

THE SOUTH'S REACTION TO THE TARIFFS
AND THE FORCE BILL, 1828-1833

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PREFACE

This paper was initiated as a study of the reactions of the various staple crop regions of the South to the tariffs of 1828 through 1833. At first it was assumed that economic factors determined the regional reactions toward the tariffs. For instance, the Piedmont cotton regions of South Carolina and Georgia were suffering from a depression so the people were naturally opposed to the possible added burden of tariff duties. In the sugar cane regions of Louisiana the planters, conversely, needed protection against the influx of sugar cane from the West Indies. Both of these positions were normal, exemplifying a natural economic reaction to the tariffs. However, the author soon discovered that a focus on economics was too limited since further studies showed that not all regions of the South reacted according to the dictates of their regional staple crop economy. It appeared that opposition to or support for the tariffs was based on numerous other factors, both personal and political in nature. In the coastal regions of South Carolina and Georgia many individuals retained their wealth during the depression years and had less need to oppose the tariffs, yet they were more adamant than the indigent upland areas in their opposition to protection and their support for nullification.

The introduction of personal and political factors raised many more interesting questions. For example, why should the mountain region of one state be more favorable to tariffs than the mountain area of a neighboring state? Why was Georgia, the state most closely resembling South Carolina geographically and economically, not ready to follow the Palmetto State's lead in effecting the remedy of nullification? Why were the newer states of the Southwest in agreement with President Jackson when he censured the South Carolina nullifiers rather than with their southern agricultural neighbor? Were personalities, not economic factors, the real causes for some of the abnormal reactions to the tariffs? Were regional jealousies within a state also major factors in causing the unusual reactions? Why did some localities use the political tool of nullification as a weapon against the federal government's power, while other areas vehemently denounced such action and, in turn, supported the Union? And finally, why did South Carolina react so violently to the question of protective tariffs when some of the other states were just as economically depressed?

These questions and others are expounded in this paper which has a threefold purpose. First, it is the desire of the author to present a narrative of the various reactions within each southern state to the tariffs of 1828, 1832, 1833, and the Force Bill. Second, the author hopes to analyze the varied economic, political, and social reasons for the reactions. Third, the author hopes to alleviate the

commonly held belief that the South as a whole opposed protective tariffs and supported nullification.

Thus the author proposes and tests these hypotheses: (1) the South did not exhibit a totally negative reaction to protective tariffs although it was an agricultural region; (2) the reactions to the tariffs were based mainly on the economic needs of the environmental unit--whether urban, Tidewater, Piedmont, mountain, or other; (3) non-economic interests cannot be discounted for they outweighed economic logic in a few situations; and (4) South Carolina, although the leading state in advocating nullification, was itself not totally unified on the tariff issue. It should be noted that the term "economic," though generally referring to the specific agrarian or non-agrarian economy of each area, also includes the need for internal improvements, the desire for Indian removal so new cotton lands would become available, and other related factors.

In order to test these hypotheses, the author's methodology consisted of studying the individual economies of the different physiographic regions of eight southern states, noting the reactions of the people and their congressmen in each of the areas to the four measures noted, and then analyzing the reasons for such action. The southern congressmen's speeches, debates, and votes in Congress provided the best source of information about the logic behind each reaction, while newspapers, biographies, correspondence, and

other sources also aided the author in gaining insight into the mood of each region.

The author extends appreciation to the library staffs of Oklahoma State University, Memphis State University, and the Memphis Cossitt-Goodwin Institute for their assistance in locating obscure sources essential to the writing of this dissertation. And special thanks go to Dr. Norbert R. Mahnken and Dr. Homer L. Knight of the Oklahoma State University Department of History. Professor Mahnken suggested that the author reexamine the tariff controversy in its full perspective and gave valuable assistance throughout the entire research and editorial process. Dr. Knight provided the support, inspiration, and guidance which helped the author accomplish her goal. I also wish to thank Dr. LeRoy H. Fischer of the Department of History and Doctors Daniel Selakovich and Idella Lohmann of the Department of Education for their valuable assistance in this endeavor.

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

. . . I see no prospect of a satisfactory adjustment of the Tariff. Some impression has certainly been made by the movements in Carolina, but not sufficient, I fear, to compel the oppressor to let go his grasp. All history proves . . . reason is perfectly impotent to stay the course of injustice and oppression.

John C. Calhoun to Richard K. Cralle,
April 15, 1832¹

In 1832 many southerners were excitedly talking of nullification, secession, rebellion. They viewed the North as an oppressor, bent upon subjugating the southern people both politically and economically. To remind them that their luxurious standard of living, their depleted soil, their one-crop economy, and their overproduction of cotton might be causing the region's ills would only evince indignant refutations. They quickly informed anyone with such notions that the real cause for southern problems was the tariff. Southern apologists pointed out that one need only look at Charleston harbor to view the death of a community, for although the waterfront had once been alive with activity, many ships now languished idly in the quiet South Carolina sun.

¹Letter of John C. Calhoun to Richard K. Cralle, Apr. 15, 1832, J. Franklin Jameson (ed.), The Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1899 (Washington, D. C., 1900), II pp. 317-318.

Ships which did sail to Europe with cotton and other southern crops were northern vessels controlled by northern merchants, and planters whose crops were transported were dependent upon northern capital to finance the venture. The declining incomes of southern planters, they contended, were due not only to the profits taken by the middlemen, but also to the added burdens of the recent tariffs which the northerners had imposed upon the South--tariffs which levied high duties on foreign imports brought to Southern ports. Since the South was an agrarian region with very limited industry, many consumer goods had to be purchased from Europe or the North.² If European goods were excluded by tariffs, northern items must be purchased, yet they were more costly and often of inferior quality. Should the Europeans retaliate and counter the American protective tariff policies with restrictive acts of their own, southerners might be faced with further taxes on their cotton when it reached English or French ports. Any strongminded South Carolinian knew George McDuffie's forty-bale theory by heart in 1832, and could readily explain to all listeners that forty bales of every one hundred bales of cotton exported went to make up the profit of northern middlemen and to costs imposed by the federal government. This system must be corrected. The policy McDuffie and his followers desired was free trade, a system in which no imposts

²The United States was predominantly rural in the early nineteenth century. The proportion of the total population living in cities of 2,500 or more was 5.1 in 1870, 7.3 in 1810, and 7.2 in 1820. Sixteenth Census of the United States Population, I, 18, pp. 20-21.

were levied, but which allowed articles to be imported and exported free of any duties. Yet all their pleas and exhortations to reduce the tariff and substitute free trade had gone unheeded during the 1820's. Now they must act.

This mood of fear, concern, and anger toward the northern protectionists and the national government was of fairly recent vintage, having arisen only after the War of 1812. Prior to this time, in the years between 1789 and 1815, there was little reason for division because the economic similarities of the North, West, and South produced a greater regional affinity--at least in regard to tariffs. The North was not the manufacturing center it would become in later years; the West was not densely settled; and the South was not yet a "planter's paradise" except in the coastal Tidewater. In fact, the entire country tended to be a land of small farmers. New England was noted for its commercial activity and small home industry, but most of its people still worked the rock-strewn soil. Residents of Pennsylvania and New York were also husbandmen with some involvement in home industry, and the other western states which stretched to the Mississippi River were just emerging as grain producing entities. Even the South, the best farming region in the country, was distinctively different from what it would be in a few years, for cotton was not yet "King." Eli Whitney's cotton gin, invented in 1793, was truly revolutionary in its implications, but not until after 1814 did cotton expand into the Piedmont and frontier lands of the lower United States.

The somewhat similar economic make-up of the three regions was not the only factor minimizing tariff controversies in the era before 1816. Although several impost measures became law, southerners believed the acts passed--with the exception of the Tariff of 1816--were basically for purposes of revenue and not for protection. Nevertheless, they watched each successive tariff bill with concern. The southerners raised no serious objections to the first tariff of 1789 which levied specific duties upon thirty-six enumerated articles and imposed average duties of 5 per cent ad valorem, and they accepted the twenty-seven other acts modifying duties upon foreign imports which were passed between 1789 and 1816.³ Nevertheless, they noted with concern the gradual increase in duties, especially the "Mediterranean Fund" act of 1804 which placed average ad valorem rates at 12½ per cent, and the act of 1812 which doubled all duties to 25 per cent ad valorem.⁴ Since this latter measure was passed to meet the costs of the war, southern politicians considered it a temporary action for revenue purposes only, and as a result many people of the South and the West, under the influence of the "War Hawks," heartily supported the bill.

The 1812 act was destined to be the last tariff measure readily acceptable to southerners, and conversely, the last moderately protective bill supported by northerners. This

³Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century, (New York, 1966), I, p. 111.

⁴Ibid., p. 112.

reversal of attitudes was due to the changed American economic position at the end of the War of 1812. Both the North and South were different. In the North, the commercial interests transferred their capital from shipping and fishing enterprises to infant manufacturing ventures because during the arrested trade period of 1807-1812 and the war period of 1812-1815, normal import activities were curtailed. Most of the funds went into woolen and cotton textile industries but returns in some enterprises were often disappointingly low since overhead was high, workers lacked experience, and production costs rose. In order to develop, many manufacturers agreed, they needed to retain the exclusionary practices of the war years. English merchants and manufacturers, on the other hand, sought to reclaim their old American markets in 1815 by dumping a surplus of goods into the United States at such reduced prices that they could not be undersold; an action which, if successful, threatened to destroy the youthful industries of New England. Many New England politicians and industrialists announced that a protective tariff which would prohibit the influx of these foreign goods was needed to save them.

The South, too, developed new economic traits after the war. The cotton culture now enveloped much of the region as the farmers and planters moved into the Piedmont and uplands of South Carolina and Georgia and began infiltrating the frontier states of the Southwest. Total production increased rapidly not only due to the efficiency of the cotton gin, but

also as a result of the introduction into the South of a Mexican variety whose bolls opened more widely and which could be picked more easily than the earlier varieties of upland cotton. Consequently, the amount of cotton picked by a slave in a day doubled, and adult slaves were usually able to pick from 150 to 200 pounds of seed cotton daily.⁵ As a result of the expansion of areas of production, the tremendous profits which accrued, and the enhanced personal prestige of the slaveowners, the cotton culture became entrenched in the South. Free trade was now more important to them than ever because the small New England mills could in all likelihood never consume the enlarged southern supply of raw cotton.

The southerners, although realizing the growing strength of the agricultural economy of their region, were unsure of themselves in 1816 when a new tariff--the first protective tariff in American history--came under consideration. Cotton goods, which were of greatest concern to the farmers and slaveowners of the South, were made subject to a general ad valorem duty of 25 per cent; but it was further provided that a specific duty be added so that "all cotton cloths, whose value shall be less than 25 cents per square yard, shall be taken and deemed to have cost 25 cents per square yard, and shall be charged accordingly."⁶ Some southerners supported

⁵Clement Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization, 1790-1860 (New York, 1961), p. 28.

⁶Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York, 1967), p. 76.

the bill because of their post-war patriotic mood, their fear that the British might renew the war, and their convictions that the South, too, would soon have its own textile centers. Even so eminent a congressman as John C. Calhoun supported the act. But in general, the South gave much more opposition than help to the effort to sustain the manufactures brought into being by the war. Southern representatives in the final ballot voted thirty-one to fourteen against the bill, with seven abstaining. Eleven of the negative votes came from North Carolina.⁷

The South's hesitant and limited support of protective tariffs ended in 1819 as a new disaster--the panic of 1819--beset the country. All former commitments to nationalism ended as the people turned their attention to the needs of their own region. The price of cotton fell from 33 cents a pound in 1818 to 8 cents in 1819, and the depression gave no evidence of lifting.⁸ The marked contrast in incomes made a tremendous impact on the southern mind, and cotton and tobacco raisers and others looked about for the source of their problems. They found four scapegoats on which to place the blame: the northern bankers, the New York and Philadelphia commission houses, the Yankee peddlers, and the protective tariff. Since these forces stemmed from the North, the South reacted defensively by reverting to a sectionalist stand

⁷Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist 1782-1828 (New York, 1944), p. 118.

⁸Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization, p. 29.

aimed at protecting their own agrarian interests, increasingly convinced that industry would never materialize in most southern states.

Southerners moved quickly to curb new tariff legislation. They were successful in 1820 when the manufacturers, farmers, and miners of the North and West asked not only for protection against foreign textiles, but also against imports of iron, molasses, raw wool, flax, hemp, wheat, and corn.⁹ Southern opponents of the measure were aided by New England merchants, ship owners, and distillers. The first two opposed duties on hemp, flax, and iron because they were essentials in the shipbuilding industry, while the distillers renounced the measure because the duties on molasses would hurt their rum industry.

Although the measure proposed in 1820 failed to pass Congress, the protective issue was not dead for a new element inserted itself--politics in the form of new regional political alignments and power. The Eighteenth Congress was the first body elected under the reapportionment of Congress following the census of 1820. New York, Pennsylvania, and the Old Northwest--states overwhelmingly in favor of protection--gained twenty-eight seats. The South added only six members. Eight of the twelve seats added to the Senate after 1810 went to tariff-supporting regions.¹⁰ Protectionist

⁹Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, p. 71.

¹⁰Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, I, p. 286.

interests, cognizant of their new political position, confidently prepared to offer a new tariff measure, while the South began to consider its position hopeless both politically and economically.

The South's apprehensions were quickly confirmed as the House Committee on Manufactures introduced a protective tariff bill in February, 1824. The proposed measure established rates on cotton and woolen goods at 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem, rather than the current 25 per cent rate, and urged duties for many of the same interests listed in the proposed measure of 1820. The congressional debate which ensued was one of the most heated discussions yet heard in Washington as the southern agrarians and northern merchants, shipbuilders, and distillers verbally battled the Mid-Atlantic and Western manufacturers and grain producers who wanted to establish and protect their home industry. Southern arguments seemed fruitless, for the bill passed the House of Representatives 107-102, and the Senate 25-21.¹¹ An analysis of the vote shows that it was sectional: the western and middle states supported the modification and the South opposed; New England remained divided in sentiment. The nature of southern opinion is best represented by the vote of southern congressmen; fifty-seven opposed the bill and one favored it. The two states of Pennsylvania and New York were the keys to passage

¹¹Ibid., pp. 288-289.

of the act since they gave a 50-9 vote in favor of the bill with one abstention.¹²

The Tariff of 1824--the highest protective measure to date--was weighted in favor of the manufacturing, farming, and mining interests of the western, middle, and northern states, yet strangely enough, New England woolens manufacturers did not benefit from the bill. In fact, their economic situation to some extent deteriorated because the new tariff duties of 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem on woolens was offset by a duty of 30 per cent on raw wool, an article which had previously been admitted at duties of 15 per cent ad valorem.¹³ Their condition was further threatened by the new British trade laws effected in 1824. These acts virtually abolished England's duty on raw wool imports, and as a result, the lower price for raw material enabled British producers to manufacture and to sell goods cheaply. By 1825 an influx of inexpensive British woolens was saturating American markets, and the American wool manufacturers were again menaced.¹⁴

Cotton producers of the South shared the misery of the woolens manufacturers although much of the rest of the country was enjoying returning prosperity. Cotton prices fell

¹²Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, pp. 74-75.

¹³Ibid., pp. 75, 79.

¹⁴William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War (New York, 1965), p. 117.

from 32 cents in June to 13 cents in October, 1825. They continued to fall until they reached a low point of around 8 cents in 1827. As the depression continued, agrarian spokesmen constantly denounced the tariff which propped up prices for goods they had to buy on the protected market while, at the same time, they were selling raw materials on an unprotected market. Senator Robert Hayne of South Carolina announced in Congress ". . . , we will not hold ourselves bound to maintain the system,"¹⁵ and the South Carolina legislature passed a resolution in 1825 branding the protective tariff system unconstitutional.¹⁶

Southern objections to further protective measures went unheeded as the House Committee on Manufactures responded to the plea of the woolen manufacturers by presenting a new tariff measure to Congress for consideration in 1827. The bill did not change the 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem rate on manufactured woolens, but established three minima of 40 cents, \$2.50, and \$4.00. All such manufactures except worsted stuffs and blankets costing less than any of these minima were to be assessed as if they cost the highest sum designated in that bracket. The foreign goods which usually cost around \$1.00 would thus be almost prohibited since they would be subject to duty as if they cost \$2.50.¹⁷

¹⁵Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., II sess., III, p. 732.

¹⁶Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 117.

¹⁷Register of Debates, 19 Cong., II sess., III, p. 732.

The proposed tariff of 1827 met strong opposition in both houses of Congress. The House of Representatives finally passed the measure by a vote of 106-95, but when the bill was sent to the Senate it became deadlocked. John C. Calhoun, the Vice President of the United States, finally cast a tie-breaking vote to defeat the measure.¹⁸

The southerners were elated at their success, but the protectionists, emboldened by the narrowness of their defeat, decided to continue their fight. They invited all "friends of protection" to attend a convention in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and to propose new tariff schedules. As a result, protectionists representing several economic interests arrived, and many of them suggested duties on items which would benefit their local constituencies. Thus by broadening their basis of support, the protectionists hoped to accomplish their goal of writing a bill which could pass Congress. At the conclusion of their meeting in 1827, the delegates sent a memorial to Congress, petitioning for protection and suggesting the framework for a new tariff.¹⁹

The proceedings of the Harrisburg Convention were watched carefully by the presidential contenders of 1828: John Quincy Adams, the protectionist incumbent, and Andrew Jackson, the Democrat whose position on the tariff was unclear. Needing an issue, each decided to use the tariff

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 496, 1099.

¹⁹Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 122.

issue to his own advantage. Adams and his supporters decided to favor protection openly in order to win strong support in New England, but Jackson and his political allies were confronted with a problem. Many individuals in both the southern free trade wing and the northern protectionist wing of the Democrat party favored the Tennessean, not knowing his tariff beliefs, so Jackson would be taking a great risk if he took a strong stand on the issue. The Old Hero decided to follow a noncommittal policy by stressing his 1824 position when he had declared himself in favor of a "judicious examination and review of the tariff question,"²⁰ As a result, the manufacturing states continued to regard him as a protectionist, and the South remained confident that he was not in sympathy with that program.

While Andrew Jackson maintained silence, his supporters --especially those in New York--laid the groundwork for the Tariff of 1828.²¹ The measure, as presented to Congress, represented the fruits of the Jacksonian political alliance between New York and Pennsylvania, the West, and the South, and took the form of a scheme to drive a wedge between people who wanted protection for manufactured goods and those who wanted protection for raw materials. Duties so carefully

²⁰Robert V. Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson (Philadelphia, 1963), p. 154.

²¹Martin Van Buren's efforts to elevate Andrew Jackson to the presidency are ably presented in Remini, Robert V., Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1970.

worked out by the Harrisburg Convention were rejected, and duties demanded by the woolen manufacturers were reduced to a level no longer prohibitory. The duty on raw wool was raised so that it would aid the producers of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and western Virginia, but it would injure the domestic manufacturers who purchased wool from foreign sources. The heavy duties placed on hemp, molasses, and iron worked to the detriment of New England shipbuilders, merchants, distillers, and fabricators of machinery, but favored the iron and hemp interests of the West. The New England wool manufacturers were most disgruntled by the bill placed before them because it changed the 40 cent, \$2.50, and \$4.00 minima proposed by the Harrisburg Convention by inserting the \$1.00 minimum valuation. This made the bill less prohibitory since most foreign goods imported were in the cheaper brackets. The measure, as written, placed the woolen interests in the awkward position of opposing the protective measure for which they had asked.²²

The plan seems to have been for southerners to oppose the final bill and for the Jackson supporters in Pennsylvania, New York, and the West to vote for the bill. New England congressmen concerned with the problems of woolen manufacturers would presumably vote against the measure, thus defeating it and causing great damage to the Adams'

²²Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 1727-1729. For a complete coverage of the tariff debate, see Ibid., pp. 1729-1909, 1924-2086.

administration. Jackson, in turn, would still retain an ambiguous position on the tariff question.

The strategy, as ingenious as it was, ultimately failed. As Henry Clay stated in a letter dated February, 1828; "The Jackson party . . . do not [sic] really desire passage of their own measure, and it may happen in the sequel that what is desired by neither party commands the support of both."²³ Clay's words were prophetic, for the House of Representatives passed the bill 105-94, and the Senate supported it by a vote of 26-21 after a minor amendment was added which led several New Englanders to support the obnoxious act until a better one could be devised.²⁴

The southern free trade advocates were astounded when the Tariff of 1828 became law. Its duties of 50 per cent ad valorem on cottons and woolens were considered outrageously high, and it was feared more restrictive clauses might cause Great Britain to seek raw cotton elsewhere. Such prohibitory rates on foreign made clothes would enable industrialists of the North and West to set prices as they saw fit, and the South would soon be bankrupted. Only one hope remained: the newly elected President, Andrew Jackson, was still considered by many southerners to be an advocate of free trade. He would surely ask Congress to lower the tariff.

²³Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, I, pp. 369-370.

²⁴Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2471-2472, 786.

Any hopes for tariff reduction by President Jackson were in vain. Not only did he allow the Tariff of Abominations to continue, but he also developed a strong dislike for the southern hero, John C. Calhoun. Jackson's refusal to press vigorously for tariff revision did not go unheeded by the extremists of the South; especially those in South Carolina. Their emotional tirades kept southerners alert to the dangers facing them, and also convinced some northerners that a moderate tariff reduction might be in order.

In 1832, after four years of bickering, the Tariff of 1832 emerged from the Committee on Manufactures. Although the new act cut anticipated tariff revenues about five million dollars, only about one-fourth of the duty reductions applied to protected products. Average rates were reduced to an average of 25 per cent, but the 50 per cent rates on cottons, woolens, and iron were largely retained.²⁵ The measure was, paradoxically, both lower and more proportionately protective than the Tariff of 1828.

Reaction to the Tariff of 1832 varied. Many of President Jackson's avid supporters accepted the act as a less protective measure, but the Calhoun partisans and southern extremists denounced it as worse than the Tariff of Abominations. Some South Carolinians readied themselves for battle and raised the standard of nullification. A specially called nullification convention at Columbia, South Carolina, hastily

²⁵Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 248.

passed the Ordinance of Nullification which maintained the tariff laws were unconstitutional and null and void in their state.²⁶ Several groups in Charleston collected arms and munitions with which to uphold the new state law. Andrew Jackson, just as determinedly, presented a Nullification Proclamation which denounced state sovereignty in regard to tariffs, and requested a Force Bill which, if passed by Congress, would give the federal government authority to collect by force imposts in South Carolina.²⁷

At the height of the crisis cautious leaders on both sides of the issue began to search for a solution to the predicament. The best answer appeared in the form of a compromise tariff, authored by Henry Clay. His measure proposed lowering tariff rates gradually over a period of nine years. It appeared acceptable to a majority of people on both sides of the issue, so after nine years of dispute, Congress passed the Tariff of 1833. Hopefully, the country would settle back to a normal way of life.

The Compromise of 1833 temporarily brought the tariff debate to an end; but in that same year American historians began their voluminous recording and interpretation of the era. From the textbooks placed before younger students to the specialized works presented to students of history, one

²⁶State Papers on Nullification, pp. 28-33.

²⁷James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, D. C., 1897-1909), pp. 1204-1219, 1173-1195.

standard interpretation of the tariff interlude emerged: the southern cotton planters, faced with declining prices and exhausted soil, blamed their misfortunes on northern-imposed protective tariff measures and sought to obtain redress through nullification. Further, the historians tend to place Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun in the role of protagonists, and all others seem to fade into the background.

The standard interpretation of the tariff controversy of this era is of value, but is limited in its explanation as to the stand taken by southerners in tariff policies. It leaves unanswered certain questions which are of interest to the economic historian. For example, how did the provisions of each tariff affect the South? Was the entire South affected in the same way? Was southern opposition to the tariffs unanimous? What were the reactions of the various economic sub-groups of the South? Were the people engaged in a single economic pursuit all in agreement that the protective measures were anathema?

These questions are usually left unanswered by historians because they concern themselves with the cotton culture of extremist South Carolina to the exclusion of other southern economic units. Yet they should not cast the South in a single economic mold; the divergent physiography and the multiplicity of sources of livelihood minimizes the validity of any such assumption. The fertile Tidewater of the Atlantic coast, the less fertile Piedmont plateau, the mountains, valleys, and various soil types prevented such unity.

Further, the terrain and soil dictated the type of crop which could be raised. Some crops, such as cotton, tobacco, rice, and corn traversed state boundaries; others, such as sugar cane, limited themselves to a single state.

Assuming then, that the South was a heterogeneous economic region and that each economic unit reacted to the protective tariffs and the Force Bill in the light of its own needs and interests, it appears that one should study each interest-group separately to determine true beliefs and stances concerning the various measures. The voting records of the many southern congressmen are especially enlightening in this regard, for after discerning the economic livelihood of a given region, and correlating the economic area with the favorable and unfavorable votes cast on each measure, one sees a definite pattern of regional beliefs emerge. But perhaps the most interesting conclusion is that economics is often so intermeshed with politics that the two cannot be easily separated; and sometimes political loyalties and personal beliefs overpower the economic logic of a specific situation. For this reason the study of the southerners' political and economic reactions to the tariffs of 1828, 1832, 1833, and the Force Bill are best studied on a state-by-state basis before final conclusions can be made.

CHAPTER II

SOUTH CAROLINA

The question is no longer one of free trade, but liberty and despotism. The hope of the country now rests on our gallant little state. Let every Carolinian do his duty.


John C. Calhoun to Waddy Thompson,
July 8, 1832¹

In 1818 South Carolinians were alive with anticipation as the summer wore on and harvest time came, for South Carolina was a cotton state and prices were phenomenally good--rising 7 cents within two years to a new high of 33 cents per pound for some varieties of cotton.² No longer did the planters in the Tidewater have a monopoly on wealth and prestige because at last the cotton gin was allowing the upland Piedmont to join in the cotton bonanza. (Map 1) Planters in the Piedmont quickly amassed slaves and land, especially in the southern and east central counties which stretched from the Fall Line to the mountains. The

¹Letter of John C. Calhoun to Waddy Thompson, July 8, 1832, in William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War (New York, 1965), p. 249.

²Although the prices varied depending upon the source used, the major cotton price statistics are based upon newspaper price lists or addresses made in Congress. Another major source is George R. Taylor, "Wholesale Commodity Prices at Charleston, South Carolina, 1796-1861," Journal of Economic and Business History, IV, (1932), pp. 848-868.

South Carolina



Map 1. Economy and Topography of South Carolina

plantations which arose were often smaller than those in the lowlands since upland soils were less fertile, and the owners were the nouveau riche, yet regional jealousy was a thing of the past. By 1818 the two regions seemed one in many ways. John C. Calhoun, living near the upland town of Pendleton and married to a Charleston aristocrat was as much a lowlander as an uplander. This was true of many citizens, for inter-regional marriages and the common concerns of cotton production acted as bonds.

The only discord in 1818 appeared within the uplands itself. The northeastern Piedmont and northwestern Tidewater districts which lay near the boundary of North Carolina were different from the southern Piedmont lands, both economically and politically. There were fewer planters, most residents being farmers with smaller land holdings, and relatively few slaves. They raised some short staple cotton, but tobacco was their main crop.³ The major political spokesman for the area was Senator William Smith, a representative in state and federal government since 1803. Smith was an advocate of the Old Republican faith, a believer in the Jeffersonian doctrine of states' rights with its corollary of strict construction, and a man who thought the federal government had no authority to pass protective tariff legislation such as that passed in 1816. Smith and most other Carolinians as well as most southerners professed to be Democrats in political

³Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, pp. 17-18.

affiliation, yet although verbally supporting the party which had traditionally opposed the expansion of the federal government's authority, only a few people zealously maintained their position in the nationalistic era after the War of 1812. But while others relaxed in the post-war years of prosperity, Smith, the staunch defender of states' rights, fought against tariffs, internal improvements financed by the federal government, national banks, and any other program that might weaken the states' reserved powers.⁴

Smith, whose main supporters lived in the north central part of the state, and Calhoun, of the southern Piedmont, were enemies both politically and personally. Smith was jealous of Calhoun's popularity in Congress and strongly opposed Calhoun's stand in favor of the Tariff of 1816 and other measures which seemed to jeopardize the sovereignty of the states. Smith's dislike of Calhoun was even more pronounced in later years when William Crawford of Georgia and Andrew Jackson of Tennessee--Smith's longtime friends--turned against Calhoun.⁵

The dispute between these two politicians of the uplands extended also to the Tidewater districts, but in milder form. The lowlanders, with the exception of a few northern citizens and some Charlestonians, favored Calhoun and his flexible

⁴Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, D. C., 1961), p. 1625.

⁵Duams Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography, XVII (New York, 1935), pp. 359-361.

stand rather than Smith and his unyielding states' rights position. They had even more reason than the short staple cotton producers of the southern uplands to support the federal government. Their crop, sea island cotton, was in great demand since its long staple produced a better quality of cloth than the short staple variety, so they quickly amassed fortunes, expanded production, increased their slave holdings, and enjoyed the prestige of their position. They, as well as the wealthy rice planters of the coastal river and swamp areas who were enjoying a similar life of luxury, were both receptive to the new federal policies and supported John C. Calhoun's semi-nationalistic stand rather than supporting William Smith's position.⁶

There was one other region which supported Calhoun in 1818--the mountain area. This was a small area in the western part of the state where the Blue Ridge Mountains stretched into the Pendleton and Greenville districts. The land was very sparsely settled, causing the people to be without representatives from their region since the congressmen were elected from the more populated eastern portion of their district which lay in the Piedmont. Although they had little influence politically, they supported Calhoun's views in 1818 because they wanted any internal improvements the national government might provide. Their economy was that of subsistence farmers.⁷

⁶Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 1782-1828 (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1944), passim.

⁷Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 86.

All the physiographic regions of South Carolina in 1818 were either thriving or at least hoping to do better very soon, but the agrarians' dreams collapsed when a financial panic struck the country in 1819. It especially hurt the cotton producers of the Palmetto State when it was aggravated in the lowlands by a credit contraction⁸--a problem for the aristocrats living beyond their means--and in the uplands by overproduction of short staple cotton as the new southwestern states poured 60 million pounds of cotton onto the market in 1821.⁹ At the same time Piedmont croplands were hurt by soil depletion and erosion. The depression grew worse as the decade of the twenties progressed, and by 1828 the South Carolinians, especially the uplanders who were now living amid many deserted and overgrown plantations, turned against the policies of the federal government in general, and the protective tariff policy in particular since they felt it taxed too large a portion out of their cotton income and benefited the textile manufacturers rather than themselves. It appeared Smith had been right all along.

As the depression spread most Carolinians sought the cause of their declining incomes. More than ever, they blamed the tariffs. Although imposts were not the major reason for their economic distress, they overlooked factors such as overproduction and soil depletion and directed their

⁸Ibid., p. 36.

⁹Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-1829 (New York, 1962), pp. 52-53.

attention solely to the North from whence new demands for even higher duties were constantly emanating.

In 1824 the New England textile manufacturers successfully asked for further protection against foreign imports. The duties proposed by the House Committee on Manufactures were 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem instead of the 25 per cent currently in effect on woolens and cottons. The depressed uplanders violently denounced the bill, with George McDuffie, the fiery orator from Edgefield, being the most adamant. He condemned the bill as favoring one region of the country over another and stated that he and his fellow cotton planters had invested money in the culture when it was 30 cents a pound, but after the speculation which had occurred it was now down to 12 cents, and many of his friends were being ruined. More would suffer, he stated, if Great Britain chose to retaliate by buying their cotton from a country other than the United States.¹⁰

Lowland sentiment was also strongly against the tariff. The Tidewater's congressional battle was led by Senator Robert Y. Hayne and Representative James Hamilton, Jr., both of Charleston. Hamilton resented the injustices of the 1824 bill which aided other states and especially disliked the suggested duty on hemp which would aid Kentucky. He cried ". . . for the benefit of Kentucky, we are about to be taxed . . . sixty thousand dollars a year in the small State which

¹⁰Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I sess., p. 1677.

I represent." He considered this was "tribute" money to Kentucky.¹¹ Hayne denounced the assumption that the government was capable of regulating industry better than individuals, stating that the tariff threatened the cotton growing states with the total loss of their market for cotton, rice, and tobacco. These were major trade items since the value of exports for 1823 totaled \$47,000,000; of that, cotton alone amounted to \$20,400,000, and the three articles of rice, cotton, and tobacco amounted to \$28,500,000, or over two-thirds of all exports. All objections, though, were futile, and the 1824 measure became law.¹²

In the intervening years between 1828 and 1828 more Carolinians turned against protective tariffs since they were convinced the 1824 act added to the depression. But one politician, John C. Calhoun, did not state his views. With the state in such an uproar Calhoun was in a difficult situation; his political career seemed at stake. Some free trade extremists wanted him to support their position, but he feared he might lose northern political support if he berated the tariffs too strongly, and he knew he could not win the coveted presidency with southern votes alone. Silence seemed the best solution. Andrew Jackson, The Tennessee presidential hopeful, was in a similar predicament so he also decided to remain quiet on the tariff issue.

¹¹Ibid., p. 1518.

¹²Ibid., pp. 622, 641-642.

Calhoun's reticence to make a statement partially ended in 1827 when the northern protectionists asked for another protective measure. The resultant legislation, the Woolens Bill, passed the House of Representatives but became deadlocked in the Senate over which the Vice President was presiding. When the vote was read it showed an evenly divided body, so Calhoun, in position to break the tie, cast his vote to table and thus kill the bill.¹³ The Vice President, it seemed, was moving over to Smith's position in favor of more direct and vigorous opposition to the tariff.

The defeat of the 1827 measure did not stop the northern protectionists who quickly sought further legislation. However, the congressmen from South Carolina quickly joined the supporters of Andrew Jackson and devised a measure which, they hoped, would be rejected by all concerned. They secretly penned a bill which seemed protective, but which would actually be detrimental to the New England industrialists. They wanted the manufacturers themselves to vote it down. Jackson hoped to get support from the free traders in the South when the bill failed, and from protectionists in the Northwest for having written a protective measure.

The newly proposed bill, the Tariff of 1828, reached the floor of Congress for consideration in January of that year, but the South Carolina congressmen said very little during the tariff debates in the House and Senate although one would

¹³Register of Debates, 19 Cong., II sess., p. 496.

logically assume there would be considerable reaction to a protective measure which carried extremely high textile duties of 50 per cent ad valorem. They were generally silent as they waited for the Jacksonian plot to be effected although a few mild comments were made for the sake of pretending they hated the measure. Hayne castigated the proposed bill, saying he could not put his finger on one single item that would benefit the South, while Smith asked the Senate to strike out the section embracing a duty on cotton bagging since cotton prices had fallen and the planters were being severely hurt. Drayton condemned the law as partial, and Hamilton went further by declaring the sovereign states had never conferred upon the government the power to tax the interests of her own citizens for the exclusive benefit of industry and the citizens of other states. William Martin denied that the proposed duty on cotton was intended as protection, asserting it was for revenue only.¹⁴ But other than these few remarks, the Carolinians listened quietly, evidently amused, as the manufacturers vigorously objected to the measure.

However, toward the end of the debates some South Carolina congressmen could no longer contain themselves and openly taunted the New Englanders, telling them they had written a bill so odious even the industrialists would oppose

¹⁴Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., pp. 746, 784, 2324, 243, 2454.

it.¹⁵ The Carolinians were, of course, due for a political shock, because the New Englanders decided to support the bill which even they did not like in all of its clauses, and the bill became law.

South Carolina's reaction to the tariff of 1828 is evidenced by the congressional votes in opposition to the act; those who voted unanimously opposed the measure.¹⁶ (Map 2) The two senators, Robert Hayne and William Smith, now a Charlestonian, were strongly opposed to the act. Smith had always opposed such federal legislation, but Hayne, a planter and lawyer whose agrarian interests and political ambitions caused him to renounce a bill odious to his constituents, was a new convert to the cause.¹⁷


The four congressmen from the Piedmont, the short staple cotton region hardest hit by the depression, and the two congressmen from the upper Tidewater, the short staple cotton and tobacco farming area, also opposed the bill. George McDuffie was the extremist of this group, but Warren Davis of Pendleton, William Nuckolls of Spartanburg, and Starling Tucker of Mountain Shoals also opposed the act. John Carter of Camden, a Fall Line city, and William Martin of Barnwell

¹⁵Ibid., p. 2344. Thomas R. Mitchell told the Congress he was pleased that they kept the duty on molasses since this would help get the New Englanders to oppose the bill.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 2471-2472, 786.

¹⁷Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1030.

South Carolina



Key		Votes		
Yea	+	Senate	Yea	0
Nay	o		Nay	2
Not voting	-		Not voting	0
		House	Yea	0
			Nay	7
			Not voting	2
		Total	Yea	0
			Nay	9
			Not voting	2
			11 Congressmen	

Map 2. South Carolina's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1828

in the upper Tidewater were against the measure, but Martin was not present in Congress to cast his vote.¹⁸

The lowland congressmen were Thomas Mitchell of Georgetown, and William Drayton and James Hamilton, Jr., of Charleston. Mitchell did not cast a vote, but the other two voted against the 1828 act. Mitchell and Drayton were moderates who opposed heavy protection but who also eschewed extremism in any form, while Hamilton was an extremist whose views were similar to those of George McDuffie.¹⁹

In the final analysis, the 1828 congressional tariff vote by the South Carolinians presents a fairly unanimous picture of opposition to the most protective measure in American history. Five of the nine voting against the measure were from the depressed short staple cotton and tobacco regions of the Piedmont and upper Tidewater, and the remainder were from the thriving coastal rice and sea-island cotton region. The vote of the latter group seems rather enigmatic, since the Tariff of 1828 did not affect their products. Neither rice nor sea island cotton was plentiful enough as it was, and neither northerners nor southerners wanted special protection for either. It appears that another factor, also economically motivated, caused them to oppose the act: that

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 1296, 788, 1342, 1731, 667, 127; Register of Debates, 20 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 2471-2472.

¹⁹Ibid., 2471-2472; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, pp. 1342, 829, 997; Dictionary of American Biography, V, p. 448.

reason was slavery.²⁰ The coastal region was filled with Negro freemen and slaves, and the whites were outnumbered. This situation in itself was no problem, even though Demark Vesey's conspiracy of 1822 was well remembered; the problem was the growing protests by northerners who condemned the institution of slavery. In all probability, the wealthy coastal planters' votes against the tariff were an attempt to check the expansion of federal powers in other areas, including laws on abolition. The votes by the affluent Hayne and Hamilton reflect this logic. In later years William Harper, a nullifier, said,

. . . in contending against the Tariff, I have always felt that we were combatting the symptom instead of the disease. Consolidation is the disease. . . , Tomorrow may witness . . . (an attempt) to relieve . . . your slaves.²¹

Although the Tariff of 1828 passed Congress, reaction in South Carolina was tempered by the possibility that Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun might become President and Vice President, respectively, in the 1828 election. If silence could be maintained until these two men took office, the Carolinian free traders were sure the new Chief Executive would quickly revise the tariff downward. A few South Carolinians could not be convinced to remain silent, though,

²⁰Two authors ably show the influence of slavery in the tariff controversy, William Freehling in Prelude to Civil War is especially noteworthy, as is Frederic Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification Movement (Baltimore, 1928).

