant Commander H. Stoker
Distinguished Service Order,
Mentioned in Dispatches

Lieutenant G. Haggard
Distinguished Service Cross

Lieutenant J. Cary
Mentioned in Dispatches

Chief Petty Officer H. Abbot
Distinguished Service Medal

Chief Petty Officer C. Vaughan
Mentioned in Dispatches

Chief Engine Room Artificer 1st Class H. Broomhead
Distinguished Service Medal

Chief Engine Room Artificer 2nd Class S. Bell
Mentioned in Dispatches

Stoker PO H. Brown
Distinguished Service Medal

Stoker P. Kinder
Mentioned in Dispatches

HISTORIC SIGNAL

John Perryman

LATE in the evening of April 25, 1915, a council of war was taking place in the British flagship HMS *Queen Elizabeth* as it steamed off the coast of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The British Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Ian Hamilton, was in conference with his senior staff discussing the progress of the Allied troops ashore.

Moments earlier Hamilton had received a message from Lieutenant General William Birdwood, who had reluctantly recommended an immediate evacuation. This was based on advice from Birdwood's two divisional commanders ashore who feared the exhausted troops could not withstand a Turkish counter-attack the next day. The situation appeared grave and the matter of re-embarkation required immediate deliberation.

Far away from this scene on the other side of Gallipoli, a solitary RAN submarine, *AE2*, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Henry Stoker, an experienced Irish-born Royal Navy submariner, had completed a gruelling underwater passage through the hitherto impenetrable Dardanelles Strait. In doing so, *AE2*'s crew had made history and their submarine became the first Allied vessel to penetrate the heavily mined and fortified stretch of water. In the process, Stoker had carried out a torpedo attack against a Turkish warship before making his way into the inland Sea of Marmara.

Stoker's orders were to infiltrate the inland sea and generally "run amok" to prevent enemy shipping from re-supplying the Turkish Army defending the Gallipoli Peninsula. But, before he could proceed, it was of vital importance that he advised the Commander-in-Chief of his success so other submarines might follow and join him. At 8.45pm, *AE2* surfaced and Stoker gave the order to make the signal.

This duty fell to 22-year-old Victorian, Telegraphist William Wolsley Falconer. His use of the Morse key was about to have a profound impact on the discussions taking place in *Queen Elizabeth*, and forever cement *AE2*'s place in the history of the Dardanelles campaign. The submarine's wireless had a range of only 30-100 miles, so a guard ship, the destroyer HMS *Jed*, had been stationed in the Gulf of Saros with a receiving window set between 40 and 50 minutes past the hour.

As Falconer tapped away at his wireless set from within, the submarine's damp external wire aerial was seen by Stoker to be throwing off purple and blue sparks as the Morse message was transmitted. The young telegraphist tried in vain to get an acknowledgment that his signal had been received but, after several attempts, it was assumed that the wireless equipment had been damaged and therefore the fleet would remain unaware of their achievement.

Unbeknownst to Stoker and Falconer, the message had in fact been received in *Jed*, pieced together and relayed to *Queen Elizabeth* at the crucial moment when Hamilton was deliberating with his staff whether to order a general evacuation. The council of war was dramatically interrupted when one of Hamilton's aides handed a copy of Stoker's signal to Commodore Roger Keyes who announced, "Tell them [the troops on the shore] this. It is an omen. An Australian submarine has done the finest feat in submarine history and is going to torpedo all the ships bringing reinforcements, supplies and ammunition into Gallipoli!"

This was a tremendous fillip and in his response to Birdwood, Hamilton wrote, "Your news is indeed serious. But there is nothing for it but to dig yourselves right in and stick it out. It would take at least two days to re-embark you, as Admiral Thursty will explain to you. Meanwhile, the Australian submarine has got up through the narrows and has torpedoed a gunboat ... Hunter-Weston, despite his heavy losses, will be advancing tomorrow which should divert pressure from you. Make a personal appeal to your men ... to make a supreme effort to hold their ground. P.S. You have got through the difficult business, now you have only to dig, dig, dig until you are safe".

If nothing else, *AE2*'s signal certainly provided morale-boosting information at a time when it was most needed. Many believe that it directly influenced the decision made by Hamilton that night, resulting in the Allied forces remaining on the peninsula.

It would be a further eight months before a general evacuation was ordered and during that time the story of Anzac was carved into Australian history. Unfortunately for the 32-strong crew of *AE2*, it would be more than three years before any of them learned of the impact their incredible feat had on the Dardanelles campaign.

THE AIR WAR

Although the Royal Australian Air Force didn't officially form until 1921, many Australians attached to British flying units were involved in the air war over the Gallipoli Peninsula, **Air Commodore Mark Lax** explains.

The British side

WHILE much is known about the naval bombardment and troop landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula, it may come as a surprise to many to learn that a considerable air effort was also mounted by both sides for the entire duration of the campaign.

Because Britain's Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, was reluctant to send Royal Flying Corps (RFC) aircraft to support operations at Gallipoli, the role of supporting the Allies fell initially to a single squadron of the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), later expanded to two RNAS wings totalling more than 50 aircraft. At the time, the RFC was under considerable pressure supporting ground operations on the Western Front.

Before the landings, the Royal Navy had provided their seaplane tender, HMS *Ark Royal* (considered the first aircraft carrier), and a kite balloon ship, HMS *Manica*, for air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ark Royal could carry six seaplanes but was limited in her ability to launch and recover them. In 1915, there were no carrier decks, so aircraft had to be winched over the side and recovered the same way. *Manica* carried a tethered observation balloon that could be raised and lowered when required. The balloon would carry an Army observer who would call enemy positions down from his gondola.

By early May, the French Escadrille MF 98T had also arrived with eight Maurice Farman aircraft to support their operations on Cape Helles.

The first role of the seaplanes was reconnaissance of the Allied and Turkish lines. Spotting for naval gunfire soon followed. Fitted with a rudimentary radio, the aircraft observer would call the fall of shot and issue orders for correction.

In March, elements of No. 3 Sqn RNAS, under the command of the charismatic Commander Charles Rumney Samson, of the Royal Navy, arrived at Tenedos, a small island just off the

Gallipoli coast. With him came 18 aircraft and a number of pilots. Their arrival was timely. While there were sufficient pilots at first, including Charles Gilmour from Somerset, Tasmania, there were few trained observers for directing naval gunfire and mapping enemy positions. This shortage was made good by selecting volunteer midshipmen from the Navy and artillerymen from the Army, including Australian Shiril Goodwin.

Within days, the seaplanes were occupied in photographing the peninsula and more than 700 photographic plates were exposed, thus giving the Army command a better idea of the terrain and location of Turkish troops.

After the landings, and as operations progressed, the airmen began dropping small bombs onto the enemy positions. Given the arrival of Turkish aircraft, the British decided to bomb the Turkish airfield at Çanakkale in an effort to gain air superiority. They succeeded in destroying at least one aircraft and a hangar, but the Turks still had aircraft and crews.

On May 18, the Turkish Army reinforced the peninsula behind the Anzac lines in preparation for a major counter-attack. Their aim was to push the Anzacs back into the Mediterranean and thus force either a surrender or at least withdrawal.

Their plans were thwarted when the reinforcements were spotted by one of the RNAS aircraft, which forewarned the Allies, depriving the Turks of the element of surprise and forcing a rout. Casualties were later estimated at more than 10,000.

In mid-June, another seaplane carrier, HMS *Ben-my-Chree* (meaning "lady of my heart") arrived, bringing additional reinforcements. She was better equipped for seaplane operations and, after the Gallipoli disaster, went on to support the Anzacs in Egypt before she was sunk in January 1917.

A review of Gallipoli air operations by Colonel Frederick Sykes, who later became Chief of the Air Staff of the Royal Air Force, found the organisation, logistic support and coordination of the air effort wanting. He was then appointed in overall command of all British aviation units at Gallipoli, a surprising move given the majority of the airmen serving there were naval officers.

While he made some improvements, not enough could be done before the planned Allied August Offensive.

By now, the RNAS had formed No. 3 Wing out of the original squadron and its reinforcements. Around 40 British and French land-based aircraft were assembled on the island of Imbros in preparation and, when the landings finally came, were airborne in support of the assault. But the Allied efforts stalled and, despite airborne reports of little Turkish resistance at Sari Bair and Suvla Bay, the attack faltered.

During the final phase of the campaign from September 1915 to early January 1916, British units were reinforced and resupply was greatly improved.