²¹Speeches Delivered in the Convention of the State of South Carolina, March, 1833, in Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 256.

especially James Hamilton, Jr., Robert Hayne, and George McDuffie. These articulate men immediately berated the tariff as an injustice, and during their speeches and tours and in their newspaper articles set forth the suggested remedy of nullification. They recounted statements from Robert Turnbull's articles which had suggested a similar action in 1827. Further, they asked John C. Calhoun to write a position paper which would show the merits of such a policy.²² Calhoun's resultant document, the Exposition and Protest, ably presented the views of the nullifiers of South Carolina by stating that if the federal government went beyond its limited powers by passing an act objectionable to the sovereign states, they might constitutionally declare such act null and void within their legal jurisdiction. Calhoun, however, did not affix his signature to the paper. He was still hoping to fulfill his political ambitions.²³

The moderate reaction by many Carolinians in 1828 was short-lived as a variety of disruptive events occurred shortly after President Jackson took office. First, the new President and his Vice President, Calhoun, soon grew to dislike each other, thus ending all hopes of presidential aid for free trade policies. Second, efforts to lower the tariff in 1830 failed. Third, in 1831 William Lloyd Garrison began

²²Calhoun to Preston, Jan. 6, 1829, Virginia Carrington Scrapbook, in *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.

²³South Carolina Statutes at Large (1836), p. 247 ff; Richard Crallé, ed., Works of John C. Calhoun (New York, 1854-1859), VI, pp. 1-57.

publishing The Liberator, an abolitionist newspaper. Fourth, the Nat Turner insurrection in Virginia in 1831 caused fright among the southern slaveowners. These and other episodes produced a new attitude of defensiveness toward slavery and persuaded many South Carolinians that they must reassess their position as a state within the federal union.

The cumulative events of the early thirties convinced many moderates that George McDuffie and his group were correct in advocating nullification, and by the summer of 1831 a majority of the Carolinians seemed to be leaning toward a stronger states' rights policy against the encroachments of the federal government. The one notable who was still missing from the extremists' following, though, was Calhoun, but the stream of events and the increasing radicalism of his fellow citizens soon forced the Vice President to take a stand on the issue in order to keep a semblance of leadership among southerners. He evidently had no chance to become the next president after Jackson since the President now detested him, but he might yet gain a large following in the South so in July of 1831 he published the "Fort Hill Letter." This open publication printed in the Pendleton Messenger presented his views against protective tariffs and placed him on the side of the southern extremists.²⁴ With his open declaration several more moderates, trusting Calhoun's leadership, joined the nullification crusade.

²⁴Margaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun, American Portrait (Boston, 1950), p. 235; Cralle, Works of John C. Calhoun, VI, pp. 60-94.

Although the radicals or nullifiers were most outspoken, not all the reaction in South Carolina was negative. A new group of South Carolinians led by Daniel Huger, James L. Petigru, and Hugh Legare, all lawyers and planters from the Charleston area, and Thomas Mitchell and William Drayton, congressmen, arose to combat the nullifiers. These "unionists" based their opposition to nullification not on any sympathy for protective tariffs, for they were opposed to them, but upon the probability of civil war should nullification occur. Favoring compromise over military action, they supported the newly proposed Tariff of 1832; a bill introduced into Congress as a moderate measure that might assuage southern criticism of protective policies.²⁵

The Tariff of 1832, in its final form, reduced the duties on several items which had been covered by the 1828 act. However, the approximately 50 per cent rates of duties on cotton goods, woolens, and iron products were largely retained. The nullifiers who had contended that a general reduction of at least 15 per cent must be obtained were irate, saying no effective reductions had been made,²⁶ The unionists had hoped for a better bill, but they accepted the 1832 act as a step toward lower duties.

²⁵Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification Movement, pp. 93-99.


²⁶Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York, 1967), pp. 103-105; Charleston Mercury, May 11, 1832.

The Twenty-Second Congress of the United States which passed the Tariff of 1832 was slightly different in make-up from the Twentieth Congress which passed the Tariff of Abominations.²⁷ (Map 3) Six of South Carolina's congressmen served in both congresses; Senator Hayne, who remained in office until December 13, 1832, then resigned so Calhoun could fill the position, and Representatives Davis, Drayton, McDuffie, Mitchell, and Nuckolls. Newcomers were Senator Stephen Miller of Camden and Representative Robert W. Barnwell of Beaufort, James Blair of Lynchwood (now Bethune), John M. Felder of Orangeburg, and John K. Griffin of Milton. Four represented the Piedmont; three represented the upper Tidewater; and four represented the coastal Tidewater. The mountain fringe was again unrepresented. The vote of these congressmen, to the dismay of other southerners who presumed all Carolinians were united, was divided.²⁸ The representatives of the Piedmont--McDuffie, Davis, Nuckolls, and Griffin--once again voiced their opposition to the 1832 tariff measure. Their vote was based upon McDuffie's influential stand and on the upland depression. Desiring free trade which would enable them to buy coarse cottons and other goods cheaply on the world market while selling short staple cotton to Europe, they rallied to support their new Piedmont compatriot, John C. Calhoun.

²⁷Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 116.

²⁸Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., pp. 3830-3831, 1219,

South Carolina



<u>Key</u>		<u>Votes</u>		
Yea vote	+	Senate	Yea	0
Nay vote	o		Nay	2
Not voting	-		Not voting	0
		House	Yea	3
			Nay	6
			Not voting	0
		Total	Yea	3
			Nay	8
			Not voting	0
			11 Congressmen	

Map 3. South Carolina's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1832

Northeast of the Congaree River in the region known as Smith territory since William Smith and his states' rights, anti-Calhoun philosophy had dominated the scene for some time, there was some diversity. Smith's converts had included Miller, Blair, and Mitchell at one time, but the Calhounites drew Miller away from the fold when Smith rejected nullification as a solution.²⁹ The two votes of the region were divided, Senator Miller voting against the Tariff of 1832 and Representative Blair voting for it. Blair, a moderate who could see both sides of the picture, did not favor protection but felt the proposed tariffs were somewhat lower and would be beneficial in reducing the burden on his constituents. John Felder of Orangeburg, the representative in the southern portion of the upper Tidewater, voted against the act because of his agrarian belief in free trade. His work in agriculture and lumber was important in influencing him.³⁰

The third region, the lower Tidewater, was the least harmonious area. The congressional votes were evenly divided with Senator Hayne and Representative Barnwell voting against the bill and Representatives Drayton and Mitchell voting for it. Hayne's stand was based upon his zeal to be a political leader and his fear of governmental encroachments on slavery in the states. That Barnwell joined him in this fear is

²⁹Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, pp. 98, 235.

³⁰Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 879; Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., pp. 3830-3831, 1219.

evidenced by his statement in congress that the South could not yield to the northern majority or the North might make the South change its domestic policy. Barnwell and Hayne's votes represented the views of the planters, lawyers, and Tidewater aristocracy.

The Tidewater supporters of the proposed modification were William Drayton and Thomas Mitchell. Drayton's background explains much about his reasoning. He was not a Carolinian, having been born in Florida. After living in England, he finally settled in Charleston. He was an early Federalist, and later a supporter of moderately low tariffs, but always an unrelenting opponent of anything which might hurt the Union. His lucrative law practice allowed him to invest heavily in commercial enterprises, thus separating him from the agrarian interests of the state. Strangely, his foster brother was Robert Turnbull, the nullification advocate.³¹ Drayton's other ally, Mitchell, was also a unionist. He was a political ally of Smith and Drayton and contended the new measure was a genuine attempt to give some relief to the South. Thus a total of three votes were cast for the still protective 1832 tariff bill.

The discontented Carolinians were primed by the extremists to react violently should the measure pass, so upon receiving news of the passage of the new federal legislation, Governor Hamilton, determined to try the remedy of

³¹Ibid., pp. 3830-3831, 1219; Charleston Mercury, August 18, 1830; Dictionary of American Biography, V, p. 448.

nullification, ordered the legislature into special session on October 22, 1832. He told the group that a special convention should be called. He told the state congressmen the state should nullify the Tariff of 1832 which had been passed only for northern and western interests, and asked them to authorize a special nullification convention which could consider the feasibility of interposition.³² The delegates were receptive, so a committee was formed to write the bill calling for the convention. The committee's bill was quickly written and presented to the legislature for approval. The measure was adopted overwhelmingly as the lower house passed it 96-25, and the state Senate supported it 31-13.³³ They scheduled the nullification convention which would make the final decision for November 10, 1832, in Columbia.

The nullifiers finally obtained their major objective, when the Convention met and quickly accepted the Ordinance of Nullification, a declaration of their state's intention to nullify the tariffs, effective February 1, 1833, and to use force to protect itself if necessary.

And we, the People of South Carolina. . . are determined to maintain this, our Ordinance and Declaration, at every hazard, do further Declare that we will not submit to the application of force, on the part of the Federal Government to reduce this State to obedience. . . .³⁴

³²Camden Journal, October 27, 1832.

³³Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification Movement, p. 126.

³⁴Statutes at Large of South Carolina (Columbia, 1836-1841), I, 329ff, in Herman V. Ames, ed., State Documents on Federal Relations: The States and the United States (Philadelphia, 1906), pp. 37-41.

Events moved rapidly following the issuing of the Ordinance as Senator Hayne resigned his position in the Senate, and Calhoun resigned his position as Vice President. The two then resumed political office as Governor and United States Senator, respectively, and watched as their fellow Carolinians happily pronounced themselves successful, but their elation was short-lived because other southern states did not agree to South Carolina's proposal that a southern convention be called to decide on the correctness of nullification for the South as a whole. Also, President Jackson readied a civilian posse in Washington, making it apparent that he was willing to engage in battle with the recalcitrants.³⁵

South Carolina quickly became an armed camp as the legislature gave Governor Hayne authority to accept military volunteers, and 25,000 men quickly enlisted in the nullifier's army.³⁶ At the same time Joel Poinsett, a Charleston unionist and a friend of Jackson, recruited and equipped a similar army for the unionist cause. Jackson would have sent troops to aid the unionists, but Congressman Drayton and Daniel Huger, a leading Charlestonian, advised against it.³⁷

By the middle of December all people concerned--the President, the nullifiers, and the unionists--began

³⁵Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, pp. 279-280.

³⁶Ibid., p. 275.

³⁷J. Fred Rippy, Joel Roberts Poinsett, Versatile American (Durham, 1935), *passim*; David Franklin Houston, A Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina (New York, 1896), p. 115.

reevaluating their positions, fearing that war might begin on February 1, 1833, when the Ordinance of Nullification was to become effective. Some people suggested a new lower tariff bill as a solution to the dilemma. This recommendation was quickly acted upon by Representative Gulian Verplanck who introduced a revised tariff bill into the House of Representatives in December, 1832. The Verplanck bill which called for a 50 per cent reduction of tariff duties by 1834, offered possibilities for compromise, but some Carolinians objected to the proposal because they felt President Jackson, their enemy, supported it.³⁸ Jackson, refusing to be outdone by the nullifiers, introduced the Force Bill on January 16, asking Congress to grant him power to enforce the tariff act in South Carolina.³⁹

Meanwhile, Martin Van Buren, heir to the presidency after Jackson, worried about the effects of the Force Bill since the Democratic party that Jackson now led had followers in both the North and South. The southern wing supported the doctrine of states' rights and might bolt the party if Jackson continued to work for military authority against one state rather than resting his case by simply verbally opposing nullification. Van Buren felt opposition to nullification was defensible, but that Jackson should ignore the greater question of secession, since many southerners

³⁸Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., pp. 1763, 3120ff.

³⁹Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., pp. 244-246.

believed the old Kentucky and Virginia resolutions supported not only state sovereignty and nullification but secession, too.⁴⁰

When Jackson expressed his own convictions against the legality of secession and asserted that nullification must be put down at any price, as feared, some southern states' rights Democrats left the party under the leadership of Senator John Tyler of Virginia.⁴¹ Still Jackson, like Calhoun, did not want to see a war ensue. The only solution appeared to be the proposed Verplanck tariff which was being debated on the floor of Congress.

The Verplanck bill, although extremely lenient when compared to the 1828 and 1832 tariffs, was opposed by the leading nullifiers since the rates were above their 15 per cent formula for settlement as stated at the Nullification Convention. However, most Carolinians were prepared to accept it in principle as a better bill. Calhoun and other congressmen wrote home about their fears that it would not pass, but Calhoun, who feared his fellow statesmen had moved too far to the left, was hopeful that if it did pass it would stop the nullification movement. In the meantime the nullifiers, thinking there was some hope for relief, decided the February 1 deadline for enforcement of the Ordinance must be postponed, so on January 21 the nullifiers met in Charleston

⁴⁰Charles Sellers, ed., Andrew Jackson, Nullification, and the State-Rights Tradition (Chicago, 1963), pp. 50-53.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 55-56.

and voted to avoid conflict as long as Congress was deliberating on the tariff. If the Force Bill passed Congress, though, Hamilton planned to reconvene the Convention and ask for the next step after nullification--secession.⁴²

During this time of activity Calhoun did not remain idle. He was concerned about the radicalism of his state since, although he had reformulated the doctrine of nullification, he was opposed to an act of secession. He feared South Carolina was moving in that direction because Governor Hayne, Representatives McDuffie and Barnwell, and notables such as James Hamilton, Jr., Robert Turnbull, and Thomas Cooper, President of the college at Columbia, all were pronounced secessionists.⁴³ He feared the state would secede if the Verplanck bill or some other compromise bill failed to pass Congress.

Recognizing Calhoun's concern, Henry Clay approached the Senator about the possibility of a compromise tariff. Together they calculated a new measure which might prove partially acceptable to both sides. The new measure, the Compromise Tariff of 1833, was introduced into the Senate on February 12 while the Verplanck bill was still being considered by the House. Clay's bill proposed putting many goods on the free list and lowering the rates on protected goods

⁴²Evening Post, Jan. 22, 1833; Charleston Mercury, Jan. 23, 1833.

⁴³Margaret Coit emphasizes Calhoun's constant regard for the Union in John C. Calhoun, American Portrait; Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 291.

gradually until they reached the 20 per cent level in 1842. However, during the first nine years the 1833 tariff would remain strongly protective, dropping drastically in the last six months. The Verplanck tariff was dismissed from consideration as the new compromise bill caught the attention of the congressmen.⁴⁴

The Compromise Tariff and the Force Bill moved through Congress together. The tariff, with very little debate, passed the House 119-85 and the Senate 29-16, with the South Carolinians registering a unanimous eleven votes of approval.⁴⁵ (Map 4) Those who once wanted secession had awakened to both the economic and military problems that might ensue from that course, so were amenable to the attempt at mediation. The unionists found in this act a way to avoid both nullification and secession, so both sides saved face.


The second bill under consideration, the Force Bill, did not receive the same degree of approval the South Carolinians had bestowed upon the Compromise Tariff. The United States House of Representatives passed the measure 149-47 and the Senate supported it 32-1, but the South Carolina membership placed a 6-3 vote against it in the House, as the two senators abstained.⁴⁶ (Map 5) The citizenry understood the abstentions because they knew that Calhoun and Miller were

⁴⁴Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., pp. 477-478, 791.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 1810-1811, 808-809.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 1903, 688.

South Carolina



Key


Yea vote +
 Nay vote 0
 Not voting -

Votes

Senate	Yea	2
	Nay	0
	Not voting	0
House	Yea	9
	Nay	0
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea	11
	Nay	0
	Not voting	0
	11 Congressmen	

Map 4. South Carolina's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1833

South Carolina



Key

Yea vote	+
Nay vote	o
Not voting	-

Votes

Senate	Yea	0
	Nay	0
	Not voting	2
House	Yea	3
	Nay	6
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea	3
	Nay	6
	Not voting	2
		<u>11</u> Congressmen

Map 5. South Carolina's Force Bill Vote, 1833

using that method to show their opposition to the measure, realizing they were in a minority and could not defeat it if they voted. But they were amazed that three congressmen gave their support to the "Bloody Bill," as they termed it. These men, Representatives Drayton, Blair, and Mitchell, were unionists and used this means to voice their beliefs in the federal union over states' rights. Had their opposition to Calhoun not been so strong, they too would probably have abstained from voting. They believed the Union must be preserved, no matter by what means, and further asserted that Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had never intended for their nullification theories to be construed in the manner Calhoun and McDuffie understood them. In their opinion, these venerated men would never have supported secession.⁴⁷

Although political beliefs motivated the votes by Drayton, Blair, and Mitchell, economic factors were important underlying causes. Blair was not a cotton producer and had not suffered from the vagaries of the economy, while Drayton and Mitchell were city dwellers whose legal practices had not been hampered by the Tidewater and Piedmont depression. Emotionally, then, they were less involved than Carolinians who had felt the pinch of the ebbing economy,

The South Carolinians, however, were not satiated with the logic behind the votes of Drayton, Blair, and Mitchell

⁴⁷Charleston Courier, Nov. 7, 22, 1828; Sellers, Andrew Jackson, Nullification, and the State-Rights Tradition, pp. 33-34.

for the Force Bill. The Charleston Mercury published several letters to the editor vilifying these men.⁴⁸ The citizens of Columbia burned the three villains in effigy,⁴⁹ and letters poured into the state newspapers from other states,⁵⁰ either in support of or in opposition to the actions of the three congressmen. When Judge William Smith, having moved to Alabama, addressed the Union Party of South Carolina through the Alabama Intelligencer and said that if civil war resulted he would be on the side of these men and the Union Party, the editor of the Charleston Mercury reprinted Smith's letter and reviled him, saying he was influenced by his personal hatred of Senator Calhoun, Governor Hayne, Mr. McDuffie, and General Hamilton.⁵¹

Even though the wrathful harrangues against the Unionists' support of the Force Bill pervaded the Carolinians' thoughts for a while, one thing was changed; nullification

⁴⁸See Charleston Mercury, January-March, 1833. The editor of the newspaper, Henry L. Pinckney, was an ardent nullifier. He published reports and letters to the editor from the various nullifiers and nullification meetings in the state, and published addresses sent to his paper from other states if they supported his cause. Other nullification newspapers included the Pendleton Messenger, (Columbia) Southern Times, Columbia Telescope, Camden and Lancaster Beacon, Sumter Gazette, Winyaw Intelligencer, and the (Charleston) Evening Post. The major unionist paper was the (Charleston) Southern Patriot; others included the Charleston Courier, Greenville Mountaineer, and the Camden Journal.

⁴⁹Charleston Mercury, March 18, 1833.

⁵⁰Ibid., March, 1833.

⁵¹Ibid., March 18, 1833, from the Alabama Journal, March 9, 1833.

was dying in South Carolina. The Tariff of 1833 accomplished its objective as the moderates of South Carolina and even most of the staunch nullifiers accepted it as a reasonable alternative to the 1832 measure. Strangely, even the temperamental George McDuffie supported the compromise.⁵² The next decision concerned what action to take next. Their Ordinance of Nullification was extant, so the next move lay with them. On March 11, 1833, the Convention reassembled in Columbia and voted to repeal the Ordinance, but to emphasize their antipathy toward the Force Bill, they recalcitrantly voted to nullify it.⁵³ President Jackson wisely ignored their action. At last, the South Carolinians had a lower tariff, and peace was restored.

In conclusion, after looking at the various tariff measures and the Carolinians' reactions to them, there are several questions that should be considered. Why did most South Carolinians oppose the protective tariffs? Why did some become extremists and suggest the remedy of nullification? Why did some groups and individuals support protective tariffs? Why did some become "unionists" during that era, forsaking the states' rights position of many of their fellow statesmen, even though they too usually opposed severe rates of protection? Was there any notable regional or

⁵²Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., pp. 1810-1811.

⁵³Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification Movement, pp. 169-170.

economic continuity in the Carolinians' votes for or against tariff measures? Did non-economic factors such as personal beliefs and heritage or political motivation play a role?

The first question is of primary importance since a majority of the Carolinians opposed tariff legislation; both lowlanders and uplanders even though the economy of one area was distinctively different from that of the other. The people of both sections--the short staple cotton producers of the uplands and the rice and sea island cotton producers of the Tidewater--felt the force of the depression which struck the country in the 1820's and 1830's. Since the depression occurred just as the Carolinians were experiencing a rapid economic growth, the economic decline seemed more precipitous; both to lowlanders who maintained a fairly good income from their crops but who were caught in a currency contraction, and to uplanders whose cotton seemed to have lost its value. The tariff became the scapegoat for the Carolinians' woes, and when the depression lingered in their state longer than in others they assured themselves of the correctness of their logic.

The trend toward protectionist tariffs by the federal government produced general concern and fairly strong opposition on the part of many Carolinians, but it also produced a few radicals or extremists whose fierce disputations and oratories rang out louder than that of their fellow citizenry. Three men, George McDuffie, James Hamilton, Jr., and Robert Y. Hayne, headed the list of radicals, but their

reasons for opposing the tariffs differed. George McDuffie, a citizen of the upland town of Edgefield, lived in the region which suffered worst from the depression, and due to his added personal ambitions and physical frustrations he let nothing hinder his vigorous declamations. The other two spokesmen, Hamilton and Hayne, lived in the more wealthy districts of the Tidewater--an area not as affected by the depression--so the cause of their radicalism lies not in cotton prices but in the slavery question. The whites were often outnumbered by the blacks in the sea islands and coastal region; some slave insurrections had occurred; and the northern abolitionists were asking the federal government to abolish slavery. All these factors produced a degree of concern in the lowlands, and although little was said about the slave issue, some determined to fight the federal government's authority over state matters. They intended to oppose the government's right to impose tariff legislation, hoping that would enable them to counteract any further governmental attempts to meddle in state affairs. Hayne and Hamilton, both of whom owned many slaves, led the fight for the Tidewater aristocrats both because they believed it was an economic necessity to do so and because they were desirous of political acclaim. Interestingly, the lower Piedmont--the Edgefield and Camden districts--which had the most slaves showed the greatest degree of radicalism according

to the newspapers of the day,⁵⁴ so the question of slavery, though muted, appears to be of extreme importance.

As in all controversies, there are usually two opposing views; the same was true in South Carolina because the slave owners and cotton producers who disliked protection were counteracted by two economic sub-groups. These were the self-subsistent farmers of the small mountain region and most of the merchants in Charleston and the major port cities. The farmers whose communication with the surrounding areas was weakened by the lack of roads sought federal funds for internal improvements--money which could be obtained from high imposts. They also saw little need to oppose the tariffs because their meager crops were not affected by the vagaries of the economy. The merchants also hoped for improved internal improvements which would enable the agrarians to bring their goods to market so they, in turn, could transport them to other parts of the country and to Europe. Many of the merchants were northerners instead of native Carolinians, so were not emotionally involved with Carolinian concerns and were not concerned about impost duties which could be passed on to the consumers.⁵⁵

Although most Carolinians opposed the tariffs while a few favored them, a third group arose whose actions were more enigmatic. These were the people who opposed strong

⁵⁴Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, p. 366.

⁵⁵D. D. Wallace, History of South Carolina (New York, 1934), I, p. 364.

protective tariffs, yet who voted for some of the impost measures their fellow statesmen disliked. These people were opposed to the tariffs but more strongly opposed to the remedy of nullification, so they placed themselves in opposition to their fellow citizens by supporting Jackson and the Union. These "unionists" resided in the coastal cities and in the portion of the state lying closest to North Carolina. A resurvey of Maps 3 and 5 shows that William Drayton of Charleston, Thomas Mitchell of Georgetown, and James Blair of Lynchwood cast votes opposing the Tariff of 1832 and the Force Bill. Both of these measures provoked strong emotions since the 1832 act was passed at a time when a majority of people were strongly antagonistic to further protection, and Jackson's Force Bill was despicable to most Carolinians because of the possible military action which might ensue. Still these three men held firm to their anti-nullification beliefs and were joined by several other leading citizens: Joel Poinsett, Hugh Legare, James Petigru, Daniel Huger, Thomas Grimke, Benjamin F. Perry, and William Smith.⁵⁶

In looking at the state's physiography make-up, and at the same time noting the diverse tariff and states' rights beliefs mentioned previously, a clearly defined regional pattern of economic, social, and political thought emerges. The state was divided into seven major socio-economic regions, one being the mountain area, while the other six consisted of

⁵⁶Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification Movement, pp. 93-99.

the southern and northern portions of the lower Tidewater, upper Tidewater, and Piedmont. The cities, so complex in composition, must be categorized separately. Of these areas, citizens of the southern portions of the lower Tidewater, upper Tidewater, and Piedmont, as well as much of the northern Piedmont and several city residents, opposed the tariffs. The people of the mountain region were more favorable to tariffs, but were not a vocal element. The residents of the remaining portions of the lower and upper Tidewater weakly opposed the tariffs, being more concerned with maintaining the Union, and when necessary, many citizens of these areas voted for the tariffs. Economically, then, agrarians of the short staple cotton, rice, long staple cotton, and much of the small farming and tobacco region opposed the tariffs, the latter two being weakest in this respect, while the merchants of the city area and some self-subsistent farmers of the mountains supported the measures.

Finally, one should not overlook the importance of personalities or personal beliefs and social and political motivations when one studies the reactions to the tariffs. These non-economic factors often played an important role among many outstanding Carolinians. The personal and political groupings which might not have occurred had economics been the only factor. Although there was a degree of affinity between the citizens of the uplands and most of the people of the lowlands, it appears some of the aristocratic Charlestonians such as the Legares, Hegers, and others were

less inclined to follow the lead of the new self-proclaimed leaders of the nullification doctrines. However, some of these new stewards were so personally influential and mesmerizing in their power that many moderates followed their bidding although the less influential leaders would not have gained their support.

Altogether, after assessing the regional economics and the tariff reactions, one must conclude that South Carolina was actually quite diverse or complex in nature. There were many interest groups: the free trade agrarians (cotton and rice planters and some small farmers), the non-free trade agrarians (mountain farmers), and the free trade nullifiers or radicals (McDuffie and his allies), the free trade unionists (Drayton and his allies), and the non-free trade unionists or protectionists (the merchants). Thus there were several incompatible elements and shifting alliances. The free trade agrarians were dominant, but the free trade nullifiers proved most vocal and aggressive and gained an undue degree of notoriety.

The unrelenting efforts of the nullifiers influenced the Carolinians to take matters into their own hands and go all the way to nullification as a personal remedy for the twin evils that existed within the state; economic depression in the uplands and slave problems in the lowlands. In considering other states comparatively, one notes that only Georgia was as economically depressed and as aggravated by the abolitionists' outcries against slavery. Yet Georgia did not

join her sister state in supporting nullification, and Virginia--the state noted for leadership in states' rights efforts--also turned a deaf ear to the Carolinians' pleas for assistance. Evidently the strength of the sudden depression on the ascending economy and the desire to keep the economic foundation of the peculiar institution caused the Carolinians to stand alone in their attempt to confront the United States Government. Calhoun belatedly admitted:

I consider the Tariff, but as the occasion, rather than the real cause of the present unhappy state of things. The truth can no longer be disguised that the particular domestick institutions of the Southern states. . . has placed them. . . in opposite relation to the majority of the Union. . . , if there be no protective power in the reserved rights of the state, they must in the end be forced to rebel. . . .⁵⁷

Thus the tariff dilemma in South Carolina ended in 1833, but the camouflaged question of federal authority over the slave institution awaited a future settlement.

⁵⁷Letter of John C. Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 114.

CHAPTER III

VIRGINIA

Resolved, that (Virginians) continue to regard the doctrine of State Sovereignty and State Rights, as set forth in the Resolutions of 1798. . . as a true interpretation of the Constitution. . . and of the powers therein given to the General Government; but that they do not consider them as sanctioning the proceedings of South Carolina, indicated in her said Ordinance; nor as countenancing all the principles assumed by the President in his said Proclamation--many of which are in direct conflict with them.

Resolutions of the Virginia Legislature,
January 26, 1833.¹

The 1833 Resolutions set forth by the Virginia State Legislature upon the passage of South Carolina's Ordinance of Nullification and President Jackson's Nullification Proclamation presented a picture of tenacity and moderation, although in the light of Virginia's history many southerners expected a more radical reaction. Virginia, the home of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, authors of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolves of 1798, considered itself to be the zealous guardian of the doctrine of state sovereignty--the doctrine which declared that if the Federal Government usurped powers not delegated to it in the original compact

¹Herman V. Ames, ed., State Documents on Federal Regulations, The States and the United States (Philadelphia, 1906), p. 187.

the states had the right to interpose and declare the undelegated acts void and of no force. In turn, the states' rights creed had become a type of platform for the Democratic-Republican party of the South, and during the Twenties and Thirties numerous citizens within the Party considered themselves to be the supporters of the "Principles of '98." Strangely, both Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun felt themselves to be upholders of these precepts.²

The true importance of the old doctrines were weighed and debated during the tariff interlude of the 1820's and 1830's as free trade agrarians battled northern protectionists over new impost legislation. The wide spectrum of interpretation concerning the true nature of the Resolutions of 1798 involved two specific things; first, was a tariff constitutional in that this was one of the powers delegated to Congress, and second, was nullification the proper remedy suggested by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison if an action by the government was deemed unconstitutional? Some people declared the two statesmen had meant to imply that nullification was the only remedy possible, while others stated that they had propounded secession as the proper solution since it would be inconceivable to imply that a state could remain in the Union and not obey the Union's laws.³ Jefferson, having

²Charles G. Sellers, Andrew Jackson, Nullification, and the State-Rights Tradition (Chicago, 1963), p. 1.

³John Randolph of Roanoke, among others, was of this latter opinion. See Russell Kirk, John Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in American Politics (Chicago, 1964), p. 94.


died in 1826, was no longer present to reinterpret his document, but Madison survived until 1836 and attempted to redefine his position, contending that the states possessed only a portion of sovereign power and that no single state could nullify a national law. Further, Madison believed a protective tariff was constitutional, but doubted its expediency.⁴ However, few people were willing to listen to Madison unless they were already of the same mind, for by 1832 each individual had already developed his own theory, based on the individual economic or political needs of his region. Other than their differences on proper remedies for unconstitutional acts by the Federal Government, the majority of the people of Virginia were in agreement that states' rights and a strict interpretation of the Constitution were essential, and that the Democratic Party of Jefferson was the only political entity upholding those creeds. The minority opinion, that held by the residents of western Virginia, supported federal powers instead of states' rights, but the westerners had been a less audible element, historically, so for a time their views were considered to be inconsequential.

The South Carolina free traders, noting the historical attachment of the Old Dominion to states' rights, looked to her for support. In fact, they believed this state, second only to Georgia, was most likely to come to her aid in supporting the Ordinance of Nullification. The Carolinians'

⁴Gaillard Hunt, Writings of James Madison (New York: 1900-1908), IV, p. 183; "Letters to C. J. Ingersol," in Niles' Weekly Register, XL, p. 352.

based their reasoning not only on historic actions, but other factors as well. Virginia was the home of the fiery defender of states' rights, John Randolph; it was an agrarian state with staples of tobacco and, to a lesser extent, cotton; it had a slave situation similar to that in the Palmetto State; and finally, Virginia was also experiencing a depression. Yet with all these factors at work in favor of South Carolina, the Virginians ultimately rejected the pleas of their sister state and opposed the legality of the Ordinance of Nullification. Evidently, there were other unnoticed but potent forces within the Old Dominion which elicited her rather amazing stance against nullification. To understand what those elements were, one must note the major force--divisiveness or factionalism within the state.

One thing was quite evident to the Americans of the day --the fact that the people of western Virginia felt set apart or separated from the people of eastern Virginia. In South Carolina unity existed between uplands and lowlands and there was only a small mountain region in the very western part of the state, but Virginia suffered at the hands of nature by being dissected by two ranges of mountains in the near-center of the state. These mountains--the Blue Ridge on the right and the Alleghenies on the left--were divided by a series of valleys, the most notable being the Shenandoah Valley. (Map 6) Thus Virginia was segmented into three distinct parts, but the problems of the Valley citizens were often similar to those which beset the westerners so the two



Map 6. Economy and Topography of Virginia

felt an affinity for one another. The exceptions occurred in the Valley areas which had good transportation outlets to the east, in which case the people were more atune to the views of the easterners.

This east-west division was sharpened by the poor transportation systems of the day. Lacking proper roads and canals which would afford them good connections with the eastern citizens of their own state, the westerners relied on the only good facilities granted them by nature: the Kanawha River system and the mighty Ohio River. The former river ran through the center of the western area, past Wellsburg (now Charleston) and emptied into the Ohio. Goods sent to market or for export could be floated on barge or boat down these two rivers, then down the Mississippi River to New Orleans. It was inevitable that the westerners should feel closer to the people across the river from them in Ohio or Kentucky than to the people of their own state who lived across the mountains to the east. Nevertheless, the westerners, being politically affiliated with the east, clamored for state and federal aid so that roads and canals could be built to bridge the mountains.

The road projects that were desired by the westerners were not quickly granted, but even if a good communication system had been effected, there were many other hindrances to unity which plagued the state. The western economy was quite different from that of the east; major crops being wheat, rye, corn, and some tobacco. In general, the west was

a land of small farmers since the mountainous and hilly nature of the land precluded any large plantation economy. The valley areas and the river bottom lands provided good grazing areas for sheep and other livestock, and eventually, wool production became a major livelihood for many of the people of the north and west transmontane region, especially around Wheeling.⁵ Two small textile factories were established in Wheeling.⁶ Several of the westerners were engaged in three non-agrarian pursuits: coal and iron ore mining and salt production. The major coal mines and iron ore areas were located in the northern portions of the west and the Valley, although minor veins were uncovered in several other places. Wheeling cut three hundred tons of nails annually and rolled one thousand tons of iron.⁷ The miners strongly advocated federal internal improvement programs so they could more easily transport their goods to the North. The other resource, salt, was found beside the Ohio, but especially along the Kanawha River, an area which was a pathway to the West. The salt trade and the fertile river lands invited people moving westward to reside for a time along the Kanawha

⁵The introduction of a new breed of sheep, the Merino, proved quite valuable in northwest Virginia. Charles Henry Ambler, West Virginia, The Mountain State (New York, 1940), p. 224.

⁶Charles Henry Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, 1776-1861 (New York, 1964), p. 116.

⁷Ibid., p. 116.

to work in the salt mining industry, the only western industry which used much slave labor.⁸

The western Virginians, due to their economic interests, supported protective tariff policies, believing they needed strong prohibitions against foreign goods in order for their meager enterprises to grow. The iron industry, noted for making nails and rolled and bar iron, was not yet large enough to supply the country, but many westerners wanted the federal government to limit the foreign supply of iron to insure a stronger demand for their products. The salt industry was more highly developed than the iron, but these producers also wanted to limit the foreign supply which was coming into the area through New Orleans and up the Ohio River. The sheep herders wanted to curtail the importation of foreign wool and woolens goods so they could expand their herds and businesses and help supply the home market. As a result, most of the citizens of western Virginia increasingly supported protection, especially after 1824 when their productive activities increased. Although the change from agrarian free trade views to a high tariff belief was gradual, one western congressman initiated the trend in 1824 by supporting the measure of that year, and in the years to come the entire west changed to become advocates of protection.⁹

⁸Isaac Lippincott, "Early Salt Trade in the Ohio Valley," Journal of Political Economy, XX (1939), p. 1029.

⁹Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I sess., p. 2310.

The differences that appeared in the transmontane districts, although economic in nature, caused the westerners to support the Federalist or National Republican political party--the group which espoused protective tariffs, federally financed internal improvements, and home markets for industrial products, but sometimes the westerners crossed party lines to support Democrats if they believed the candidate supported legislation favorable to their interests. In 1824 the westerners worked to defeat William Crawford, the Democrat states' rights candidate supported by the easterners. They got Henry Clay's followers and John Quincy Adams' followers in their region to unite behind Andrew Jackson, believing he was opposed to aristocracy and conservatism which were the characteristics of their eastern neighbors.¹⁰ Both Jackson and Crawford lost the election, but the westerners were delighted that the victor was John Quincy Adams, a supporter of all the policies they approved. The easterners were displeased since the states' rights candidate they had supported, Crawford, had not only lost the election but had been afflicted by a stroke which would end his political career.¹¹

Adams' political views, not clearly defined at the time of his candidacy, were presented in his inaugural address as

¹⁰For a survey of the Virginians' alignment behind the various candidates, see Richmond Enquirer, May-November, 1824.

¹¹J. E. D. Shipp, Giant Days: The Life and Times of William H. Crawford (Americus, Ga., 1909), p. 174.

he advocated a program of enlarged government spending.¹² Items such as internal improvements were especially stressed, and it seemed he favored a new protective tariff, although a measure with average ad valorem duties of 33 1/3 per cent had just been enacted in 1824.

The people of eastern Virginia objected to a strengthened federal program not merely because of their own historic doctrine of states' rights but because of their own strong economic interests which were very different from those of the west. Eastern Virginia was tobacco country with cotton as a secondary staple. Since colonial times the Virginians had been noted for their expanding agrarian economy, the use of slave labor, and the large Tidewater and Piedmont plantations. However, between 1800 and 1830 there were clear evidences of economic decline. The wasteful system of tobacco and cotton culture depleted the soil and wore out the lands. People and capital moved westward, past Virginia, and wealth was drained from the east.¹³ Even the corn and wheat lands were nearly exhausted by the unscientific farming methods. John Randolph of Roanoke, writing in 1814 to Josiah Quincy, bewailed the decline of the seaboard planters, declaring that the region was sunk in obscurity.¹⁴ Charles Mercer, speaking

¹²George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New York, 1952), p. 8.

¹³Niles' Weekly Register, XLIV, p. 411; Annals of Congress, 16 Cong., I sess., p. 1392.

¹⁴Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-1829 (New York, 1962), p. 59.

to the Virginia convention in 1829, estimated that in 1817 land values in Virginia aggregated two hundred and six million dollars, and slaves averaged three hundred dollars, while in 1829 the land values averaged ninety million dollars, and slaves had fallen to one hundred and fifty dollars in value.¹⁵ The cotton crop, though much smaller than the amount produced by South Carolina or Georgia, totalled around 8 million pounds in 1811, twelve million pounds in 1821, and twenty-five million pounds in 1826, but then receded until it was down to ten million pounds in 1834.¹⁶ The panic of 1819 added to the Virginians' woes as their incomes declined even more. Some planters tried to convert from tobacco to cotton, hoping they could replenish the soil by changing to the second major staple, but the shorter Virginia growing season hampered many of them from achieving success except in the region bordering on North Carolina.¹⁷ Ultimately, with the lands lying idle, but with nearly a half million slaves on hand, the once wealthy planters turned to a different mode of income--the sale of surplus slaves to the newer states of the Southwest.¹⁸

The depressed economy of the east caused many easterners to be even more zealous guardians of the doctrine of

¹⁵Ibid., p. 59.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁷Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 115.