No. 2 Wing RNAS had arrived in *Ben-my-Chree* and were tasked to interdict the Turkish communications and supply lines. The war-weary troops, reduced by casualties and illness, however, could not take advantage of the renewed air effort.

Consequent operations were conducted against the German submarine threat and on August 12 the first successful torpedo attack from the air was made against a 5000-tonne Turkish supply ship. As a result, the Turks had to rely on the western overland route or across the Narrows from the east.

In the closing months of the campaign, bombing operations escalated with regular attacks made by both British and French airmen. It was only by the time of the withdrawal that the Allies finally gained control of the air with the arrival of nippy little Nieuport scouts to support the B.E.2c reconnaissance aircraft fitted with a Lewis gun. Ironically, air superiority was soon lost when the Germans brought Fokker Eindekers into the theatre – albeit too little, too late.


Perhaps the reason little is known about the efforts of the airmen on both sides of the Gallipoli campaign is that to the troops on the ground, aircraft were generally of little consideration or operated outside their field of regard. Nevertheless, the airmen played their part in the campaign which, despite their efforts, was to be regarded in history as a dismal failure.



A Turkish Albatros C.III bomber with German and Turkish airmen.



The HMS *Ark Royal*, the world's first aircraft carrier. She was used for the Gallipoli campaign. Photos courtesy Office of Air Force History



Above, a Sopwith Schneider is lowered into Lemnos Harbour from HMS *Ark Royal* in 1915.

Left, a Short Seaplane type 184 is lowered over the side in preparation for a flight.

Photos courtesy Australian War Memorial and Office of Air Force History

AUSTRALIAN PRESENCE

ARTHUR KEITH JOPP

ARTHUR Keith Jopp was one of the few members of the Australian Imperial Force to fly over Gallipoli. He served throughout the Gallipoli campaign, first as a captain in the 7th Field Battery and then as a seconded observer with the Royal Naval Air Service. While in Egypt, he volunteered for service with No. 3 Squadron. He often sent fall-of-shot corrections for naval gunfire and on one occasion succeeded in causing the sinking of a Turkish resupply vessel. He also participated in bombing missions and on several occasions engaged enemy aircraft, but with no success. After Gallipoli, he returned to the artillery and later served in France. He retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1919 with the Distinguished Service Order.

SIR CHARLES KINGSFORD-SMITH

CHARLES Kingsford-Smith served as a sapper on the peninsula from September 1915, and later as a dispatch rider. In October 1916, he transferred to the Royal Flying Corps. The following year, after graduating as a pilot, he joined No. 23 Squadron where he was shot down and wounded. He was awarded the Military Cross after bringing down four enemy machines. From April 1918 until the end of the war, he served as a flying instructor in England with the Royal Air Force. In June 1927, he and fellow airman Charles Ulm circumnavigated Australia in 10 days, but it was for piloting the Southern Cross on the first crossing of the Pacific in 1928 that he and Ulm are remembered.

SIR GEORGE JONES

TROOPER George Jones arrived at Gallipoli in September 1915 and saw action on Rhododendron Ridge until the withdrawal. He transferred to the Australian Flying Corps as a mechanic and served in Egypt before graduating as a pilot. In 1918, he flew Sopwith Camels on the Western Front with No. 4 Squadron. He became an ace, scoring seven confirmed kills, and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. After the war, he joined the Royal Australian Air Force to later become an Air Marshal and the Chief of Air Staff, a position he held for 10 years.

SIR HUDSON FYSH

TASMANIAN-born Hudson Fysh joined the 1st Light Horse Brigade and served as a trooper at Gallipoli, in Egypt and in Palestine. In 1917, he joined the Australian Flying Corps as an observer and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. At the end of the war, he completed a pilots' course in Egypt before returning to Australia. Fysh, with fellow ex-Australian Flying Corps pilot Paul McGinness and mechanic Arthur Baird, formed Australia's international airline, Qantas.

CECIL BRINSMEAD

FLIGHT Sub-Lieutenant Cecil Brinsmead has the unfortunate distinction of being the last Australian to be killed during the Gallipoli campaign. Brinsmead was a pilot with No. 3 Wing, Royal Naval Air Service. While flying a Farman over Cape Helles with a British Army observer on January 11, 1916, he was attacked by a pair of German Fokker Eindeker fighters and shot down.

The Turkish side

NOT well known is the fact that the Turks had such a well-established air service that by 1915 they were quite capable of disruptive operations against the British, French and Anzacs at Gallipoli.

The arrival of the Royal Navy had forewarned the Turks in late 1914 that an Allied invasion to capture the Dardanelles was imminent.

From early 1915, battleships shelled the Turkish forts in preparation for land operations and this caused the Turks to send two aircraft to Çanakkale for reconnaissance and bombing purposes.

As the Allied fleet assembled in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish aerial reconnaissance over the islands of Tenedos reported the size of the fleet, which gave the Turks an expectation of attack.

By March, the Turks could muster two relatively modern Albatros and a single Rumpler aircraft, which they used to full advantage. Throughout the campaign, both German and Turkish airmen flew against the Allies. Even before the landings, the Turks dropped a number of bombs on British ships, but without inflicting much damage.

On the morning of the landings, a Turkish aircraft was ordered to do a reconnaissance of the peninsula, which gave the German and Turkish High Command the full picture of the Allied assault. From this time on, regular reconnaissance flights were conducted over the front.

In the first phase of operations between January and June 1915, occasional reconnaissance and spotting flights were conducted, with little aerial combat. By June, aircraft and personnel reinforcements meant that the Turks could now mount more regular and aggressive aerial operations, with bombing becoming more regular.

Turkish air opposition forced the British and French to mount continual raids on the Turkish airfield, but it was not until early July that the Turkish aircraft were destroyed

on the ground when their hangar was hit by an Allied air raid. By coincidence, a Turkish Gotha seaplane unit arrived the next day and almost immediately began reconnaissance and bombing operations against the island bases of Lemnos, Tenedos and Imbros. Throughout the campaign, the Allies never discovered the whereabouts of the seaplane base at Naga on the eastern side of the Sea of Marmara. Soon night raids were conducted, with the seaplanes taking off and landing by moonlight.

By mid-July, regular Allied bombing forced the Turks to move their airfield to Galata on the western side of the Dardanelles and, with that, four new Rumpler bombers arrived at the front. An added bonus was the proximity to the Turkish High Command, so reconnaissance reports could be provided quickly instead of the five hours taken beforehand. In an early attempt at information operations, the Turks built decoy aircraft and lit fires at night at their old airfield, which successfully fooled the Allies who continued to bomb the decoys until the end of the campaign.

In the second phase of air operations from July to October, Turkish flights were more meticulously planned and it was during this phase that Allied aircraft fitted with machine guns took to attacking the Rumplers, but the speed of the German-built aircraft meant they could easily escape. By now bombing raids were a regular event and on July 31 a raid by the Rumplers and Gotha against Tenedos airfield littered it with 500 darts and five bombs.

A further Allied landing on August 7 produced some of the fiercest fighting on the peninsula and this caused a renewed effort by the Turkish and German airmen. On August 20, a large British air raid attacked the new airfield, destroying the hangar and other installations, but missed the aircraft which the Turks had dispersed and camouflaged. With fighting on the ground heading to stalemate, flying was reduced until September when, with new aircraft, flying operations picked up.

A fierce storm on the night of October 6-7 caused considerable damage on both sides of the front. Of the six Turkish aircraft at Galata airfield, only one was left undamaged, but it crashed the next day. It was not until the end of the month that replacement aircraft arrived. In the closing days of October, the German

squadron commander took more than 200 aerial photographs of the lines from only 400ft and, despite encountering a hail of ground fire, escaped unharmed with no damage to his aircraft.

When Bulgaria entered the war on the Turkish side in October, the British airmen turned their attacks to the railway joining the two countries to prevent vital resupply from Germany, giving the Turks on the peninsula some relief. On November 30, the Turks shot down a French Farman in flames when the aircraft's petrol tank was hit and exploded. The event is marked as the first Turkish aerial success of the war. Having been achieved by an all-Turkish crew of Captain Ali Riza and Lieutenant Orhan, made it all the more special in the annals of Turkish aviation history.

The opening of the Bulgaria-Turkey railway meant that the Allies could not continue at Gallipoli as German supplies were now guaranteed. The evacuation of Anzac and Suvla Bay began, with the last soldiers leaving by December 20. Cape Helles was clear by January 9, 1916. During this last phase, Allied air operations were stepped up to hide evidence of the withdrawal and any Turkish aircraft that appeared to be ready for take-off were immediately attacked. After the evacuation was discovered, the Turks continued to harass the naval forces and camps on the islands off shore.

It was in these last stages that the Turks concentrated their efforts against the Cape Helles withdrawal. Much aerial combat ensued and this forced the German command to send three Fokker E.1 fighters to support the Turkish airmen.

The arrival of the Fokkers changed the balance of power, as with them came four experienced German airmen from the Western Front. Aerial encounters continued even after the Allied evacuation and, by the end of March, the Germans had shot down 10 of their opposition for no loss. If these German airmen had been there earlier, the whole Allied air campaign could have faltered.

Although the evacuation was successful and the Turks celebrated their victory, regular flying operations continued for several more weeks until both sides turned their attention to other fronts.

A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

As Australians pause to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings on April 25, so too will the people of Turkey.

Alisha Welch spoke with the Turkish Ambassador to Australia, Reha Keskintepe, to gain an understanding of the Turkish perspective of the Gallipoli campaign and what it means for our two nations today.

GALLIPOLI. One hundred years ago it meant little to Australians half a world away and a population largely swept up in the patriotism and romance surrounding the outbreak of war. Fast forward 100 years and the word 'Gallipoli' is synonymous with mateship, sacrifice and courage.

But what does it mean to the people whose land Allied forces invaded?

Turkish Ambassador to Australia Reha Keskintepe – who was appointed to the position on July 26, 2012 – believes Gallipoli is equally important to the national identities of Australia and Turkey.

“The victory against foreign invasion at Gallipoli was a defining moment in the history of the Turkish people,” Mr Keskintepe says.

“It was a final surge in the defence of the motherland as the centuries-old Ottoman Empire was crumbling. The struggle laid the grounds for the Turkish War of Independence and the foundation of the Turkish Republic eight years later under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, himself a commander at Gallipoli.

“The Çanakkale land battles were among the bloodiest struggles of the war and they not only changed the course of World War I, but the flow of history thereafter.”

Mr Keskintepe says the battles heralded the emergence of Turkey's national consciousness and occupy an important place in Turkish nationhood, as well as in the history of many nations which fought there.

“From the Turkish perspective, the Çanakkale battles have unique significance,” he says.

“At a time when the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating, the Turkish nation displayed its utmost perseverance and determination to protect and defend the homeland against all odds.

“Once referred to as the ‘sick man of Europe’, the Turks proved they were not as weak as they were considered. After

decades of war and great tragedies experienced in the final days of an ailing empire, Turks proved there was no limit to the sacrifice they would endure to defend their homeland.

“We lost more than 80,000 young people at Gallipoli. This was only the recorded figure. Together with unregistered losses and wounded, the total casualty figure exceeded 250,000.”

The Ottoman Empire's casualties in World War I were enormous.

“Nearly a quarter of the population perished – about five million out of a population of 21 million,” the Ambassador says. “Among the five million, we know that only 770,000 were military casualties.”

Mr Keskintepe says the Turkish people deem the war in the Dardanelles as a turning point in the nation's history.

“I believe that what had happened in Gallipoli gave Turkish people the morale, strength and courage to fight the war of independence following World War I, which was the first of its kind in the 20th century.

“Just as Australians remember and celebrate the qualities of endurance, courage, mateship and the good humour of the Anzacs, Turks remember with pride the courage, resolve and sacrifices of their mehmetçik [soldiers].”

Perhaps it is these similarities in how Australia and Turkey honour the soldiers who fought and died at Gallipoli that shed some light into the friendly relationship between our two nations since the end of the war. Indeed, it is well documented that the soldiers themselves respected their enemy during the campaign, exchanging gifts, photographs and cigarettes.

The Ambassador agrees.

“During the campaign, mehmets and diggers developed a sense of deep respect towards each other, despite the intense fighting they endured,” Mr Keskintepe says.

“Ever since, Turkey and Australia have fostered a close and friendly relationship.

“Again with the same spirit of mutual friendship and respect, in 1985 the Turkish government officially named that part of Gallipoli Peninsula after the Anzacs and all the official maps were changed accordingly.”

He says this is unique in Turkish history.

“Many armies have attempted to invade different parts of Turkey over the centuries,” he says. “But never was a piece of Turkish land named after an invading army. Only the Anzacs were honoured by Turkey in this way.

“It is also unique in world history that our nations were able to build a genuine friendship and mutual respect on the basis of a costly battle in their past. Our friendship should serve as a message to the international community for tolerance, mutual understanding and peace among nations.”

Mr Keskintepe says the events of 1915 are deeply engraved in the national consciousness of Turks and this explains the enduring attachment of both nations to the story of the campaign and the strong mutual interest in the other's experience and memory.

“The fact that Turks, Australians and New Zealanders stand without any grievance shoulder to shoulder at the dawn ceremony at Gallipoli on April 25 every year, is testimony to this.

“As we approach the centenary of the Anzac landings at Gallipoli, I would like to convey the sincere feelings of friendship and respect of the Turkish people and the Turkish Armed Forces to Australians and ADF personnel.

“I am confident the strong relationship between our defence forces will continue to grow in the future.

“The men and women of the ADF have been extensively involved in UN and multinational peacekeeping operations around the world and they have successfully demonstrated their best qualities and capabilities in dangerous circumstances.

“I wish to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation for the good work and contributions of ADF personnel to make the world we live in a better place.”



Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, main and inset, commanded Turkish troops at Gallipoli and later became the first president of the Republic of Turkey.

FATHER OF THE TURKS

IN 1934, Turkey's leader and a former commander at Gallipoli, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, expressed the following to Australian and New Zealand mothers:

“Those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives ... you are now lying in the soil of a friendly country. Therefore rest in peace. There is no difference between the Johnnies and the Mehmets where they lie side by side here in this country of ours ... You the mothers who sent their sons from far away countries, wipe away your tears. Your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. Having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well.”

Turkish Ambassador to Australia Reha Keskintepe believes these words are inspirational and “reflect the wisdom and the statesmanship of a victorious commander who had been in the middle of the horrendous battle himself and who witnessed first-hand the sorrow and suffering of thousands of soldiers”.

“Those words capture so much of what this is all about,” Mr Keskintepe says.

“That, in the aftermath of such a bitter war, the best values of humanity, namely compassion, respect, fraternity and peace, can arise. By defining ‘opposing’ forces as ‘those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives’, Atatürk, as a soldier and a commander, expressed his sentiments of appreciation for the Anzacs with sincerity and statesmanship.

“He paid tribute to the bravery of Anzac soldiers who fought in a battle against people whom they never met, in a land which was unfamiliar and far away from their home-lands.”

Mr Keskintepe says it is significant that Atatürk made this statement in 1934, “when the wounds of human losses were still fresh and close ones of those who had fallen in the battle ground were still alive”.



Six Turkish prisoners captured by Australians at Anzac Cove. Photos courtesy Australian War Memorial

BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

IN 1967 Turkey established diplomatic ties with Australia and opened its Embassy in Canberra in the same year. A year later the Australian Embassy was opened in Ankara, Turkey.

Mr Keskintepe says the second major diplomatic encounter between Turks and Australians took place soon after with the signing of the Labour Agreement, allowing Turks to “settle in this wonderful country”.

“Today, 150,000 Australians of Turkish origin constitute a valuable social and cultural bridge between the two countries,” he says.

“Turkey and Australia share common values and ideals and enjoy close cooperation in addressing international issues of common concern.

“They have a productive and steadily developing relationship, with substantial dialogue across a wide range of issues, frequent high-level visits and expanding bilateral trade and investment.”

During the campaign, mehmets and diggers developed a sense of deep respect towards each other, despite the intense fighting they endured. Ever since, Turkey and Australia have fostered a close and friendly relationship.

– **Reha Keskintepe,**
Turkish Ambassador to Australia



FOR VALOUR

There are so many VC stories from Gallipoli. Albert Jacka's VC embodies the spirit of the junior NCO leadership role, but I admire all the Gallipoli VCs because these were guys who'd never been in combat before and it shows their commitment, character and loyalty to one another.

– Corporal Mark Donaldson, VC

Marking 100 years since Gallipoli is all about reflecting on and celebrating the spirit of Anzac, knowing, as I do, that it is alive and well in the ADF and across the Australian community.

– Corporal Dan Keighran, VC

Of the 64 Victoria Crosses bestowed to Australians in the Great War, nine were awarded for gallantry on the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915; seven during the Battle of Lone Pine alone.