¹⁸Turner, Rise of the New West, p. 57.

states' rights--a doctrine which would prohibit the federal government from using federal monies for internal improvements and which would not allow the Congress to pass more protective tariffs. They believed either of these programs would plunge them deeper into debt. Many easterners even went a step further than simply opposing expenditures by the national government; they also refused to sponsor building programs within their own state, especially if it would benefit the west. They did not want to spend money on a region other than their own. They carried their attitude a step farther, as they had done since colonial times, by trying to prevent the west from having a large representation in the state legislature; it was not until 1829 that the westerners were able to achieve a democratic representation pattern.¹⁹

By 1828 the westerners and easterners had firmly established, but divergent, ideas concerning President Adams, internal improvements, tariffs, and party politics. The westerners were becoming predominantly National-Republicans while the easterners were Democratic-Republicans--the party of Jefferson. The General Survey Bill of 1824, providing for road projects which were termed of national importance, alienated the easterners a step further from Adams when, during his administration, he asked for some roads which were not deemed essential.²⁰ Strangely, by 1828 the easterners and

¹⁹Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, pp. 137-174.

²⁰Register of Debates, 18 Cong., I sess., I, pp. 1296-1311, 1468.

westerners had reversed their former positions in regard to presidential contenders; the majority of easterners favored Andrew Jackson for the next Democratic-Republican candidate, while the westerners supported John Quincy Adams or Henry Clay.²¹ The easterners, although they realized Old Hickory was more friendly to "commoners" than to themselves, felt Jackson would oppose internal improvements, would favor a low, or as he said "judicious tariff," and might oppose the bank monopoly which they disliked. Adams' presidential programs had ingratiated him in the eyes of the westerners whose major objection concerned internal improvements so they were almost totally for him and his party.²² It was during this moment of pre-election decision-making that the Jacksonian supporters, led by Martin Van Buren, worked to effect a scheme which would enhance Jackson's chances for the presidency, while at the same time retard those of Adams. This plan emerged as the Tariff of 1828.

The Virginians' attitudes toward the Tariff of 1828 were divided. The act was extremely protective, almost to the degree of prohibition on some items since it established average ad valorem duties of around 50 per cent. The eastern Virginians hoped, as Jacksonians, that the northern manufacturers would find the measure objectionable and, along with the rest of the South, vote it down. The western

²¹Richmond Enquirer, November 28, 1828.

²²Register of Debates, 18 Cong., I sess., III, pp. 1285, 1320, 1312.

Virginians who had sent delegates to the Harrisburg Convention in 1827 to petition Congress to retain protective duties on woolens and salt, supported the tariff.²³ They wanted a high duty on woolens to preserve the sheep-raising and woollen industries against British competition, and a salt duty because this item was being brought to New Orleans as ballast for ships and distributed along the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers by steamboats.²⁴


The 1828 tariff, in its final form, gave protection to wool, woolens, cotton goods, iron, and several other items. Although the textile manufacturers of New England were unhappy at the duty on wool and the poor system of minima listings on woolens, the western Virginians and Pennsylvanians were pleased. They felt they could supply the North with wool and iron and expand their enterprises. This support of protection by the westerners is evidenced in their congressional tariff vote in 1828, a vote which was quite different from that of the agrarians throughout the rest of the South.²⁵ (Map 7)

In 1828, Virginia representatives cast three votes for the "Tariff of Abominations"; these votes were cast, however, by representatives from the western portion of the state--an area suggesting, in its extent and boundaries, the present

²³Niles' Weekly Register, XXXII, pp. 388, 417.

²⁴Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 203.

²⁵Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2471-2472.



Map 7. Virginia's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1828

state of West Virginia. This area sent a solid slate of National-Republicans to Congress to represent them: Isaac Leffler of Wheeling, William Armstrong of Romney, and Lewis Maxwell of Weston.²⁶ Leffler, representing the iron interests of the north, was a lawyer in Wheeling before his 1827 election to Congress.²⁷ He made the only comment on the floor of the House from his district as he worked to gain protection against foreign iron.²⁸ Armstrong, a lawyer and a former Democrat, represented the sheep and iron interests of the northeast. He chose to remain silent during the debates as did Maxwell, the most noted National-Republican of the group.²⁹ Maxwell, who represented the salt, wool and internal improvement interests of the west, was not a new convert to this political party as were many other Virginians, but had supported governmental programs during most of his career.³⁰

Although the west had only three congressmen, all voting for the bill, the east had twenty-one, none of whom favored the act.³¹ This division shows a strict sectional cleavage

²⁶Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, D. C., 1961), pp. 1208, 488, 1278.

²⁷Ibid., p. 1278.

²⁸Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, p. 2697.

²⁹Ibid., passim.

³⁰Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1278.

³¹Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 786, 2471-2472.

in regard to excessively strong protective tariff. Of the twenty-one votes, four did not vote, but seventeen cast decisive votes against it. These congressmen will be noted in more detail later, but it is important to note the general uniformity of the east in this year. The coastal region, the Tidewater, the Piedmont, and even Alexander Smyth of Wythe and Robert Allen of the transitional mountain and valley area opposed the measure. Smyth, born in Ireland, was a Democrat who had directed an unsuccessful campaign against Canada in the War of 1812. He was in ill repute with many Americans, but his constituents thought highly of him.³² Allen, also a Democrat, was engaged in agriculture in the fertile area of the Shenandoah Valley. This portion of the Valley was generally atune to the beliefs of the east due to the better agrarian economy; although this eastern orientation did not always hold true.

The votes of these eastern congressmen were cast with a great deal of confidence because they were Jacksonians and they believed a majority of opposition votes would be cast against the tariff so that it would not become law. Only four congressmen from the east made major contributions to the debate, though the extremely lengthy speeches of Nathaniel Claiborne and Mark Alexander seemed to make up for the others.³³ Alexander stated the bill was constitutional in

³²Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1628, 472; Dictionary of American Biography, XVII, pp. 373-374.

³³Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, passim.

laying and collecting taxes, but that it violated the spirit of the Constitution. He said, "There is sometimes a fatal delusion in speculating too much on the weakness of those whom we tend to oppress."³⁴ Claiborne spoke for the tobacco interests in opposing the principle of the bill. He said, "Some gentlemen suppose that we, who are opposed to this bill are opposed to all tariffs, but this is not so. Who is not opposed to a moderate, judicious, and Constitutional tariff? No one."³⁵ Philip P. Barbour, an accomplice in the Jacksonian scheme, tried to explain his part in the formation of the Committee on Manufactures. He said he understood his duty which was to compose the Committee with a majority of people opposed to tariffs, and had attempted to perform that duty by placing men on the committee who were from regions which seemed favorable or unfavorable to manufacturers but was surprised to find that things turned out differently and that a protective measure appeared. As for himself, he assured his constituents that he was "violently opposed to the American System."³⁶ Barbour's words were intended for his constituents who might not realize the true intentions of the committee he and the Jacksonians had purposely chosen--men who

³⁴Ibid., p. 2414.

³⁵Ibid., p. 1791.

³⁶Ibid., p. 2413; Niles' Weekly Register, XXXIV, p. 137.


would write an extremely protective and objectionable measure.³⁷

When the Tariff of 1828 passed Congress, men such as Barbour were chagrined, but with the disservice rendered to Adams when the measure was passed under his administration, they felt confident that they could look forward to better years once Jackson was elected so their reactions were fairly moderate. The easterners were not completely certain of Jackson's stand on several issues, but many felt he was the best candidate available in the absence of William Crawford. The westerners had by this time reversed their former support of Jackson and favored John Quincy Adams, the staunch advocator of internal improvements. Jackson, the easterners' choice, won the election.³⁸

The years of Jackson's first administration, 1828-1832, were years of change in Virginia's economic and political history; the end result being the fragmentation of the east into "pockets" of political thought. By 1832, when the next tariff was enacted, the old cleavage between west and east was still noticeable because the westerners continued to vote in a solid pattern, but there was an evident difference of opinion within the east itself. (Map 8) In order to

³⁷Although Niles' Weekly Register and other papers covering the tariff reactions of the South are filled with adamant editorials against the 1828 measure, the majority of comments came from South Carolina. The Virginians remained relatively quiet.

³⁸Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 28, 1828.



Key	Yea vote +	Nay vote o	Not voting -	Votes	Senate	Yea vote 0	Nay vote 2	Not voting 0	Total
					House	Yea vote 11	Nay vote 8	Not voting 3	Yea vote 11
									Nay vote 10
									Not voting 3
									<u>24</u> Congressmen

Map 8. Virginia's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1832

understand the 1832 tariff vote, these eastern incongruencies merit consideration.

The first area of particularism in eastern Virginia was found in the northern part of that section--an area which was represented by Charles Mercer of Leesburg, and later Aldie.³⁹ (Map 8) This Loudoun County region was, by 1832, definitely National-Republican in political affiliation since the people of this area wanted to strengthen their economy by effecting better transportation systems across the state. The system decided upon was a Chesapeake and Ohio Canal which would allow the northern part of the state to develop as a commercial center.⁴⁰ Mercer was at one time the president of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, but he was removed when President Jackson tired of his anti-administration remarks.⁴¹ Mercer was well liked by the westerners because of his support of internal improvements, and secondly, because of his desires to transport former slaves who were then free to a colony in Africa.⁴² The westerners, having few slaves themselves, were not inclined to promote this institution.⁴³ Mercer was less favored by the people directly to the south of his district who held opposing viewpoints.

³⁹Biographical Directory of the American Congress, pp. 1320-1321.

⁴⁰Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 123.

⁴¹John Eaton, President Jackson's closest friend, superseded Mercer as President of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company. National Intelligencer, May 22, June 6, June 8, 1830.

⁴²Charleston Mercury, April 12, 24, May 1, 17, 1830.

⁴³Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 186.

The second eastern area which seemed set apart from the rest of the state and the Mercer area was located in the northern fall line and Piedmont in Orange, Culpeper, and surrounding counties and a portion of the upper Shenandoah Valley. The prevalent attitude here was one favoring states' rights and anti-tariff sentiment due to the agrarian nature of the tobacco-planting area. The people were Democrats and were represented by John Patton of Fredericksburg, John Barbour of Culpeper, and William Gordon of Lindseys, and the upper Shenandoah Valley was represented by Robert Allen who was influenced by the traditional regional beliefs of his eastern neighbors. This was also the area once represented by congressmen John Taliaferro of Fredericksburg and Philip P. Barbour of Gordonsville--two notable leaders of and staunch supporters of the Democrat Party.⁴⁴ Philip Barbour, probably the most representative of this group, was one of the earliest political leaders from this section to attack federal internal improvement policies and other governmental programs which would lead to a monopoly or would cause the tariff to be increased. He was an ardent strict constructionist, a lawyer, and for a time, a supporter of Jackson as leader of the Democratic party.⁴⁵

A third area of sentiment, one which was more nationalistic than Philip Barbour's states rights element, lay below

⁴⁴Biographical Directory of the American Congress, pp. 1434, 513, 472, 1687, 514.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 514.

the Barbour district, just mentioned, and in a horizontal path above Richmond. This area was the center of Thomas Ritchie's influence. Ritchie, although never a congressman, wielded a great deal of power among citizens around Richmond by editing a widely circulated newspaper, the Richmond Enquirer.⁴⁶ He had purchased the paper in 1804 and was asked by Judge Spencer Roane, his cousin, and President Thomas Jefferson to do federal printing oriented toward the Democratic-Republican Party. Ritchie's paper, which he edited for forty-one years, generally presented his views to the people. He supported Jackson and Van Buren, opposed Henry Clay and John Calhoun, and backed some measures demanded by the westerners such as internal improvements and greater democracy in representation. The westerners, in turn, gave him strong support.⁴⁷ One man, William Rives, present in the Twentieth Congress and the latter part of the Twenty-Second Congress, lived in the western fringe of the "Ritchie District" at Milton and echoed Ritchie's pro-Jackson, Democratic, anti-tariff sentiments.⁴⁸ He was also opposed to the bank, as was Jackson, and proved to be one of Jackson's strongest supporters, but he, like many others,

⁴⁶Charles Henry Ambler, Thomas Ritchie, A Study of Virginia Politics (Richmond, 1913), passim.

⁴⁷Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington, 1913), p. 21; Dictionary of American Biography, XV, pp. 628-629.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 636-637; H. H. Simms, The Rise of the Whigs in Virginia (Richmond, 1929), p. 64.

later left the Jackson camp.⁴⁹ J. J. Roane of Rumford Academy and Joseph Chinn of Nuttsville also belonged to this faction which was rather nationalistic on some issues.⁵⁰

A fourth distinct region lay in the vicinity of Richmond, slightly to the west and south. This Amelia and Powhatan County area was a coal mining area and, as such, favored protective tariffs.⁵¹ The region was small, but it contributed to the industrial nature of Richmond, the strongest manufacturing city of Virginia. William Archer of Elk Hill represented the people from this area. He was at first a Democrat, but due to some of the exacerbating actions of Jackson, became a Whig in later years.⁵² Alexander Stevenson, representing Richmond, the Capitol and leading city, was a former lawyer and a Democrat and was well respected by congressmen from states other than his own. He favored states' rights, though more moderately than some of his fellow Virginians. Nevertheless, his vote was never placed on any of the major bills of the era, for the members of the House of Representatives chose him to be Speaker, a position which would allow him to cast only tie-breaking votes.⁵³

⁴⁹Dictionary of American Biography, XV, pp. 628-629.

⁵⁰Biographical Directory of the American Congress, pp. 1524-1525.

⁵¹Journal, House of Representatives, 22 Cong., I sess., p. 1023.

⁵²Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 486.

⁵³Ibid., p. 1654.

To the south and east of Richmond lay the lower Chesapeake Bay area which was represented by Senator John Tyler of Gloucester and Richard Coke of Williamsburg, a rather aristocratic and states' rights tobacco region. Tyler was especially noted for his anti-tariff position and strong belief in state sovereignty.⁵⁴

Just below the Tyler district lay the Norfolk, Virginia Beach area which fronted the Atlantic Ocean; an area represented by Senator Littleton Tazewell and Representative Thomas Newton, Jr., both of Norfolk, and William McCoy of Franklin. This region was considered the truly democratic area of the east because it had been settled by people who were less pretentious and who often felt affinity toward their North Carolinian neighbors.⁵⁵ However, this area was rather divided in sentiment regarding tariffs, with Tazewell being the most pronounced opponent of protection and one of the strongest states' rights advocates. All were in agreement in political party affiliation, though, and supported the Democratic party.⁵⁶

The lower portion of Virginia, the Piedmont and the southwestern Valley area, was basically a farming region whose citizens opposed protective tariff legislation and supported states' rights. Although all were Democrats, Thomas

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 1737, 718.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 1696-1697, 1387, 1290.

⁵⁶Cole, The Whig Party in the South, p. 7.

Bouldin of Charlotte was most outspoken. He opposed encroachments on reserved state powers and strongly opposed protective tariffs and internal improvements. He, as well as most of the other people in the Piedmont, opposed any government inclinations to meddle in a state's slave policy.⁵⁷

Thus, when Jackson was elected in 1828 it appeared he had a fairly strong following in eastern Virginia, the portion of the state which had strongly supported him in the election, and especially the Ritchie area. The weakest support came from the Mercer area, the central Potomac, and the Virginia Beach region. The east, except for these latter three zones, felt Jackson would do their bidding and support strict construction of the Constitution and a concomitant reduction of the tariff.

Although the eastern Virginians waited, Jackson, by 1832, had done nothing to alleviate the tariff stress suffered by southern agrarians. Virginia's tobacco depression was still occurring, causing them to consider the 1828 act a hardship.⁵⁸ Finally, in 1832, in reaction to the outcries of the South, a new tariff bill emerged from Congress, but the bill, contrary to expectations, retained some of the protective features the South opposed.⁵⁹ Southerners were again

⁵⁷Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., VIII, pp. 3210, 3235, 3672.

⁵⁸Turner, Rise of the New West, pp. 52-57.

⁵⁹Frank Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York, 1967), pp. 103-105.

enraged at the northern domination of tariff policy and at the thought that the government sponsored a permanent protective program.

One other factor was added to the 1832 tariff debate-- the question of nullification. Since 1828 the radical element of South Carolina had pushed the cause of nullification, and by 1832 had gained countless followers. This possible action by the South Carolinians against the governmental tariff influenced some of the Virginians' 1832 tariff votes, as will be noted. (Map 8).

The Virginians' congressional tariff vote of 1832 was more evenly divided than that of 1828, with eleven votes in favor of the protective measure, ten against, and three not voting.⁶⁰ Again the western region cast a united vote in favor of the bill due to their desire for protection, but also to emphasize their opposition to nullification. In the east the three more nationalistic regions, previously mentioned, presented a vote favorable to the tariff. These included first, the vote of Mercer, second, the Roane and Chinn votes, and third, the Archer vote. Three other eastern votes supported the measure; those of Thomas Newton, John Mason, and Nathaniel Claiborne. These men's ballots were cast to show their opposition to nullification more than to give solid support to protection. In looking at the east and west, one sees that four westerners supported the 1832 act


⁶⁰Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, pp. 1219, 3830-3831.

while seven easterners favored it. (Maps 7 and 8) This vote shows a change of position since 1828 because no easterners had backed tariffs then. The total of eleven yeas and ten nays show that there was a growing change in economic and political thought in Virginia and an increasing division of sentiment.

After the passage of the Tariff of 1832 the Nullification Ordinance of South Carolina caused increasing concern. Most eastern Virginians did not like the existing tariff, but neither were they too interested in annulling a federal law or separating from the Union. They had a decision to make, though, because South Carolina asked for support in calling a southern convention, and Andrew Jackson, after stating a lower tariff might be in order, threw the firebrand of federal powers over state sovereignty by presenting his Nullification Proclamation and Force Bill which maintained the federal authorities had the right to enforce the tariff in South Carolina.

The decision regarding the first issue, a lower tariff, was an easy one to make since few wanted a civil war and since a majority did want a favorable tariff bill. The congressional vote on the suggested remedy, the Tariff of 1833, which lowered imposts over a nine-year period, shows a great degree of accord.⁶¹ (Map 9) The westerners unanimously favored the bill because it would prevent disunion, an action

⁶¹Ibid., II sess., IX, pp. 1810-1811, 808-809.



Key

Yea vote +
 Nay vote O
 Not voting -

Votes

Senate

Yea vote 2
 Nay vote 0
 Not voting 0
 Yea vote 20
 Nay vote 1
 Not voting 1

House

Total

Yea vote 22
 Nay vote 1
 Not voting 1

24 Congressmen

Map 9. Virginia's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1833

which would seriously injure them, and the east, with two exceptions, also voted unanimously for the bill. Stevenson's speakership position again did not allow him to vote, so the only vote in opposition to the bill came from Charles Mercer. Mercer did not let the threat of nullification deter him from opposing a lower tariff which would detract from the present protective system. The revenues from such measures were important to his constituents who desired canals and roads.

The most important congressional vote was that on Jackson's Force Bill of 1833, since the basic Virginia doctrine of state sovereignty seemed at stake. The President appeared to be rejecting the validity of the old document by asserting that not only was South Carolina erroneous in invoking it, but that the federal government could justifiably use force to curtail such recalcitrant states.⁶² The questions of the constitutionality of a protective tariff as well as the constitutionality of Jackson's actions were debated. Was using force against a sovereign state a usurpation of power? Was nullification the proper remedy suggested by the "Principles of '98"? And, finally, was nullification--but not secession--objectionable to Madison and Jefferson? There were no unanimous answers on the part of the Virginians because of the already strong fragmentation, but the major

⁶²Ibid., pp. 1810-1811. The House vote for the final passage of the Force Bill was not given by names, but the vote was given on the question of engrossing and reading for a third time. The information given is based on that vote of March 1, 1833.


divisions of sentiment can be observed in their voting pattern. (Map 10).

The gamut of political thought showed all types of attitudes in Virginia in 1833; National Republican unionists, unionist Jacksonian Democrats, states' rights nullifying Democrats, and states' rights secession Democrats. The western part of Virginia was unanimously in favor of the "Bloody Bill" or Force Bill since the people there were National Republicans who opposed separating from the Union. Charles Mercer's eastern National Republican area was of the same view. The nationalistic area of Virginia Beach also supported the Force Bill. These people, but Senator Rives especially, were Jacksonians. Rives felt banks and tariffs were constitutional but not necessary at the time.⁶³ Although he was opposed to the tariffs, he also opposed nullification. He and Ritchie were not pleased with Jackson's actions, but continued to support him through the ordeal. Rives, never one to hide his views, stated on the floor of Congress:

It is my misfortune to differ from my worthy and honorable colleague, as well as from other honorable senators coming from the same quarter of the Union as myself No one is . . . more thoroughly opposed to the American System than myself . . . but what, Sir, will be the consequence if South Carolina be permitted, without opposition, to nullify the revenue laws of the Union? . . . The example would inflict a mortal wound on the Constitution. The Government would thenceforth be virtually dissolved, and we should inevitably fall back into the anarchy and confusion of the Articles of Confederation.⁶⁴

⁶³Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 207.

⁶⁴Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, pp. 491-517.



Map 10. Virginia's Force Bill Vote, 1833

As the question grew more emotional, the first two groups mentioned--National Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats of Rives' caliber--united to form the Union Party.⁶⁵

The remaining Democrats were not in agreement although they were opposed to Jackson's Force Bill as obviating the sovereignty of the states. They disagreed on the method of remedy, with one group suggesting that Virginia align with South Carolina in supporting nullification and one group opposing such an action as contrary to Jefferson's intended purpose. The latter group, in turn, suggested secession as the only constitutional remedy,⁶⁶ The nullifiers, of the two, were most radical, for the seceders were not ready to act and hoped the final step could be avoided. The nullifiers, however, rallied around the vocal leaders who demanded immediate action. The major nullifiers were scattered throughout portions of the Piedmont, and some resided in the Tidewater; the most adamant ones lived nearer to the North Carolina border. Thomas Bouldin, Thomas Davenport, John Barbour, William Gordon and Governor John Floyd were among the group which favored nullification. Bouldin, the main exponent of this doctrine, once said in Congress, "The power to protect manufactures belongs not to (the federal) government, but is a usurpation."⁶⁷ He later was more precise:

⁶⁵Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 209:

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 209; Niles' Weekly Register, XLIV, p. 162.

⁶⁷Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., VIII, p. 3210.

Mr. Chairman, my Constituents are, in a high degree, the friends of law and order; their attachment to the Union of these States, on the principles of the Constitution, has no limits whatever. But they cannot for simple Union's sake give up that Constitution itself. . . .⁶⁸

The nullifiers, though ambivalent, were held in check by those who said only secession was constitutional and that Jackson's Force Bill was definitely unconstitutional. These secessionists included Senator John Tyler, a very influential party man, P. P. Barbour, William Gordon, and others.⁶⁹ In fact, John Tyler was the only senator to cast a negative vote against the Force Bill since other southerners in the Senate opposed it but chose to refrain from voting.⁷⁰ Senator Rives, the other Virginia senator, as noted, voted for the bill. The outcome of the nullifier-secessionist sentiment was the formation of the States' Rights Party of Virginia. The party's strength lay in the region south of the Rappahannock River and east of the Blue Ridge Mountains, although, of course, not all people of this region were in agreement.⁷¹ The outcome of the tariff and nullification controversy was a political realignment within the state, a trend toward hatred of Jackson and his "dictator" methods

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 3235.

⁶⁹Niles' Weekly Register, XLIII, p. 249; Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, pp. 368-377, 1653, 1767, 1897.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 688.

⁷¹Charleston Mercury, January 4, 1833; Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, p. 218.

on the part of the States' Rights Democrats,⁷² the complete break by John Tyler and his followers from the Jacksonian Party which had supported the despised Force Bill, and the emergence of the Whig party--an "umbrella party" which held many discontented, anti-Jackson southerners.⁷³

In studying the Resolutions of Virginia once again, one notes that they considered the Resolutions of 1798 as the true interpretation of the Constitution, opposed South Carolina's Ordinance of Nullification, and opposed Jackson's Force Bill. The convention which wrote this document was dominated by the States' Rights secessionists, though men of differing beliefs were also on hand.⁷⁴ This is one reason why South Carolina's nullification pleas were discounted; the nullifiers did not dominate.

In conclusion, it is apparent that the Virginians had as many reasons as the South Carolinians did to react adversely to protective tariff legislation; the major ones being the agrarian nature of their economy, the prolonged depression, and the agrarian-related institution of slavery. The majority of transmontane citizens reversed their former free trade position during the Twenties and began to support protection in order to aid their mining and wool producing

⁷²The Virginians' opposition to the Force Bill and their resultant anti-Jackson realignment can be seen in Niles' Weekly Register, XLIII, in which various Virginia newspaper articles are quoted, pp. 249, 285-286, 345.

⁷³Cole, The Whig Party in the South, pp. 20-21, 29.

⁷⁴Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, pp. 215-217.

industries and to enable the federal government to return some of the monies, thus gained, to them in the form of internal improvements. The majority of cismontane residents favored low imposts, yet many variables were added to their situation which caused several groups to alter their position and to, at times, support protection. These variables concerned such questions as nullification, secession, union, states' rights, political and personal alliances, and internal improvements. In turn, the divisiveness of the east prevented united action when Virginia was asked to support South Carolina's call for a southern convention. It seemed that the sub-regional units of thought were the outstanding factors to the different people, while tariff legislation became almost secondary.

The Virginians' rather mild reaction is especially interesting since one would expect a region suffering so intensely from the depression to erect strong defenses against a heavy impost system. The depression was so grave that even James Madison and Thomas Jefferson were placing their homes on sale to pay their debts. Evidently, there were some sociological factors involved in their actions which caused them to accept the situation as it was without looking for a scapegoat. The Virginians had suffered from eroded lands and declining prices for years, while South Carolina's decline was extremely precipitous, so the people had by the 1830's adjusted to their problems. If the depression had come as a sudden shock to them, they too might have supported nullification.

The same conditions account for the Virginians' reactions toward the institution of slavery and its place in America. While the South Carolinians were using the tariff as a camouflage to shield their state and its institutions against any legislation by the federal government, the Virginians were anxious to rid the state of many slaves and freemen by colonizing them in Africa, selling them to other states, or having the federal government buy them and transport them to another area. They had less need of slave labor than the cotton states since fewer hands could work the tobacco fields.

These factors and others previously mentioned account for Virginia's varied reactions to the various tariff controversies of the 1828-1833 era. The southern Piedmont and Tidewater citizens--those nearest South Carolina--supported nullification, but the rest were too involved in political and constitutional rhetoric to come to the aid of their sister state. As the Resolutions of the State of Virginia showed, Virginia took the middle road.

CHAPTER IV

NORTH CAROLINA

The Committee will not assert that Congress have no power, under the Constitution, to lay duties on imports, which are intended to operate as a protection to manufactures; they maintain, however, that the exercise of such a power, as contemplated by the Woolens Bill, is a direct violation of the spirit of that instrument. . . . It is conceded, that Congress have the express power to lay imposts; but it is maintained, that that power was given for the purpose of revenue, and revenue alone. . . .

Report of the North Carolina
Legislature, January, 1828¹

Only one state in the country, North Carolina, had the distinction of having an unblemished free trade record in 1828. When the first protective tariff passed Congress in 1816 the Carolinians cast all eleven of their votes against it. This vote, out of a total of thirty-one opposition votes from the South as a whole, and their unanimous disapproval of the proposed tariffs of 1820 and 1824, showed the steadfastness of the North Carolinians' antagonism to protection and at the same time portrayed the laxity of the other southerners in maintaining their free trade system.² Many of the

¹Herman V. Ames, ed., State Documents on Federal Relations, The States and the United States (Philadelphia, 1906), pp. 148-150.

²Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 1782-1828 (New York, 1944), p. 404.

other southerners, including John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, favored some of the measures before them, asserting that the country needed funds for military improvements after the War of 1812, and that the South would have its own industry within a few years. To these liberal minded leaders, North Carolina seemed to be conservative and negativistic without reason.

By 1827 the pronouncements by the southerners who had supported much of the protective legislation ended, and they reverted back to the strong states' rights position of an earlier era when the South objected to all that was libertine in regard to federal policy. Suddenly, the unwavering obstructionist tactics of the North Carolinians merited reconsideration and were worthy of praise, while the weak and wavering positions of many renowned southern leaders had to be reassessed to determine whether they were truly for the South or against it. Even John C. Calhoun, realizing that the South was losing its position of political leadership and economic stability, transformed himself from a semi-nationalist to a states' rights free trader in order to carry the banner for many of his southern brethern.

Calhoun's belated entry into the field of obstructionist politics did not handicap him or the other southern extremist leaders who reviled many of the new federal policies. By 1827 he and his fellow South Carolinians were casting about, looking for southern allies who would help fend off the federal government from its attempt to levy high imposts on the

South for the benefit of the manufacturers of the North. They presumed strongest support for their cause would come from the states of Georgia, Virginia, and North Carolina, all of which were agrarian states with economic problems and with states' rights, free trade tendencies.

The South Carolinians' suppositions that the North Carolinians would aid them in the fight against the tariffs were gratified in 1827 when representatives for the northern manufacturers presented the Woolens Bill to Congress for approval in 1827. Governor Hutchins Burton of North Carolina declared in his November message to the General Assembly, "The dignity and interest of the state requires that North Carolina should not be silent," and requested the body to adopt an anti-tariff report.³ The Assembly, acting upon his request, adopted a statement renouncing the Woolens Bill as a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, maintaining that the manufactures in the United States were not an object of general interest, but of local interest. They asserted that the federal government had protected the producers by laying an enormous duty on the South which "palsies every effort of the agriculturist, withers the product of his industry, and greatly impairs foreign commerce."⁴

North Carolina's Report of the Legislature, written in January, 1828, was penned with the knowledge that the Woolens

³Niles' Weekly Register, XXXIII, p. 283.

⁴Executive Documents, 20 Cong., I sess., III, No. 62.

Bill of 1827 was but the initiatory step in a new series of attempts by the North to gain their desired goals. Although the act failed of passage by one vote, that cast by Vice President Calhoun, the protectionists seemed greatly stimulated to make renewed efforts to achieve their objective, and conversely, the free traders were just as resolute in their determination to suppress future protection movements. Although it appeared the free traders could not prohibit protective tariffs from being presented to Congress for consideration, a negative strategy seemed to be in order; they could present a protective measure to Congress, as requested, but would make it so extremely protective and distasteful to the interests who had advocated protection in the first place that no one would support it. This ingenious strategy was carefully effected in 1828 as the Twentieth Congress convened.

Politics played an important role in the tariff controversy, and was, along with the natural aversions to the tariffs, the dominant force behind the scheme to write a tariff which would be objectionable to all. A majority of the southerners from North Carolina and elsewhere were Democratic Republicans, or as they were often called, Democrats of the Jeffersonian tradition, and they hoped to use the tariff issue to arouse support for a Democrat, especially Andrew Jackson, while causing the Federalist or National Republican administration of John Quincy Adams to come into disfavor. However, whether a presidential position was involved in the

controversy or not, the North Carolinians would have maintained their opposition to protection.

North Carolina's aversion to protective tariffs was based on several historical, political, personal, and economic factors. The democratic tradition of frugality and laissez faire was deeply entrenched in the minds of the citizenry by 1828 as the populace asserted the federal government should refrain from interfering with the policies of any state. Such laissez faire, states' rights doctrines, they felt, had been usurped by President John Quincy Adams, and they were anxious that no further encroachments be made. They took as their mentor the renowned North Carolinian, Nathaniel Macon, who was the epitome of states' rights leadership. Macon, born in what later became Warren County, North Carolina, was at one time so staunch in his advocacy of parochialism that he advocated rejection of the Constitution of the United States. He became a close friend to Thomas Jefferson, except for a short time in 1806 when he supported Jefferson's opponent, John Randolph. As a young politician and party leader, he had been anti-Federalist to the extent he detested Alexander Hamilton and all his federal measures and other federal acts including the Alien and Sedition Acts.⁵ He especially opposed the growing tendency of the federal government to interfere with the issue of slavery. At a time when many southerners were not yet alarmed about

⁵Dictionary of American Biography, XII, pp. 157-159.

the future of slavery, Macon castigated the Missouri Compromise of 1820, stating that this was but the first step in an attempt to free all slaves. Macon often stated he opposed the institution of slavery on moral grounds, but due to the debts incurred by his family, had to maintain the slave labor system on his tobacco plantation by the Roanoke River in order to survive.⁶ Four years later, in 1824, he supported the strongest states' rights candidate available, William Crawford of Georgia, for the presidency, and in succeeding years continued to favor legislation and political leaders who would work to preserve the rights of the states.⁷

Macon and his arch-conservative policies were well suited to the times and temperament of his fellow Carolinians who, because of the enormity of the economic problems within their state, believed they could not stand the added burdens of a protective tariff. The insolvency of the state seemed insurmountable because nature had not been kind; the mountainous nature of a portion of the state, the shallow and often dangerous river system, and the coastal obstructions prevented both internal and external transportation from developing. The often unfavorable climatic conditions and the infertile soils of much of the state forestalled the development of a major staple crop culture. The legislative committee of North Carolina stated in 1830 that they were a

⁶Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, D. C., 1961), pp. 1250-1251.

⁷Dictionary of American Biography, XII, pp. 157-159.

state "without foreign commerce for want of seaports, without a staple, without manufactures; in short without any object to which native industry and active enterprise could be directed."⁸ Actually the state had a staple crop of tobacco in the north and especially the middle eastern section, but the level of production was small in comparison to that of other states.⁹ The same was true of cotton which was raised in the portions of the state bordering on South Carolina;¹⁰ 10 million pounds of cotton was produced in North Carolina in 1826, as compared to 70 million pounds in South Carolina and 75 million pounds in Georgia.¹¹ The people not occupied with these two cultures were occupied in other agrarian and non-agrarian pursuits which included raising corn, beans, peas, and some livestock, making naval stores, and exporting lumber, but many of the Carolinians existed on the level of self-subsistent farmers.¹²

The climatic and transportation problems affecting the state seemed insurmountable. Certainly nothing could be done about the climate which prevented them from raising a lot of cotton, a crop that took a long growing season, but several

⁸Hugh Talmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, A History of a Southern State, North Carolina (Chapel Hill, 1954), p. 298.

⁹Hugh Talmage Lefler, The Presidential Election of 1824 in North Carolina (Chapel Hill, 1939), pp. 7-8.

¹⁰Raleigh Register, November 13, 1818, June 30, 1820.

¹¹Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-1829 (New York, 1962), p. 52.

¹²Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2110-2118.

Carolínians at times sought ways to overcome the transportation liabilities along the coast, an area which had no good commercial ports. The towns of Wilmington and Beaufort presented possibilities for future development, but in general, no large ships could enter the coastal region. The sand bars provided a continuous natural barrier from the northern part of the state to Bogue Inlet which was about three-fourths of the way down the coast. Supplies that were exported had to pass through Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, thence southward to either Ocracoke Inlet or Beaufort Inlet to reach the Atlantic.¹³ The swamps to the Northeast were a further hindrance, and the few navigable rivers which flowed eastward across the Tidewater into the coastal waters emptied into the Sounds. The rivers stretching upward across the Tidewater into the Piedmont were valueless as a connective between the two regions because no locks or canals allowed goods to reach the lower level in safety. As in other states, the mountains presented the ultimate handicap to transportation and communication, so the state was, in essence, weak and divided.¹⁴ Much of the state's limited commerce was carried on through the neighboring states of Virginia and South Carolina rather than through commercial centers in the east. Trade that did occur in the east was limited to small coastal vessels bound

¹³Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina, p. 314.

¹⁴Lefler, North Carolina History Told by Contemporaries, pp. 199-201.

for the West Indies rather than the larger vessels from Europe or the North.¹⁵

The weakened economy of the state enmeshed the citizens in a negativistic cycle: they could not make much money, so they did not want to expend money, even to better their transportation facilities. In 1817 the state revenue from taxes, public land sales, and bank stocks was \$98,000, \$4,500, and \$36,000 respectively. These meager revenues, in comparison with those of other states, led the government to limit its expenditures so that a total of \$132,000 was expended annually for all purposes in the period between 1813 and 1835. After the salaries of the state officials were paid, little was left for the needed roads and canals.¹⁶


Although these economic difficulties were state-wide, there were pockets or localities which were more wealthy than others and which had distinctive agricultural and political interests--interests which would become important factors in their tariff attitudes when the tariffs of 1828, 1832, 1833 and the Force Bill were presented for consideration. (Map 11) One major area, the northeastern Tidewater, an area including the counties of Pasquotank, Camden, and others, was noted for its lumber, but especially for its rather backward nature and its small farm crops such as corn, beans, and peas.¹⁷ This

¹⁵Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2116-2118.

¹⁶Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina, p. 303.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 370.

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Map 11. Economy and Topography of North Carolina

region, more than any other eastern area, was handicapped by the distance to the trade outlets and by the swampy nature of the coast. Some of the farmers maintained a few slaves, but the quantity of black laborers was small in number when compared with other coastal areas. Many of the citizens of the area became less obstructionistic in regard to federally financed internal improvements, although they usually maintained their states' rights position on other issues. This portion of North Carolina was, in later years, the major Whig stronghold of the east.¹⁸

The other portions of the Tidewater, running in a north-south direction, were divided into the tobacco lands, the naval store and mixed farming area, and the cotton and rice region. The first of these areas, the tobacco lands, were centered around the Roanoke River Valley, especially in Edgecombe County, and, in smaller degrees, in the counties further southward.¹⁹ On the coast as a whole, a second major income came from naval stores which were notable in the Tyrrell and Hyde County vicinity, while much of the general production of the Tidewater centered around corn, other small grain crops, and the raising of hogs.²⁰ Much of the eastern area, the Tidewater region lying below the northeastern area first mentioned, was, with the exception of the Albemarle

¹⁸Ibid., p. 329.

¹⁹S. H. Hobbs, Jr., North Carolina: Economic and Social (Chapel Hill, 1930), *passim*.

²⁰Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina, p. 370.

Sound area, the strongest Democratic stronghold of the state, the richest area of the state, the area of North Carolina which had a fairly good staple crop economy of tobacco and cotton, and the portion of the state which had the most slaves. The rice zone along the southeast coast also was fairly opulent and had numerous slaves.²¹ Nevertheless, the people of the Tidewater of North Carolina were never as wealthy as the planters in the other southern seaboard states.

The Piedmont, another distinctive area of North Carolina, was also subdivided in economic make-up. The region was noted for the two staples of tobacco and cotton, which were produced in smaller quantities than in the neighboring states, and for the basic small farm crops of the upland farmers. The tobacco region was centered in the counties along the Virginia border; the poorer farmers who raised corn, other grain crop, and livestock lived in the center of the Piedmont; and the cotton producers lived in the counties along the South Carolina border. The three Piedmont regions were also divided politically as years passed because the tobacco and cotton areas maintained their allegiance to the Democrat party while the central corn-growing region became a Whig stronghold.²²

²¹R. H. Taylor, "Slaveholding in North Carolina: An Economic View," The James Sprunt Historical Publications, XVIII, nos. 1-2.

²²Lefler, The Presidential Election of 1824, p. 160; Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina, p. 370; Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington, 1913), p. 4.

The mountain area of western North Carolina was more related to the central Piedmont than to the rest of the state since it too was a small farming region with a near-subsistence economy. Very little trade was carried on due to the poor transportation facilities, and since each farmer raised most of his own goods, there was almost no slave labor. Cattle, hogs, whiskey, corn, wheat, and fruits were the mainstay of the people. This area, like the central Piedmont, turned to the Whig party in later years.


In 1828 when the Tariff of Abominations, the tariff devised by the southern, western and northern supporters of Andrew Jackson as a presidential contender, was presented to Congress for consideration, the small regional idiosyncrasies had not yet emerged strongly enough to take political form; North Carolina was still a one-party state.

The general opposition to tariffs, the Democratic political affiliation of the populace, the historically conservative nature of the state, and the enormity of the proposed tariff rates all worked together in causing the North Carolinians to reject the Tariff of 1828. The schedule which placed average ad valorem duties of about 50 per cent on imported goods seemed atrocious to them, and consequentially, all of the North Carolinians appeared unanimous in their opposition to the tariff.

North Carolina's congressmen, fifteen in number, placed their solid vote against the Tariff of 1828.²³ (Map 12) All

²³Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., pp. 2471-2472, 786.

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Key

Yea vote +
 Nay vote o
 Not voting -

Votes

Senate	Yea vote	0
	Nay vote	2
	Not voting	0
House	Yea vote	0
	Nay vote	13
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea vote	0
	Nay vote	15
	Not voting	0
		<u>15 Congressmen</u>

Map 12. North Carolina's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1828

of these men resided in the Tidewater and Piedmont, with no representatives coming from the mountain region. Lemuel Sawyer of Elizabeth City represented the Albemarle Sound district. He was more democratic-minded than the future representative from this area would be, having supported Presidents Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, and having endorsed their theories of economy and strict construction of the Constitution.²⁴ Senator Nathaniel Macon of Warrenton, Willis Alston of Hyde Park, Macon's nephew, Senator John Branch of Enfield, Daniel Turner of Warrenton, and Thomas Hall of Tarboro represented the northern tobacco area;²⁵ while John Bryan of New Bern and Gabriel Holmes of Clinton represented the eastern naval store, farming, and lumber region.²⁶

In the northern Piedmont, the tobacco region was represented by Lewis Williams, a noted Democrat who served his state in fourteen congresses from 1815 until his death in 1842, and Augustine Shepperd of Germantown.²⁷ Samuel Carson of Pleasant Garden and John Long of Longs Mill represented the central farming area;²⁸ Daniel Barringer of Raleigh represented the central fall line farming area;²⁹ and John

²⁴Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1565; Dictionary of American Biography, XVI, pp. 394-395.

²⁵Biographical Directory of the American Congress, pp. 1250-1251, 475-476, 588-589, 1733, 992.

²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 616, 1070.

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 1823, 1592.

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 667, 1232.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 520.

Culpepper of Beards Store represented the lower tier of cotton counties.³⁰

Although the tariff vote appeared to the public to be a totally united negative action on the part of the North Carolinians, internal economic antagonisms were noticeable; problems which would later lead to a further regional political cleavage. John Bryan of New Bern, in a lengthy congressional discussion concerning the proposed amendment on molasses, favored striking out the additional duties proposed due to the injury it would inflict upon his constituents. He stated:

The only foreign trade of North Carolina is, and long has been, with the West India Islands, while the shallowness of our waters forbid our participation in the European trade. . . . North Carolina produces . . . the materials . . . desired in those Islands. We can export . . . lumber of all kinds, staves, shingles, pork, bacon, corn, peas, beans, naval stores, fish and live stock. . . . This trade . . . with the French islands is essentially a barter trade . . . molasses is therefore received of necessity as a return cargo. . . . If this vent for our products is closed, great and general distress must ensue.³¹

Bryan further stated that the Committee on Manufactures, in recommending the additional duty on molasses, was attempting to exclude that which was imported and distilled into spirits. He said it seemed they were trying to legislate a demand for whiskey made from home grown grain and then exclude foreign spirits and molasses to compel its use. He

³⁰Ibid., p. 763.

³¹Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2110-2111.

contended that the Committee and the interests favoring such action would be aiding one interest at the same time they were annihilating the West India trade of North Carolina.³²

The Piedmont representative, Samuel Carson, quickly arose to counter Bryan's remarks. He said his colleague should have confined his remarks to the district he represented and permitted those representing other parts of the state to act in the interest of their own constituents. He stated he favored retaining the additional duty on molasses, although he gave his vote with the perfect understanding that upon the final question he would vote against the whole bill, it being immaterial in what shape it was presented.³³ He clarified the situation of the west by saying:

With the western end of North Carolina, it is very different. We have none of the advantages of commerce, and consequently, none of the benefits resulting from this lumber and molasses trade; but we have . . . a fine climate and soil well adapted to the culture of hemp, and if other branches of industry are to be protected, an adequate protection on hemp would cause some people to turn their attention to the growing of that article.³⁴

Carson also objected to the east's determination to continue the molasses trade since that product was made into "Yankee rum" and since, if the molasses trade ceased, the demand for domestic spirits (whiskey) would be increased.

³²Ibid., pp. 2110-2118.

³³Ibid., pp. 2118-2119.

³⁴Ibid., p. 2119.

These, he felt, were the only advantages to be calculated on by the farming community of North Carolina.³⁵

The east-west confrontation did not evince any reconsiderations in regard to the final decision on the bill. All actually agreed with Daniel Turner that the tariff was "inexpedient, oppressive, and a violation, if not of the letter, then of the spirit of the Constitution."³⁶

In 1828 the tariff, although all the North Carolinians and many other southerners objected, became law, and soon thereafter, the new President, Andrew Jackson, took office. Jackson, born in the region near the North Carolina-South Carolina border, was presumed to be a friend of the people and in sympathy with the anti-tariff views of the South. He quickly gained the North Carolinians' favor by selecting John Branch of Enfield as his Secretary of Navy and by supporting the doctrine of states' rights in various state controversies. They especially noted his states' rights actions in regard to the various Indian controversies and the Maysville Road veto. The westerners of North Carolina who had favored Jackson, thinking he supported internal improvements, were disheartened. Since the War of 1812 they had hoped the federal government would fund the projected national road which would run from Maine to Louisiana. The westerners knew that such a road would greatly benefit their region, but the slaveholding east, led by Nathaniel Macon, objected

³⁵Ibid., p. 2119.

³⁶Ibid., p. 2437.

to any such federal policies, saying they were but the first step toward the emancipation of slaves.³⁷

Jackson, a strong-willed President, soon aroused personal animosities between himself and other southern Democrats over the Peggy Eaton affair when not only John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, his Vice President, but also John Branch of North Carolina and others incurred his displeasure. Many of the Cabinet members eventually resigned. Later, other southerners disagreed with him when it appeared that he was becoming more nationalistic in belief. The Jefferson Day Banquet toast between himself and Calhoun led the states' rights Democrats to see that Jackson would not be the pawn of the South as had been expected; and they in turn realized that the President would not help them effect a reduction of the hated tariff. Several South Carolinians were already propounding the virtues of nullification, the doctrine enunciated by Robert Turnbull in 1827 and John C. Calhoun in 1828. By 1832, when a new tariff bill was written, the support for or opposition to the measure was based not only on economic considerations, but personal antagonisms, alliances, and constitutional doctrine.

The Tariff of 1832 was a highly protective measure, although before the numerous amendments were added, it was intended as a lower tariff. A few provisions, but only a few affecting the South, were lowered. Although the bill was

³⁷W. E. Dodd, The Life of Nathaniel Macon (Raleigh, 1903), pp. 317-326.

still protective, the tariff outlook of the North Carolinians seemed to change in 1832 in comparison to their vote in 1828. (Map 13) The representatives' opinions, as seen in the vote of the congressional leaders, shows eight of the fifteen representatives favoring the act which was still highly protective in regard to cotton and woolen goods which the southerners needed. Six still opposed the tariff, while one abstained.³⁸ This split vote, as compared to the fifteen votes in opposition to the 1828 bill, represents a noticeable change of thought.


North Carolina's 1832 tariff vote was not quite as regular as the voting patterns of other states, but some of the regional attitudes are apparent. For example, William Shepard of Elizabeth City voted in favor of the bill. He represented the district which wanted internal improvements, the Albemarle Sound district, and contended that tariff revenues might be used to initiate road and canal projects. Also, as a National-Republican, he felt the Union was the primary consideration involved and that, although he did not care for Jackson as a democratic President, nevertheless, he supported his arguments for unity.³⁹

Most of the Roanoke tobacco region and the remainder of the Tidewater favored the Tariff of 1832. Thomas Hall of Tarboro, Micajah Hawkins of Warrenton, and John Branch

³⁸Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, pp. 1219, 3830-3831.

³⁹Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1591.

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Map 13. North Carolina's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1832

represented the strong tobacco interests, while Jesse Speight of Stantonsburg, Lauchlin Bethune of Fayetteville, and James McKay of Elizabethtown represented the mixed cotton and tobacco region which was also noted for its naval stores and small grain crops. The attitude of most of these men can be summed up by Hall's comments in Congress when he stated he had never in his life given a tariff vote and he never should, but in the present case he had voted "solely upon the principle of a reduction of taxes." He said he had never voted for laying on one cent, but he perceived the present case to be a direct reduction of some millions of dollars so he supported it.⁴⁰ The possible reduction of taxes was not the only matter involved: as Democratic-Republicans, not National-Republicans, and thus as strict-constructionists, the North Carolinians also based their decision on the proper interpretation of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Like the Virginians who favored secession but not nullification if the need arose, the North Carolinians of the northern Tidewater, following the lead of their former senator from Warrenton, Nathaniel Macon, said the Principles of '98 conceded the right of secession, but not of nullification.⁴¹ The doctrine of nullification, if enacted, would allow a state to remain in the Union yet not obey its laws, and this,

⁴⁰Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, p. 3831.

⁴¹Macon was John Randolph's lifelong friend and was influenced by his thinking. Noble E. Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power (Chapel Hill, 1963), p. 73.

to the northern Tidewater citizens, was an impossibility. They decided to vote for the 1832 act in accordance with the wishes of some of the Virginians and in order to show the South Carolinians they did not countenance the doctrine of nullification.

Only two Tidewater congressmen opposed the Tariff of 1832. John Branch of the northern district had developed a distinctive antipathy toward Andrew Jackson so he opposed the measure which had the earmarks of a protective measure which was acceptable to the President. Branch had been Jackson's Secretary of Navy in 1828, but was forced to resign during the Peggy Eaton affair, and although he was John Eaton's friend and a Jacksonian Democrat, the episode caused him to turn to support of John C. Calhoun by 1832.⁴² John McKay, the owner of three hundred slaves, voted against the bill due to his proximity to South Carolina and the influence of the nullifiers from that state. He resided at the fringe of the rice and cotton area, cultures which used slave labor, and he agreed that governmental interference in tariff problems might lead to further encroachments into other state affairs.⁴³

The Piedmont had three separate centers of opinion in regard to the 1832 bill; the areas dominated by Willie Mangum, Lewis Williams, and Henry Connor. Willie Mangum of

⁴²Dictionary of American Biography, II, pp. 596-597.

⁴³Ibid., XII, p. 75.

Orange County led a strong Whig element of politicians and farmers. He was at one time a Jacksonian Democrat, but, like several others, his views changed when Jackson appeared to be supporting eastern interests over those of the west. He opposed the protective tariff, but also opposed nullification even though he was friendly with many South Carolinians,⁴⁴ Many of the people of the central Piedmont, Democrats who were becoming Whigs, were not supporters of the general Whig platform which endorsed protective tariffs, internal improvements by the federal government, and national banks. The North Carolina Whigs belonged to a different wing of the Whig party, the anti-tariff, pro-internal improvement wing.⁴⁵ Senator Bedford Brown, Samuel Carson, and Abraham Rencher, along with Willie Mangum, voted against the 1832 tariff, asserting that it was too high.

Lewis Williams, a planter in the northern tier of tobacco counties, did not vote, although as a Jacksonian Democrat he would have probably favored the bill. Augustine Shepperd supported the measure, but he too would later become a Whig in opposition to Jackson. The other Jacksonian Democrat, Henry Connor, a planter who, along with Jackson, fought the Creek Indians in 1813-1814, supported the measure. Daniel Barringer of Raleigh, a town which often allied with the Tidewater tobacco-slaveholding interests, also supported the bill.

⁴⁴Ibid., XII, p. 233.

⁴⁵Lefler and Newsome, North Carolina, p. 329.

The 1832 tariff vote shows that the Jacksonian Democrats of the Tidewater and northern and southern Piedmont generally favored the bill, as did the National Republicans of Albemarle Sound; the first due to their support for the President and their beliefs in secession instead of nullification, and the latter due to the desire for federal money for internal improvements and their support of the Union. But the Piedmont was more divided, with the Jacksonian Democrat area of the north supporting the measure, the Whigs' central area opposing it, and the Democratic southern area favoring the bill. The Whigs, as mentioned, were opposed to protective tariffs, and also opposed to Jackson; the Democrats were supporters of Jackson and his policies in that year.

With the passage of the Tariff of 1832, the resultant Ordinance of Nullification by the South Carolinians, and the Nullification Proclamation and Force Bill by the President, the citizens and congressmen, both from the North and South, began looking for a method to ease the tensions of the people. After concerted congressional actions, the Compromise Tariff of 1833, a bill which proposed lowering tariff duties over a period of nine years, emerged and was passed into law. In North Carolina the people as a whole were relieved at this easing of pressure. The Whigs, National Republicans, Jacksonian Democrats, and Jeffersonian Democrats all supported it. The vote consisting of fourteen yeas, no nays, and one

abstention, shows this to be true.⁴⁶ (Map 14) Neither the Whigs nor Democrats wanted a high tariff, and the National-Republicans did not want a partitioned Union, so all were satisfied.


The vote on the Force Bill, a bill involved not so much with tariffs but with the doctrine of states' rights, showed the political cleavages of the state more clearly if one remembers that there was one National Republican area and a large Democrat area in the Tidewater, and that there was, from north to south, a Democrat, Whig, Democrat, area in the Piedmont. (Map 15) Except for one person, the Tidewater congressmen favored the Force Bill.⁴⁷ This again showed their opposition to the doctrine of nullification as opposed to secession, and their general antipathy toward disunion when they felt conditions did not merit it. They believed tariffs for revenue were constitutional though unjust. Hall, feeling Jackson was too strong in his attack on states' rights, would not accept the general stand of his section, while William Shepard, the National Republican of Elizabeth City, favored Jackson's stand for the Union.

The Piedmont vote shows the Jacksonian Democrats such as Lewis Williams casting a vote for Jackson's bill, the Whigs such as Abraham Rencher opposing the act, the Senators not voting, and the Democrats of the lower Piedmont siding

⁴⁶Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, pp. 1810-1811, 808-809.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 688, 1903.

North Carolina



Key


Yea vote +
 Nay vote o
 Not voting -

Votes

Senate	Yea vote	1
	Nay vote	0
	Not voting	1
House	Yea vote	13
	Nay vote	0
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea vote	14
	Nay vote	0
	Not voting	1
		<hr/>
		15 Congressmen

Map 14. North Carolina's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1833

North Carolina



Map 15. North Carolina's Force Bill Vote, 1833

with their neighbor, South Carolina, in opposing the bill which attacked their states' rights, anti-tariff, pro-nullification stand. The one man who resided in the central Whig area but who aligned himself with the nullifiers of South Carolina, Samuel Carson, stated in Congress that the bill was "more despotic in character than the Alien and Sedition laws."⁴⁸ His Whig constituents, in disagreement with his views, saw fit to renounce him at the polls during the next congressional elections.⁴⁹

When South Carolina asked that a southern convention be called to consider the situation, the North Carolina legislature met to discuss the matter and present their own views. The state, predominantly Jeffersonian Democrats of the secessionist category, adopted the following Resolves:

That the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina doth entertain . . . a warm attachment to the Constitution. . . . [and a] devoted attachment to the Federal Union. . . . yet it is believed, a large majority of people think [tariff] acts unconstitutional; and they are united in the sentiment, that the existing Tariff is impolitic, unjust and oppressive. . . . That the doctrine of Nullification as avowed by the State of South Carolina . . . is revolutionary in its character, subversive of the Constitution . . . and leads to a dissolution of the Union.⁵⁰

The Resolves, which also asked that a peaceable adjustment of the existing controversy be sought by all representatives, were passed by a vote of 47 to 7 in the Senate of

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 1766.

⁴⁹Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 677.

⁵⁰Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, p. 51; Niles' Weekly Register, XLIII, pp. 351-352.

North Carolina, and 98 to 22 in the House.⁵¹ Governor Montfort Stokes concurred with the majority of the North Carolinians. Thus, North Carolina was strongly opposed to South Carolina's nullification position in 1833.

In conclusion, it appeared that North Carolina was opposed to tariffs except for the citizens of the Albemarle Sound area which at times broke from the conservative mood of the state and favored tariff revenues which could be used for local internal improvements, and that the generally favorable attitude toward the protective tariff of 1832 was based upon both what they considered to be the true principles of '98 and the desire to achieve whatever cuts were offered in this bill. It is also evident that the two-party system which was emerging was quite different from the situation in some other states, for the Whigs of the middle Piedmont and the extreme northeast were of the internal improvement and not the protective tariff wing of that party, but the North Carolina Whig party did not fully mature until 1834 when President Jackson's bank policies alienated countless citizens. Finally, it appears that regional proximity and the cotton culture were major factors causing the lower Piedmont to lean more toward the South Carolina doctrine of nullification than any other section of the state, with some southern Tidewater citizens doing the same. Since North Carolinians were more indigent than people of other states it

⁵¹Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, p. 51.

would seem their opposition to tariffs would be quite strong, yet this was not the case for their poverty stricken economic system was one to which they had adjusted. They were not so suddenly shocked by the loss of prosperity as was South Carolina, so they had no reason to suddenly fight the federal government as the source of their economic problems or as the contemplated enemy of slavery since they had fewer plantation slaves than did South Carolina.⁵² They, as noted in their Resolutions of 1833, felt themselves to be opponents of protective tariffs and defenders of states' rights. To a great degree, North Carolina was one of the consistent anti-tariff states during the tariff interlude.

CHAPTER V

TENNESSEE

[President Jackson] is not one of those who change their opinions from day to day as some politicians do. . . . On great political questions he forms his opinion on reflection and abides by them until his judgment instructs him that he ought to change them. Upon the [tariff] his opinions were made public so early as . . . 1824; and I defy any man to show that he has ever written or uttered one word inconsistent with the sentiments [then] expressed. . . .

Felix Grundy,
February 15, 1832¹

Felix Grundy, speaking in 1832 during the congressional debates concerning the writing of a new tariff, berated Henry Clay of Kentucky for having stated that the Chief Magistrate pursued an equivocal course in regard to the tariff question.² Clay had inferred the President had manipulated things so that on the south side of the Mason and Dixon line he was understood to be in opposition to the tariff, while on the north side, the opposite opinion was ascribed to him. Grundy's defense of the President is interesting because Grundy and Jackson, both from Tennessee, did not share the same views in regard to tariffs; Grundy favored low tariffs

¹Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, p. 395.

²Ibid., pp. 393-412.

while the Chief Executive at times favored higher ones. Jackson, as a presidential contender in 1824, had supported the tariff act of that year which placed protective duties at 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem on textiles, an action which was not in accord with the citizens of his own state,³ and as candidate for the presidency in 1828, his supporters had been responsible for writing the Tariff of Abominations although they did not want it to become law. Nevertheless, upon its passage and upon Jackson's election to the presidency in that same year, the people of the South and West noted that four laborious years passed before the Old General made any statement favoring tariff adjustment, and that in those years his northern supporters had profited more than his southern allies. But if other southerners and westerners such as the South Carolinians or Henry Clay noticed Jackson's seeming duplicity, the Tennesseans seemed unaware. They, like Felix Grundy and James Polk, went about their own business of voting against protective tariffs when only economic issues dominated, but in voting for them when President Jackson's reputation was at stake. The irony is that, although believing in low tariffs and state sovereignty, most of the Tennessee congressmen voted in favor of the Tariff of 1832 which was still strongly protective and for the Force Bill of 1833

³Jackson, in a letter sent to Littleton Coleman, stated he favored a "judicious tariff." James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson (Boston, 1860), III, pp. 35-36.

which seemed to renounce the doctrine of states' rights.⁴ Tennessee's unremitting support of the President was evidently not based on economics or political doctrine, but on personal factors. In order to understand the rather strange reactions of the Tennesseans, it is best to note the conditions existant within the state prior to the 1828-1833 tariff era.

Tennessee, initiated into the Union in 1796, was by the Twenties and Thirties a fairly well developed agrarian state with corn as its major crop in total production.⁵ However, when compared to the other more fertile states of the South and Southeast, Tennessee seemed little more than a land of small farmers.⁶ The people, separated by physiographic conditions into three distinct regions, produced two staple crops, cotton and tobacco, in the most fertile pockets of land, and grain crops such as wheat, corn, and oats throughout the other areas. The agrarian activities of the people ranged all the way from the more aristocratic nature of the plantation economy, to a frontier style of life based on self-subsistence. Altogether, the state became not one entity, but "the Three States of Tennessee" as the varying

⁴The eleven Tennessee congressmen cast a 10-1 vote against the Tariff of 1828, but supported the Tariff of 1832, the Tariff of 1833, and the Force Bill with 9-2, 10-1, and 9-2 votes respectively.

⁵Stanley J. Folmsbee, Robert E. Corlew, and Enoch L. Mitchell, Tennessee: A Short History (Knoxville, 1969), p. 292.


⁶Caleb Perry Patterson, The Negro in Tennessee, 1790-1865 (New York, 1968), p. 58.

political and economic needs and interests of the people from one specific portion of the state made them at times feel quite separate from the citizens of other portions of the state.

East Tennessee, one of the three regions and the first section to be settled, was of secondary agricultural importance when compared to Middle Tennessee due to the scarcity of fertile land but was, at first, the section with the strongest political power. (Map 16) This region, running from the border of North Carolina on the east, and stretching across the Unaka Mountains and the Great Valley to the middle of the Cumberland Plateau on the west, was predominantly a mountainous, hilly region. Except for the fertile farm lands of the Great Valley of the East Tennessee River and the other small river valleys, the East Tennesseans had severe natural handicaps which prohibited them from establishing a major plantation system or from developing a large staple crop system. But although there were limitations, the easterners planted a variety of crops and raised fruits and vegetables as well as raising hogs and cattle. Corn and wheat were their major crops, while cotton and tobacco were secondary pursuits. By 1850, they were producing only one bale of cotton and ten hogsheads of tobacco, but were producing 1,813,338 bushels of wheat and 10,998,654 bushels of corn.⁷ Their major income came from pork and foodstuffs

⁷Report of the Comptroller to the General Assembly, 1850, p. 44.

Tennessee



Map 16. Economy and Topography of Tennessee

which were sent down the Tennessee River or herded across the southern part of the state to Alabama, a region which was more accessible to the east Tennesseans than was the western portion of their own state.⁸ Due to their trade problem, they, although considering themselves to be Jeffersonian Democrats in Jackson's day, demanded internal improvements.⁹ By the 1820's, however, the easterners' demands for roads and canals were often contradicted by the middle Tennesseans, for although the East was fairly densely populated and the capitol was centered at Knoxville, the easterners had to fight to maintain control of state politics. Many of the leading eastern politicians eventually united into a closely knit political organization known as the Sevier machine, a group which wielded a lot of power in the Tennessee political arena during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

Middle Tennessee, the second major division within the state, was a cotton, tobacco, and small farming region. It included the western half of the Cumberland Plateau, the Central Basin surrounding Nashville, the Highland Rim which surrounded the Nashville Basin, and the lands stretching westward to the Tennessee River. The Central Basin, an extremely fertile area, drew planters from Virginia and the Carolinas and other seaboard states who hoped to make or

⁸Oliver Taylor, Historic Sullivan (Bristol, Tenn., 1909), p. 230.

⁹Patterson, The Negro in Tennessee History, p. 63; also numerous votes of the Tennessee General Assembly concerning internal improvements.

renew their fortunes as great plantation owners. Nashville quickly became the leading city of Middle Tennessee as the people flocked to the area, then as the best lands around Nashville were taken, the settlers scattered to the other portions of the region, which, although less fertile, provided a subsistence for small farmers and, in some areas, a major income for cotton and tobacco farmers. Tobacco, centered in the north and northwestern part of Middle Tennessee along the Cumberland River Valley, provided the planters in Robertson, Smith, Williamson, Montgomery, Sumner, Dickson, and Stewart counties with fairly large incomes.¹⁰ By 1840 Tennessee's tobacco yield was exceeded only by that of Virginia and Kentucky. Cotton planters found the counties of Davidson, Williamson, Maury, and Rutherford to be the best production areas of the middle portion of central Tennessee, while a second group of planters located themselves in Lincoln county and other central Tennessee counties along the Alabama border.¹¹ The plantation economy which centered around these two staples used slave labor, and as the years progressed the institution affixed itself more deeply on the state. As the planters gained political power in central Tennessee they worked to gain even more control over the state as a whole, hoping to surpass the East Tennesseans in the state legislature and to bring the capitol to Nashville,

¹⁰Patterson, The Negro in Tennessee, p. 61; Folmsbee, Corlew, and Mitchell, Tennessee, p. 293.

¹¹Patterson, The Negro in Tennessee, p. 61.

but the legislators of central Tennessee, with the exception of those around Nashville, were not as interested in internal improvements since the Cumberland and Tennessee River systems provided them with good water transportation. The Nashville residents wanted internal improvements in order to bring in more raw materials from the hinterland so their city might develop to its full potential.¹²

West Tennessee, the region stretching westward from the Tennessee River to the Mississippi River, was the last section of the state to be settled. A portion of this land was in the Congressional Reserve and was used to settle claims held by North Carolina, which had once been the owner of all of Tennessee, before any land could be sold to Tennesseans. After 1810 the Congressional Reserve was finally opened and several new settlers joined the frontiersmen and squatters who already resided there.¹³ The southwest portion of West Tennessee, the district around what would become the city of Memphis, was owned by the Chickasaw Indians until 1818 when Andrew Jackson and Governor Isaac Shelby negotiated with the Indians and purchased it. Then, in 1819, Jackson, General James Winchester, and John Overton established the town of Memphis on the banks of the Mississippi River, an area which became the center for West Tennessee cotton

¹²Thomas P. Abernethy, "The Origin of the Whig Party in Tennessee," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XII (March, 1926), p. 513.

¹³American State Papers, Public Lands (Washington, D. C., 1860), pp. 584-585.

production.¹⁴ The two counties of Shelby and Fayette provided the most fertile cotton lands,¹⁵ and in turn, became the homes of the more aristocratic planters of the west, while the counties to the north, especially Lauderdale, Gibson, Weakley, Carroll, Benton, and Haywood became noted for small scale tobacco planting.¹⁶ The rest of West Tennessee was a land of small farmers and frontiersmen, with some of the poorest land being located in the central and southeast portion of West Tennessee. The farmers produced corn, wheat and garden crops. West Tennessee, a latecomer in the field of settlement, was never as powerful in the political arena as it hoped to be in the first quarter of the 1800's because it was too sparsely settled; only one congressman represented the region.¹⁷

Out of the tripartite regionalism within the state, there emerged a struggle for political power which pitted the Sevier machine of East Tennessee against the political powers of Nashville, a group known as the Blount machine. John Sevier, famous for his early efforts in settling East Tennessee and for his victories in the Revolutionary War and

¹⁴Gerald M. Capers, Jr., The Biography of a River Town, Memphis: Its Heroic Age (Chapel Hill, 1939), passim; J. M. Keating, History of Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee (Syracuse, 1888), passim.

¹⁵Patterson, The Negro in Tennessee, p. 62.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 62.

¹⁷Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, D. C., 1961), pp. 108, 112, 116.

against the Indians, was a hero to the eastern citizens, so for years his group of politicians was able to control politics in the East with ease.¹⁸ The Middle Tennessee residents also supported two noted citizens, William Blount and James Robertson, the "Father of Tennessee," who had helped settle the Watauga area. Andrew Jackson was one of the favorites of this second political circle.¹⁹ When Blount lost favor at the national capitol by supporting an expedition against Spanish Florida, the United States government expelled him from his seat in the Senate, then Andrew Jackson took his vacated seat and a half-brother, Willie Blount, took control of the Blount machine in Tennessee.²⁰ It seemed Blount's actions had hurt the Middle Tennessee machine until John Sevier, who had completed three terms as governor, became implicated in fraudulent land sales. The Blount faction seized upon this scandal, and used it to their benefit. Since Middle Tennessee opposed allowing land sales until surveys were made and the settlers were allowed to pre-empt their holdings, most of the people there were upset with Sevier's maneuvers, but the poorer settlers and squatters were pleased with the views of the Blount machine, a group which they deemed more democratic than the faction in East

¹⁸Thomas Perkins Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: A Study in Frontier Democracy (Chapel Hill, 1932), pp. 164-181.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 168.

²⁰Isabel Thompson, "The Blount Conspiracy," East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, II, pp. 3-21.

Tennessee.²¹ Andrew Jackson, whose career was in the hands of the Blount group, was elected as Tennessee's first delegate to the House of Representatives in 1796, but retired after one session due to financial reverses and lack of interest. It was after this, in 1797, that he was selected to fill the Senate position left open by Blount, but he made no great impression upon that body and again resigned after serving a few months.²² In 1801, by the tie-breaking vote of Governor Roane, the first state executive from the Blount faction, Jackson was elected to the major-generalship of the militia, an office to which he had long aspired, so his zeal proved more long-lasting and rewarding in this position than as congressman.²³ Between 1812 and 1824 Jackson became one of the most famous Americans of his day as he fought the Creek Indians during the War of 1812 and won renown at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend, and especially when his troops defeated the British at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815. In 1818 Jackson's troops invaded East Florida and executed two Britishers who were supposedly engaged in inciting Indians and marauders to cross the border and fight the Americans, but although some people frowned upon this incident, many Americans felt he was justified. As Indian

²¹Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, pp. 170-171.

²²Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, I, pp. 212-219.

²³Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, pp. 170-171.

Commissioner in 1818 and 1819 he was successful in removing the Indians of southwest Tennessee from the state, as noted. His nickname, "Old Hickory," was known to all Americans by 1820 and his exploits were told throughout the country; so by 1823, having in the meantime moved to the Hermitage, a plantation near Nashville, and having recouped his financial losses, he was again prepared to enter into politics, this time with a genuine interest.²⁴

Jackson's re-entry into the political arena was heralded not only by Middle Tennessee but by East and West Tennessee alike. For the first time most regional jealousies were obscured due to the popularity of the Hero of New Orleans. Although his political views were not completely known, varying economic groups considered him to be a supporter of their personal interests: he was considered as a champion of the cause of the frontier, especially after Secretary of Treasury William Crawford of Georgia compensated the Cherokee Indians for conflicting claims on lands already obtained by the Jacksonian cession treaty;²⁵ but he also appeared to support the aristocrats rather than the debtors when he opposed the creation of a state loan office or bank in Tennessee which Felix Grundy, a truly democratic-minded person, had attempted to establish,²⁶ and when he supported the wealthy contender

²⁴John William Ward, Andrew Jackson; Symbol for an Age (New York, 1953), passim.

²⁵Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, p. 239.

²⁶Nashville Clarion, July 25, 1820; Joseph H. Parks, Felix Grundy: Champion of Democracy (Baton Rouge, 1949), passim.

as opposed to the poorer candidate in the 1821 governor's race. But although Jackson was a fairly opulent planter with slaves and was a Middle Tennessean of the Blount organization, the rich and poor alike from East, Middle, and West Tennessee nearly all supported the hero as he contended for the presidency in 1824 and 1828.

The people of Tennessee, although eager for Jackson to be elected Chief Executive, had definite interests and needs which they expected him to support. They were basically Democratic-Republicans of the Jeffersonian creed and expected economy in government and protection of the states' rights doctrine. Many were cotton farmers and planters who hoped no major protective tariffs would be passed to hinder their economy,²⁷ but there was a division of sentiment on questions such as internal improvements:²⁸ East Tennessee supported federal internal improvements due to the isolated nature of their section; the Nashville merchants and planters of Middle Tennessee who wanted to insure easier transportation of their tobacco and cotton crops favored them; some of the West Tennesseans who hoped to develop their regions supported internal improvements; but the small farmers of Middle

²⁷Tennessee's cotton production increased from 1 million pounds in 1801 to 3 million in 1811, 20 million in 1821, and 45 million pounds in 1826. Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-1829 (New York, 1962), p. 52.

²⁸Andrew Jackson was one of the few who defended protection since he believed it was necessary to build up industry for military reasons, and for the creation of a home market for the West's surplus agricultural products.

Tennessee were opposed.²⁹ The bank issue also continued to be divisive, for the larger cities tended to favor them while several rural areas opposed them.³⁰ The Tennesseans were lax in their Jeffersonian principles in these two respects, but on the tariff issue there was fairly united opposition. They looked to Jackson, should he win the election, to help them revise the tariffs.

Andrew Jackson, having lost the presidential race of 1824 to John Quincy Adams, determined to win the election of 1828 by, strangely, allowing his supporters to initiate a new tariff bill. The bill, actually the work of a few politicians such as Martin Van Buren and Silas Wright of New York, was effectively contrived to get support from northerners who felt Jackson was for a protective measure and from southerners who felt he opposed such acts³¹ since they realized Jackson could not win with southern votes alone. The southern Jacksonians expected the tariff would be killed since it was to be exorbitantly protective and abominable to the New England manufacturers, and they hoped President Adams would be condemned for even pretending to support such a prohibitory bill.

²⁹Stanley J. Folmsbee, Sectionalism and Internal Improvements in Tennessee, 1796-1845 (Knoxville, 1939), passim.

³⁰Abernethy, "The Origin of the Whig Party in Tennessee," p. 513.

³¹Robert V. Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson (Philadelphia, 1963), pp. 171-180; Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (New York, 1951), pp. 173-175.

During the congressional debates concerning this controversial tariff measure the Tennesseans, as well as many other southerners remained unusually silent since most of them understood the scheme and hoped to effectively perpetrate it. They did not especially want the New Englanders to realize the amount of intrigue involved for fear they might, out of anger, support the bill although it was too protective even for them. Only three comments were made by the Tennessee congressmen during the weeks of debate, two by John Eaton and one by John Marable, but these remarks were simply statements on an amendment.³² Most of the congressmen, with one exception which shall be noted, assumed Andrew Jackson was, like them, opposed to the obnoxious bill.


The congressional vote on the Tariff of 1828 shows the degree of Tennessee's opposition to the bill. (Map 17) Ten out of eleven congressmen voted against it.³³ In East Tennessee the four congressmen, John Blair, a lawyer from Jonesboro, Pryor Lea and Senator Hugh Lawson White of Knoxville, and James Mitchell of Athens all opposed it.³⁴ Blair and Mitchell represented the small farmers and White and Lea represented the Valley citizens who had mixed forms of livelihood, from professional to business pursuits, most of whom

³²Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 733, 782, 2322.

³³Ibid., pp. 2471-2472, 786.

³⁴Biographical Directory of the American Congress, pp. 562, 1202, 1804, 1340.

Tennessee



<u>Key</u>		<u>Votes</u>		
Yea vote	+	Senate	Yea vote	1
Nay vote	o		Nay vote	1
Not voting	-		Not voting	0
		House	Yea vote	0
			Nay vote	9
			Not voting	0
		Total	Yea vote	1
			Nay vote	10
			Not voting	0
			<hr/>	
				11 Congressmen

Map 17. Tennessee's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1828

were agrarians and small businessmen. In West Tennessee the one representative, David Crockett of Trenton, also voted in opposition.³⁵ His constituents were frontiersmen, squatters, and small farmers since the good cotton lands were found more to the southwest. Again the agriculturalists objected to a bill from which they could not benefit. Middle Tennessee, with one exception, was also opposed to the measure. The northern tobacco interests, represented by John Marable of Yellow Creek and Robert Desha of Gallatin, would not be benefitted by this bill.³⁶ Neither would the cotton interests which were represented by John Bell and John Eaton of Nashville, James Polk of Columbia, and Jacob Isacks of Winchester.³⁷ Isacks resided in Winchester in an area less fertile than the other middle and southern Tennessee area, but general farming and the cotton culture existed in that vicinity. Three of the four, all except John Eaton, abided by the interests of the people and voted against the bill; John Eaton's reasoning was not based on normal economics.

John Eaton, married to the ward of Andrew Jackson, became a close friend and staunch supporter of his wife's benefactor a few years before the 1828 campaign, and it was he who undertook to support his friend for the presidency. As a lawyer and a slaveholder, the views and interests of the

³⁵Ibid., p. 755.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 1262, 803.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 539, 884, 1467, 1108.

two were similar, so he and other leading Jackson proponents decided to form a political clique at Nashville. Eaton did everything he could to aid Jackson in maintaining national favor, and when the protective tariff of 1828 came up for a vote, Eaton voted yea. The vote cast in favor of the tariff by Eaton was politically motivated because, ever desirous of aiding Jackson, he realized a pro-tariff vote would cause the northerners to gain more confidence in the Old General. Once Jackson won the election he repaid Eaton for his efforts by granting him the position of Secretary of War although the position had been promised to Hugh Lawson White, the able politician of East Tennessee.³⁸

The tariff passed both houses of Congress and was signed into law by President Adams on May 19, 1828. Because the bill was enacted during the administration of this man, Jackson and his followers were not heavily blamed. To a degree they had succeeded in their purpose, although the abominable tariff was now law, Jackson tried to keep silent on the measure, although in 1824 he had supported what he termed a "judicious" tariff which had enacted average tariff rates of 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem.³⁹ By the end of 1828 the people were denouncing Adams and proclaiming Jackson, and finally the coveted presidential seat was obtained by him in the fall of that year. Tennessee's popular vote favored

³⁸Dictionary of American Biography, V, pp. 609-670; Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, p. 294.