Corporal Alexander Burton, VC and Corporal William Dunstan, VC

Citation (abridged): In the early morning of August 9, 1915, during the Battle of Lone Pine, the enemy made a determined counter-attack on a newly captured trench held by Lieutenant Tubb, Corporal Burton, Corporal Dunstan and a few men. They advanced up a trench and blew in a sandbag barricade, but Lieutenant Tubb and the two corporals repulsed the enemy and rebuilt the barricade. Strong enemy bombing parties twice again succeeded in blowing in the barricade, but on each occasion the enemy were repulsed and the barricade rebuilt, although Lieutenant Tubb was wounded and Corporal Burton killed while most gallantly building up the parapet under a hail of bombs.

Major Frederick Tubb, VC

Citation (abridged): In the early morning of August 9, 1915, the enemy made a determined counter-attack on the centre of a newly captured trench held by then-Lieutenant Tubb. They advanced up a trench and blew in a sandbag barricade, leaving only a foot of it standing. Lieutenant Tubb led his men back, repulsed the enemy and rebuilt the barricade. Strong enemy bombing parties succeeded in twice again blowing in the barricade, but on each occasion Lieutenant Tubb, although wounded in head and arm, held his ground with the greatest coolness, rebuilt it and succeeded in maintaining his position under very heavy bomb fire.

Lieutenant John Hamilton, VC

Citation (abridged): During a heavy bomb attack by the enemy on the newly captured position at Lone Pine on August 9, 1915, then-Private Hamilton, with utter disregard for personal safety, exposed himself under heavy fire on the paradoss in order to

secure a better firing position against the enemy's bomb-throwers. His coolness and daring example had an immediate effect. The defence was encouraged and the enemy driven off with heavy loss.

Captain Albert Jacka, VC

Citation (abridged): For most conspicuous bravery on the night of May 19-20, 1915, at Courtney's Post, Gallipoli Peninsula. Then-Lance Corporal Jacka, while holding a portion of our trench with four men, was heavily attacked. When all except himself were killed or wounded, the trench was rushed and occupied by seven Turks. Lance Corporal Jacka at once, most gallantly, attacked them single-handedly and killed the whole party, five by rifle fire and two with the bayonet.

Lieutenant Leonard Keysor, VC

Citation (abridged): On August 7, 1915, Lieutenant Keysor was in a trench which was being heavily bombed by the enemy. At great personal risk he picked up two live bombs and threw them back at the enemy. Though wounded he continued throwing bombs, thereby saving a most important portion of the trench. The next day, Lieutenant Keysor bombed the enemy out of a position from which temporary mastery of his own trench had been obtained. Although again wounded, he declined evacuation, [instead] volunteering to throw bombs for another company, which had lost all its bomb-throwers. He continued to bomb the enemy until the situation was relieved.

Captain Alfred Shout, VC

Citation (abridged): On the morning of August 9, 1915, with a small party, Captain Shout charged down trenches strongly occupied by the enemy, and personally threw four bombs among

them, killing eight and routing the remainder. In the afternoon he captured a further length of trench and continued personally to bomb the enemy at close range, under very heavy fire, until he was severely wounded, losing his right hand and left eye. He succumbed to his injuries.

Lieutenant Colonel William Symons, VC

Citation (abridged): On the night of August 9, 1915, then-Lieutenant Symons commanded the right flank of some newly captured trenches and repelled several counter-attacks with great coolness. The next morning the enemy attacked an isolated trench, killing or severely wounding six officers in quick succession. Lieutenant Symons led a charge which retook the trench, shooting two enemy with his revolver. The trench was under fire from three sides, so Lieutenant Symons withdrew to nearby head cover and, under heavy fire, built up a barricade. His coolness and determination finally compelled the enemy to discontinue their attacks.

Captain Hugo Throssell, VC

Citation (abridged): For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty during operations on the Kaiakij Aghala (Hill 60) on the Gallipoli Peninsula on August 29-30, 1915. Although severely wounded in several places during a counter-attack, he refused to leave his post or to obtain medical assistance [until] all danger [had] passed. He then had his wounds dressed and returned to the firing line until ordered out of action by the medical officer. By his personal courage and example he kept up the spirits of his party, and was largely instrumental in saving the situation at a critical period.

– Information and photos courtesy Australian War Memorial

SHARP SHOOTER

The legend of Gallipoli sniper Trooper Billy Sing lives on with the ADF's current sniper generation, **Sergeant Dave Morley** reports.

AKANGAROO shooter and member of the Proserpine Rifle Club in Central Queensland put his considerable skills with a rifle to good use at Gallipoli, officially killing more than 150 Turks.

William Edward "Billy" Sing was born on March 2, 1886, at Clermont in central Queensland. His father, John Sing, was a Chinese settler from Shanghai, China, and his mother, Mary Ann, was an English nurse from Staffordshire, England.

Billy Sing enlisted into the 5th Light Horse at Proserpine, Queensland, on October 24, 1914, two months after the outbreak of World War I.

In mid-June 1915, the 5th Light Horse moved to Chatham's Post on the seaward side of Bolton's Ridge on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Trooper Sing then began his deadly occupation in earnest.

Major Stephen Midgely, of the 5th Light Horse, once asked Trooper Sing how he felt about killing men in "cold blood". Trooper Sing replied, "Shooting the illegitimates has not caused me to lose any sleep".

Trooper Sing and his spotter, Trooper Tom Sheehan, had a close shave on August 25 when a Turkish sniper exploited their sudden and careless movement and fired at them.

The Turk's shot passed through Trooper Sheehan's telescope, end to end, wounding him in both hands, before entering his mouth and coming out his left cheek.

The almost-spent bullet travelled on, completing its run by hitting Trooper Sing in the right shoulder.

Trooper Sing was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal and Mentioned in Despatches for his service at Gallipoli.

After the evacuation in December 1915, Trooper Sing transferred to the 31st Battalion and served on the Western Front, where he was awarded the Belgian Croix de Guerre in February 1918.

During his war service he was gassed, wounded in action on three occasions, with gunshot wounds to the shoulder, leg and back, and hospitalised for parotitis, mumps, rheumatism and influenza.

He returned to Australia and was discharged in November 1918.

On May 19, 1943, Billy Sing's aorta ruptured and he died alone, aged 57, in his room at a boarding house in West End, Brisbane, with just five shillings (50 cents) in his pocket.

There was no sign of his World War I medals or awards. He was buried at Lutwyche Cemetery in Brisbane.

The legend of Billy Sing lives on with the Army's present gen-

eration of snipers. Former sniper instructor at the Army's School of Infantry Sniper Wing, Sergeant Adam McNamee, who served on six deployments to East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, said Trooper Sing was an iconic figure among the sniper fraternity.

"With 150 confirmed kills, and up to 300 unconfirmed kills, he is the highest scoring sniper in Australian history," he said.

"Aussie snipers to this very day see Billy as the grandfather of modern sniping and we still hold him up as an example of a person to emulate in combat environments.

"We use Billy's perseverance, observation, cold but calculated killing ability and, above all, the effect he brought to the battlefield, in our teachings.


"We use him as an example of what we call a force multiplier, where one man and a spotter create an effect out of all proportion to their size."

Sergeant McNamee said the snipers in his cell on operations started a tradition, beginning in the early days of East Timor, of erecting a sign, "Billy Sing's Bar and Grill", wherever they were based.

"Every Anzac Day, when we can, we have a private service at his grave, a place where we can commemorate not just the man, but all the sniper boys we have fought alongside," he said.



Trooper Billy Sing became a legend at Gallipoli for his sharp-shooting sniper skills. Photos courtesy Australian War Memorial



Corporal Alexander Burton, VC



Corporal William Dunstan, VC



Major Frederick Tubb, VC



Lieutenant John Hamilton, VC



Captain Albert Jacka, VC



Lieutenant Leonard Keysor, VC



Captain Alfred Shout, VC



Lieutenant Colonel William Symons, VC



Captain Hugo Throssell, VC

ANZAC NURSES

Australian nurses answered the call during World War I, with thousands rushing to enlist in the Australian Army Nursing Service, **Laura Carew** reports.

MORE than 3000 Australian civilian nurses volunteered for active service during World War I. Twenty-five died during their service and eight received the Military Medal for bravery. However, theirs is a story rarely told.

From the first Allied landings at Gallipoli on April 25, 1915, Australian nurses cared for hundreds of casualties in hospital and transport ships anchored offshore. Working in often gruelling conditions, with limited medical supplies and a desperate lack of fresh water, they tended to a seemingly endless stream of wounded and sick soldiers for the duration of the campaign.