³⁹Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, p. 395.

Jackson with 44,293 votes for him compared to only 2,240 for John Quincy Adams.⁴⁰

Tennessee's reactions to the Tariff of 1828 were mild compared to other states in the South since the people felt Jackson would work to lower duties within a short time. The newspapers such as the Knoxville Register and Nashville Gazette noted a distaste for the measure, but it seemed the people felt Jackson could do no wrong, and did not realize he was at odds with their point of view as cotton and tobacco farmers.

In 1830 the President vetoed the Maysville Road Bill, thus stating his opposition to federal internal improvements. Tennessee, as an inland state, and especially East Tennessee, had been, to a great degree, an advocate of such measures. He also seemed opposed to the power and extension of the banking system; again something many citizens of his state desired. Yet, due to the strength of the states' rights tradition and to the strong prestige of Jackson, these actions were also quietly accepted. Several politicians of the state were alert to his actions and anxious to oppose him, but, in order to retain the support of their own constituents who were enthusiastic Jacksonians, they had to remain silent.

In 1832, after four years under the Tariff of Abominations and with the sound of "nullification" being heard throughout parts of the South, Jackson stated it might be

⁴⁰Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson, p. 187.

wise to consider a new tariff measure. The bill which emerged in the House of Representatives was less protective than the 1828 measure, but by the time it had been amended, the duties on iron and textiles retained the protective rates.⁴¹ Nevertheless, as a state which almost worshiped the Old Hero and which had more to gain from union than separation, all nine of the representatives voted in support of the act although they were not in favor of the retained woolen and cotton duties.⁴² (Map 18) James Polk, a true Jacksonian-Democrat and opposer of nullification who was as anxious as the rest that the duties be lowered even more, said that it appeared to him that although there had been no petition from the woolen manufacturers, the principle that was sanctioned went to increase not to reduce the protecting duty. He recommended that they not lose sight of the objective with which they had begun--a fair compromise to all interests of the country.⁴³

John Bell, often considered the founder of the Whig Party in Tennessee,⁴⁴ was in 1832 on the verge of his break with the Jackson administration, but though he often disagreed with Jackson's policies, he remained silent and avoided an open break because of the Chief Executive's


⁴¹Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, passim.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 3830-3831, 1219.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 3658-3659.

⁴⁴Dictionary of American Biography, II, p. 157.

Tennessee



<u>Key</u>		<u>Votes</u>	
Yea vote	+	Senate	Yea vote 0
Nay vote	O		Nay vote 2
Not voting	-		Not voting 0
		House	Yea vote 9
			Nay vote 0
			Not voting 0
		Total	Yea vote 9
			Nay vote 2
			Not voting 0
			<u>11 Congressmen</u>

Map 18. Tennessee's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1832

popularity. He was sympathetic toward John C. Calhoun and the Carolinians in regard to the retained protection policies of this bill, but felt the Union should be preserved. He stated on the floor of the House that he was not for any section or interest, but he was for Union.⁴⁵

David Crockett, who during his congressional career made the mistake of opposing Jackson, was not reelected by his constituents to the Twenty-Second Congress,⁴⁶ but instead William Fitzgerald, a Jacksonian, represented the West.⁴⁷ Fitzgerald supported the measure in order to assure the nation of his support for Jackson rather than Calhoun. In Middle Tennessee two of the state's three leading Democratic Party leaders, James Polk and Cave Johnson of Clarksville, supported the measure as did the other Jacksonians, William Hall of Green Garden and Jacob Isacks of Winchester. Bell, as mentioned, cast a vote for the bill, not because of his staunch support of Jackson, but due to the desire to save the Union. The only vote against the bill was by Felix Grundy, the third leading Democrat of the state. Grundy was sympathetic to the states' rights stand of the Carolinians who claimed the bill was unconstitutional. The senators, more so than the representatives, considered the bill objectionable as it reached the voting stage since its protective

⁴⁵Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, pp. 3348, 3388.

⁴⁶Dictionary of American Biography, IV, pp. 555-556.

⁴⁷Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 892.

qualities remained too strong. Grundy voted against this 1832 bill, but later realigned with Jackson and favored further administration and party policies. He said he had been willing to vote for the bill as it came from the House, but in its present shape he could not vote for it.⁴⁸ This was also the sentiment of Senator Hugh White from East Tennessee. White, a very reputable man who had been slighted by Jackson on different occasions, and who would become a Whig leader in the future, cast a vote not tinged by politics or personal bias, but against the objectional feature of the senate bill.⁴⁹ The rest of the congressmen in his section voted for the measure, again as a vindication of the President's actions to date.

The Tariff of 1833, coming after weeks of agitation and concern, was a compromise act intended to allay the nullification actions of South Carolina. The Carolinians' Ordinance of Nullification, which was countered by Jackson's Nullification Proclamation and Force Bill, stated the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were unconstitutional and that they, as a sovereign state, had reserved powers not granted to the federal government so could declare unconstitutional actions such as this tariff null and void. President Jackson's Proclamation asserted the states had given up their sovereignty to form the Union and that he intended to maintain the

⁴⁸Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, pp. 1206 ff.

⁴⁹Dictionary of American Biography, VIII, pp. 32-33.


Union by force if necessary. The Tennesseans, as Democrats, had always maintained the doctrine of states' rights, and Jackson himself had upheld it in regard to the Indian affairs of Georgia in 1832, but now he appeared to be reversing himself. But when the question revolved around separation as espoused by South Carolina, or Union, as proclaimed by Jackson, most Tennesseans favored the latter. The Tennessee General Assembly adopted resolutions in 1832 declaring that they regarded the resolutions adopted by the State of Virginia in 1798, and the commentaries of Mr. Madison thereon, as the true exposition of the Constitution, and that although South Carolina claimed to adhere to the same doctrines, the General Assembly of Tennessee denounced nullification as heresy.⁵⁰ The Tariff of 1833, a bill which lowered the protective duties, appeared to be the solution, not only to ending the nullification controversy, but to achieving the desired agrarian goal of lower duties.

The Tennessee congressional tariff vote of 1833 shows that ten of the eleven congressmen favored the bill.⁵¹ (Map 19) William Fitzgerald, again the Jacksonian representative in the west, supported it as did all the congressmen from Middle Tennessee. The cotton and tobacco planters were especially pleased since this measure supported a gradual

⁵⁰Resolutions of the Tennessee General Assembly, in Charles Sellers, ed., Andrew Jackson, Nullification, and the State-Rights Tradition (Chicago, 1963), p. 50.

⁵¹Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, pp. 1810-1811, 808-809.

Tennessee



<u>Key</u>		<u>Votes</u>	
Yea vote	+	Senate	Yea vote 2
Nay vote	O		Nay vote 0
Not voting	-		Not voting 0
		House	Yea vote 8
			Nay vote 1
			Not voting 0
		Total	Yea vote 10
			Nay vote 1
			Not voting 0
			<u>11 Congressmen</u>


Map 19. Tennessee's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1833

return to free trade. In East Tennessee all favored the bill except Thomas Arnold of Campbell Station. Arnold's actions were both politically and personally motivated because he was, by this time, disenchanted with Jackson, and was becoming a Whig in politics. The Whig movement, an anti-Jackson movement, was just gaining converts and was not yet solidly organized. Arnold, a teacher then a lawyer in Knoxville, despised Jackson's underhanded tactics in an 1823 election when Jackson, then hoping to become a presidential contender in 1824, had learned that John Williams, a man who disliked him, was running for the Senate. Since it would not do to have an opponent elected in his own state so close to the election date, Jackson himself ran against and defeated this man who was a friend of Arnold.⁵² Arnold never forgave Jackson, and he was only one of a growing number who had personal reasons for disliking the rash actions of the Old General. Others in the East, with the exception of this man, accepted the act because their Union tendencies overrode their growing anti-Jackson tendencies,

The ultimate test of Jackson's strength in Tennessee lay in the reaction to the Force Bill. (Map 20) The congressional vote of that state shows Jackson still retained his mesmerizing hold over the general populace and that the political leaders, with one exception--again Thomas Arnold--felt they must support him because their constituents

⁵²Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, p. 293.

Tennessee



Key

Yea vote	+
Nay vote	O
Not voting	-

Votes

Senate	Yea vote	2
	Nay vote	0
	Not voting	0
House	Yea vote	7
	Nay vote	2
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea vote	9
	Nay vote	2
	Not voting	0

11 Congressmen

Map 20. Tennessee's Force Bill Vote, 1833

demanded it.⁵³ That this hero-worship is evident is noted in the vote of the western section, an area that was the most democratic of the three. Here William Fitzgerald voted for the bill which was anathema to true Democrats. It is also evident in East Tennessee where all but the one vote was cast for the bill because this was becoming the stronghold of the Whig party. Arnold's objections were the same as those impelling him to vote against the 1833 act since he didn't favor a bill which would get Jackson out of his dilemma, Middle Tennessee, more staunchly in favor of Jackson as a party leader than any other section, voted for the bill also.

In summary, the Tennesseans' reactions to the tariffs, more so than reactions by other southerners, were motivated by party politics, economics, personal attitudes, and psychological factors instead of by logic or by strong economic desires alone. The divisive forces between the three major regions of Tennessee were present in the 1828-1833 era, but were obscured by the prevailing counterforce of the Old Hero, the man who was so universally acclaimed. When the Tennesseans opposed the 1828 tariff, they did so for economic reasons because their agrarian way of life necessitated a degree of free trade, but when, in 1832, they favored the protective measure, they did so because the vote was a test of Jackson's power over Calhoun's threats of nullification. They did this even though they still considered the bill objectionable.

⁵³Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, pp. 1903, 688.

They accepted the 1833 Compromise Tariff as more in line with their needs and desires and cast a normal, logical vote for it, but that same year they again went against their principles and favored the seemingly ultra-federal Force Bill. They listened to Felix Grundy, a leading Tennessee Democrat, who defended the administration as he made the following statements:

[Concerning] the Proclamation lately issued by the President . . . a great injustice has been done in this debate. . . . South Carolina had no right to annul the revenue laws . . . no State has a constitutional right to secede from the Union. . . . I should make this remark, that if that instrument [the Nullification Proclamation] be construed as in all fairness it should be . . . none of these ultra federal doctrines would be found in it of which gentlemen complain.⁵⁴

Grundy, Polk, and other Democrats were able to hold the state in the Jackson ranks during the tariff and nullification interlude, but Jackson himself alienated many people in personal encounters, and ultimately, in 1834, an opposition party emerged in East Tennessee and in some of the larger, wealthier cities. But the South Carolinians were right in 1832 when some of them said that of all the southern states Tennessee could be least counted on to aid them in supporting nullification and in opposing the federal government's tariff measures.⁵⁵

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 667.

⁵⁵William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War (New York, 1965), p. 239.

CHAPTER VI

GEORGIA

The Government of either State is to be considered an independent moral agent. . . . Georgia claims . . . there is such a radical difference of opinion between the authorities of Georgia and those of the United States, that the harmony and tranquility of the two governments . . . can never be maintained uninterruptedly until the Indians shall have been removed.

George M. Troup,
November 7, 1826¹

States' rights, the central theme of Georgia history for a number of years, was centered around the state's desire to remove the Cherokee and Creek Indians from within her boundaries.² This doctrine which maintained that certain rights, such as Indian affairs, were reserved to the states was not in opposition to the attitudes of federal officials, even President John Quincy Adams, although he revoked one of the cession treaties; Adams simply felt the 1825 Treaty of Indian Springs was not valid since the proper Indian authorities had not supported it.³ Upon the revocation of the treaty, George M. Troup, the Governor of Georgia, began a seething series of

¹American State Papers, -Indian Affairs (Washington, D. C., 1832-1834), II, p. 728.

²Ibid., I, II, passim.

³Ibid., II, 575-576, 563-564, 584.

letters to federal authorities denouncing their actions. Not all of his letters were sent directly to Washington officials though. Some, such as the one quoted, were sent to "Fellow-Citizens," for 1826 was an election year and George Troup, the incumbent governor seeking re-election and heading one of the two major political factions within the state, needed an issue which would gain the support of the constituents.⁴ Troup's letters evidenced a willingness to fight or even separate from the Union to maintain states' rights in such cases of governmental usurpation, and many Georgians appeared willing to support him. His fight obtained results within a few months when a new, legal removal treaty was written ceding Creek lands in Georgia to the state.⁵

The successful recalcitrance of the Georgians was especially noted by the South Carolinians in the decade of the Twenties. The South Carolina nullifiers, who also espoused the states' rights doctrine, had called for a southern convention to consider complete nullification and to test the constitutional validity of the extremely protective 1828 and 1832 tariffs. They felt certain that this sister state, as well as Virginia, could be counted on to ally with them in their fight against the federal government's protective tariff policy. They logically based their assumption on two major considerations; first; the fact that the Georgians had

⁴Ibid., p. 728.

⁵Ibid., pp. 612-613, 747.

proved their readiness to fight for states' rights in regard to federal infringements on state Indian policies, and second, the fact that Georgia was beset with economic ills similar to those afflicting South Carolina. However, early in 1833 the South Carolinians were rudely awakened to the incorrectness of their logic when the Georgians, although exhibiting a strong distaste for protective tariffs and leaning more toward South Carolina's viewpoint than did any other state, renounced the doctrine of nullification. Instead, they supported the President in his determination to maintain federal laws. To understand Georgia's reactions, it is best to note the economic, social, and political elements existing within the state in the first three decades of the nineteenth century.

Much of the history of Georgia centers around two men, George M. Troup and John Clark, the leaders of the two political factions within the state in the 1820's.⁶ These factions developed, not because of personal antagonisms between the two men, but due to pre-existing conditions which caused two divergent types of livelihood and outlook to arise. These two interest groups, the aristocrats and the small farmers, simply waited for the proper personalities to come along to weld them together and to speak for their interests.

The dominant faction within the state in the 1820's was the aristocratic element which consisted of planters,

⁶Ulrich B. Phillips, Georgia and State Rights (Washington, 1922), pp. 93-103.

merchants, lawyers, and other men of wealth.⁷ These people were located in two main regions, the Tidewater lands of southeastern Georgia and the eastern Piedmont.⁸ (Map 21) The coastal planters, like those in South Carolina, raised long staple cotton and rice and had large holdings of slaves, while further inland the planters raised short staple cotton, as did their upland counterparts.⁹ Numerous slaves were also found in this portion of the uplands.¹⁰

The economic nature of these two areas was not the only element binding the people together; the other tie was based on lineage since the settlers of the two regions came basically from the state of Virginia.¹¹ These people, proud of their family heritage, developed a supercilious attitude toward the people of other backgrounds, especially North Carolinians, and believed political leadership should be in the hands of the educated elite, or in other words, men of their own class and conviction.¹²

⁷George Smith, The Story of Georgia and the Georgia People, 1732-1860 (Macon, 1900), pp. 242-244; John Edgar Dawson Shipp, Giant Days, or the Life and Times of William H. Crawford (Americus, 1909), pp. 34-35.


⁸Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, pp. 106-108.

⁹Robert Preston Brooks, History of Georgia (Boston, 1913), p. 209.

¹⁰Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, pp. 106-108.

¹¹Shipp, Giant Days, pp. 34-35.

¹²Amanda Johnson, Georgia as Colony and State (Atlanta, 1930), p. 193.



Map 21. Economy and Topography of Georgia

These planter-aristocrats were opposed by the second class of Georgians, the frontier-farmer group.¹³ These people, small cotton farmers or self-subsistent frontiersmen, lived in the northern, central, and southwestern parts of Georgia between the planters' lands just mentioned, and the Indian lands, while at times some of them lived within the Indian domain.¹⁴ One of the farmers' major desires was to wrest these lands from the Creek and Cherokee nations. Since many of these farmers were North Carolinians, they did not become too friendly with the haughty Virginians.¹⁵

The leadership element arose rather naturally for the farmers when Elijah Clarke, the old Revolutionary War hero and Indian fighter, made a name for himself fighting the Creek chieftain, Alexander McGillivray, and his Indian marauders from Florida. He was soon pushed into the position of spokesman for the poorer Georgians and was supported by the hardy men of his type. His son, John Clark, who preferred to shorten the spelling of his name, soon assumed the reigns of authority handed him by his father.¹⁶

The aristocratic group found a leader in the person of James Jackson, a lawyer in the Yazoo land fraud cases at the turn of the century. Jackson fought the Yazoo land claimants

¹³Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, p. 89.

¹⁴Smith, Story of Georgia, pp. 241, 304-305.

¹⁵Johnson, Georgia as Colony and State, p. 193.

¹⁶Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, pp. 95, 97.

and other land grabbers in general, but the Clarke supporters charged his actions were designed more to build a political organization than to prevent frauds.¹⁷ Whatever his intent, he succeeded in gaining a political following which included two lawyers who hoped to enhance their own political careers, William H. Crawford and George Michael Troup.¹⁸ In 1800 James Jackson's followers supported the Jeffersonian political doctrines and declared themselves to be the Jeffersonian party of Georgia; this left only the Federalist position open for their opponents, the Clarke faction.¹⁹ The result was indeed ironic for the aristocratic element supported the democratic Jeffersonian party while the democratic farmers were forced into the aristocratic Federalist party. The frontiersmen, being unsuited to the Federalist doctrines of the day, also finally joined the Jeffersonian party, but the intrastate factionalism within this party remained as strong as ever. Upon James Jackson's death in 1806, control of the aristocratic party passed to William Crawford in the uplands and George Troup in the lowlands, and control of the Clarke faction passed from Elijah to his son, John Clark.

By 1820 the intrastate factionalism was as strong as ever as both parties sought to elect men of their choice to

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 95-96.

¹⁸Shipp, Giant Days, pp. 36, 38, 45-46; Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, p. 97; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, D. C., 1961), pp. 752, 1729.

¹⁹Johnson, Georgia as Colony and State, p. 194.

the state legislature, though on a national scale Georgia appeared to be united. The citizens as a whole seemed to favor low tariffs, Indian removal, and states' rights. This unity expressed itself in the state's strong electoral support of William Crawford, Georgia's candidate for the presidency in 1824, in an election which had political repercussions in the South.

William Crawford, a Democratic-Republican, was considered to be the natural heir to the presidency since he had served the party faithfully for a number of years and had acted as Secretary of Treasury under President Monroe for the past eight years.²⁰ The party leaders nominated him in a congressional caucus to be the presidential contender against John Quincy Adams, the National-Republican nominee, but although Crawford was a Democrat, several groups from the South and West opposed him because they felt he represented the old "Virginia Dynasty."²¹ Two states' legislatures, Tennessee and Kentucky, placed their own favorite sons, Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay, in contention for the position, and as a result split the vote of the party, but Crawford's chances were weakened anyway when he became seriously ill before the election. The Clark party supported Jackson, but the electors from Georgia were aristocrats so all votes were given Crawford. John Quincy Adams won the coveted office.

²⁰Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 752.

²¹Shipp, Giant Days, pp. 175-176.

The importance of the 1824 election is two-fold. First, the newly elected President's policies seemingly did not coincide with the Crawford-Troup faction's views on states' rights, causing the ensuing state versus federal confrontations as previously mentioned. Second, another incident which was to have consequence in the tariff issue occurred-- an issue involving John C. Calhoun. Calhoun, of the neighboring state of South Carolina, also had presidential ambitions, but due to the number of contenders in the 1824 race he became a candidate for vice president. Animosity arose between Crawford and Calhoun as each worked to oust the other from favor, for both knew only one person from the South could hope to win enough votes for national office.²² Although Crawford's political fortunes declined after his illness, his dislike of Calhoun continued. With Crawford no longer a strong contender, the Troup faction switched to support of Andrew Jackson, the Clark party's favorite, rather than to Calhoun, but by the time the tariff controversies shook the country, there were both elements of agreement and disagreement between the factions. The tariff controversy caused these conditions to emerge into view.

The Tariff of 1828 with its average ad valorem rates of 50 per cent was firmly opposed by the Georgians. Georgia was a state which depended on cotton as its primary staple, having increased its production from 10 million pounds in 1801 to

²²Southern Recorder, Oct. 15, Nov. 19, Nov. 27, 1827.


20 million in 1811, and 45 million pounds in 1821. It was second only to South Carolina in total production.²³ Their cotton prices, like South Carolina's, were depressed during the Twenties, and they blamed the Tariff of 1824 for hurting them even more. Even before the Tariff of 1828 was written, the Governor and General Assembly had stressed they would resist efforts to grant protection by all constitutional means and the Southern Recorder and other Georgia newspapers denounced the proposed tariff as unjust.²⁴ Georgians became more silent as the tariff bill of 1828 emerged from committee in Congress, for they, like other southerners, hoped the portions of the bill which hurt the New England manufacturers would cause them to join the South in opposing it. Although the Tariff of 1828 passed Congress and was signed into law, all seven votes from Georgia were cast against it.²⁵ (Map 22). The senators, Thomas Cobb of Greensboro and John Berrien of Savannah, made no statements in Congress but balloted against the bill.²⁶ Three representatives also made no comments during the congressional debate: John Floyd of Jefferson, Charles Haynes of Sparta, and Wilson Lumpkin of Madison, but the other four representatives saw fit to make a few

²³Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-1829 (New York, 1962), p. 52.

²⁴Niles' Weekly Register, XXXIII, pp. 33, 221-222; see also Southern Recorder, January-March, 1828.

²⁵Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2471-2472, 786.

²⁶Ibid., passim.



<u>Key</u>	
Yea vote	+
Nay vote	o
Not voting	-

<u>Votes</u>		
Senate	Yea	0
	Nay	2
	Not voting	0
House	Yea	0
	Nay	7
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea	0
	Nay	9
	Not voting	0
		<u>9</u> Congressmen

Map 22. Georgia's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1828

statements.²⁷ Richard Wilde of Augusta was the only congressman to make a lengthy speech opposing protection and castigating the bill which, he said, would benefit the North at the expense of the South.²⁸ Tomlinson Fort of Milledgeville supported a duty on indigo, and George Gilmer of Lexington and Wiley Thompson of Elberton simply and briefly stated their opposition.²⁹ This silence was short-lived, for with the passage of the bill many Georgians were angered and expressed their opposition vigorously. They supported Andrew Jackson for president in 1828, hoping he would seek relief for the South, but by 1830 the only reductions which had appeared were on tea, coffee, molasses, and salt.³⁰ The system of protection and the 50 per cent ad valorem duties of the 1828 tariff continued to exist.

The Tariff of 1832 was only slightly better than the Tariff of 1828, so once again the Georgians evidenced their displeasure by vote and action.³¹ (Map 23) Both of Georgia's senators, Troup of Dublin and John Forsyth of Augusta, opposed the bill. Troup did not voice his opinions in Congress, but Forsyth, who was weakening in his alliance with Troup, at one time stated he intended to vote for the bill


²⁷Ibid., passim.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 2698-2699.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 2322, 2299, 2327, 2708, 2445.

³⁰Georgia Courier, May 31, 1830.

³¹Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, pp. 1219, 3830-3831.



Map 23. Georgia's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1832

because unless it was enacted, the country would be left with the existing protective bill without any reduction.³² He voted against the bill when the question was called, but not before he had alienated many of his aristocratic friends. Six of the seven representatives also voted against the bill, with Augustin S. Clayton being most outspoken in Congress. He felt Georgia and the South "paid all and got nothing."³³ As he continued the congressmen listened intently as he laid before them the spectre of nullification.

We are awake to the sufferings you have inflicted on us under the talisman of Union . . . we will serve the Lord of Liberty. . . . If you do not withdraw your exactions, if you will not live with us upon the terms of equal rights, we shall certainly part from you. . . .³⁴

Of the other Georgia congressmen, only four made speeches against the bill. Henry Lamar of Macon and Daniel Newnan did not voice their opinions, leaving that up to Thomas Foster, Wiley Thompson, and Richard Wilde. These men made some remarks against the bill, but none were as incendiary as those made by Clayton.³⁵

Only one Georgia congressman, James Wayne of Savannah, favored the Tariff of 1832. Wayne made four short speeches in Congress, stating his opposition to keeping duties high

³²Paul Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, 1825-1853 (Chapel Hill, 1948), pp. 9-10, 15; Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, pp. 624-626, 650-651, 1204, 1290.

³³Ibid., pp. 3530-3567.

³⁴Ibid., p. 3567.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 3705, 3780, 3798, 7474, 3722, 3723.

and mentioning that some concessions should be given to South Carolina.³⁶ Wayne, a lawyer in Savannah, and a representative for the merchants, hoped to obtain a bill which would keep commerce strong as well as counter the nullification argument.³⁷ Thus only one Georgia congressman favored the bill by vote, although another spoke in favor of it.

The post-tariff reaction was quite strong in Georgia once the tariff bill became law, and finally the state political leaders called for a convention to consider the merits of nullification, a policy which had gained attention in their state after a year of strong agitation and propaganda from their neighboring state of South Carolina.³⁸ The ensuing events within the convention showed the populace that all were not in agreement as to the proper procedure which Georgia should follow. These varying outlooks merit some consideration.

The differences of opinion which occurred in 1832 were caused by the reemergence of the partially dormant Clark-Troup factionalism, as well as some personal factors which affected a few individuals. By the time these elements had completely emerged there were three groups in existence, each with its own set of views on the tariff and nullification. The Clark faction, the first of the three groups, opposed

³⁶Ibid., pp. 3683, 3713, 3723, 3774.

³⁷Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1785.

³⁸Southern Recorder, Nov. 22, 1832.

nullification although they also opposed extremely high tariffs. Like the unionists of South Carolina, these people awakened to the fact that they must not let the nullifiers take over and disrupt the state. The main force which dominated their decision was their admiration of Andrew Jackson, for he, along with Elijah Clarke, had fought against the Indians and in 1814 Jackson had won the Battle of Horseshoe Bend as well as helping stop the Indian menace arising from the Florida marauders. Such men as Tomlinson Fort of Milledgeville, Wilson Lumpkin of Madison, and Charles Haynes of Sparta, all congressmen in the previous sessions, now openly worked against nullification, as did James Wayne and John Forsyth of the Twenty-Second Congress.³⁹ These Clark-Unionists established newspapers to combat any nullification literature which might ensue. The Federal Union, Tomlinson Fort's paper at Milledgeville, became the leading Union chronicle, with The Democrat of Columbus and The Telegraph at Macon running a close second.⁴⁰ The Clark-Union following increased in size as they not only denounced nullification but used it to politically castigate the Troup faction. They would not renounce the "hero of the common man," for they themselves were commoners. As stated by William Lumpkin:

Upon several occasions we have been compelled to throw ourselves upon our reserved rights, and resist Federal encroachments; but we have never veiled

³⁹Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, pp. 23, 30.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 22.

ourselves in the flimsy garment of peaceable constitutional nullification.⁴¹

The Troup faction, although berated as nullifiers by the Clark-Union group, were basically opposed to nullification. One wing of this group went all the way to supporting interposition as a remedy, but this was not true of the Troup faction as a whole.⁴² Thus the Troup element can be termed the state's right wing while the nullifiers should be noted separately. George Troup, a senator in 1832, made no speeches in the halls of Congress, but within the state he stressed his opposition to nullification. Troup and his followers, as well as the Clark faction, were involved with trying to gain jurisdiction over the Cherokee lands in the northern part of the state, but when the Cherokees, an extremely civilized nation, met the Georgians in federal court in the case of Worcester v. Georgia in 1832, Chief Justice John Marshall, on March 3, declared the federal government had exclusive authority over tribal Indians and their lands within a state and that state regulatory laws were not enforceable in the domain of the Indians.⁴³ The Georgians would have been extremely unhappy had Andrew Jackson, the President, not chosen to ignore the court's decision.⁴⁴

⁴¹Federal Union, Nov. 8, 1832.

⁴²Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, pp. 23, 30.

⁴³Federal Union, March 29, 1832.

⁴⁴Mary Young, "Indian Removal and Land Allotment," American Historical Review, LXIV (October, 1958), pp. 31-45; Mary Young, "The Creek Frauds, A Study in Conscience and Corruption," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLII (December, 1955), pp. 411-437.

Thus, in regard to this statewide problem, the Troup faction and others felt their friendship with Jackson must be maintained. They disclaimed any accusations made by Clark-Unionists that they supported the doctrine of nullification, but they did oppose the tariff and did favor states' rights.⁴⁵

The third group was a minority faction led by Augustin Clayton and John M. Berrien. Clayton of Athens, was a cotton planter and the owner of one of the few cotton textile factories in the vicinity. He stated in Congress that although he was a manufacturer he opposed the bill for he saw how good his profits were even with his small endeavor. In making one pound of cotton into cloth his expenses ran 16 cents while his selling price was 31½ cents, so his profit was 15½ cents per every pound.⁴⁶ Clayton was strongly devoted to the cause of states' rights and opposed the tariffs and the Supreme Court as curtailing those rights. His ally, John Berrien of Savannah, had a deeper reason for being a radical nullifier. Berrien, a member of Jackson's Cabinet from 1829 to 1831, had become disenchanted with the President over the Eaton affair. Also, a distinct lack of trust existed between the two.⁴⁷ Berrien felt the tariff was

⁴⁵Federal Union, April 26, 1832; Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, p. 30.

⁴⁶Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, pp. 3727-3728.

⁴⁷Thomas P. Govan, "John M. Berrien and the Administration of Andrew Jackson," Journal of Southern History, V (November, 1939), pp. 447-467.

unconstitutional, as noted in his 1829 congressional speech, and his growing alliance with John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, a man who also heartily disliked Jackson, abetted his nullification tendencies.⁴⁸ The nullifiers of Georgia, led by these radicals, were never to become as numerous as those in South Carolina.

These were the three elements presented in the convention which met in Milledgeville on November 12, 1832.⁴⁹ It seemed to the Clark men that the States' Rights faction was in control, so John Forsyth and other conservatives walked out,⁵⁰ Forsyth hoped this would delay any radical plans the convention might have, but Berrien and Clayton hoped the committee which had been formed could formulate a good radical plan of action which would be acceptable to a majority of Georgians. They were soon disappointed for the resolutions presented were not too radical. They stated Georgia's belief in free trade, and her opposition to the unconstitutional tariff which they vowed to resist by all means within their power. First, however, they would wait for a congressional effort to lower the existing measure.⁵¹ The states' rights

⁴⁸Augusta Chronicle, Aug. 25, 1832; Richard H. Shryock, Georgia and the Union in 1850 (Durham, 1926), p. 95.

⁴⁹Southern Recorder, Nov. 22, 1832; Federal Union, Nov. 22, 1832.

⁵⁰Niles' Weekly Register, XLIII, pp. 220-222; Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, p. 130.

⁵¹Niles' Weekly Register, XLIII, pp. 220-222, 229; Stephens F. Miller, The Bench and Bar of Georgia: Memoirs and Sketches, I (Philadelphia, 1858), pp. 60-62.


element, instead of the nullifiers or the unionists, dominated the convention.

Once the resolutions by the convention were heard by the people of the state, many stated their opposition to even these attitudes. The General Assembly, saying it, not the convention, truly represented the people, met to allay the fears of the populace in late November, 1832. They repudiated the convention resolutions and stated that the true representatives of the state favored calling a convention of southern states to study the tariff question. But to them, nullification was completely wrong.⁵²

All concerned waited for the new Compromise Tariff of 1833 to emerge from Congress, a bill which was much better than either the 1828 or 1832 measures. When the balloting on the compromise act occurred, the vote of the Georgia Congressmen was quite different from the vote on the 1832 bill which most disliked. In 1832 eight congressional votes were cast against the bill with one in favor, but in 1833 seven votes were cast for the measure with two not voting.⁵³ (Map 24) Troup and Wilde did not vote, but the votes of the others are quite understandable for whether one belonged to the Clark, Troup, or Clayton element, he would favor a low tariff and would want to avoid conflict. Of the seven congressmen who voted for the bill in 1833, only James Wayne

⁵²Niles' Weekly Register, pp. 279-280.

⁵³Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, pp. 1810-1811, 808-809.



Key
 Yea vote +
 Nay vote o
 Not voting -

<u>Votes</u>	
Senate	Yea 1 Nay 0 Not voting 1
House	Yea 6 Nay 0 Not voting 1
Total	Yea 7 Nay 0 Not voting 2
	<u>9</u> Congressmen

Map 24. Georgia's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1833

cast a vote similar to the 1832 vote, for this Clark man was voting not only for low tariffs but for Jackson and the Union. This appeared in all of his congressional votes.⁵⁴


The Force Bill or Bloody Bill did not find the same following among the Georgians in Congress.⁵⁵ (Map 25) To people who favored states' rights, this measure was despicable. Naturally Augustin Clayton voted against it, although Berrien was not in Congress to show his opposition. Others who opposed the act included the Troup men; Thomas Foster, Henry Lamar, Daniel Newnan, Wiley Thompson, and Richard Wilde. Again the Clark men can be discerned in the voting pattern for John Forsyth and James Wayne voted for this bill which enraged most men of a states' right creed. Wayne stated the Bloody Bill was not meant to dissolve the Union, but instead helped the Union, while Thomas Foster denounced Wayne for supporting the act. He stated he was against the employment of military force, and although he did not approve of South Carolina's measures, he supported her effort to prohibit the Union from changing its character.⁵⁶

With the passage of the new and lower tariff in 1833, the South Carolinians calmed themselves slightly, and the issue of nullification appeared to disappear from view on the part of the Georgians. The period of calm was short-lived,

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 1697-1698, 1768, 1812.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 688, 1903.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 1768, 1865-1876.



Key
 Yea vote +
 Nay vote o
 Not voting -

		<u>Votes</u>	
Senate	Yea	1	
	Nay	0	
	Not voting	1	
House	Yea	1	
	Nay	6	
	Not voting	0	
Total	Yea	2	
	Nay	6	
	Not voting	1	
		<hr style="width: 100px; margin-left: 0;"/>	
		9	Congressmen

Map 25. Georgia's Force Bill Vote, 1833

for the submerged anti-Jackson sentiment on the part of the aristocratic planters and states' rights leaders soon erupted as Jackson did more things to gain disfavor in the eyes of the Georgians. The result was the emergence of the Whig party of Georgia.⁵⁷

The question of why Georgia did not heartily support nullification even though so similar to South Carolina in many ways can be answered. Georgia was suffering from the depression, especially in the Piedmont, and there were numerous slaves, both in the Piedmont and the Tidewater, but these conditions were not as bad as they were in South Carolina for if new Indian lands were opened the farmers and planters would have fresh soils in which to plant new crops. There were no major slave insurrections in Georgia like in South Carolina so they were not as worried about the slave situation. The main reasons, though, concern the situations within Georgia itself. The state was not as united as was South Carolina because regional and personal factionalism existed, as has been noted. Also, the bonds of communication between the regions were not as strong as in the Palmetto State. The major difference, though, was Indian removal, a problem which existed in Georgia throughout the tariff interlude. In President Jackson they found a man who would support any of their anti-Indian actions. They returned this

⁵⁷Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington, 1913), pp. 49-61; Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia, p. 1.

favor and maintained his friendship at the cost of suffering through some protective tariff measures. They in turn gained the disfavor of some South Carolinians, but this was to be expected because the old Crawford-Troup faction heartily disliked John C. Calhoun and other Carolinians anyway. Although they too might suffer the consequences, tariff interests were secondary to the Georgians. And finally, there were no able young orators of the caliber, skill, and zeal of George McDuffie, Robert Hayne, and James Hamilton, Jr., of South Carolina. Thus Georgia, the state most likely to align with South Carolina in support of the nullification program, turned away from her sister state to support South Carolina's enemy, Andrew Jackson, the Indian fighter.

CHAPTER VII

ALABAMA

But the strife and dissension which have been produced by the persevering efforts of the advocates of this doctrine [nullification] to gain for it the favorable opinion of the people, have been carried to such excesses that it is already growing into an evil not less to be deprecated than the tariff itself. . . .

Governor John Gayle,
November 5, 1832¹

It seemed that opposition to South Carolina's doctrine of nullification was inversely proportional to a state's distance from her, for Georgia had a fairly strong element of nullifiers, but Alabama had fewer. In fact, Alabama was vigorous in her support for the Union and President Jackson during the tariff and nullification crisis. This degree of Union sentiment seems strange when compared to other southern states such as South Carolina and Georgia since there were strong economic similarities among them; all were dependent upon cotton for their major source of income. In turn, it was natural, seemingly, for an agrarian state like Alabama to oppose the tariffs which benefited the manufacturing interests of the North and Northwest and the hemp and sugar

¹Alabama Senate Journal, called session (November, 1832), pp. 6-14; Niles' Weekly Register, XLIII, p. 220.

producers of Kentucky and Louisiana instead of themselves. But the Alabamians did more than condemn the protective tariffs of 1828 and 1832, they denounced the most effective remedy the South had for ending the protective legislation --the doctrine of nullification. To the present day student of history, several questions remain: Why were these people so strongly opposed to nullification--a doctrine which, if extensively supported, might cause the North to reconsider the tariff duties and, in turn, to lower them? Why did Governor Gayle consider nullification an evil worse than the tariff? And, were most Alabamians in agreement with Governor Gayle's position? An understanding of Alabama's tariff and nullification reactions is best arrived at by looking at the conditions within the state which laid the foundation for opposition to the tariffs and also to nullification.

When Alabama entered the Union in 1819, the populace, although separated by distance, had common problems which tended to unite them. Primarily, they were all newcomers to a young, western state, and together they faced the problems of claiming the land and establishing themselves as farmers and planters. It was natural for citizens of a newly established commonwealth to look to the federal government for protection and aid during its early years. Also, citizens of a young state usually had problems of an individual and local nature which caused them to be too concerned with their labors to be strongly involved in politics, although most

people from Alabama as well as the other southern states claimed to be followers of the Democrat party.²

The Alabamians had, other than the above degree of unity among themselves, a special bond of unity with the federal government--the desire for a national policy of Indian removal. Alabama had once been the home of several Indian nations with the Choctaws living in the southwest and west, the Chickasaws in the northwest, the Cherokees in the north and northeast, and the Creeks, the dominant group, in the central, southern, and eastern areas,³ but the United States government had gained much of this land in various cession treaties until, when Alabama gained statehood in 1819 the Choctaw Indians retained only one small area along the western boundary while the Chickasaw retained an even smaller area along the northwestern border, but the Cherokee and Upper Creek held title to the largest area, a strip of territory on the eastern side of the state. All told, the Indians retained about 12,000 square miles of land or one-fourth of the area of the state.⁴ They remained in these lands, creating few problems, until the settlers filled the best portions of the ceded lands and looked for even more.

The variety of settlers who poured into Alabama inadvertently formed the basis for the social, economic, and

²Theodore H. Jack, Sectionalism and Party Politics in Alabama, 1819-1842 (Menasha, Wisconsin, 1919), p. 23.


³Bureau of American Ethnology, Eighteenth Annual Report, Plate 1.

⁴Niles' Weekly Register, XXXVII, pp. 12-13.

political sectionalism which emerged in later years. These people, basically from Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, worked their way into the four major areas opened for settlement. (Map 26) They could settle in the north along the Tennessee River and the fertile lands to the north and south of it; in the north central part of the state which was less fertile; in the Black Belt which ran across the lower central part of the state in a seventy-five to one hundred mile strip; or in the south-central and southwestern part of Alabama. The best area was the fertile Black Belt, but a small area in the western Tennessee Valley and around the Huntsville area and the lands near the rivers of the southwest were also quite productive. The early settlers did not fully realize which regions would be most profitable, so they tended to settle in areas either near the borders of their old home state or else in areas which were already populated by people from their native state. Many Tennesseans settled the Tennessee River Valley and the lands to the north and south of it. They were joined by some Virginians and a few Georgians, but the latter group was found mainly in Madison County in the Huntsville area.⁵ Since only a few counties in this region were extremely fertile, the majority of these people became cotton farmers with few slaves. The richer western counties as well as Madison County could maintain large scale culture better, so planters

⁵Thomas P. Abernethy, The Formative Period in Alabama, 1815-1828. (University, Alabama; 1965), pp. 34-51.

Alabama



Map 26. Economy and Topography of Alabama

with numerous slaves were found there.⁶ In general, it should be noted that the north was basically a small farm region.

The settlers from South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia worked their way across the state into the river lands of the west and southwest. The soils were fairly fertile, especially along the rivers, and numerous plantations arose. The major plantations appeared in the Black Belt which touched the lower west-central part of the state and stretched eastward into and across the lands owned by the Upper Creeks. The eastern part of the Black Belt was settled mainly by Georgians who simply worked their way westward into Alabama, and some of them settled inside the Indian domain. These people of the south, the Georgians, Carolinians, and Virginians, became the dominant planters and slaveholders of the day.⁷

The year of statehood, 1819, was a year of depression for the nation, but the young state of Alabama had fewer problems than the old, settled states to the east whose citizens had a backlog of debts and whose soils were becoming exhausted. The newly opened lands of Alabama poured 20 million pounds of cotton into the market by 1820, and hurt the easterners even more since the market was already oversupplied.⁸

⁶Ibid., p. 39.

⁷Ibid., p. 41.

⁸Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-1829 (New York, 1962), p. 52.

As a result of this and other economic factors, the price of cotton began a downward trend throughout the South. Alabama's cotton producers also suffered as the price of short staple cotton fell from 17 cents to 6 cents in the 1819-1823 period.⁹ However, the Alabamians could actually be considered prosperous in comparison to the other southeastern states since their fresh soils produced a more bountiful crop with less labor, but they too felt the sting of the depression. They were especially worried about the consequences of highly protective tariffs, realizing that it was improbable that northern manufacturers could use all the cotton produced in the south. If prohibitory tariffs caused Europe to retaliate by refusing to buy American cotton, they knew their economy would be ruined; thus, their major concern with federal politics was centered around tariff needs.

As early as 1822 the Alabamians felt that the answer to the country's problems, especially the ones related to the tariff, lay in the person of Andrew Jackson. As a southwesterner and a Democrat, he evidently would, if elected president, feel a concern for the South, especially in regard to free trade.¹⁰ The low tariff question became of pressing concern to the Alabamians and others in the early Twenties for it was rumored a bill would be introduced into Congress by certain northern manufacturers who were also feeling the

⁹Abernethy, The Formative Period in Alabama, p. 83.

¹⁰Niles' Weekly Register, XXV, pp. 323-324.

strain of depression. Their fears were realized in 1824 when not one but two setbacks befell the South: the protective tariff of 1824 was passed, placing textiles on the enumerated lists with duties of 33 1/3 per cent ad valorem;¹¹ and John Quincy Adams, the National-Republican, defeated Andrew Jackson for President. Adams' victory seemed to the South a defeat for the Jeffersonian doctrine of states' rights, economy in government, and strict construction of the Constitution. The defeat, which pitted Adams and Henry Clay against Andrew Jackson who actually had the plurality of popular votes, and against the Georgia candidate who was in line for the position, William Crawford, caused the southerners to unite more strongly around Jackson for the campaign of 1828.

The 1824 election in Alabama saw some divided sentiment, with a few people being opposed to Jackson. Since William Crawford of Georgia was also a candidate for the presidential office, the Georgia settlers around Montgomery and Huntsville gave him their support, while some slight support for Adams came from the southwest and west where a number of planters from Virginia and the Carolinas who were growing more unsure of the outcome of the "democracy" which was developing, lived. Their changing attitudes developed because they were growing wealthier and, in turn, more conservative. Jackson won the majority of the state outside these three regions,

¹¹Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I sess., passim.

his strongest support coming from the north and north-central region where the small farmers of a democratic nature resided.¹²

Thus it can be seen there was beginning to be an element of disagreement between north and south Alabama as early as 1824. This division was based upon the economic divergence between north and south, a difference which was no longer one simply between Tennesseans, Carolinians, Virginians, and Georgians, but one between small farmers and large farmers, slaveholders and non-slaveholders, democrats and conservatives. This difference was not striking at first, but it was noticeable in the newspapers of the day as the articles referred to the people of "the north," or "the south," but even though there were mixtures of these elements in each region, the dominant group of an area tended to maintain control.¹³

Two problems added to the incompatibility of the people in north and south Alabama. First, communications were poor because the Indians still held the eastern region so the north-south routes were along the western rivers and past the Tuscaloosa area.¹⁴ The second problem concerned the banking situation since some of the people from south Alabama, both merchants from Mobile and planters in the Black Belt and

¹²Huntsville Democrat, November 22, 1824.

¹³Southern Advocate, May 13, 1825, March 17, April 28, 1826,

¹⁴Abernethy, The Formative Period in Alabama, p. 102.

southwest, wanted to establish a branch of the Bank of the United States in Alabama in 1826, thinking the presence of banks would help maintain a stable credit system for the plantation owners and others. However, the northerners grew to believe such a bank would benefit the planters of the south more than the farmers of the north so they fought against it.¹⁵

In spite of the growing economic and regional schism, Alabama as a whole tended to favor Andrew Jackson for the presidency in 1828. With this in mind, they elected Jacksonian Democrats to the Twentieth Congress of 1827-1828: senators William R. King and John McKinley, and representatives John McKee, Gabriel Moore, and George W. Owen. McKinley and Moore were from Huntsville in north Alabama, the strongly Jacksonian area, while McKee was from Tuscaloosa in the west central part of the state, an area which also supported Jackson, but Owen was from Claiborne, a southwestern town which leaned toward the planter interests.¹⁶ The most notable congressman of this group was William King from Selma, a staunch Jacksonian-Democratic leader who catered to the wishes of the northern element although he lived in the planting district of the south.¹⁷ This was not too uncommon,

¹⁵Niles' Weekly Register, XXXII, p. 124; Southern Advocate, June 16, 1826.

¹⁶Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, D. C., 1961), p. 106.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 1168.

though, since the spokesmen of the Jacksonian interests could be found throughout the state. Southern Alabama Jacksonians were not so unusual as the fact that no southern anti-Jacksonians were vocal in politics at this time. Time and events would, of course, alter that. In 1828 most were seemingly Jacksonians, strict constructionists, free-trade agrarians. These were the conditions existant within the state of Alabama at the beginning of the most heated tariff debates in American history--conditions which were not evident to those outside Alabama and which were not outstanding when the tariff issue revolved around the question of free trade alone. But when other factors were present the Alabamians often based their reactions on other personal considerations. The question of a protective tariff in 1828 encompassed only economic factors, so more unity than really existed appeared to be present in Alabama.

As southern free traders and supporters of Andrew Jackson for the presidency in 1828, the Alabamians joined in the plot to effect a tariff which would be so high that the New England manufacturers themselves would help the South vote it down. The Tariff of 1828, an act with average ad valorem duties of 50 per cent, was the result of their collaborations.¹⁸

When the Tariff of 1828 reached the floor of Congress for debate, the Alabamians, although concerned with the

¹⁸Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (New York, 1951), pp. 173-175.


protective duties on textiles included in the bill, were rather confident that the bill would not pass so only one of the five congressmen made any remarks.¹⁹ (Map 27) Gabriel Moore of the Huntsville planting area condemned the duties on hemp and cotton bagging in the bill. He said most of the cotton bagging used in Alabama was made in Kentucky and it had been shown by the Tariff of 1824 that the South suffered from such duties, and maintained that before 1824 bagging was purchased from Kentucky at 33 or 33 1/3 cents due to transportation costs, but after 1824 the cost was between 40 and 45 cents. This proved to Moore the unjust nature of the act which forced them to buy this northern product at a high rate because of transportation and tariff costs when they could buy it more cheaply from a foreign source. He felt duties on this and other items would cause the British to place retaliatory duties on their cotton and thus they would be hurt in more than one respect.²⁰ The other Alabama congressman joined Moore in placing a unanimous vote against the bill but to the dismay of many southerners, the measure passed.²¹

Although Moore was the only one to condemn the tariff openly in Congress, the act was strongly berated throughout the state, especially after its passage. The Mobile Register

¹⁹Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, passim.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 2207-2208.

²¹Ibid., pp. 2471-2472, 786.



Map 27. Alabama's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1828

and the Huntsville Democrat were strongest in their anti-tariff pronouncements, suggesting a boycott of northern goods to show northern manufacturers what it was like to suffer from the tariff injustices. These and other papers contended home manufactures in the South might be the solution.²² One paper, the Southern Advocate of Huntsville, a former Adams newspaper but now a half-hearted Jackson paper, suggested that it might be best to give the tariff a try.²³ This point of view reflected the sentiments of the editor, a man from the North, who felt less hostile to the tariffs. The General Assembly of Alabama sent a resolution of protest to Congress, numerous anti-tariff meetings were held, and Governor Murphy, in his message to the General Assembly, denounced the Tariff of 1828 which would, he said, hurt the cotton trade by causing a virtual prohibition of these exports to foreign countries.²⁴

Only two areas of Alabama, other than some from Huntsville who favored trying the tariff, expressed no opposition to the act; the Black Belt and the western Tennessee Valley cotton counties. The larger planters in these regions urged a trial of the tariff; then, if it worked a hardship, stated it could be adjusted.²⁵

²²Niles' Weekly Register, XXXV, pp. 83, 259-260.

²³Ibid., p. 69.

²⁴For a description of the anti-tariff reaction in Alabama, see the Southern Advocate and other newspapers for January-March, 1828; Niles' Weekly Register, XXXV, p. 69.

²⁵Jack, Sectionalism and Party Politics in Alabama, p. 25; Niles' Weekly Register, XXXV, p. 69.

It thus appeared that a new division was beginning to emerge in Alabama over the tariff issue. The state, which at first seemed completely opposed to the protective tariff, now had a group opposed and a second group, which though not strongly for the protective act, were not radically against it. These two groups all had one thing upon which they were in complete agreement; they did not believe in nullification, the doctrine being pronounced by the South Carolinians since 1828, and a doctrine which seemed to be gaining strength in South Carolina with each passing year.²⁶

By 1832, and with the passage of the tariff of that year, a third faction appeared in Alabama, a faction that disagreed with the other two by saying nullification was a sound remedy, though in turn, it agreed with the first group in saying tariffs were destructive to the South.²⁷ This third group was led by two men: James Calhoun and Dixon H. Lewis. Calhoun was a nephew of John C. Calhoun, the nullification theoretician of South Carolina. He and other South Carolinians including a group which had gone to college at Columbia, South Carolina, had been exposed to the strong states' rights doctrines of the Carolinians.²⁸ Of the two, Dixon Lewis gained the most acclaim in Alabama. Lewis, of

²⁶Ibid., pp. 69, 149, 275-277.

²⁷Jack, Sectionalism and Party Politics in Alabama, p. 29.

²⁸William Garrett, Reminiscences of Public Men in Alabama for Thirty Years (Atlanta, 1872), pp. 288-289; Willis Brewer, Alabama, Her History, Resources, War Record, and Public Men (Montgomery, 1872), p. 218.

Montgomery County in the heart of the Black Belt, was a Virginian by birth, a Georgian in upbringing, a student in Columbia, South Carolina, and an Alabama cotton planter and lawyer. His uncle was Bolling Hall, a Georgian congressman and a personal friend of William Crawford, Nathaniel Macon, and John Taylor who were all leading states' rights advocates. Lewis supported Andrew Jackson in the 1822-1828 period and even proposed resolutions to the state legislature in 1827 supporting Jackson's name for the presidency. His zealous protection of states' rights was known: he had denounced President Adams' actions in regard to the Indian problems in Georgia; he opposed banks as Hall and Crawford had done; and he presented a resolution to the General Assembly deprecating the increase of federal power,²⁹ but Lewis, in 1828, was in the minority in espousing states' rights to the point of nullification. The people did not fully understand his position which, as Abernethy says, was a "purely negative support of Jackson and a very positive support of state rights."³⁰

By 1832 the nullification doctrine was spreading, and it was rumored that South Carolina would follow this remedy should the 1832 tariff be higher than the 15 per cent rates they proposed. The Jacksonians, the dominant group in

²⁹Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1215; Garrett, Reminiscences, pp. 471-475; Virginia P. Brown and Helen M. Akens, Alabama Heritage (Huntsville, 1967), p. 132.

³⁰Abernethy, The Formative Period in Alabama, p. 151.

Alabama, continued their pronouncements against nullification, an action which would split the Union, and Senator William King, one of the earliest speakers against this doctrine, told the people of Selma in 1828 that he opposed nullification although some individuals were trying to make the government feel that the South and Southwest were the advocates and supporters of a most distinguished and meritorious citizen and were planning to dissolve the Union.³¹ The Mobile Register wrote: "We will frankly declare, it was not from the State of South Carolina that we ever expected a proposition, the bare contemplation of which must cause the heart of a patriot to sink within him."³² The Southern Advocate recited some of the toasts which were made in opposition to South Carolina's actions:

The Union of the States: Palsied be the arm
that shall be raised to sever it.

The Tariff: Unconstitutional in principle,
unjust and unequal in its operation. We will not
oppose it with violence and passion, but by rely-
ing on our own resources.³³

The Tariff of 1832, an attempt to lower the level of tariff duties, was presented to Congress for debate in the spring of that year, and Alabamians, like other southerners, were quite interested in the particulars of this bill. William King and Garbiel Moore, the two strong Jacksonian Democrats, had been in Congress in 1828 when the earlier bill was

³¹Huntsville Democrat, November 7, 1828.

³²Mobile Register, July 12, 1828.

³³Southern Advocate, November 7, 1828.

passed but the three new members, Clement Clay of Huntsville, Samuel Mardis of Montevallo, and Dixon Lewis of Montgomery, had not.³⁴ Clay and Mardis were Jacksonians, but, as has been noted, Dixon Lewis was breaking from Jackson due to his strong states' rights sympathies and his nullification tendencies.

During the congressional debates of 1832, King and Moore concerned themselves with attempting to get amendments added to help the South.³⁵ King berated the bill as still too protective and "unjust upon our section," and stated he was "for constitutional resistance of this oppressive system." He more truly expressed his fears by saying:

. . . if the majority will persist in this species of injustice and oppression . . . consequences will result which I shudder to think of. Sir, this is no idle threat. . . . I stand here as one of the most moderate of those who are opposed to the mis-called American System, advocating conciliation, union. . . .³⁶

King spoke correctly, for his moderation was well known when compared to that of others in Congress, especially Dixon Lewis. Lewis made the most prolonged speech of any Alabama congressman, a speech which lasted most of two days. After mentioning the agrarian nature of his section of the country, he injected his feelings in regard to South Carolina, without directly speaking the word nullification.

³⁴Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 114.

³⁵Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, passim.

³⁶Ibid., p. 661.

Sir, the prosperity of Alabama has frequently been alluded to in this debate; and for what other purpose than to detach her from the great and suffering anti-tariff interest of the South, I am at a loss to imagine. . . . The withering blasts of federal legislation have not yet produced in Alabama that desolation which has swept over the more exhausted states. . . . Alabama is prosperous . . . despite . . . taxation.³⁷


Lewis' speech is important in showing not only his sentiments against the protective tariff and his concern for South Carolina, but also in showing the reason most Alabamians did not go all the way to nullification; they were fairly wealthy, despite taxation.³⁸ They hated the duties, but could afford to suffer from them more than break with the Union when prosperity existed.

When the vote was taken, King, Moore, and Lewis voted against the bill.³⁹ (Map 28) All three opposed the continued degree of protection on cotton and woolen goods. King and Moore, the moderates, felt that if this act were rejected, a lower bill might be presented and the trend to nullification on the part of some southerners could be averted. Lewis voted in outright opposition to a protective act, no matter what the outcome might be, while two votes in favor of the

³⁷Ibid., pp. 3567-3586.

³⁸Alabama, like upcountry Georgia and much of Mississippi and Louisiana, was enjoying the second great period of expansion of frontier cotton planting in the Twenties, and her cotton production had increased from 20 million pounds in 1820 to 45 million pounds in 1830. William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York, 1965), p. 204; Turner, Rise of the New West, p. 52.

³⁹Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, pp. 3830-3831, 1219.



Map 28. Alabama's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1832

tariff of 1832 were cast by Clement Clay of Huntsville and Samuel Mardis of Montevallo, men who also opposed the tariff but felt the reduction in the 1828 duties was a step in the right direction. They were Jacksonian Democrats who believed the tariff could be lived with, then adjusted.⁴⁰

The passage of the Tariff of 1832 and the resultant Ordinance of Nullification passed by the special nullification convention in South Carolina caused much reaction throughout the country. In Alabama the citizens continued to hold free trade meetings to condemn the protective tariffs and to consider South Carolina's call for a southern convention. The Assembly concurred in such a meeting but on the same date passed resolutions asking Congress to speedily enact tariff reductions and South Carolina to suspend her Ordinance of Nullification.⁴¹ The state which had once seemed rather united was starting to break under the weight of the tariff and nullification disputes, and the people who had once been basically Jacksonian-Democrats, were starting to split. The majority remained Democrats of Jacksonians, supporting the President in this controversy and expounding the merits of Union while berating nullification. The splinter group that broke from this party became the States' Rights Democrats, a group led by Dixon Lewis and James

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 703, 1272.

⁴¹Herman V. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, The States and the United States (Philadelphia, 1906), pp. 48-50; State Papers on Nullification, pp. 224-225, 219-223.

Calhoun. These people opposed the tariff, favored nullification, and were hostile to Jackson.⁴² A third group or party also gained strength--the National-Republicans or, as it came to be known, the Whig party. This group disliked Jackson and were in other ways rather different from the other elements within the state. These men were planters in a portion of the Black Belt, the southwest, and in a small part of the northern Valley, who with time and age and wealth, were becoming more conservative. With the frontier nature of their state disappearing, they began to consider the merits of the federal government, a body which might finance internal improvements which would help them get their crops to market and banks which could provide them with credit.⁴³ Henry Clay's American System seemed to have merit to them, although they were not as enthusiastic about the third part of his plan--that concerning the tariff. Clay supported protective tariffs, as did the National-Republicans of the North, but the National-Republicans of Alabama simply felt a tariff was not an item which would hurt them; they never supported protection to the degree of their northern counterparts.⁴⁴

Division within the state of Alabama increased as the Compromise Tariff of 1833 and Jackson's Force Bill were

⁴²Garrett, Reminiscences, pp. 288-289, 471-475; Brewer, Alabama, pp. 218, 330-331.

⁴³Southern Advocate, April 13, 1827.


⁴⁴Arthur Charles Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington, 1913), pp. 25-26.

introduced into the United States Congress. A compromise tariff, the Verplanck bill, was already on the floor of the House when Henry Clay introduced a second compromise measure into the Senate. Since all revenue bills were to originate in the House, his actions seemed unconstitutional, but with affairs as they were, King, the moderate Jacksonian-Democrat, suggested that Clay's bill be allowed to enter the Senate.⁴⁵ King hoped the bill would produce the desired effect of curbing tariff rates and ending the cry for nullification. Clay's bill, which was ultimately accepted and substituted for the Verplanck bill, provided for the lowering of duties over a nine-year period of time, but it was an adequate change as far as the Alabamians were concerned. When the vote was taken all five Alabama congressmen, including Lewis who accepted it as a Calhoun-sponsored bill, (Map 29) voted for the Compromise Tariff of 1833.⁴⁶ They had reason to, for if this more moderate bill were not passed and the Force Bill did pass, there would almost assuredly be a war between South Carolina and perhaps other states and the federal government.

The Alabamians, although mostly Jacksonian-Democrats, did not countenance the Force Bill, a bill which seemed to oppose the doctrine of states' rights. Even Moore, who next to King, had been a long-time Jacksonian, castigated this action:

⁴⁵Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, p. 480.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 1810-1811, 808-809.



Key
 Yea vote +
 Nay vote O
 Not voting -

<u>Votes</u>		
Senate	Yea	2
	Nay	0
	Not voting	0
House	Yea	3
	Nay	0
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea	5
	Nay	0
	Not voting	0
		5 Congressmen

Map 29. Alabama's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1833

I rise with no hypocritical pretense of extraordinary attachment to the Union. This bill proposes to clothe the President of the United States with dictatorial and discretionary powers. . . . It makes the President of the United States a national dictator. [The Alabamians] gave him their confidence when he was a plain and unpretending planter like themselves. But they voted for Andrew Jackson to be the President of a free people, subject to all the restraints of the Constitution. . . . Little did they expect he would march at the head of a standing army . . . [to collect] odious, unjust, unequal, and unconstitutional taxes.⁴⁷

With States' Rights Democrats opposing the actions of Jackson, and the Whigs disliking him but desiring to remain attached to the Union, the majority party of Democrats were rethinking their attachment for President Jackson. The one solution, as noted, was to pass both bills--the tariff and Force Bill--at the same time, so one would cancel the odiousness of the other. It seemed evident the Force Bill would pass due to the North's predominant support of it. Samuel Mardis warned that the two bills must be passed together, stating that if the congressmen thought passage of the Force Bill alone would have no serious consequences, they deceived themselves. He said the Force Bill had the wrong title. It should be called "a bill to dissolve the Union."⁴⁸

The Alabama congressmen showed their opposition to the Force Bill in two ways; the senators refused to honor it with a vote, knowing it would pass anyway, and the representatives


⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 488-492.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 1770-1771.

all cast opposition votes.⁴⁹ (Map 30) So the bill passed, but at least the nullification furor was ended.

In analyzing Alabama's role in the tariff and nullification controversies, one can note three things: Alabama was predominantly a Jacksonian state, a factor which was enhanced by the prosperity of the state and by the desire for further Indian removal; second, the tariff and nullification dilemma caused two anti-Jackson elements to emerge, neither of which was very strong in the 1828-1831 period; and third, it should be noted that regionalism and social and economic factors played a part in the tariff controversies and caused regional political units to develop. The people were actually divided into four parties which might be termed the Jacksonian Democrats (Union), the Northern Whig (Union), the States' Rights Democrats (Nullification), and the Southern Whigs (States' rights). The first two groups, located in the north and north-central part of the state and sometimes scattered elsewhere, were unionist in their outlook because the communications problem and regional jealousies caused them to feel separated from the rest of their state and to have needs and interests of their own. In the South, the States' Rights Democrats and States' Rights Whigs were mainly the planter element. During the late Twenties the two southern groups would merge into the Southern Democrats, again due to proximity and similarity of interests. These people belonged to

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 1903, 688.



Key

Yea vote +
Nay vote o
Not voting -

<u>Votes</u>			
Senate	Yea	0	
	Nay	0	
	Not voting	2	
House	Yea	0	
	Nay	3	
	Not voting	0	
Total	Yea	0	
	Nay	3	
	Not voting	2	
			5

Map 30. Alabama's Force Bill Vote, 1833

the Georgian, Carolinian, and Virginian groups, while the northern element had been mainly from Tennessee, with some from Virginia and Georgia.

Altogether, Alabama's support for the Carolinian doctrine of nullification was limited. Except for one small group, many Alabamians felt more affinity for Georgia and Virginia and the leaders of those states--the first of which supported Jackson over Calhoun, and the second which maintained the "Principles of 1798" did not condone nullification. The Alabamians, though, had two very personal reasons of their own for being less radical in their reactions to the tariffs than the other states--they were emerging from the depression and were becoming prosperous, and they still needed federal support to rid themselves of the remainder of the Indians which held some very fertile lands. It was necessary that Alabama maintain the bonds of Union.

CHAPTER VIII

MISSISSIPPI

Resolved, That the doctrine of Nullification is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and in direct conflict with the welfare, safety and independence of every State in the Union; and to no one of them would its consequences be more disastrous, more ruinous, than to the State of Mississippi. Resolved, That we will, with heart and hand, sustain the President of the United States. . . .

Resolutions of the Mississippi Legislature,
January, 1833¹

The position of Mississippi in the controversy over protective tariffs and nullification is interesting because in the period between 1828 and 1833 only two strong voices were heard advocating nullification, yet in later years Mississippi became one of the strong states' rights advocates of the South and carried the doctrine of state sovereignty to the ultimate conclusion of secession, second only to South Carolina. The basis for this disunionist sentiment, though obscured by the popularity of Andrew Jackson, was nevertheless present in the late Twenties and early Thirties. It was noticeable in the sectionalism of the state which pitted the older, more wealthy and conservative planters and merchants

¹Report and Resolves of Mississippi, in State Papers on Nullification (Boston, 1834), pp. 231-233.

of the west against the newly arrived smaller farmers of the east, in the small but growing anti-Jackson sentiment, in the areas which favored Henry Clay and the American System, and in the disappointed attitudes of the Jacksonians of Mississippi who were chagrined at the President's attack on state sovereignty as embedded in the Force Bill.

In 1828, at the time of the passage of the Tariff of Abominations, Mississippi was a young frontier state with a strong degree of national sentiment since, like most frontier states, it needed the protecting hand of the federal government until its problems could be solved and its institutions established. Its major attachment to the Union centered around the Indian problem, since the Indians owned more land than the whites did and since the settlers were always anxious to increase their holdings. The Indians retained 16,885,760 acres and the United States government retained 11,514,517 acres of Mississippi land, leaving only 2,663,957 acres out of the 31,074,234 total acres for the settlers.² The lands owned by the Mississippians were in the southern portion of the state, with the exception of one small parcel in the northeast. Even these lands had been opened gradually as Indian cessions and an acquisition from Spain occurred. Of the two early Indian cessions, the first, the Treaty of Fort Adams in 1801, ceded the old Natchez district to the United States government and the second, the Treaty of Mount

²American Almanac (Boston, 1832), p. 149.

Dexter in 1805, ceded the southeastern Choctaw area to the Americans.³ Finally, in 1812, the remainder of the southeastern lands which had been taken from Spain in 1810 were added to the territory.⁴ Thus in 1817, the year statehood was granted to Mississippi, the lands were available for legal settlement only in the extreme southern region below the parallel of Natchez, but in 1820, three years after statehood, it was realized that the region near the Tombigbee River in the northeast part of the state which had been ceded by the Chickasaws to Alabama was actually in Mississippi territory.⁵ This strip of land soon became Monroe and Lowndes counties, but the region was so small in comparison to the Mississippi lands of the south and so distant from them that it was several years before it became politically important.

The voters of Mississippi had a high regard for Andrew Jackson because of his victories against the Creek Indians in 1813 and against the British in 1815, but their admiration grew in 1820 when he and Thomas Hinds, a Mississippian who had aided Jackson in some of his campaigns, were successful in getting the Choctaws to sign the Treaty of Doak's Stand, a treaty which gave much of the west-central part of the state

³John K. Bettersworth, Mississippi: A History (Austin, 1959), pp. 129, 168, 176.

⁴Ibid., p. 176.

⁵Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi (Chapel Hill, 1960), p. 20; John K. Bettersworth, Mississippi, pp. 129-130.

to the government.⁶ Still, about fifty per cent of the land --the northern half of the state--remained in the hands of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, and it was this need for further Indian cessions which induced the Mississippians to consider Andrew Jackson, a man known to believe in removal policies, for the presidency.


In the southern portion of the state, the land now settled by the whites, there was not complete unity for even in this rather small region, sectionalism existed. There were three areas which because of age, position, or way of life, felt themselves to be separate entities.⁷ (Map 31) The first region, the Natchez district, was the oldest, most settled portion of the state since it had been the first land area given up by the Indians and because it contained the rich delta soils of the Mississippi River. The fertile brown loam of the river lowlands proved favorable to the cotton culture and to the commerce which developed out of the trade in cotton.⁸ As Americans from the eastern states moved into this region they established the plantation system and worked their lands with the slaves they brought with them. The

⁶Ibid., p. 176; Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, p. 19.

⁷Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, The Heart of the South, I (Chicago, 1925), p. 554; the divisive spirit is ably presented in Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi.

⁸Charles S. Sydnor, A Gentleman of the Old Natchez Region: Benjamin L. C. Wailes (Durham, 1938), pp. 1-30; Dunbar Rowland, ed., Encyclopedia of Mississippi History, II (Madison, 1906), pp. 302-318.

Mississippi



Map 31. Economy and Topography of Mississippi

Natchez District, by 1830, held 34 per cent of the state's white population and 65 per cent of the state's slave population.⁹ The wealth gained by these planters gave them an added prestige in the state, and the age of their district, when compared to the newer districts to the north and east, gave them a degree of political power not wielded by the other districts, at least in the early years of statehood.

The second important region was often termed the "Piney Woods" area, a portion of land which lay directly to the east of the Natchez District, and stretched across the lower portion of the state to the Alabama border. The soil there was less rich so large plantation farming was seldom noted. The people were mainly small farmers engaged in planting small cotton and grain crops and in herding and lumbering.¹⁰ This land area contained 28 per cent of the white and 4 per cent of the slave population of the state in 1830,¹¹ Most of the Piney Woods district lay in the lands ceded by the Choctaws in 1805, just four years after the Natchez cession, yet late enough to place them second in the political as well as the social arena.

⁹The Statistics of the Population in the United States . . . Compiled from the Original Returns of the Ninth Census . . . (Washington, 1872), pp. 41-43.

¹⁰John Francis Hamtramck Claiborne, "A Trip Through the Piney Woods," Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, IX (Oxford, 1906), pp. 487-538.

¹¹The Statistics of the Population . . . Ninth Census, pp. 41-43.

The third region was the "New Purchase" or the 1820 Doak's Stand purchase from the Choctaw Indians. This region lay to the north and east of the Natchez district in a strip that touched the Mississippi River on the west, and stretched from the west central portion of that river to the middle of the state then veered southward to the Natchez and Piney Woods districts. This area had a more varied economic and political makeup because the western delta land was quite rich and could support a plantation economy, although the eastern stretches were more adaptable to a small-farm economy.¹² It took some time for plantation agriculture to establish itself, so, in the meantime, the region felt a closer kinship with the Piney Woods, a region which was also new and which was scorned by some Natchez politicians and planters. One county, Washington, developed more quickly than the rest and became a slave-owning county with a plantation economy, feeling a closer affinity to the Natchez district than to its own region.¹³ As a whole, the area in 1830 contained 30 per cent of the whites and 18 per cent of the slaves of the state.¹⁴

The psychological differences between these regions-- the idea of being the primary or secondary region--and the

¹²John K. Bettersworth, Mississippi, pp. 8, 16-17.

¹³Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, p. 20.

¹⁴The Statistics of the Population . . . Ninth Census, pp. 41-43.

economic differences which existed in the early years between the wealthier people of the west and the farmers of the east, were not the only factors causing disagreement. Political issues and policy proposals were also involved, especially in regard to internal improvements, banks, the slave trade, further Indian removal, and, at times, the tariff. Many people of the Natchez district were opposed to internal improvements by the federal government, did not especially press for further Indian removal, and were rather opposed to allowing further slave sales in the state, but they favored the establishment of a branch of the Bank of the United States in their area.¹⁵ The easterners held the opposing view in each instance.

In looking at the reasoning of the Natchez element, the explanation for these attitudes is clear. If internal improvements were granted, they would benefit the Piney Woods and eastern areas more than the planters of the Natchez district. They already had the mighty Mississippi as a transportation route, but should the easterners be granted money for canals they might establish a waterway to the south which would divert their goods to the Gulf rather than through the merchants at Natchez.¹⁶ If Indian removal occurred and the remaining northern lands were opened, more farmers would in

¹⁵Natchez Gazette, December 21, 1832.

¹⁶Register of Debates, 19 Cong., 2 sess., p. 12; Natchez Gazette, December 21, 1831; Monticello Pearl River Advocate, May 7, 1830.

all probability enter the state and attach themselves politically to the New Purchase and Piney Woods element, thus causing Natchez to lose its political power.¹⁷ And if slave sales continued as the Virginians and North Carolinians and other states to the east sold their surplus slaves, the Natchez district would make less money on the slaves they wanted to sell into the upper portions of their own state.¹⁸ Thus, these were three things the Natchez element did not want, but it did want the branch Bank of the United States since the merchants as well as the planters were always anxious for a stable and plentiful supply of money and credit.¹⁹ So many sectional differences emerged that the editor of the Pearl River Advocate finally wrote, "Why do members of the legislature from the west, so uniformly oppose, either directly or indirectly, every measure which is brought forward, calculated to benefit us?"²⁰

Even with this degree of sectionalism, there was major agreement on some things in the Twenties--especially on the necessity of electing Andrew Jackson to the presidency. The people from the Doak's Stand purchase and from the Piney Woods as well as the two northern Tombigbee counties were strongly in favor of elevating Jackson to this position, and

¹⁷Natchez Natchez, April 3, 1830.

¹⁸Niles' Weekly Register, XXXIII, p. 211; Natchez Natchez, November 13, 1830.

¹⁹Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, p. 21.

²⁰Natchez Natchez, May 22, 1830.

the planters of the Natchez area were generally in accord. However, it should be noted that if any section or group opposed him, it was this area and the planters of river counties to the north of Natchez. The old river towns with the planters and merchants often had a number of National-Republicans in them.²¹ This was especially true of Natchez, but as a whole, even this area found much in common with the democratic spirit of the day and the democratic goals of the South. In most situations these Federalist-leaning people cast their lot with the Democratic-Republicans, probably because they knew only the Democratic party could succeed in a young, southern, frontier state. Altogether, the Democratic, states' rights, Jeffersonian party was the party of the state, and when Jackson lost the presidency to John Quincy Adams, the National-Republican, in 1824, it was not due to lack of support in Mississippi for he won a majority in every county although Adams got a good degree of support in the Natchez district.²²

The second thing the Mississippians seemed to agree upon was the necessity for a low tariff. Those who disagreed had little to say, either in the papers or in the halls of Congress as a tariff bill which was highly protective emerged. Sentiment was strongly against it because Mississippi was a cotton state experiencing a recession which had caused cotton

²¹John K. Betterworth, Mississippi, pp. 170-171.

²²Ibid., pp. 171-172.

prices to drop to around the 10 cent per pound level in 1828.²³ The southern planters were upset by their reduced profits, but the northern manufacturers of textiles were also feeling the pinch of reduced incomes and were suggesting as a remedy a protective tariff. The reaction of Mississippi was violent as they berated such a proposal and the President, John Quincy Adams, who, they felt, condoned this portion of the American system. The reaction was much the same in the other southern states, but the Jacksonians of the South and West ultimately endeavored to block the passage of a protective bill by creating a measure which would be objectionable, even to the easterners who had asked for protection.


The power of the anti-tariff Mississippians was rather weak in Congress for they had only one representative along with the two allotted senators, all of whom were Democrats. (Map 32) The Natchez district was represented by Senator Thomas H. Williams of Washington and Representative William Haile of Woodville.²⁴ For the first time, the east was able to send a man from their district to Washington, Senator Powhatan Ellis of Winchester, who termed himself a descendant of Pocahontas.²⁵ These men were all hearty supporters of

²³Ibid., pp. 189-190.

²⁴Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961, (Washington, D. C., 1961), p. 107.

²⁵Ibid., p. 857; Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, p. 10.

Mississippi



<u>Votes</u>		
Senate	Yea vote	0
	Nay vote	2
	Not voting	0
House	Yea vote	0
	Nay vote	1
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea vote	0
	Nay vote	3
	Not voting	0
		3 Congressmen

<u>Key</u>	
Yea vote	+
Nay vote	o
Not voting	-

Map 32. Mississippi's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1828

Andrew Jackson. Haile, knowing the Jacksonian sentiment, had simply campaigned by placing notices in the papers saying "Haile will be supported by the friends of General Jackson."²⁶

Since the tariff was fought by the rather secretive machinations of the leading Jacksonians, few people felt the need to speak their piece in Congress. Only Haile, a noted inebriate, saw fit to make himself heard.²⁷ Since Congressmen from the North were evidently trying to obtain a protective bill for their own interests, he suggested the propriety of a protective duty for indigo and castor oil, two products which would benefit the South because, within a few years, the South could supply the American demand. He stated that action of this nature "would be a most healthful duty . . . would gratify the South and the West and remove some of the constipations which have been manifested in this debate."²⁸ He felt the indigo or "blue ruin" duty, if introduced into the bill side by side with the minimums on woolens, "would have a happy influence of giving a beautiful blue tinge to the neighboring woolens."²⁹ He continued that this suggestion was simply a test on the sincerity of the

²⁶Ibid., p. 12.

²⁷Ibid., p. 14; Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, pp. 2318-2322, 2329.

²⁸Ibid., p. 2319.

²⁹Ibid.

advocates of protection, because he had heard "there was honor even among thieves."³⁰ Haile's suggested amendments were defeated.

In the midst of the argument over the Tariff of 1828, one area of the state, Natchez, suggested there might be merit to this act. The businessmen there argued that cotton was hard on the soil and that already evidence of this could be seen. They suggested the possibility of some other pursuit in the state such as manufacturing, and said possibly the tariff was not so abominable after all.³¹ The Natchez Ariel was especially strong in its support of the tariff,³² but the pro-tariff voice of this area was easily argued down by the other Mississippians who were not ready to abandon the cotton culture.

The Mississippians, other than the Natchez element, determined to express their disapproval of the tariff as proposed in 1828. A few anti-tariff meetings were held,³³ and the legislature of Mississippi, acting in accordance with majority sentiment, passed resolutions declaring ". . . the Tariff of 1828 is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution of the United States; impolitic and oppressive in its operation in the Southern States, and ought to be resisted by all

³⁰Ibid., p. 2329.