Working in the hospital ship *Sicilia*, Sister Lydia King wrote in her diary:

"I shall never forget the awful feeling of hopelessness on night duty. It was dreadful. I had two wards downstairs, each over 100 patients and then I had small wards upstairs – altogether about 250 patients to look after, and one orderly and one Indian sweeper. Shall not describe their wounds, they were too awful. One loses sight of all the honour and the glory in the work we are doing."

The Australian Army Nursing Service (AANS) was formed in 1903 as part of the Australian Army Medical Corps. During World War I, 2000 of its members served overseas alongside Australian nurses from other organisations, such as the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service and the newly formed Red Cross.

The nurses served in Britain, France, Belgium, the Mediterranean and the Middle East working in hospitals, on

hospital ships and trains, or in casualty clearing stations closer to the front.

Many AANS nurses served as part of the 3rd Australian General Hospital, which was set up in response to a request from the British War Office.

The unit set sail for England from Sydney's Circular Quay aboard the transport ship *Mooltan* on May 15, 1915; just one month after its inception. Originally slated for service in Etaples, France, the unit was instead diverted to Mudros, on the island of Lemnos, in the Aegean Sea near Gallipoli.

After two weeks of travel across the seas from London, the nurses arrived in Lemnos on August 2 to discover that not only was there no hospital and no accommodation ashore, but the ship carrying all of their supplies, *Ascot*, had not yet arrived. Consequently, they were transferred to the transport ship *Simla*, which was anchored in the harbour.

While six nurses left for 10 days of temporary duty aboard the hospital ship *Fermosa*, the remainder spent the next five days working hard to get everything in order on shore.

On the evening of August 8, accompanied by a piper, 40 nurses were marched ashore and into their new tents. More nurses arrived on Lemnos the following day, just in time for the opening of the hospital.

By the morning of August 9, more than 200 wounded and sick had been admitted. Four days later, that number had reached 800. Between August 9 and August 22, as a result of what would later be known as the August Offensive, thousands of wounded were brought to all the hospitals on the island of Lemnos.

During this time, the 3rd Australian General Hospital

treated large numbers of wounded soldiers from all Allied armies. During the August Offensive, 32 soldiers died at the 3rd Australian General Hospital, seven of whom were Australian. On August 20, much to the relief of the nurses, the *Ascot* finally arrived at Lemnos and delivered much-needed supplies.

The conditions on Lemnos were far from idyllic. By late October 1915, Australian nurses were still living in tents, while their Canadian and English counterparts lived comfortably in huts. The weather on the island was terrible – it was bitterly cold, with strong winds and rain. The nurses' diets contained no fruit or vegetables, and they received butter and eggs only once a month.

The nurses of the 3rd Australian General Hospital continued their admirable duties on Lemnos Island until January 1916, when the unit and its hospital were transferred to Abbassia, Egypt. Not long after arriving in Egypt, the 1040-bed hospital closed. Since its inception on Lemnos Island in August 1915, the 3rd Australian General Hospital had treated 7400 patients, of whom only 143 had died.

The 3rd Australian General Hospital went from Egypt to Brighton, England, and then to Abbeville in France, where it was based until 1919.

There were a number of reasons a nurse may have volunteered for service in World War I: the chance to travel; the chance to be involved in the war; the opportunity to be closer to a serving loved one; to help troops in need; or in search of independence. Whatever the reason, by the time the war came to an end, it had become clear that nurses were essential to military medical service.

INSPIRING LEADER

MATRON Grace Wilson arrived on Lemnos in early August, just days after learning of the death of her brother, Graeme, who was shot by a Turkish sniper at Gallipoli three months earlier.

As casualties began to arrive, she was appalled by the lack of equipment and conditions "too awful for words".

Leading by example, Wilson set about bringing order out of chaos at the tent hospital. Despite their own discomfort and the huge workload, the nurses persevered and within a month were treating more than 900 patients.

Sister Frances Selwyn-Smith wrote of Wilson's leadership: "At times we could not have carried on without her. She was not only a capable Matron, but what is more, a woman of understanding."

With the outbreak of World War II, Wilson was appointed Matron-in-Chief of the 2nd Australian Imperial Force. She served in the Middle East until illness forced her to return to Australia in 1941.

Holding a parasol and notebook, Matron Grace Wilson "does a round" on Lemnos. Photo courtesy Australian War Memorial



The greater community probably does not know quite how close they [Australian nurses during World War I] were to the frontline, in what was in those days most definitely not considered a suitable place for a lady. They paved the way for nurses, and women in general, to be considered equal to men and professionals in their own right. The core duties of military nurses have not changed, and I do not think that my reason for becoming a nurse – to care for the sick and wounded – would have been any different to those who signed up to go to Lemnos, Egypt or board a hospital ship.

– **Flight Lieutenant Alex Hardingham,**
Nursing Officer, Joint Health Command



The absolute selflessness that saw them volunteer for service and the dedication to duty for the duration of the war is a testament to the strength and character of those amazing women. It is these women who formed the basis of my 'vision' of nursing in that light.

– **Lieutenant Colonel Natalie Leaver,**
Nursing Officer, 7th Brigade Headquarters



Medical and nursing sisters of the 3rd Australian General Hospital in the tent lines with patients on Lemnos Island.

The Australian Army Nursing Service (AANS) has a long history of supporting ADF operations, pre-dating Australian Federation in 1901. When the call was made for nurses to support the Anzacs in World War I, the AANS stepped up and worked with limited supplies in a challenging environment. Although nursing has changed over the past 100 years, the legacy of the nurses who served in World War I continues.

– **Flight Lieutenant Bernard Clarke,**
Nursing Officer, 1 Expeditionary Health Squadron Townsville



Through their actions, the Anzac nurses proved they were equal to anyone and enhanced society's attitude to women and nursing. Our forefathers must have thought so, too. If you stand at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Australian War Memorial and look at the stained glassed panels, you will see the nurse, captioned 'DEVOTION'. That one word sums up the Anzac nurses. I am humbled when I think of their sacrifices and proud to be a part of their legacy.

– **Lieutenant Alexander "Jim" Evans,**
Nursing Officer, Larrakeyah Health Centre



Nurses of the 3rd Australian General Hospital form up to follow a piper into their camp under the leadership of their matron, Miss Grace Wilson, and second in command of the hospital, Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Dick at Mudros West, Lemnos. Photo courtesy Australian War Memorial

Their dedication to duty and unwavering compassion and care in the grimmest of times and in the harshest of environments cannot fail to inspire. Their persistent and exceptional delivery of health care is still the basic tenet of what we do today.

– **Lieutenant Paula Evans,**
Nursing Officer, Joint Health Command



GALLIPOLI

100th Anniversary Tribute



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
The 21st Battalion marches up Monash Gully after arriving at Gallipoli. Photo courtesy Australian War Memorial

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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
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ON THE COVER

A group of unidentified Australian and New Zealand soldiers in a frontline trench on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Photo courtesy Australian War Memorial

CENTENARY SIGNIFICANCE

**Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin
CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE**

AS THE Anzacs waited, cloaked in darkness, preparing to go ashore, none could have foreseen how the Gallipoli landing would influence generations of Australians for centuries to come.

They knew they were in for a fight, knew they would take casualties and, in Charles Bean's words, they knew "a lot of Australians – boys who began their life on the Murray or in a backyard in Wagga or Bourke or Surry Hills – will be left lying in Turkey", but nobody knew the scale of the carnage or the horror they would face.

The Anzacs found themselves in a desperate predicament, fighting a determined enemy who held a significant tactical advantage. They made up the deficit with determination, tenacity and courage. Countless stories of bravery, self sacrifice and compassion in the face of appalling adversity emerged from the battlefield. These stories have become the Anzac legend – embedded in our ethos and entrenched in Australian culture.

One hundred years on, I ask myself what I would have done in their shoes. Would I have had the courage to

continue, even in the face of certain death? Could I have endured the hardships or shown the kind of unconditional loyalty of true mateship on the battlefield as the Anzacs did?

The Anzac spirit comes to the fore whenever Australians face tragedy or adversity, wherever they are around the world. It is something we talk about but cannot clearly define – values that evoke our sense of nationalism and the uniquely Australian character others admire. It is evident in the way we conduct ourselves, especially in times of trouble. No task too big, no job too hard. We enjoy a laugh, but we get the job done – and we do it well.

As serving ADF personnel, we are the heirs of the Anzac legacy. We must embrace it with great respect and dignity and aspire to uphold its ideals. It represents the virtues we seek in ourselves as Australian military personnel and we promise to honour the memory of those men and women who suffered to secure our freedom.

Every name on the Australian Roll of Honour represents someone with family and friends who mourned for them and a story about a life cut short by war.

We should never forget that sacrifice, nor should we forget that the Anzac legend was built on the actions of individual men and women in service to our nation.

Lest we forget.



**Vice Admiral Tim Barrett
CHIEF OF NAVY**

AS WE approach Anzac Day it is once again time to reflect on the sacrifices made by those in uniform and their families. We should think of what these sacrifices mean, not just in terms of forging a national identity, but also to the lives of each individual.

This Anzac Day is special. It forms part of an ongoing commemoration of Australian involvement in World War I a century ago.

I have been fortunate to attend commemorative services for the departure of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force from Sydney and for their actions at Bitia Paka near Rabaul, for HMAS Sydney's destruction of the German raider Emden, for the departure of the first Anzac Convoy from Albany, and soon for the actions of HMA Submarine AE2 penetrating the Dardanelles.

Each of these commemorations highlight the involvement of Navy in the distinct events that led up to the landings at Gallipoli.

To be frank, I was surprised and a little disappointed at how little most people knew of these contributions. I ask you all to learn a little more of Navy's history during the Centenary of Anzac and pause to remember all the sacrifices made by Australian service personnel.



**Lieutenant General David Morrison
CHIEF OF ARMY**

THROUGHOUT much of the last century and every day of this one, our Army has been on operations around the world. For an Army with 114 years of service, this is a formidable record.

Our service and sacrifice is transcribed on memorial plinths around the country and in the 102,000 names listed on the Australian War Memorial's Roll of Honour.

Anzac Day is about remembering those who served before us, and the coming together of the Australian community. At home and abroad, Australians will pause to reflect on the humanity and courage of those killed in action, or who died as a result of their service to our nation.

All who wear the Rising Sun badge have an obligation to live up to the title of 'Australian Soldier'. On this, the 100th anniversary of Anzac, we who are privileged to wear the uniform of the Australian Army, living our values of courage, initiative, respect and teamwork, are honoured to be the recipients of the Anzac legacy.

This is my final Anzac Day as the Chief of Army. I am tremendously proud of our history and of our Army today. Most importantly, I am immensely proud of the men and women of the Australian Army.



**Air Marshal Geoff Brown
CHIEF OF AIR FORCE**

THIS year marks the 100th anniversary of the landing at Gallipoli by the Anzacs.

Those who landed at Gallipoli faced a determined adversary. In the grim months that followed, values of teamwork, mateship, selflessness and courage were forged.

The Air Force values of today reflect the values forged by the Anzacs.

Allied air power was deployed during the Gallipoli campaign. Aircraft, including airships, were employed throughout that hard-fought encounter.

On this Anzac Day, the 100th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, let us remember that we serve with the values forged by the Anzacs and by those early airmen.

As Air Force members, we are proud inheritors of their values and tradition.

Through dedicated service, Air Force members honour the legacy of all the veterans of the Gallipoli campaign.

I am immensely proud of the achievements of Air Force members, past and present, who so readily serve in the spirit and values forged by Australia's first Anzacs.



LEST WE FORGET

INFAMOUS OPERATION

Despite the bravery of our Anzac soldiers, poor Allied command decisions are the reason Australia's most famous amphibious landing resulted in failure, **Dr Andrew Richardson** explains.

OPENING a new theatre in Turkey was the scheme adopted by the British War Council in the search for a way around the stalemate of the Western Front.

Poorly conceived, it envisaged knocking Turkey out of the war and securing the support of the fractured Balkan nations for the Allies.

Enthusiastically encouraged by Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, the strategy involved an Allied fleet of old pre-dreadnought battleships destroying the forts along the Dardanelles and steaming through the Sea of Marmara, upon which it was expected the Ottoman government would capitulate.

When the naval campaign to force the straits failed in March, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was tasked with undertaking amphibious landings.

The British 29th Division would make the main attack at Cape Helles, with the object of capturing the Kilit Bahr Plateau and destroying the Turkish gun batteries on the peninsula overlooking the straits.

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps would make a subsidiary landing north of Gaba Tepe to seize the Sari Bair Range, and then advance inland to cut the Ottomans' north-south road communications, thereby isolating the Kilit Bahr Plateau. Once this was done, the Anglo-French fleet was expected to steam up the Dardanelles to Constantinople.

At 4.30am on April 25, 1915, 4000 troops of the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade (9th, 10th, 11th and 12th battalions) began Australia's most famous amphibious landing.

Facing them were 81 Ottoman riflemen of the 8th Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment. The outnumbered Ottomans were quickly overwhelmed. Contrary to the myth, no Ottoman machine guns swept the beach as the Australians waded ashore, nor did they target the landing boats or the tows bringing them to the shallows.

Contemporary photos taken an hour after the landing show an almost casual scene on a beach free of corpses. The initial landing had been a success.

The Anzac force landed slightly north of their intended point on Brighton Beach, although the 'misplaced' landing was by no means a catastrophe, placing the Anzacs closer to their initial objective than originally planned.

Scaling the difficult terrain and punching through the light Turkish screen, the Australians quickly took Plugge's Plateau, the high ground along the cove, before pushing inland to the 400 Plateau where they halted and dug in along Second Ridge, 1500m short of their covering objective along Third Ridge.

As the 2nd Brigade came ashore, the 3rd Brigade commander, Colonel Ewen Sinclair-MacLagan, diverted them from their original objective of seizing the Sari Bair heights to the right flank of his brigade without any indication the Turks were counter-attacking.

Despite the protestations of its commander, Colonel James McCay, the 2nd Brigade moved to the 3rd Brigade's right flank, instead of pushing up the main range to secure the heights. This action, together with Sinclair-MacLagan's decision to halt on Second Ridge, turned the Anzac operation from an offensive action into a purely defensive one and handed the initiative to the Turks.

Major General William Bridges, the commander of the 1st Division, landed after 7am and despite believing "there was nothing preventing the advance from continuing" he failed to take effective command and press the advance forward to capture Sari Bair.

Instead, he returned to Anzac Cove where he remained at the end of his telephone receiving calls for reinforcements and giving up all thought of exploiting the initial success of the landing.

Most of the 1st Australian Division now occupied the lower reaches of Second Ridge and the important high ground on the main range was weakly defended by about three companies from different battalions. Few reinforcements reached them.

Meanwhile, the Ottomans, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Sefik (27th Regiment) and Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal (19th Division), were initially restrained from sending reinforcements to the Anzac area. Sefik eventually moved

at 6am and, by 8am, having travelled 8km, his two reserve battalions (1/27th and 3/27th) and his machine-gun company had occupied the 3rd Brigade's objective – Third Ridge – unopposed.

At 8am Kemal took the three battalions of the 57th Regiment and its machine-gun company forward, arriving on the battlefield around 10am. There, although greatly outnumbered, he set about organising a two-pronged counter-attack.

At 12.30pm it was delivered with boldness and aggression: the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, attacked about seven battalions of Australians at the southern end of Second Ridge, while the 57th stormed down the main range, eventually driving a mixed force of Australian and New Zealanders off the key feature Baby 700 and confining the Anzacs to a narrow beachhead of no tactical value.

The Ottomans had acted boldly, gaining a clear idea of the unfolding situation before committing their forces. By contrast, Sinclair-MacLagan acted hastily and committed the Anzacs to a defensive battle well short of its objective on ground of no tactical value, while Bridges exercised little control over the battle.

The Ottoman forces were fighting a war of national survival, but the successful containment of the invading Anzac troops to the ridges immediately adjacent to Anzac Cove came at a desperate and heavy cost.

While the Commonwealth War Graves Commission lists 613 Australian and 147 New Zealanders killed on April 25, Ottoman estimates of losses across the 27th and 57th Regiments for April 25 number nearly 2000 men.

Ottoman aggressiveness and resolute command won the day, and the territory seized on April 25 by the Anzacs was to more or less remain the extent of the ground captured during the entire eight-month campaign.

Strategic errors in launching an attack on the peninsula with insufficient manpower and resources was exacerbated by British and Australian command failures. Brave but inexperienced Australian and New Zealand troops were hamstrung by the command breakdown above them, with the added problem of facing a determined and skilful Ottoman enemy. These elements cast the die for not only the first day, but the entire campaign.