³¹John K. Betterworth, Mississippi, p. 190.

³²Ibid., p. 190; Natchez Natchez, August 14, 1830.

³³For a survey of the antitariff meetings held in Mississippi, see the Natchez Gazette, the Woodville Mississippi Democrat, and other noted papers of the day.

constitutional means."³⁴ However, their resistance was to no avail, for although all three of Mississippi's votes were cast against the measure, it passed into law.

South Carolina, after the passage of the tariff of abominations, suggested the possibility of nullification as a remedy for such unwarranted actions by the North, but did not seem ready to carry out such a measure by herself. Most of the southern states, including South Carolina and Mississippi, felt Jackson's elevation to the presidency would provide the remedy they needed since he, in all probability, would lower the tariff. When, in 1828, he did win, most of the southerners were relieved, thinking there would be no necessity for nullification. Only a small minority of Mississippians actually supported the extremists of South Carolina who espoused nullification.

Within the state of Mississippi the nullification element consisted of two types of people; those who truly believed this was the only solution open, and those who were hostile to Andrew Jackson. At times the question of the tariff and the attitude of hostility toward this man became confused in the minds of the people. There were not too many avowed nullifiers in Mississippi, but two of the leaders of this minority who dared oppose Jackson were George Poindexter and John Quitman.

³⁴Herman V. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations: The States and the United States (Philadelphia, 1906), p. 156.

George Poindexter, appointed to Congress to fill the unexpired term of Robert Adams in December of 1830, was an enigmatic senator in many respects. Poindexter, a Virginia born lawyer, came to the territory of Mississippi in 1802 and was soon involved in public life in Natchez and Wilkinson, Mississippi. He was the most well-known figure in the state, having served as the attorney-general of the Territory, in the general assembly of the Territory in 1805, as a territorial delegate to the United States Congress from 1807 until 1813, and as the United States district judge for the Territory. Upon the admission of Mississippi as a state, Poindexter served in the Fifteenth Congress in 1817-1819, as the governor of Mississippi 1819-1821, and finally, as United States senator.³⁵ Not only was he well known for serving in political positions, but his outspoken actions also gained him notoriety since he often stated his beliefs openly even though they were contrary to the views of a majority of his constituents. One view which set him apart from other Mississippians was his dislike of Andrew Jackson.

Poindexter's reasons for this antipathy are not completely known, but there were evidently two causes; one was simply a personality clash. Poindexter, though so ill he could hardly walk had been appointed to fill out an unexpired congressional term, and upon arriving in Washington, had a meeting with the President. At their first meeting the

³⁵Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1466.

personality clash was evident for Jackson later noted that Poindexter had a "sinister look."³⁶ The real break occurred over Jackson's system of patronage when the President appointed a Tennessean, one of his former wife's relatives, to the job of surveyor of the public lands of Mississippi. Poindexter protested violently until Jackson reversed himself and appointed one of Poindexter's friends to the post, but when Poindexter's friend died, leaving the position open again, Jackson appointed another Tennessean, Samuel Gwin. Poindexter again protested, and finally induced Congress to reject Gwin for the position.³⁷

The other man who was opposed both to Jackson and the tariff was John Quitman. He wrote to one friend in 1831 that he hoped Calhoun or some anti-tariff man would run for the presidency in 1832, but that he was strongly opposed to Martin Van Buren if he proved to be a proponent of tariffs and internal improvements.³⁸ Quitman, not only concerned with the dilemma of the South but interested in effecting a change, declared himself for Calhoun and organized the State Rights Association in Adams County.³⁹ His doctrines soon gained more followers and similar associations were

³⁶Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, p. 47.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 48-49.

³⁸John Francis Hamtramck Claiborne, Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, Major General, U.S.A., and Governor of the State of Mississippi, I (New York, 1860), passim.

³⁹Cleo Hearon, "Nullification in Mississippi," Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, XII (1912), pp. 37-71.

established in Wilkinson, Hinds, and Amite counties--all in west Mississippi.⁴⁰

Poindexter and Quitman failed to gather a large following in support of Calhoun and in opposition to Jackson and the protective tariff policies because of the Indian problem. The main factor influencing the Mississippians was their enthusiasm for the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek which was initiated by Andrew Jackson and John Eaton in 1830. This treaty gave Mississippi an area of Choctaw land which stretched from border to border in the north central part of the state, leaving only the far northern area in Indian control. Altogether it added about 75 per cent more land to the state.⁴¹ Although Poindexter considered his hatred of Jackson more important than the Indian cessions, most of his constituents were of a different opinion--especially when John Calhoun penned his "Fort Hill" letter in 1831 which clearly stated his nullification views.⁴²

In 1832 the question of protective tariffs again emerged in congress as a new tariff was presented. This bill, initiated as a less-protective act, became, in its final form, quite protective. The Mississippi congressmen, still three in number, were Poindexter, Ellis, and a new man, Franklin

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi, p. 555.

⁴²John C. Calhoun, "Fort Hill Address," in Richard K. Crallé, ed., Works of John C. Calhoun, VI (New York, 1883), pp. 58-94.

Plummer of Westville.⁴³ Plummer, in congress since 1830, won his election by leading east Mississippi in its fight against the Natchez district. He stressed the power the east could have if settlers of the Doak's Purchase and Piney Woods area would work together politically.⁴⁴ In the early Thirties, the east was finally becoming a political power in its own right.

When the 1832 tariff bill reached the floor in congress, only Poindexter made any public statements. (Map 33) He castigated the bill, saying it established the principle of protection and, due to the inequality of its operation, he considered it worse than the bill of abominations of 1828 and could never give it his vote.⁴⁵ His sentiments were naturally stronger than those of the other Mississippi congressmen because he had a double purpose: fighting protection and disavowing any tariff that President Jackson supported. Powhattan Ellis concurred with Poindexter in opposing the 1832 measure because it seemed too protective, but he did not renounce his support for Jackson.⁴⁶ The vote of Franklin Plummer, contrary to those by his fellow statesmen, was cast for the tariff. Plummer felt this compromise bill


⁴³Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 115.

⁴⁴Edwin A. Miles, Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi, p. 31.

⁴⁵Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, pp. 619, 625, 1154, 1186, 1200, 1284, 1290.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 1219.

Mississippi



<u>Votes</u>		
Senate	Yea vote	0
	Nay vote	2
	Not voting	0
House	Yea vote	1
	Nay vote	0
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea vote	1
	Nay vote	2
	Not voting	0
		<u>3</u> Congressmen

<u>Key</u>	
Yea vote	+
Nay vote	o
Not voting	-

Map 33. Mississippi's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1832

was slightly better than the 1828 measure, and since he opposed Poindexter, was also prone to vote for a bill which Poindexter disliked.⁴⁷

After the passage of the Tariff of 1832, a convention in South Carolina declared the acts of 1828 and 1832 null and void, and, in turn, the President issued his Nullification Proclamation which seemed to deny the doctrine of state sovereignty and the rights of nullification and secession. South Carolina reacted by issuing a call for a southern convention to consider the question of state powers, but only Georgia and Alabama replied favorably to this call. The legislature of Mississippi did not hesitate in rejecting South Carolina's actions, and assigned a committee the duty of writing a resolution on the subject. The resolutions which emerged were three in number: first, that the doctrine of secession was to be condemned; second, that the doctrine of nullification was contrary to the Constitution; and third, that they would sustain the actions of the President of the United States in the full exercise of his legitimate powers.⁴⁸ The 30-3 passage of these resolutions in the House was indicative of the majority sentiment of the legislature of Mississippi.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 3830-3831.

⁴⁸Herman V. Ames, State Documents, pp. 183-185.

⁴⁹Cleo Hearon, "Nullification in Mississippi," p. 51.

Again the sentiment of the Mississippians was influenced by the Indian removal actions of the President, for in 1832 the final Indian territory in the state was ceded to the government. This Chickasaw cession, the Treaty of Pontotoc, left the settlers in control of the complete state although the Chickasaws reserved the right to decide when they would leave for Oklahoma.⁵⁰ The faith which the Jacksonian-Democrats of Mississippi had in the President had been upheld.

The nullification and tariff controversy was not yet resolved, for in January of 1833 the President introduced his "Force Bill" into Congress which, if passed, would give him the right to collect the tariffs in the recalcitrant state of South Carolina. He tempered this action by suggesting the feasibility of a new, lower tariff.

As far as the people of Mississippi were concerned, a lower tariff would be beneficial, not only in averting military action, but also in aiding the agrarian interests of the South. Again Senator Poindexter was the only Mississippi congressman to fully state his position. He was opposed to any bill Jackson might introduce, but favored the bill Henry Clay introduced into the Senate, the Compromise of 1833.⁵¹ He especially liked the Clay bill since Jackson hated Clay and since Calhoun and Clay had agreed to this bill together. When other senators argued the impropriety of

⁵⁰Statutes at Large of the United States of America . . . , VII (Boston, 1833), pp. 381-387.

⁵¹Register of Debates, 22 Cong., 2 sess., IX, p. 474.

introducing the compromise bill into that house, Poindexter helped convince them that it should be accepted, urging them that the acceptance of this bill would be a compromise between both parties.⁵² When the vote was taken, he and the other Mississippi congressmen cast a unanimous vote for it,⁵³ and the bill ultimately passed congress, thus initiating a trend toward lower tariffs. (Map 34)

The attitude toward the Force bill was different, for even the Jacksonians of Mississippi felt the President went a step too far advancing the cause of federal powers over states' rights. Probably most of the people would not go as far as Senator Poindexter did in berating the President, when in a speech before Congress he said:

. . . If the title of this bill corresponded with its provisions, it might be called "A Bill to Repeal the Constitution of the United States and to Invest in the President Despotic Powers." No bill has ever been presented into the consideration of Congress . . . so virtually destructive of public liberty. . . .⁵⁴

Realizing that the Force Bill would pass Congress, the Mississippi senators, Poindexter and a new man, John Black of Monroe, refused to vote.⁵⁵ (Map 35) Black, a Jackson Democrat, had taken Ellis' seat, replacing him as the senator from the east.⁵⁶ The third vote, that of representative

⁵²Ibid., p. 701.


⁵³Ibid., pp. 1810-1811, 808-809.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 179-182.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 688, 1903.

⁵⁶Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 558; Dunbar Rowland, ed., History of Mississippi, p. 609.

Mississippi



Votes


Senate	Yea vote	2
	Nay vote	0
	Not voting	0
House	Yea vote	1
	Nay vote	0
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea vote	3
	Nay vote	0
	Not voting	0
		<hr/>
		3 Congressmen

Key

Yea vote	+
Nay vote	o
Not voting	-

Map 34. Mississippi's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1833

Mississippi



<u>Votes</u>		
Senate	Yea vote	0
	Nay vote	0
	Not voting	2
House	Yea vote	0
	Nay vote	1
	Not voting	0
Total	Yea vote	0
	Nay vote	1
	Not voting	2
		3 Congressmen

<u>Key</u>	
Yea vote	+
Nay vote	o
Not voting	-

Map 35. Mississippi's Force Bill Vote, 1833

Plummer was cast in opposition to the bill.⁵⁷ So for the first time, the Mississippians were opposed to an action by President Jackson, but when this bill and the compromise tariff both passed, it seemed the issue of states' rights and the hyper-emotionalism of most southerners would be quelled. This did occur in some states, but the South Carolinians raged on, as did Quitman and Poindexter and their new States' Rights Party of Mississippi;⁵⁸ in fact, by 1834 the States' Rights Party was gaining converts. The issue was still very much alive, and under the direction of Quitman, was building a states' rights, anti-government attitude into the minds of the people.⁵⁹

Mississippi states' rights history can thus be divided into two separate phases: first, the 1828-1832 era when Indian Removal was important and when President Jackson, because of his leadership in this matter, was held in high esteem; and second, the 1833-1861 era when Mississippi grew increasingly opposed to northern power. In the first period although the tariff controversy reared its head, the people overlooked the objectionable bills and continued to favor the

⁵⁷Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II sess., IX, pp. 1903, 688.

⁵⁸The State Rights Party was organized in Jackson, Mississippi, in June of 1834 on the motion of John Quitman; Dunbar Rowland, ed., Encyclopedia of Mississippi History, II, p. 151; Jackson State Rights Banner, June 24, 1834.

⁵⁹James E. Winston, "The Mississippi Whigs and the Tariff, 1834-1844," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (June, 1934), p. 505.

government under Jackson. The few voices that were willing to denounce the tariff openly tended to be opposed to the President personally, and in their minds, considered both the man and the act doubly odious. These States' Rights Party men--a splinter group of the Jacksonian Democrats--also had to contend with a growing prosperity after the initial depression in the late Twenties, so fewer followers were willing to join them. The third party in the state, the Whigs or as they were known at the time, National-Republicans, remained fairly quiet except to at times mention a tariff did not seem too abominable, and that perhaps Mississippi should try to become a manufacturing state. Both these parties were centered in the Natchez and river counties.

In 1832 the situation began to change due to three things: Jackson's Force Bill; the completion of Indian removal; and the continued actions of the agitators, especially Quitman. With the maturing of the state with age and the resultant growth of the Whig party, the States' Right Group and the Whigs coalesced, especially when Van Buren took over and Jackson was no longer a uniting force. But that merger and the growth of nullification and secession sentiment was the second chapter in Mississippi history and need not be recited here. Mississippi, in comparison to South Carolina and Georgia, remained fairly quiet in the tariff interlude.

CHAPTER IX

LOUISIANA

Little did I expect that in the first six months of my public life, I should have heard . . . in this Hall . . . the cry of disaffection, secession, disunion. Little did I expect to hear the bold menace, that unless you abandon your protective policy the Union itself would be severed. Let me tell you, sir, Louisiana is determined to adhere to the union. . . .

Henry A. Bullard,
June 15, 1832¹

Louisiana, along with her sister states, emerged from the War of 1812 into a world of optimism and expansion. The United States had just won the "Second War for Independence" against Great Britain and her destiny now lay in her own hands, to mold and to shape as she pleased. For the people of Louisiana, the future looked especially bright because the young state which had entered the Union in 1812 with a mixed population of Creoles, French, Spanish, and Americans had a new found unity and pride in their country after achieving a heroic victory at the Battle of New Orleans, and they lived in a region which promised to be a farmer's and planter's

¹Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., VIII, p. 3588.

paradise.² Not only did they have new, fresh lands which beckoned the cotton farmers from the older states of the East, but also a climate and water transportation system which enabled them to raise a crop unique in the American agrarian community--sugar cane.

Sugar cane culture was not new in Louisiana, having been recommended as a possible staple for the area as early as 1700.³ The Jesuits introduced the valuable plant into the parish of St. Mary in 1725,⁴ and as the years progressed, the culture spread to the surrounding areas. Sugar was first produced on a profitable scale in 1795 by the Creole, Jean Etienne de Bore', when his crop realized a profit of \$12,000.⁵ Yet though his efforts laid the foundation for the sugar industry in Louisiana, its progress was at first extremely slow. In 1802 the sugar exported from Louisiana amounted to 1,576,933 pounds, the product of around seventy-five plantations,⁶ but in 1803 Louisiana became a Territory of the United States, thereby placing the sugar domains within the bounds of a rapidly growing nation which could provide an

²For a description of the various peoples of Louisiana, see Clement Eaton, The Growth of Southern Civilization, 1790-1860 (New York, 1961), pp. 125-135; Joseph Tregle, Jr., "Early New Orleans Society: a Reappraisal," Journal of Southern History, XVIII (February, 1952), pp. 20-36.

³J. D. B. DeBow, The Industrial Resources, Statistics, etc., of the United States (New York, 1854), III, p. 275.

⁴Ibid.

⁵J. Carlyle Sitterson, Sugar Country; the Cane Industry in the South, 1753-1950 (Lexington, 1950), p. 5.

⁶Joseph George Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff, 1816-1846," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXV (January, 1942), p. 26.

extensive home market for its produce. By 1812 sugar cane seemed indispensable to the future prosperity of the newly added eighteenth state of the Union.⁷


Although the sugar culture expanded, the tropical nature of the plant dictated the type of climate it must have; an early frost could ruin the crop. Consequently, the Sugar Bowl extended northward only a distance of a hundred miles from New Orleans, forming a crude triangle from the Red River on the north to the marshes bordering the Gulf of Mexico on the south, and from the Bayou Vermilion on the west to the Mississippi River on the east.⁸ (Map 36) Moreover, the enormous expense of constructing the necessary buildings, purchasing the needed slaves, and acquiring other important tools for production, made a large capital outlay a necessary prerequisite for entry into the sugar industry. The sugar plantation was a farm where cane was grown and also a factory where sugar was produced; every plantation had to have its own master's dwelling, barn, stables, gristmill, laundry, daily, icehouse, tannery, smithy, hospital, slave quarters, and sugar house.⁹ In 1861, according to one historian, the average value of 1,000 sugarhouses was \$50,000, while many

⁷The statistics from 1803 to 1817 on the sugar crops are deficient, so it is difficult to accurately assess the progressive annual increase of the culture during the above period.

⁸Charles P. Roland, Louisiana Sugar Plantations During the American Civil War (Leiden, 1957), p. 1.

⁹Ibid., pp. 3-4.

Louisiana



Map 36. Economy and Topography of Louisiana

cost over \$100,000.¹⁰ Still, when all conditions proved favorable, the planters realized good profits. William J. Minor, the absentee owner of a plantation in southern Louisiana, realized an average profit of about \$4,176.25 a year from his enterprise in the late Thirties and Forties, not the best years in the South's economy by any means.¹¹

The prohibitive capital outlays needed to establish a sugar plantation and the natural restrictions which confined the culture to the southern part of Louisiana caused most Americans who entered the new state to engage in a second great agrarian pursuit--the cotton culture. The newcomers, most of whom were familiar with the crop from their experiences in the states to the east, settled in the northern part of the state in the Mississippi River delta, the Red River valley, and the hill country lying between the two. The cotton lands stretched southward, through a transitional diversified farming region to the sugar region of the south, while the Florida parishes, occupying the upper southeast portion of Louisiana also produced cotton.¹² In 1816, just after the termination of the War of 1812, the Louisiana

¹⁰Walter Prichard, "The Effects of the Civil War on the Louisiana Sugar Industry," Journal of Southern History, V (August, 1939), p. 317.

¹¹J. Carlyle Sitterson, "The William J. Minor Plantations: A Study in Ante-Bellum Absentee Ownership," Journal of Southern History, IX, no. 1 (February, 1943), p. 73.

¹²Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 1812-1952 (Baton Rouge, 1957), pp. 11-12. The major cotton plantation areas were Concordia, Catahoula, Tensas, Franklin, Madison, Richland, East Carroll, Morehouse, and Red River.

cotton planters, aided by fresh soils, the increased demand for cotton, and the soaring prices for the short staple variety which reached 27.2 cents per pound in that year,¹³ challenged the sugar planters for supremacy even in lower Louisiana. Together, the two staples forecast a great future for the citizens of the state¹⁴--a future they were determined to protect through favorable tariff legislation.

When Louisiana entered the Union in 1812, the American tariff then in force levied a duty of 2½ cents a pound on brown sugar and 5 cents a gallon on molasses,¹⁵ but with the advent of war, all impost duties were doubled. Sugar duties jumped to 5 cents a pound, and molasses duties increased to 10 cents a gallon. However, Congress stipulated that all war duties should cease one year after the termination of hostilities, and that the tariff rates would revert to their prewar levels. The sugar producers realized they might soon be faced with an influx of sugar from the West Indies, and that some of the young plantations might be ruined. In desperation, the sugar planters of Louisiana--a southern agrarian state--asked Congress to maintain the wartime protective duties on sugar. Although that body did not completely

¹³William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York, 1965), pp. 351-352.

¹⁴The people of Louisiana also raised non-staple products such as corn, strawberries, tobacco, rice, and other mixed farming crops.

¹⁵Joseph Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff," p. 27.

follow their recommendation, it did report a new tariff bill which set the duty on brown sugar at 4 cents a pound, allowing a 1½ cent increase over the prewar rate.¹⁶

Most southern agrarians supported free trade in 1816, being more lenient in that regard than they would be in the decade of the Twenties, so it appeared that the sugar planters of Louisiana were betraying the cause of the South when they sought protection for their product. However, the eloquent pleas by the state's congressmen allayed some of the fears of their southern neighbors as they presented arguments which would be reiterated many times in the years to come. They stated Louisiana's sugar producers could not possibly compete with the influx of sugar from the West Indies unless a restrictive tariff curtailed the imports from that source; maintained that Louisiana, within a few years, could supply the needs of the entire United States; and stated that trade with Louisiana would arrest the flow of American dollars to the Islands.¹⁷ Further, they contended that the extensive capital invested in their endeavors made protection a necessity, and that the United States, having taken it upon themselves to admit Louisiana as a state, owed her protection, especially since the other portions of the measure fined the citizens of Louisiana for the support of the other states of

¹⁶Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress of the United States from 1789 to 1897 (Washington, 1899), pp. 39, 46.

¹⁷Annals of Congress, 14 Cong., I sess., pp. 1656-1657.

the Union such as Kentucky which favored hemp duties and the New England states which would receive protection for industry.¹⁸ Thomas Robertson, representative from Louisiana, realized that the animus of the northern manufacturers was directed at agrarians in general, and that they, in attacking the southern free trade system, were also indisposed to allow protection for any southern article although they themselves wanted high tariff duties. He stated in Congress, "Gentlemen, call it an agricultural product; is that sufficient to render it an object of prejudice?"¹⁹

Evidently, the agrarian nature of the product was quite sufficient to render it objectionable to northerners, for they not only opposed the proposed 4 cent rate, but successfully reduced the figure in the House of Representatives to 2½ cents.²⁰ Robertson ultimately voted against the Tariff of 1816 since it did not benefit the sugar industry,²¹ but the Senate raised the duty to 3 cents, and after both houses concurred in this amendment²² the President signed the new tariff into law.

In 1824 the Committee on Manufactures reported a second major tariff bill which proposed average ad valorem tariff

¹⁸Ibid., p. 1260.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 1259.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 1326-1327.

²¹Ibid., p. 1352.

²²There was no call for a recorded vote in the Senate.

rates of 33 1/3 per cent on cottons and woolens, a 6 cent per square yard duty on cotton bagging, and a retention of the 1816 sugar rates of 3 cents per pound.²³ The people again objected. Although sugar was important to them, Louisiana, in 1824, was primarily a cotton state. Louisiana's cotton production increased from 2 million pounds in 1811 to 10 million pounds in 1821, and was, in 1824, again in a stage of rapid acceleration which would result in a total output of 38 million pounds two years later.²⁴ The young southwestern state, as well as the cotton states to the east, refused to countenance the measure which they claimed might cause Great Britain to retaliate against the American tariff policy by refusing to buy the southern product. Congressmen William Brent, Henry Gurley, Edward Livingston, and Josiah Johnston denounced every protective portion of the measure except the duty on sugar. They attacked the duty on cotton bagging which, they contended, was solely for the benefit of Kentucky to the detriment of Louisiana and other cotton states which needed this product.²⁵ When the Kentucky delegation accused the Louisiana congressmen of opposing the principle of protection on northern items, but supporting it for themselves, the southerners countered with their major argument, saying

²³Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I sess., pp. 960-965.

²⁴Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West, 1819-1829 (New York, 1962), p. 52.

²⁵Annals of Congress, 18 Cong., I sess., pp. 1515, 1545-1546, 1665-1667.

the duties they sought were not protective but were of a nature which was clearly separate from the protective system. This was the reasoning they had to use to gain support from their southern allies, and a line of attack they would revive in 1828 when a new tariff proposal appeared in Congress.

In 1828 the southern Democrats, some of whom were Louisianians, determined to use counterattack methods to dispose of the New England woolens manufacturers' demands for a new protective tariff. The southerners and westerners who favored Andrew Jackson for the presidency in the next election placed men on the Committee of Manufacturers who supported free trade, and who, in turn, drafted a tariff measure which, if effected, would harm the woolens manufacturers and other New England interests which sought help.²⁶ They proposed doubling the duty on molasses from 5 cents to 10 cents a gallon while disallowing any drawbacks on rum; establishing specific 50 cent, \$1.00, \$2.50, and \$4.00 valuation levels on woolens and stipulating that all goods in any specified bracket should be assessed as if they cost the highest amount in that category; and increasing the duties on raw wool to a mixed specific and ad valorem rate which amounted to a 50 per cent duty. All of these recommendations were detrimental to the industrialists who made rum from molasses and who used foreign wool in their textile factories. They especially attacked the \$1.00 minimum which would allow many cheap or

²⁶Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party (New York, 1951), pp. 173-175.

coarse articles of foreign material to enter the United States, and contended the bill was not beneficial to New England.²⁷

The southerners found nothing in the bill which would merit their support, but realized that was inherent in the nature of the tariff measure. It appeared that most of the material benefits, should the measure pass, would be realized by the westerners who would be aided by the duty on wool, and increased imposts on hemp, pig iron, hammered bar iron, rolled bar iron, and even molasses since exclusion of that item in New England might allow them to make more corn liquor in the West.²⁸ But although the Jacksonians of the west might vote for the final passage of the act, the southerners expected the measure to fail because both the New England people and the southerners would oppose it. They did not criticize the westerners since they knew they were also involved in the scheme to kill the tariff.

The Louisiana congressmen deftly denied that the Tariff of 1828 was a plot against the New Englanders, and argued against the proposed measure with arguments similar to those they had used in 1824. The representatives, Henry Gurley, William Brent, and Edward Livingston, opposed the act. Gurley, a Baton Rouge planter, again attacked the duty on cotton bagging, as he had in 1824. He said the tariff proposed

²⁷ Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York, 1967), pp. 88-100.

²⁸ Ibid.

a duty upon an article used exclusively by cotton growers like himself, and, unlike other duties in the bill, it bore upon a particular section of the country which could least afford it. Gurley directed his remarks at the Kentuckians, who, he said, would derive the benefits from the increased duties on hemp.²⁹ Brent, a National-Republican from St. Martinsville, was not outspoken during the 1828 debates, although he too had opposed duties on cotton bagging in the earlier sessions.³⁰ Livingston, probably the most noted Louisiana congressman,³¹ was a Jacksonian Democrat from New Orleans, and it was he who stated that there was a third section of the country which was interested in the duty on molasses, and that was Louisiana. He announced he supported the protection proposed for that item since Louisiana's sugar growers who owned one million acres of sugar land which could produce 60 gallons per acre could supply the whole United States. He still maintained, though, that he generally opposed the principle of protection, but if the bill did pass, he wanted some of his constituents to share in the benefits.³²

²⁹Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961 (Washington, 1961), p. 983.

³⁰Ibid., p. 594.

³¹Livingston served as United States District Attorney, representative and senator from Louisiana for a number of years before obtaining a position on future President Jackson's cabinet. Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1226; Ira Flory, Jr., "Edward Livingston's Place in Louisiana Law," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XIX, no. 2 (April, 1936), p. 328.

³²Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, p. 2346.

Although the bill ultimately passed the House of Representatives, all three of Louisiana's representatives voted against it.³³ (Map 37)


The senators from Louisiana were less united in their opposition to the measure than were the representatives. One vote cast for the Tariff of 1828 came from Dominique Bouligny of New Orleans. Bouligny, a Creole, represented the sugar interests and, as a National-Republican, supported Henry Clay's American System which called for protective tariffs. However, he appeared uncertain as to what course to follow, ultimately voting for the third reading, for an indefinite postponement, and finally, for final passage of the measure.³⁴ His partner in the Senate, Josiah Johnston, a Democrat from Alexandria, firmly opposed the bill since it was alien to the best interests of the cotton planters.³⁵

Altogether, the Louisiana delegation showed their state's continued opposition to protective tariffs, but their efforts were unavailing as the measure passed Congress. The other cotton states of the South turned their attention to the presidential election of 1828, hoping to elect a man who would aid them in reducing the tariff. The most likely candidate was Andrew Jackson, a supporter of "judicious

³³Ibid., pp. 2471-2472, 786.

³⁴Ibid., p. 786; Charles Cayarre, History of Louisiana, The American Domination (New Orleans, 1903), IV, pp. 68, 346; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 576.

³⁵Register of Debates, 20 Cong., I sess., IV, p. 786; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1132.



Map 37. Louisiana's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1828

tariffs" as opposed to John Quincy Adams who was known to favor protection.

The people of Louisiana were not as united as were many of the eastern states in their choice of candidates for the election of 1828. For the first time a strong political cleavage between National-Republicans and Democrats arose, although there had been earlier differences of opinion based on nativity, or Creole as opposed to American heritage.³⁶ Most of the National-Republicans, including William Brent, Henry Gurley, Dominique Bouligny, and Edward White supported John Quincy Adams. Brent stated he saw no reason why the administration should be changed,³⁷ and White, a future representative from Donaldsonville who disliked Andrew Jackson and Edward Livingston, was of the same opinion.³⁸ The Whigs were usually sugar producers, and they wanted to retain in office a man who would give continued support to their unique culture.

The Democrats, although not all united in their choice for the presidency, generally favored Andrew Jackson. Most of them were producers of cotton, having come late to the lands of Louisiana, and having brought the characteristics of frontier democracy with them. Some of them, such as

³⁶Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 35.

³⁷Niles' Weekly Register (Baltimore, 1827), XXXII, p. 309.

³⁸Diedrich Ramke, "Edward Douglas White, Sr.," Louisiana Historical Quarterly (April, 1936), XIX, no. 2., pp. 283-284; New Orleans Bee, June 18, 1828.

Edward Livingston, supported the Old Hero because they had fought with him in the Battle of New Orleans,³⁹ while others blamed the Tariff of 1828 on Adams and argued that Jackson, a southern man, would be more likely to redress their grievances. The cotton lands in the northern portion of Louisiana were strongholds of Democrat support.⁴⁰ The Democrats of the South and Southwest were victorious in the contest, and sent Andrew Jackson to the White House.

Although the Democrats of Louisiana won the political battle of 1828, they were not overly jubilant because the cotton economy was undergoing a depression. Cotton prices sank to below 10 cents a pound as the American economy dipped lower and lower.⁴¹ The millions of pounds of new southwestern cotton which were added to the market, along with other economic factors, caused the dilemma, but few southerners actually realized that overproduction was a major problem; instead they blamed the tariffs.

At the same time that the cotton planters of Louisiana were suffering a decline in income, the sugar planters grew wealthy. Sugar production gradually increased in Louisiana from 30,000 hogsheads in 1823, to 71,000 hogsheads in 1827,

³⁹Biographical Directory of the American Congress, p. 1226.

⁴⁰Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 35; the terms Whig and National-Republican are used synonymously.

⁴¹William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, pp. 351-352; Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860 (Washington, 1933), II, p. 1027.

and 87,965 hogsheads in 1828.⁴² Each hogshead averaged 1,000 pounds net, and yielded from forty-five to fifty gallons of molasses.⁴³ The 1828 figures represented the work of 308 sugar estates which utilized 21,000 slaves, 82 steam engines, and 226 horses.⁴⁴ It was apparent to the cotton planters that in eight years' time, cotton had been challenged for leadership by sugar. The statistics gave strong proof of this: Louisiana's income from both cotton and sugar respectively had been \$6,960,000 to \$2,100,000 in 1820, \$3,040,000 to \$4,899,000 in 1828, and \$2,044,620 to \$6,069,585 in 1828.⁴⁵ This showed that the position of the two crops was almost reversed, in a three to one ratio, within the eight year period of time.

The low prices for cotton, the blight upon a portion of their crop, and the evident profitability of sugar cane convinced many cotton planters of lower Louisiana that they must, if at all possible, convert their lands to the production of sugar, and between 1828 and 1830 the whole complexion of the Louisiana economy changed. The sugar industry became the dominant endeavor of the agrarians, and spread not only throughout the remainder of the lower zones which were

⁴²J. E. B. DeBow, The Industrial Resources; Statistics, p. 275.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Niles' Weekly Register, XXII, p. 120; Joseph Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff," pp. 53, 55-56.

conducive to the culture, but moved further northward into the drier areas. This movement was stimulated by the introduction of a new, hardy variety of sugar cane, the ribbon species, which was brought into the state by a Mr. Coirn and John McQueen of Georgia.⁴⁶

With the advent of the new role for sugar in Louisiana, the planters' attitudes toward the tariffs changed. The changeover to the production of this expensive crop necessitated protection. This was especially true in 1830 when a recession temporarily struck the state, forcing many of the planters to rely on foreign capital until the hard times ended.⁴⁷ Many of the people in the cotton states to the east were shocked at the appearance of a set of resolutions recorded by the state legislature of Louisiana on March 15, 1830:

Resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the State of Louisiana . . . that the general assembly of their state do not concur in the views and sentiments expressed by . . . Mississippi, relative to the Tariff of 1828; that the legislature of this state does not perceive the unconstitutionality or impolicy of adopting such measures, nor has the state suffered any injury therefrom.

Resolved, That we concur in the resolutions of . . . Vermont, by which they have declared the law of 1828 . . . to be constitutional, expedient, and harmless to the southern states.

Resolved, That our senators in Congress be instructed and our representatives be requested, to

⁴⁶J. D. B. DeBow, The Industrial Resources; Statistics, p. 275.

⁴⁷Joseph Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff," p. 56.

accede to and support such measures as those contemplated by the law of 1828 on the Tariff.⁴⁸

The Louisianians' decision to renounce the principles of free trade that they had advocated during the earlier tariff debates stemmed from their realization that they had no allies. Many southerners, basically producers of cotton, disliked the sugar planters who were presumably wealthier and who were covertly supporting protection while openly voicing opinions which seemed to support the cotton interests. These easterners had never strongly sided with the Louisianians, although the people of that state naturally supported the agrarian cause as long as cotton dominated their economy. Now, in 1830, the sugar producers realized they would have to gain support from one of the two sections in order to retain the protective support needed by their industry. The decision being made, the planters wasted no time; they not only announced their new position by means of the Resolutions of 1830, but also returned a solid slate of National-Republicans to the House of Representatives.⁴⁹

In 1830 and 1831 the positions of the protectionists and the free traders polarized even more. Memorials from the numerous cotton regions poured into Congress asking that the tariff duties be lowered. In 1830 Daniel Barringer of

⁴⁸Herman V. Ames, ed., State Documents on Federal Relations, The States and the United States (Philadelphia, 1906), pp. 161-162.

⁴⁹Biographical Directory of the American Congress, pp. 983, 1416, 1802.

North Carolina tried to get the House of Representatives to reduce the duty on brown sugar by 1 cent per pound, but the Louisiana congressman from Donaldsonville, Edward White, successfully convinced the legislators to retain the 3 cent duty.⁵⁰

The tensions over tariff policy did not lessen in 1832, but increased to the point that civil war seemed eminent. The radicals of South Carolina convinced many of the citizens of the Palmetto State that if the newly proposed Tariff of 1832 did not lower the impost duties to around the 15 per cent ad valorem level they had the historical and constitutional right to declare the tariff null and void in their state, and possibly, they might go a step further to secession. They further justified their demands by saying the growing surplus in the treasury warranted tariff reductions. Conversely, the National-Republican sugar planters of Louisiana desired to keep the tariff rates high so the treasury would remain full.⁵¹ Since the sugar domains had expanded, they needed more internal improvements to connect the farming regions to the waterways, and even the Democratic cotton farmers in the region were coming to the same conclusion. Some of the latter group even renounced the party of Jackson and turned to the opposition party; it seemed that increased

⁵⁰Register of Debates, 21 Cong., II sess., pp. 358-359, 455.

⁵¹Dora J. Bonquois, "The Career of Henry Adams Bullard," Louisiana Historical Quarterly (October, 1940), XXIII, no. 4, pp. 1012-1013.

wealth and maturity caused people to become more conservative rather than democratic.

The debate over the proposed Tariff of 1832 was heated as the cotton farmers of the Southeast criticized the insufficient lowering of duties and asked that the rates be cut further. Although impost levels on cotton bagging were reduced from 5 cents to 3½ cents per pound, iron duties were lowered from \$1.12 to 90 cents per 112 pounds, and sugar duties were dropped from 3 cents to 2½ cents per pound, the Carolinians were dissatisfied. They wanted the items decreased further, and especially desired a reduction in woollens and cottons duties which remained at an average ad valorem level of around 50 per cent.⁵²

Louisiana's congressmen, especially Henry Bullard, outspokenly berated South Carolina's position while trying to get the House to revise the sugar duty upward. Bullard, a cotton planter, weakened the South Carolinians' arguments by stating that he and other cotton planters of his state favored the tariff. He said that although they sometimes differed on it and other questions, they did not think of quarreling about it nor of complaining that they were oppressed. He said, ". . . on the contrary, that section of the country is prosperous, highly prosperous, and contented."⁵³ He pointed out that the older seaboard states'

⁵²House Report, No. 481, 22 Cong., I sess., pp. 29-36.

⁵³Register of Debates, 22 Cong., I sess., p. 3588.

problems lay, not with the tariff, but with their eroded and exhausted soils, and stated that he was for protection and for the Union.⁵⁴ Philemon Thomas, the aging general who had fought in the Revolutionary War, supported Bullard's arguments, and Edward White, though saying little in congress, opposed the tariff. After continued debate the measure passed the House of Representatives, with Bullard and White voting against it because they did not want the sugar duty lowered by a half cent, and Thomas supporting it because he favored moderation.⁵⁵ (Map 38)


The Senate also passed the measure, after at first restoring the 3 cent rates on sugar, then again lowering them to 2½ cents. Louisiana's senators made no comments, but cast their votes in favor of the bill.⁵⁶ Altogether, the state appeared to favor moderation, with a total of three men supporting the act and two rejecting it.

Strangely, the passage of the Tariff of 1832 evinced no loud denunciations from the citizens of Louisiana even though the sugar duty had been lowered slightly. On the contrary, the New Orleans Bee criticized White and Bullard for opposing the act. The newspaper contended they should have backed the tariff since the duties would cause only temporary embarrassment and because the 2½ cent duties would allay discontent

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 3589.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 3830-3831.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 1219.



Map 38. Louisiana's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1832

and make protection more permanent.⁵⁷ Both the cotton and the sugar planters of Louisiana seemed satisfied.

The same degree of contentment was not noticeable in the state of South Carolina; they called for nullification. A convention quickly assembled and set forth the Ordinance of Nullification, a document which declared the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 null and void within their state. Such actions in the Palmetto State frightened the people of Louisiana because they knew disunion would harm their flourishing economy. Instead of holding nullification meetings, like many South Carolinians were doing, the people of Louisiana held union meetings.⁵⁸ Each state throughout the South and North anxiously awaited the outcome of the dilemma as President Jackson proclaimed he would use force if necessary to collect the revenues and asked Congress to pass a Force Bill to that effect.