GALLIPOLI PENINSULA

KEY LOCATIONS




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|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Hill 971 | 10. Mortar Ridge | 19. Owen's Gully | 28. MacLogan's Ridge | 37. McCay's Hill |
| 2. Chunuk Bair | 11. Pope's Hill | 20. Johnston's Jolly | 29. Plugge's Plateau | 38. Bolton's Ridge |
| 3. Battleship Hill | 12. Russell's Top | 21. McLaurin's Hill | 30. Razor Edge | 39. North Beach |
| 4. Baby 700 | 13. The Sphinx | 22. Steele's Post | 31. Mule Gully | 40. Holly Ridge |
| 5. Third Ridge | 14. Walker's Ridge | 23. Sazli Biet Dere | 32. Hill 165 | 41. Sniper Ridge |
| 6. Ince Bair | 15. Brighton Beach | 24. Courtney's Post | 33. Ari Burnu | 42. Victoria Gully |
| 7. Scrubby Knoll | 16. Pine Ridge | 25. Quinn's Post | 34. Anzac Cove | |
| 8. Adana Spur | 17. Legge Valley | 26. Monash Valley | 35. Hell Spit | |
| 9. The Nek | 18. Lone Pine | 27. Shrapnel Gully | 36. Razor Back | |

– Courtesy Australian Army History Unit

Australian soldiers move towards Hell Spit after the initial landing.



Troops of the 11th Battalion and 1st Field Company Australian Engineers assemble on the forecave of HMS London, part of the fleet which carried the Australians from Lemnos Island to Gallipoli. HMS Bacchante is steaming ahead. Photo by Ellis Ashmead Bartlett



Main and inset, the 2nd Brigade lands at Anzac Cove an hour after the initial landings. Photos courtesy Australian War Memorial and Australian Army History Unit



1914

October 29: Turkish fleet, under Germany's Admiral Souchoin, bombards Russian ports on the Black Sea.

November 2: Russia declares war on Turkey. Britain and France do the same three days later.

November 25: First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill proposes naval attack to force a passage through the Dardanelles.

1915

January 13: Churchill convinces the War Council to "prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its object".

February 19: Allied Fleet under Vice Admiral Sackville Carden begins an attack on the Dardanelles' forts.

March 12: General Sir Ian Hamilton appointed to command Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

March 18: Vice Admiral John de Robeck launches final Allied naval attack on the Dardanelles. Three battleships – *Bouvet*,

Irresistible and *Ocean* – are sunk by mines and a further three ships are damaged.

March 22: Hamilton and de Robeck agree on the need for a combined land-sea operation.

March 24: Liman von Sanders appointed to command the Turkish Fifth Army at Gallipoli.

April 25: Allied landings at Helles, Anzac and Kum Kale. *AE2* passes through the Dardanelles.

April 28: First Battle of Krithia.

April 30: *AE2* sunk in the Sea of Marmara.

May 1: Turkish attack at Helles.

May 6-8: Second Battle of Krithia.

May 19-20: Mass Turkish attacks at Anzac lead to heavy Turkish losses.

May 24: Truce at Anzac to bury dead.

May 25: Sinking of battleship *Triumph* by German submarine.

June 4: Third Battle of Krithia.

July 12-13: Allied attacks at Helles.

August 4-6: Secret reinforcement to Anzac.

August 6-9: Diversionary attack at Lone Pine.

August 6-7: Diversionary attacks at Helles; main Anzac offensive toward Sari Bair range commences; two Allied divisions land at Suvla.

August 7: Attack at the Nek; Charge of 3rd Light Horse Brigade, Russell's Top.

August 8: New Zealand forces capture Chunuk Bair.

August 9: Allied units, including Gurkhas, briefly capture part of Hill Q.

August 9: British forces at Suvla fail to capture high ground due to earlier arrival of Turkish forces.

August 10: Turks re-take Chunuk Bair from British troops who relieved the New Zealanders.

August 12: British attack at Suvla; one of Hamilton's staff officers, Guy Dawnay, first puts forward idea of partial evacuation.

August 12-13: Turkish counter-attack at Helles.

August 15: British attack at Kiretch Tepe in Suvla area.

August 21: Large Allied attack at Suvla.

August 29: Partial Allied capture of Hill 60 in Suvla area.

October 16: Hamilton and his chief of staff, Major General Walter Braitwaite, replaced.

October 28: Hamilton's replacement, Sir Charles Monro, arrives at Gallipoli and three days later recommends evacuation.

December 8: Monro ordered to evacuate Suvla and Anzac.

December 12: Troops at Suvla and Anzac told of plan to evacuate.

December 19-20: Evacuation of Anzac and Suvla.

1916

January 7: Last Turkish attack at Helles.

January 8-9: Evacuation of Helles and end of campaign.

THE AUGUST OFFENSIVE

Despite being given five additional divisions to conduct an offensive midway through the Gallipoli campaign, the Allies' complex plan to dominate the peninsula failed, **Ian Finlayson** explains.

BY MAY 1915, trench lines of the Ottoman Army and the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) in the Dardanelles had solidified.

The British and French held Cape Helles, but not the dominant feature of Achi Baba to their north. The position of the Anzacs to the north-east of Cape Helles was more precarious, with the corps holding a narrow strip of coastline centred on Anzac Cove.

The initial landings had failed to achieve their objectives, so the next question was whether to continue with the campaign or evacuate the peninsula.

The British Cabinet considered the possibility of evacuation, but the strategic repercussions of a defeat were considered to be too high. It was against this background that the commander of the MEF, General Sir Ian Hamilton, was given five additional divisions to conduct an offensive in August.

Hamilton's plan for the August Offensive required the Anzacs to break out and secure the Sari Bair Range to their north-east. This would trap all Ottoman forces south of the Sari Bair Range and enable Hamilton to dominate the peninsula.

The main effort from the Anzacs would be supported by two secondary attacks. The first would be a 'limited demonstration' from the divisions in the Cape Helles area while the second would be a landing at Suvla Bay by two fresh divisions of the British IX Corps.

Lieutenant General William Birdwood, commander of the Anzacs, had been planning a breakout from Anzac Cove and in early July he produced his overall plan.

Birdwood's offensive would start with an attack by the 1st Brigade towards Lone Pine in the south-east. This was a feint, designed to draw enemy troops away from the Sari Bair Range. Concurrent with the landings at Suvla Bay, the main thrust on the Sari Bair Range would be undertaken by a composite force based on the Anzac Division.

The 4th Australian Brigade and the 29th Indian Brigade would advance along North Beach and then undertake a left flanking attack to seize the high points of the range (Hill 971 and Hill Q),

with elements of the British 40th Brigade clearing the foothills before the assault. At the same time the New Zealand Infantry Brigade would take Chunuk Bair, giving Birdwood the ability to link up with the current Anzac positions. The 3rd Australian Light Horse would then advance up the Nek to secure the last two prominent ridgeline features (Baby 700 and Battleship Hill), assisted by the New Zealand Brigade attacking down from Chunuk Bair.

Birdwood's plan was complex. To succeed it required a high degree of coordination between formations in difficult terrain, experienced leadership, excellent communications and the element of surprise.

The offensive began on the afternoon of August 6 with the 'demonstration' attack from Cape Helles and the 'feint' on Lone Pine.

The attack from Cape Helles was a disaster, gaining no ground at a cost of 3000 British soldiers killed over two days.

The Australian attack on Lone Pine began at 5.30pm with 800 men assaulting in three waves. Upon reaching the Ottoman lines they engaged in fierce hand-to-hand fighting and by 6pm secured a foothold and dug in. The Battle of Lone Pine continued for the next four days with 2000 Australians killed or wounded.

During the night of August 6-7, the British IX Corps landed at Suvla Bay and by the morning more than 20,000 men were ashore facing negligible opposition. However, due to indecisive leadership and inexperience, the landing stalled on the beach, wasting the opportunity presented.

The main Anzac effort to capture the Sari Bair Ridge commenced at 4.30am on August 7. Moving in the dark over tough, broken ground, the brigades soon lost their way and unit cohesion slowly disintegrated. Dawn found the exhausted troops dispersed and short of their objectives. Despite the fact that New Zealand Brigade had not secured Chunuk Bair, the Australian attack on Baby 700 and Battleship Hill proceeded as planned.

The assault across the Nek was poorly conceived, as the attackers were required to charge over open ground into strong Ottoman positions.

The attack was over in 15 minutes, with three waves of

Australian troops cut down in quick succession. Birdwood had placed the commander of the Anzac Division, Major General Sir Alexander Godley, in charge of the breakout. He attempted to run the battle from the confines of his forward command post, but poor maps and unreliable telephone communications meant he had to rely on runners to deliver orders and receive information.

At this critical juncture in the battle he was unable to establish control of his dispersed brigades. Unaware of the true state of affairs, Godley ordered a dawn attack by the three engaged brigades and his divisional reserve (the British 39th Brigade) for the morning of August 8.

The outcome of these attacks was predictable. The Ottomans, now aware of the objectives, had occupied and reinforced the high ground. In its attempt to capture Hill 971, the 4th Brigade was decimated and forced to withdraw to its start line after losing 600 men in a matter of minutes.

The 39th Brigade and 29th Indian Brigade attacks on Hill Q were subjected to withering enemy fire and stalled 100m from the summit.

Only the New Zealand Brigade had limited success. A small detachment seized the crest of Chunuk Bair, but enemy fire soon forced them to retreat to the reverse slope of the summit.

At dawn on August 9 Godley ordered a third series of attacks on Sari Bair. However, his brigades were exhausted and incapable of further offensive action. Only the recently arrived 39th Brigade enjoyed any success, managing to secure a temporary foothold on Hill Q, only to withdraw under heavy artillery fire.


The New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair were relieved and replaced by fresh British battalions during the night of August 9-10, but this force was driven off the ridge during an Ottoman counter-attack the following day.

The August Offensive ended in complete failure. Birdwood's ambitious plan for night marches up steep, unfamiliar gullies and ridges asked too much from troops who were exhausted even before the offensive began.

Once in front of their objectives, poor leadership meant the brigade attacks degenerated into a series of individual battles at which point Birdwood's complex plan failed.



A platoon of the 13th Battalion forms up on a steep path at Sphinx Gully on August 7, 1915, waiting for platoon commander Captain Joseph Edward Lee to address them. The men are in full battle order and it is probably before the advance on Sari Bair. Captain Lee is standing in front of a tent and A Company's platoon sergeant, Joseph Leddy, is at right in the foreground.



Captain Leslie Morshead (right), of the 2nd Battalion, and Private James Brown Bryant, of the 8th Battalion, stand in a trench at Lone Pine after the battle. Australian and Turkish dead are on the parapet. Photos courtesy Australian War Memorial



Above, three unidentified members of C Company, 14th Battalion, in Australia Valley after the unsuccessful offensive against Chunuk Bair and Hill 971 between August 8-10, 1915.

Left, a captured Turkish trench during the Battle of Lone Pine.

Photos courtesy Australian War Memorial and Australian Army History Unit

RESOURCEFUL EVACUATION

After eight months on the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Allies had failed to meet their objective of taking Constantinople. **Ian Finlayson** explains how the successful evacuations of the peninsula were in part the result of Australian ingenuity.

FOLLOWING the failure of the August Offensive, the commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF), General Sir Ian Hamilton, knew the best he could hope to achieve in the short term was to establish a defensive line strong enough to deter any future Turkish attack.

While Hamilton believed a decisive victory was still possible, he also knew that this would require additional divisions. Any extra divisions were unlikely, as the British Cabinet was losing confidence in the concept of an indirect approach against the Central Powers through Constantinople.

The Western Front was seen as the decisive theatre and one which had the priority call on resources. The result was a declining flow of reinforcements to the peninsula, leaving many units well below their authorised establishments. Despite this, Hamilton would not contemplate an evacuation, fearing significant casualties from such a difficult operation.

Facing an impasse, the British Cabinet acted and on October 14, 1915, replaced Hamilton with General Sir Charles Monro, an experienced commander from the Western Front.

By October 31 Monro had undertaken an inspection of his new command and provided an assessment of the Gallipoli situation to British Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener. With the exception of the Anzacs, Monro felt his troops were not capable of further sustained effort. Any successful offensive would require frontal attacks into entrenched enemy positions and, even if contemplated, there was no room within the existing beachheads to accommodate the men or artillery required to support future offensives.

Furthermore, the approaching winter gales would make any logistical build up across the beaches increasingly difficult. Intelligence reports also indicated the impending arrival of significant German artillery reinforcements, including heavy calibre howitzers. Once the Ottomans had these weapons in place they could systematically demolish the MEF trenches. Monro concluded that an evacuation was the only course of action open.

Reluctantly on November 22, Kitchener and the British

Cabinet endorsed Monro's recommendation. Monro was then elevated to the position of Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and the commander of the Anzacs, while Lieutenant General William Birdwood was confirmed as commander of the Dardanelles Army. Birdwood's new Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Brudenell White, started work on the evacuation plan.

White considered that a successful evacuation rested on three factors: the Ottomans must be deceived until the very last moment; the final stage of the evacuation must not take longer than two nights; and Anzac Cove must be evacuated simultaneously with Suvla Bay.

White's most difficult issue to be decided was how to conduct the evacuation. Whether to conduct a fighting withdrawal to the beaches, or to hold the front line with a small rearguard while the main body of troops were silently evacuated? Despite the clear risk of any rear guard being overrun, White was a firmer advocate for the latter course of action. He reasoned that because the enemy was so close, a fighting withdrawal would inevitably lead to the Ottoman forces firing directly onto the evacuation beaches. This would have disastrous consequences for any embarking force.

Deceiving the Ottoman forces about the evacuation, while holding the line with a small rearguard, was the only viable option. If this could be achieved Birdwood and his staff felt there was a fair chance of getting most of the men and equipment off the peninsula without incurring unacceptable losses.

At the beginning of December the Anzac-Suvla garrison numbered 85,000 men, 5000 animals, 200 guns and significant stocks of food and ammunition.

At first only the corps commanders and their staff were told of the planned evacuation. The troops were told that numbers were being reduced in order to facilitate supply during the approaching winter months. However, the intended evacuation of such large numbers of men and material could not be concealed forever and, on December 12, divisional and brigade commanders were advised of the operation. Once they became aware of the evacuation, the troops soon entered into the spirit of the enterprise.

All the usual daily activities were maintained. Artillery programs were shot off, trench barbed wire continued to be renewed and men were detailed to loiter in the rear areas to give the impression of numbers.

By mid-December under a careful program of phased evacuations carried out by the Navy, the size of the garrison was down to 18,000 men with 28 artillery pieces.

On the night of December 19 only 5000 men remained ashore in Anzac-Suvla Bay, facing 60,000 Ottoman troops. At this stage any discovery of the evacuation would have been fatal for the remaining troops.

In order to give the impression that trenches were still manned, the Australians had invented a delayed action rifle. Mounted on the trench parapet, the rifle was fired by water dripping into a container on a long string attached to the trigger mechanism. By rigging up dozens of these devices and varying the rate at which water dripped into the can, the Australians were able to simulate sniper fire over a period of several hours. By 10pm, 1500 men remained in the frontline trenches and at 1.30am the final withdrawal began.

A mine under the Ottoman lines at the Nek was fired at 3.30am and the remaining supply dumps fired. By 4am there were no defenders left ashore at Anzac.

The success of the Anzac-Suvla evacuation gave encouragement for those tasked to evacuate the British and French forces at Helles. However, with the element of surprise now lost, this evacuation was going to be more difficult.

An Ottoman offensive on January 7, 1916, was repulsed with heavy losses and convinced the Ottomans that an evacuation at Helles was not being considered. In fact the evacuation begun that very night and, using techniques developed at Anzac and Suvla, all troops were evacuated by January 8. Like Anzac and Suvla, a substantial force was evacuated from Helles without sustaining a single casualty.

The evacuations were brilliantly conducted and their success was regarded as some consolation in an otherwise disastrous campaign.

COSTLY CAMPAIGN

DURING the eight-month Gallipoli campaign, 130,672 soldiers lost their lives, including:

- 8709 Australians
- 2701 New Zealanders
- 21,255 British
- 9878 French
- 1500 Indians
- 86,629 Turks



Guns are lined up, ready to be loaded onto ships in preparation for the Allied evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Williams Pier is in the middle, with the steamer Milo grounded at the end of the pier to act as a breakwater.



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A delayed action rifle, invented by the Australians to trick the Turks into believing the Allies were still at full strength during the evacuation. Photo courtesy Army History Unit



Above, Sergeant Mitchell with hands bandaged and Sergeant Pascall, both of the Australian Army Medical Corps, prepare for the evacuation of Gallipoli. Both men are carrying a white bag probably filled with biscuits and Sergeant Mitchell is wearing the hat of a New Zealander.

Left, tents and dugouts at Shrapnel Gully at Anzac Cove, under snow, just before the evacuation. Photos courtesy Australian War Memorial