The House of Representatives, alarmed at the situation, began work on a bill "to reduce and otherwise alter the duties on imports" on January 8, 1833, and shortly thereafter, Henry Clay introduced a second compromise proposal into the Senate. Clay's measure quickly took precedence and worked its way through Congress as the Compromise of 1833. The new bill provided for a gradual reduction of duties until

⁵⁷Dora J. Bonquois, "The Career of Henry Adams Bullard," p. 1019; New Orleans Bee, July 14, 1832; Diedrich Ramke, "Edward Douglas White, Sr.," p. 285.

⁵⁸Baton Rouge Gazette, December 29, 1832, January 5, 1833,


1842, at which time the tariff should be on a revenue basis only with average ad valorem duties of around 20 per cent. All of Louisiana's delegation voted for the measure.⁵⁹ (Map 39) To them Union was the most important factor to consider, and after all, the duties would remain high for a while, then drop gradually. They had not deserted the protective principle.

On March 1, 1833, the second measure which was working its way through Congress, the Force Bill, emerged for a vote. This bill which was designed to combat South Carolina's Ordinance of Nullification seemed patriotic to the five congressmen from Louisiana, and the entire delegation voted for it.⁶⁰ (Map 40) Without the Union, their economy would suffer.


Louisiana's changing economy had thus propelled her into the ranks of the protectionists--a position which seemed incongruous since the cotton culture made up a large portion of the state's economy. However, cotton was second in total value of production when compared to sugar cane, and even the producers of the secondary crop were fairly affluent. Although once democratic upon their entry into the state, the cotton planters often became Whigs as they grew wealthy and conservative, and even those who remained Democrats of the Jacksonian persuasion sought benefits in the protective

⁵⁹Register of Debates, 22 Cong., II. sess., p. 818.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 1810-1811, 808-809.



Map 39. Louisiana's Congressional Tariff Vote, 1833



Map 40. Louisiana's Force Bill Vote, 1833

tariffs so roads could be built and so that Texas cotton could be excluded from the American market. If any state's reactions to the tariffs could be listed in contradistinction to those of South Carolina, that state would be Louisiana.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

An astute observer of American history once noted that the elements of diversity within the South--the physiographic differences, the varied modes of livelihood, and even the divergent climatic conditions--prevented the attainment of any natural unity, and he further concluded that there was not one South, but many. To a great degree, his contention is valid, especially in regard to the tariff controversies of 1828 through 1833. Yet many Americans of that era, as well as those of a later period refused to recognize the diversities inherent within the region. They looked instead at the elements of cohesiveness--the agrarian economy, the warm climate, the institution of slavery, and the ideal of the country gentleman--and assumed that all the people in that section of the country, with the possible exception of the sugar planters of Louisiana, would act as a single unit in supporting the doctrine of free trade. Such preconceived notions, however, belie the truth of the situation, for a reassessment of the South's reactions to the various tariffs and to the Force Bill shows that factions emerged in nearly every state to counter the protagonists of free trade, and especially to curtail any extremists' reactions which might

lead to disunion. Even South Carolina, the most rebellious state of all, was not without its unionists and protectionists. Evidently, some obscure internal problems were disrupting the tranquility and harmony of the South, but in order to understand the logic behind each action, the author had to revert back to the assumption that there were truly many Souths, and, in turn, to survey the peculiar economic, social, and political conditions inherent within each area.

The economic factors are most vivid, for the South was a land of mountains, plains, deltas, plateaus, and coastal lowlands, each with its own distinctive local economy that had special needs and interests of its own although it might be a part of a larger southern culture. While the southerners were predominantly agrarians, their modes of livelihood varied from that of the small self subsistent farmer, to the medium scale agriculturalist who raised sheep, cattle, or grains, to the large scale planters who depended upon a staple crop economy. Of the staples, the cotton culture predominated, having spread throughout the South from lower Virginia to Louisiana. However, other money crops such as rice, tobacco, and sugar cane also played a major role in the agricultural community.

In general, these separate economic elements caused some regions to disagree with their neighboring area, but strangely, many southerners within a distinctive region or within a well defined staple crop area, often quarrelled among themselves or with people engaged in the same pursuit

who lived just across the state boundary. This, in turn, shows that economic factors were not the sole cause for the various southern reactions, but that other independent variables were involved. For example, an internal political feud in South Carolina which caused one group to support and one group to oppose John C. Calhoun and his free trade policies, led some agrarians to vote for protective tariffs when they, in reality, disliked them. A senator from Tennessee supported the highly protective Tariff of 1828 to further the political objectives of one of his friends even though many of his constituents disagreed with his position. Some people in northeastern Virginia, coastal Virginia, western Virginia, and eastern Tennessee favored protection so they could obtain federally financed internal improvements. Other citizens in portions of Tennessee, Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi supported protection whenever a question of allegiance to Andrew Jackson arose since they preferred to support the Old Hero rather than his enemy, John C. Calhoun. Moreover, other people from Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi who wanted the Indians removed from their domains also supported some protective tariffs and unionist measures in order to retain the support of Andrew Jackson, a noted advocate of removal policies. Finally, some of the populace in Virginia and North Carolina backed moderate tariffs in order to stigmatize the South Carolinians' contention that nullification was an historic and constitutional doctrine.

All these adverse reactions, and more, took place at various times during the tariff interlude, but this does not deny the fact that a majority of the southerners were free traders when only economic interests were at stake. In general, the cotton, tobacco, corn, and rice producers of the South opposed the tariffs which they felt were for the benefit of the textile manufacturers of the North. Conversely, the sugar cane producers, the self sufficient farming interests, the sheep raisers, the salt, iron, and coal miners, and the merchants favored protection. Some of these elements reacted favorably to the impost measures because they wanted to exclude foreign imports similar to those produced by their own labor, while others did so because they did not have such a large personal stake in the workings of the tariff and did not consider the issue of great importance. This disinterest was especially true of the merchants who were often former northerners or Europeans with only a moderate interest in the South, and the subsistence level farmers who would not directly feel the effects of such legislation. Nevertheless, both those who opposed and those who supported free trade, did so with purely economic interests in mind during the first portion of the tariff era--a condition which was destined to be of short duration.


In 1828, when the tariff of that year emerged, the elements of economic motivation were singularly apparent, as was the fact that the South was predominantly a free trade region. Since 1824 many agrarians had berated the tariffs,

contending that they placed a tax upon one portion of the Union for the benefit of another, but that measure was nothing when compared to the measure being debated in Congress. The new act proposed average duties of 50 per cent ad valorem instead of the old $33 \frac{1}{3}$ per cent rate, and increased the duties on cotton bagging, cottons, and woolens, all of which were needed by the southern agrarians. Although the discussions in the Senate and House of Representatives became muted because of the political overtones involved, the congressmen's final vote on the measure distinctively placed most of the South in the free trade bracket. (Map 41) Seventy-four of the eighty-three southern senators and representatives cast their votes against the act, five supported it, and four did not vote. In scrutinizing the position of the congressional votes on the map, one notes that the rice and long staple cotton planters of the coast, the tobacco planters of eastern Virginia, North Carolina, and portions of Tennessee, and the short staple cotton producers and other farming interests from lower Virginia to Louisiana opposed the tariff. Their reasons for so doing were based on the factors previously noted. But other clearly defined regions also appear-- areas which supported the Tariff of Abominations.

In 1828 two major regional groups favored protection, the sheep raisers, salt, iron, and coal miners, and other farmers, all of western Virginia, and the sugar producers of southern Louisiana. The Virginians had two things in mind. They wanted to prohibit the import of foreign wool and other

KEY:

- Yea Votes +
- Nay Votes o
- Not Voting -



Map 41. Southern Congressional Tariff Vote, 1828

items which they could supply, and they hoped to get federal support for internal improvements since their fellow statesmen in the east would not aid them. They could only obtain the funds if the national treasury received money from the tariffs. In Louisiana, the second major protectionist region, the sugar planters there, though few in number when compared to the cotton planters within the state, wanted protection against the West Indies sugar cane which was not only more abundant, but of better quality. Only one vote, that of John Eaton of Tennessee, supported the new level of duties because of personal rather than economic motives. Eaton wanted to help Andrew Jackson, his long time friend, win the coveted position of President of the United States, and he believed this could be done only if the northerners thought Jackson and his friends favored protection.

Other than the one vote, the reactions to the Tariff of 1828 were clearly economic and wholly uncomplicated, but by 1832 when the next tariff appeared, the former positions were often abandoned. Too many variables had entered the picture. Many South Carolinians were radicals and were threatening to nullify any further protective legislation; Andrew Jackson, the President who presumably favored low tariffs at one time, now seemed to support high imposts, and he despised the noted southern leader, John C. Calhoun. The American economic depression as well as the soil depletion of the Tidewater and Piedmont in the older seaboard states added to their troubles. Other problems were also apparent: the Indians still


held lands in the Southwest; intrastate feuds and animosities increased; and political factionalism grew more distinct. Altogether, these factors caused a more localized reaction to the Tariff of 1832.

The most notable reaction occurred in South Carolina when a large group of short staple cotton planters from the Piedmont, and several rice and short and long staple cotton planters from the Tidewater, became extremists in their denunciations of the tariff. They held free trade meetings, rallied around John C. Calhoun and other more radical orators, and announced that they planned to institute an embargo against northern goods which entered their state. Further, they asserted that if the newly proposed Tariff of 1832 did not reduce impost duties to around the 15 per cent average ad valorem level, they would declare the tariff null and void in their state and ask other southerners to do the same.

These threats by the Carolinians did not frighten the northerners and westerners who wanted a strong degree of protection. Nevertheless, they ultimately presented a measure to Congress for consideration which reduced the duties from those established in 1828. Yet, in its final form, the 1832 tariff was still highly protective and far above the 15 per cent level demanded by the Carolinians.

When the congressmen voted on the Tariff of 1832, a strange realignment appeared: no longer were the transmontane Virginians and the sugar planters of Louisiana alone

in their support for protective tariffs, but they were joined by groups of people in every other southern state-- even South Carolina. (Map 42) Thirty-six southern congressmen favored the tariff, as compared to five in 1828, while forty-three opposed the act, and four did not vote. Evidently, the changes which had occurred during the preceding four years led to the transformed response by the people even though the South was as much an agrarian center as ever before. The western Virginians retained their protectionist stance for the same reasons that impelled them to support the earlier tariff, and some eastern Virginians who wanted internal improvements, who rejected South Carolina's threats of nullification, and who sought moderation, aligned with them. The same logic held true for the North Carolinians who cast their votes for the tariff. In South Carolina, the enemies of Calhoun, the friends of President Jackson, and the merchants voted for the act, while a Jacksonian Democrat in the port city of Savannah, Georgia, did the same. Throughout the rest of the southwestern states, the votes cast for the tariff evidenced a desire for moderation, reflected regional animosities, or showed the degree of support for the President rather than for the radicals of South Carolina. Even two sugar cane producers of Louisiana supported the act although it reduced the duties on their product by a half cent because they believed the new level would be accepted as a permanent rate.



Map 42. Southern Congressional Tariff Vote, 1832

Although all southerners who opposed the Tariff of 1832 did so because they believed it was still too protective, and all who supported it wanted, among other things, moderation, tranquility did not lie ahead. The most violent period of tariff reaction ensued as the nullifiers of South Carolina, true to their word, passed the Ordinance of Nullification and declared that the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were null and void in their state, as of February 1, 1833. They in turn called upon all other southern states to support them in this action by subscribing to the doctrine of nullification. President Jackson, however, quickly countered with his Nullification Proclamation that declared one state could not nullify a federal law, and the Force Bill which asked Congress for the right to use coercion in collecting imposts from the recalcitrant state.

Throughout the South the various interest groups polarized even further, some becoming radical and zealously supporting the doctrine of nullification, others rejecting such action and demanding that the Union not be impaired. Union meetings and nullification meetings were held throughout the South, and at one point, civil war seemed imminent. All interest groups turned their eyes toward South Carolina to see what would happen next.

Before noting the resultant reactions of South Carolina, the question as to what caused the people of that state to become so radical merits consideration. It would appear that if their extremism was caused by the depression which

afflicted their staple crop economy, the states of Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia might become just as enthusiastic in their opposition to protection since they too suffered economic reverses. But ultimately, South Carolina stood alone in her determination to rid the South of the tariffs and have them declared unconstitutional.

The answer to the question seems to lie in a complex set of factors, which, when interwoven, produced the reaction noted. The planters of Piedmont South Carolina had, after the War of 1812, achieved great wealth in the short staple cotton culture, a new found livelihood which united them more closely with their lowcountry counterparts who produced short and long staple cotton. But by the late 1820's the recently found riches eluded them when a depression struck the country and when, at the same time, their soils became exhausted and the new southwestern states flooded the market with millions of pounds of cotton. Mystified, they looked for the cause of their sudden precipitous decline of incomes, and in turn, blamed their problems on the tariffs.

However, if one contends the depression caused the people of Piedmont South Carolina to become radical, then why did not the states of Virginia and North Carolina ally with them since they too were severely harmed by a prostrate economy. The answer is twofold. First, these two states were too divided internally, a factor which prevented strong united action. This is especially true of Virginia where the easterners and westerners were separated from each other

by the mountains that dissected the state and by the different tariff outlooks which already existed. North Carolina, always a handicapped state because of the poor transportation system, was also never able to achieve any degree of strong, positive, united action, but contented itself with being a negative or obstructionist force on many federal issues. Second, the two older states were less radical than South Carolina because they had adjusted to the economic woes which befell their lands long before the added burden of the depression appeared. Virginia's continued production of tobacco had long since depleted the soil, and, by 1832, many of the once luxurious plantations were being sold to pay the debts of the owners. Seeking a new source of wealth, they turned to a new means of income, the sale of slaves to the young frontier states of the Southwest. Although Virginia had once been prosperous and had had fertile soils at an earlier date, North Carolina had never been blessed with a favorable economy and was the most backward of any seaboard state. But whatever the reason, the two states were used to adversities. Sociological theorists suggest that when a group is doing well, but is met with sudden reversals, they are most likely to rebel, while those with no hope of change or who have never obtained wealth, usually never consider such action. This seems to be the case with Piedmont South Carolina when the people became wealthy and had the hopes of a bright future before them, then suddenly lost it, and, in a reverse fashion, true of Virginia and North Carolina.

The citizens of the South Carolina Tidewater, however, were in a much better position than that of their struggling upland neighbors. Some produced short staple cotton, but many raised rice and the popular long staple variety of cotton, both of which were in great demand and never suffered as much in the depression. Strangely, though, many of the wealthy lower Tidewater planters were more radical than the suffering agrarians of the uplands. Evidently the logic which impelled them to embrace radicalism was not based upon the presumed destructiveness of protection but upon the institution of slavery. They realized they must join the fight against the tariffs in order to combat any future attempts by the government to abolish their peculiar labor system. By reverting to the doctrine of states' rights and winning a victory in the argument against protection, they stood a better chance of maintaining the slave system against further onslaughts; so it was this combined unity of purpose in the lowlands and uplands which produced a radical reaction in the Palmetto State that was not noted in the rest of the South.

The degree of unity within South Carolina between the depressed planters of the uplands and the slave owners of the lowlands, and the determination to use the radical remedy of nullification was unique in that state alone. The other southern states not only refused to come to South Carolina's aid by accepting the doctrine of nullification but often denounced such a policy. Altogether, in observing the

reactions of all of the southern states, and assessing the degree of extremism in each, three conclusions, among others already mentioned, appear. First, it is concluded that radical reaction to the tariffs was inversely proportional to the degree of prosperity within a given state. Second, radical reaction to the tariffs was inversely proportional to the degree of friendship and respect the citizens of a given state had for Andrew Jackson. Third, radical reaction to the tariffs was inversely proportional to the distance of any given southern state from South Carolina.

All of these factors, and more, are evidenced by the actions within each southern state during the tariff era, as noted in detail in the preceding chapters, but some cases merit special attention. For example, Georgia came closest to uniting with her neighbor because her citizens were beset with much the same economic problems. Virginia and North Carolina were next in line in giving partial support, but the states to the west were basking in the aura of newly opened cotton lands and the new wealth from the sugar culture, so they opposed an action which might harm their economy.


Personalities also played a part in the reactions of the southerners because many of the people revered Andrew Jackson--the hero of the common man, the Indian fighter, the unionist, and the opponent of John C. Calhoun. Even some South Carolinians such as Joel Poinsett, William Smith, and other unionists who had known Jackson in the war supported

their old friend instead of the political upstart and nullifier from their own state. Georgia, although having many citizens who liked Calhoun, had a strong faction which supported Jackson because William Crawford, their leading politician, liked the President but despised Calhoun. Also, they wanted the Chief Executive to remove the rest of the Indians from Georgia. Such territorial gains would more than counterbalance any losses from protective tariffs. The states further west, Alabama and Mississippi, also liked Jackson because they sought Indian removal, and Tennesseans revered him simply because he was from their state and because they presumed him to be a commoner like themselves. The Louisianians aligned with Jackson as the Hero of New Orleans and the man who would preserve the Union: the new frontier states could not easily survive on their own.

Not only did many westerners and southwesterners favor Andrew Jackson in his efforts to stop the extremists of South Carolina, but it appeared that distance from that state served to mute the trend toward radicalism. The people of South Carolina learned of the merits of nullification through their orators and local newspapers, but the further west one traveled, the more the lines of communication decreased. Moreover, the people in a region lying in close proximity to South Carolina often traded with the area, had personal friends or relatives there, or knew John C. Calhoun personally. Some of the neighboring areas, in turn, often supported South Carolina, while the more distant states did not.

Although the disputes and alignments continued, the question concerning what South Carolina would do still awaited an answer, but in the meantime her threats of future nullification as of February 1, 1833, and her demands for a lower tariff proved effective. The Carolinians and the other opponents of protection throughout the South pressured the Congress into restudying the tariff problem, and the senators and representatives, agreeing that many tariff duties should be reduced, effected a compromise measure--the Tariff of 1833. The new act which proposed lowering the tariff duties over a nine year period until they reached to old 1824 levels, seemed acceptable to all. The advocates of protection supported the compromise because the decreased duties would come gradually and because they wanted to avert civil war; the free traders also favored it, hoping to prevent strife; and even the nullifiers supported it because they realized they stood alone in advocating the use of force against the federal government. Only two congressmen, one man who staunchly supported internal improvements and felt lowered tariffs would curtail such endeavors, and another who disliked Jackson, opposed the measure. (Map 43) Apparently the larger problem of civil conflict was more important than the old arguments for protection or free trade.

A final matter awaited the congressmen's approval: the Force Bill. This measure, though not a tariff act, was Jackson's answer to the recalcitrance of the South Carolinians who refused to pay the impost duties. However, many




Map 43. Southern Congressional Tariff Vote, 1833

citizens read more into the proposed measure than that. They believed the President was attacking the age old doctrine of states' rights, and this they rejected, but supporters of the Old Hero believed passage of the act would mean a victory for the Union over the action by one state. The congressional voting pattern on the Force Bill clearly depicts the two lines of thought. Many people in Louisiana, Tennessee, and western Virginia supported Jackson as a personality and wanted to maintain the Union so they voted for the act, while the scattered votes for the measure in eastern Virginia, North Carolina, northeastern South Carolina, and eastern Georgia depicted various independent elements who either disliked Calhoun, opposed nullification, or supported Jackson. (Map 44) The second element, those who voted against the act as well as those who abstained to show their distaste for the measure, believed the Force Bill ran counter to the doctrine of state sovereignty and felt the President had overstepped the prerogative of his office. Many of them also harbored a personal dislike for the Chief Executive.

The two measures passed in 1833 stemmed the extremism on both sides, and the tariff controversies subsided as prosperity returned to the nation, but the incendiary remarks made by some of the combatants and the spectre of nullification and secession would be long remembered. The Americans, with the passage of time, soon dismissed the complexities of the situation and the degree of intrastate factionalism which existed, and regarded the tariff era as

Key:
Yea Votes +
Nay Votes o
Not Voting -



Map 44. Southern Congressional Force Bill Vote, 1833

the time when the South fought the North, and the time when the agrarians of the lower United States fought the manufacturing interests of the other section to maintain free trade. The fact that many of the cotton planters and other agrarians supported some of the protective tariffs quietly slipped back into the pages of history.

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This monograph ably presents the workings of the sugar cane industry of Louisiana and emphasizes the problems and benefits from such ventures.

Taylor, George R. "Wholesale Commodity Prices at Charleston, South Carolina, 1796-1861," Journal of Economic and Business History, IV (August, 1932), 848-868.

Taylor's tabulations are important in showing the rate of economic growth and decline in South Carolina.

Treagle, Joseph George, Jr. "Early New Orleans Society: A Reappraisal," Journal of Southern History, XVIII (February, 1952), 20-36.

This study was of importance in depicting the various heritages and attitudes of nativity in New Orleans which in turn led to diverse political beliefs.

_____. "Louisiana and the Tariff, 1816-1846," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXV (January, 1942), 24-148.

This is an excellent tariff history of the cotton and sugar industries of Louisiana.

Winston, James E. "The Mississippi Whigs and the Tariff, 1834-1844," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (June, 1934), 505-524.

This article deals with a later period of tariff history, but was used for general background data.

Young, Mary. "Indian Removal and Land Allotment," American Historical Review, LXIV (October, 1958), 31-45.

This article deals with the various Indian removal actions of the 1830's and is important in showing the determination of the young western states to take the lands so they could produce cotton.

Books

Abernethy, Thomas P. From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: A Study in Frontier Democracy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932.

This book is a history of Tennessee and was especially useful in giving background information and in surveying the rise of the Whigs in the state.

_____. The Formative Period in Alabama, 1815-1828. University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1965.

Abernethy ably presents many of the confusing political alignments of the Alabama Whigs. The chapters on agriculture, politics and the election of 1824, and politics and federal relations were especially useful.

Ambler, Charles Henry. Sectionalism in Virginia, 1776-1861. New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1964.

Ambler's excellent work presents the regional aspects of cismontane Virginia and the resultant political beliefs of the people. The maps on the congressional tariff votes of 1828 and 1832 are superb.

_____. Thomas Ritchie, A Study in Virginia Politics. Richmond: Bell Book and Stationary Company, 1913.

This biographical sketch was useful in showing the political power and beliefs of this dynamic Virginian.

_____. West Virginia, The Mountain State. New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1940.

This history of West Virginia was useful in gaining an understanding of the economic conditions there which caused the people to support protection. The chapters on state rights to nationalism, the constitutional convention, and sectional strife were most beneficial to this study.

Bancroft, Frederic. Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification Movement. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1928.

Bancroft's skillful study of the nullification movement is important in presenting the personal and regional antagonisms prevalent in South Carolina and the positions taken during the nullification controversy.

Bettsworth, John K. Mississippi: A History. Austin: The Steck Company, 1959.

This history of Mississippi was useful in giving information on the topography, livelihood, and Indian problems within the state.

Brooks, Robert Preston. History of Georgia. Boston: Mentzer, Bush and Company, 1913.

Brooks' history of Georgia is a very comprehensive work which deals with all aspects of the state's history. The most useful chapters for this study were "A State Lays its Foundations," and "The Golden Age of Peace and Plenty."

Coit, Margaret L. John C. Calhoun, American Portrait. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950.

Coit's Pulitzer prize winning biography of Calhoun is a very readable, interesting, and well documented account of the South Carolinian's life. It is important in presenting Calhoun's position in the tariff era.

Cole, Arthur Charles. The Whig Party in the South. Washington: American Historical Association, 1913.

This is one of the best surveys of the origins and beliefs of the Whig party in the different regions of the South. Although it emphasizes the period after 1830, it gives some background information and other valuable material.

Cunningham, Noble E. The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1963.

This book was important in showing the political factions throughout the South, and in portraying the beliefs of such leaders as Nathaniel Macon and John Randolph.

Dangerfield, George. The Era of Good Feelings. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1952.

Dangerfield's work was important to this study as a survey of the period. The chapter entitled "The Lurid Administration" was most useful.

Eaton, Clement. The Growth of Southern Civilization, 1790-1860. New York: Harper and Row, 1961.

Eaton's refreshing book surveys the complete spectrum of economic life in the South from the farm economy to the plantation system of the country gentleman.

Folmsbee, Stanley J. Sectionalism and Internal Improvements in Tennessee, 1796-1845. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1939.

Folmsbee's study is important in showing the factionalism which emerged in Tennessee politics over the problems of internal improvements and the various local economies.

Folmsbee, Stanley J., Robert E. Corlew, Enoch L. Mitchell. Tennessee: A Short History. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1969.

Three noted historians from Tennessee have united in producing this elucidating book on Tennessee history. It is especially important for this study in showing the divisions within the state, the political leadership, and the general attitude toward the tariffs.

Freehling, William W. Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.

This author is especially indebted to this refreshing study of South Carolina during the tariff era. Freehling's skillful analysis of the causational factors and the factionalism is well documented and very creditable.

Garrett, William. Reminiscences of Public Men in Alabama for Thirty Years. Atlanta: Plantation Publishing Co., 1872.

Garrett's work gave important information on the noted leaders in Alabama politics. The material on James Calhoun and Dixon Lewis was especially helpful.

Gray, Lewis Cecil. History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860. 2 vols., Washington: The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1933.

This book was an informative source of statistical information on the various forms of agriculture in the South.

Houston, David Franklin. A Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina. New York: Russell and Russell, 1896.

This is an analytical study of South Carolina's actions in the nullification controversy. It is useful in learning about the effects of the tariff on the state.

Howard, Perry H. Political Tendencies in Louisiana, 1812-1952. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957.

This is one of the better volumes on the agrarian cultures of Louisiana and the related political beliefs.

Jack, Theodore H. Sectionalism and Party Politics in Alabama, 1819-1842. Menasha, Wisconsin: Menasha Publishing Company, 1919.

This is an extremely valuable source on the regionalism in Alabama and the resultant political alignments.

Johnson, Amanda. Georgia as Colony and State. Atlanta: Walter W. Brown Publishing Company, 1938.

Johnson's very comprehensive volume on Georgia history is well documented and has several valuable maps and charts. The chapters on the lands and people, factional politics, economic advances, the change from factions to parties, the Whigs, and the ante-bellum economy are especially helpful.

Keating, J. M. History of Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee. Syracuse: D. Mason and Co., 1888.

This volume is helpful in giving background information on the western portion of Tennessee, and especially in showing the cotton culture in the growing frontier region.

Kirk, Russell. John Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in American Politics. Chicago: Henry Regenery Company, 1964.

Kirk's noted biography on John Randolph was useful to this study in portraying the states' rights beliefs of this man and his influence on contemporary politics.

Lefler, Hugh Talmage, and Albert Ray Newsome. A History of a Southern State, North Carolina. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954.

This is one of the better works on North Carolina history. It was useful in learning about the economy, the state's changing role in national politics, and the emergence of the two-party system there, as well as the relationships between the citizens of North Carolina with those of the neighboring states.

_____. The Presidential Election of 1824 in North Carolina. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939.

Lefler's study of the 1824 election was useful in presenting the political divisiveness in North Carolina which was based on economic needs.

Miles, Edwin A. Jacksonian Democracy in Mississippi. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960.

This is one of the most useful volumes on Mississippi tariff history, since the author deals with the various congressmen, their political and economic beliefs, and the influence of the internal improvement and Indian problems on their reactions to the tariffs.

Murray, Paul. The Whig Party in Georgia, 1825-1853. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1948.

Murray's scholarly volume is one of the best works to date on the intrastate political coalitions within Georgia during the tariff era. The discussion of the Troup Party is especially valuable.

Olmstead, Frederick Law. A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States with Remarks on their Economy. New York: Dix and Edwards, 1856.

Olmstead's travel account is a valuable historical document. He related the various types of life he surveyed in the South. It was important for this work as a source of a better economic understanding of the people.

Parks, Joseph H. Felix Grundy: Champion of Democracy. University: Louisiana State University Press, 1940.

This biography is helpful in portraying Grundy's background, his truly democratic nature, and his influence on politics in Tennessee.

Parton, James. Life of Andrew Jackson. 3 vols., New York: Mason Brothers, 1860.

This well known study of Andrew Jackson was useful in assessing Jackson's changeable reactions to the various political problems of the day and his relationship with John C. Calhoun.

Phillips, Ulrich B. Georgia and State Rights. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.

This noted volume was useful in dealing with the George Troup and John Clark feud in Georgia and the attitude of each toward the various tariffs.

Remini, Robert V. Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1970.

Remini's skillful study is especially helpful in analyzing the shrewd machinations of Martin Van Buren as he worked to effect the Tariff of 1828 that would benefit Andrew Jackson.

_____. The Election of Andrew Jackson. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott and Company, 1963.

This publication was especially helpful in gaining an overall view of southern beliefs in 1824 by noting the regions which especially favored Jackson and the reasons for that support.

Rippy, J. Fred. Joel Poinsett, Versatile American. Durham: Duke University Press, 1935.

Rippy's biographical study of Joel Poinsett is useful in analyzing the logic behind this unionist's actions in South Carolina.

Roland, Charles P. Louisiana Sugar Plantations During the American Civil War. Leiden: J. J. Brill, 1957.

The historical sketch of the Louisiana sugar industry which was included in this work was especially helpful.

Rowland, Dunbar, ed. Encyclopedia of Mississippi History. 2 vols. Madison: University Press, 1907.

This work was quite helpful in gaining an understanding of George Poindexter and John Quitman of Mississippi.

_____. History of Mississippi, The Heart of the South. 2 vols. Chicago: The S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1925.

Only portions of this study were useful for this paper. The presentations on John Black, Adam Bingaman, and William Brandon are helpful, as was the material on Jackson's Indian removal actions.

Shipp, John Edgar Dawson. Giant Days, or The Life and Times of William H. Crawford. Americus: Southern Printers, 1909.

This excellent biography elucidates the power of Crawford's leadership in a portion of Georgia and his disputes with John C. Calhoun.

Shryock, Richard H. Georgia and the Union in 1850. Durham: Duke University Press, 1926.

Shryock's study, although centered on a later period of history, was useful in gaining better background information on Georgia's earlier history.

Simms, H. H. The Rise of the Whigs in Virginia, 1824-1840. Richmond: The William Byrd Press, 1929.

Simms' scholarly study ably presents the various factions within Virginia. The material on Thomas Ritchie was quite helpful.

Sitterson, J. Carlyle. Sugar Country: The Cane Industry in the South, 1753-1950. Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1953.

Sitterson's valuable study of the sugar cane industry in Louisiana and the South as a whole gives a thorough picture of the location, problems, political needs, and benefits derived from the unique culture.

Smith, George. The Story of Georgia and Georgia People, 1732-1860. Macon: Franklin Printing Company, 1900.

Smith's history of Georgia was useful in gaining general background information.

Stanwood, Edward. American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth Century. 2 vols. New York: Russell and Russell, 1903.

This is an extremely important history of the tariff controversy, although the author's prejudices in favor of tariffs become involved.

Taussig, Frank W. The Tariff History of the United States. New York: A. M. Kelley, 1967.

This is the best tariff history to date. It presents the various tariffs and the impost system ascribed to each. The author, although prejudiced in favor of free trade, has done an excellent job.

Turner, Frederick Jackson. Rise of the New West, 1819-1829. New York: Collier Books, 1962.

Turner's study of the forces shaping the political behavior of the early Republic is a superb work. It surveyed the South's reactions to the internal improvement measures, the tariffs of 1824 and 1828, and the Ordinance of Nullification. The statistics on cotton production were especially valuable.

Ward, John William. Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953.

Ward's interpretative study of Andrew Jackson was beneficial in clarifying the unusual reaction of the lower class people of Tennessee and throughout the South to the man who was more aristocratic and who did not always act in the best interests of that region.

Wiltse, Charles M. John C. Calhoun. 3 vols. Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1944-1951.

This analytical and insightful study is one of the best works on Calhoun to date, although he makes several value judgments on Calhoun, the South Carolina unionists, and Andrew Jackson.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Augusta Chronicle, 1832.

This Georgia paper showed the states' rights attitude of many of the people in Augusta.

Baton Rouge Gazette, 1827-1833.

This unionist paper presented the sugar cane and even some cotton producers' opposition to nullification.

Camden Journal, 1828-1833.

This South Carolina paper was one of the unionist papers, and was useful in comparison to the Charleston Mercury.

Charleston Courier, 1828-1833.

The Courier was another South Carolina union paper.

Charleston Mercury, 1828-1833.

Henry L. Pinckney's Charleston Mercury was a valuable source for this paper. It was a nullification paper, but Pinckney often printed editorials and statements from other papers which he hoped to use to arouse the people of his state.

Georgia Courier, 1830.

This paper was useful in learning about the Georgian's attitude toward Crawford and toward the tariffs.

Huntsville Democrat, 1824.

This was used to gain some background information about the state's position on the 1824 tariff.

Jackson State Rights Banner, 1833-1834.

This Mississippi newspaper was the leading states' rights paper.

Milledgeville Federal Union, 1830-1833.

This was the official Democratic paper of Georgia.

Monticello Pearl River Advocate, 1830.

This paper supported the wishes of the southeastern people of Alabama, or the Piney Woods region which was usually opposed to the Natchez populace. They favored more internal improvements and were more democratic.

Natchez Natchez, 1830-1832.

The Natchez paper presented the Whig views of the people from that region.

New Orleans Bee, 1830-1846.

This paper was useful in the tariff era studies because the Bee outspokenly supported or denounced the Mississippi congressmen's votes as they saw fit. When some congressmen voted against the Tariff of 1832 because the sugar duties were a half cent lower, the Bee criticized them for not supporting a duty which could remain permanent.

Niles' Weekly Register (Baltimore) 76 vols., 1811-1849.

This was a valuable source of information since Hezekial Niles printed materials gleaned from papers from throughout the North and South, as well as portions of the congressional debates. He was prejudiced in favor of protection, and his own statistics were often invalid.

Raleigh Register, 1815-1825.

This paper was the leading William Crawford organ for a long time. It continued to support states' rights. Joseph Gales was the editor.

Richmond Enquirer, 1804-1860.

This paper, edited by Thomas Ritchie, was a leading supporter of the administration during the tariff era.

Southern Advocate (Huntsville), 1825-1827.

This leading Alabama paper was beneficial in learning more about the agrarian problems of the northern portion of the state. The Southern Advocate was centered in the wealthy city of the north which became more nationalistic in later days.

Southern Agriculturist (Charleston), 1828-1853.

This is an outstanding source of contemporary agrarian information. The paper mentioned the problems faced and offered recommendations for better scientific farming methods.

Southern Recorder (Milledgeville), 1828-1853.

This was the leading State Rights-Whig party newspaper of Georgia.

Other Printed Sources

Ames, Herman V., ed. State Documents in Federal Relations: The States and the United States. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1906.

Ames' compilation of the various documents relating to the tariff controversies in the southern states has been very helpful. He presents the various state resolutions, 1828-1833.

Cralle, Richard K., ed. Works of John C. Calhoun. 6 vols. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1853-1856.

This compilation of the works of Calhoun, though not complete, was useful in learning more about the letters of Calhoun to fellow politicians of the day and his changing position on tariff policy.

DeBow, J. D. B. The Industrial Resources, Statistics, etc., of the United States. 3rd ed., 3 vols. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1854.

This is a valuable source of statistical information on the sugar and cotton culture of the South.

Freehling, William W., ed. The Nullification Era: A Documentary Record. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.

Freehling has compiled several notable speeches and writings by the leading combatants of the tariff era. Of special interest are the speeches by George McDuffie, Thomas Cooper, Robert Turnbull, James Hamilton, Jr., and John C. Calhoun.

Gales, Joseph Jr., and William W. Seaton, eds. Annals of Congress. 42 vols. Washington: United States Government, 1816-1824.

A very valuable source for this paper. This record of the congressional debates covers the period through 1824 when the tariff of that year became law. Most of the arguments which would be used in later years were used at that time, so these volumes enabled the reader to gain good background information.

Register of Debates in Congress. 14 vols. Washington: United States Government, 1825-1837.

This is probably the single most valuable source for this paper. The congressional speeches made by the senators and representatives from each state, as well as the voting record of each, served as a basis for a better understanding of the tariff attitudes of the people from each local area of the South.

Lefler, Hugh T., ed. North Carolina History Told by Contemporaries. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1934.

Lefler has compiled several documentary materials by contemporary North Carolinians. The articles and papers which were especially useful were on Jeffersonian Democracy in North Carolina, Opposition to the Tariff of 1828, North Carolina's Attitude toward Nullification, and Sectionalism.

Maline, Dumas., ed. Dictionary of American Biography. 20 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932.

These volumes were used to learn more about various congressmen who served in the Twentieth and Twenty-second Congresses.

Richardson, James D., ed. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 20 vols. New York: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1897-1909.

These papers are useful in studying Jackson's attitude toward Calhoun and toward the nullification attempts of South Carolina.

Sellers, Charles, ed. Andrew Jackson, Nullification, and the State-Rights Tradition. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963.

Sellers' book contains several articles which revolve around the question of states' rights. Of special benefit were the speeches and writings by George McDuffie, John C. Calhoun, Andrew Jackson, John Tyler, Nathaniel Macon, and Benjamin F. Perry.

Statutes at Large of the United States of America. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1845-1873.

This publication carries the various federal laws passed by Congress.

Taussig, Frank William, ed. State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1893.

Taussig's compilation of tariff speeches was especially valuable in gaining a better understanding of the 1824 tariff controversy.

Taylor, George Rogers, ed. The Great Tariff Debate, 1820-1830. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1953.

This compilation of several of the speeches made in Congress for and against the tariffs, the editorial opinions, and some memorial from conventions has two or three speeches which are especially good, but the rest are not strongly related to the South.

United States Government. American State Papers: Indian Affairs. Washington: United States Congress, 1832-1834.

This source was useful in gaining a better understanding of the various removal treaties for the Indians of the Southwest, and the attitude of Andrew Jackson and the people of the frontier states toward the various nations.

United States Government. American State Papers: Public Lands. Washington: United States Congress, 1860.

These documents covered the land policy of the United States Government toward the states and the Indians of the Southwest.

United States Government. Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961.

This volume lists the congressmen elected to the various sessions of congress, and tells their political affiliation and personal history.

United States Government. Executive Documents, No. 62, 20 Congress, I session, III.

This memorial relates North Carolina's position against protective tariffs.

United States Government. House Report, No. 481, 22 Congress, I session.

This 1832 petition from the citizens of Louisiana to the United States Congress called for lower duties on woolens and cottons.

United States Government. Journal of the House of Representatives. Washington: United States Congress, 1828-1833.

These documents presented the memorials and petitions and other general statements of discontent against the various tariffs.

United States Government. Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress of the United States from 1789 to 1897. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1899.

The various official tariffs are compiled in this volume.

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