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The University of Southern Mississippi

THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE: 1918–1986

by

Joel Richard Bius

Abstract of a Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
of The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2015

ABSTRACT

THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE 1918–1986

by Joel Richard Bius

May 2015

The military-industrial complex has been the topic of intense conversation among historians since President Dwight Eisenhower first gave the phrase life in January 1961. The term typically conjures up images of massive weapons procurement programs, but it also ironically involved one of the world's most highly-engineered *consumer* products, the manufactured cigarette. “The Soldier and the Cigarette: 1918–1986” describes the unique, often comfortable, yet sometimes controversial relationships among the military, the cigarette industry, and tobacco and politicians. The dissertation argues that the federal government’s first cigarette warning in 1964 changed a relationship between soldiers and cigarettes that the Army had fostered for almost half a century. Thereafter, the Army faced formidable political, cultural, economic, and internal challenges as it sought to *unhinge* a soldier-cigarette bond that it helped to *entrench*.

“The Soldier and the Cigarette” is also a study in modern American *corporatocracy*. Through a lens of corporatocracy, the dissertation reveals an American political economy that can only be described as paradoxical, involving a host of characters possessing vested and varied interests in the cigarette enterprise. Whether bureaucrats, soldiers, lobbyists, government executives, legislators, litigators, or anti-smoking activists, all struggled over far-reaching policy issues involving the cigarette. Under the visible hand of *modern economic arrangements*, these groups attempted to balance issues of conscience, commerce, and personal freedom, as well as the needs of

big business, taxpayers, and the military-industrial complex. This study is important because the soldier-cigarette relationship established by the Army in WWI, renewed time and again thereafter, and then broken apart in 1986, underpinned one of the most prolific social, cultural, economic, and health care related developments in American history: the rise and proliferation of the American manufactured-cigarette smoker and the lucrative industry supporting them.

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A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my beautiful, lovely, and faithful wife, Leigh Bius, two solid young sons, Jake and Brooks Bius, and the precious little girl, Mary Jewel Bius, who was born to all of us the day before this dissertation was presented for defense. I also dedicate this work to the memory of my father, H. Wayne Bius, my mother, Billi Fae Bius, and close family members Jewel Brannan, Larry Brannan, and Carol Lewis Bailey, who all passed away during the time I was writing. In the midst of such a cycle of life, death, joy, pain, and creation, it is with great sincerity and true humility that I call this a work of inspiration grounded in Christian faith, enduring hope, and everlasting joy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	ii
DEDICATION.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	vii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE RISE OF THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE.....	21
III. THE DAMN Y, THE SOLDIER, AND THE CIGARETTE IN WORLD WAR I.....	48
IV. GENERAL PEYTON MARCH, THE SOLDIER, AND THE CIGARETTE	80
V. SMOKE ‘EM IF YOU GOT ‘EM: THE GREATEST GENERATION GOES TO WAR	104
VI. THE SOLDIER, THE CIGARETTE, AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE.....	144
VII. SOLDIER-STARTERS	165
VIII. HEALTH CARE AND THE AVF	192
IX. CAP, JOE, AND THE JESSE HELMS CREW GO TO WAR.....	217
X. THE CIGARETTE SNOWBALL	255
XI. THE END OF THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE: SFA2000 INVADES THE DOD.....	282
XII. EPILOGUE.....	308
BIBLIOGRAPHY	320

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AAA</i>	Agricultural Adjustment Act
<i>AAR</i>	After Action Reports
<i>ADVON</i>	Advanced Echelon Team
<i>AEF</i>	American Expeditionary Force
<i>AVF</i>	All Volunteer Force
<i>B&W</i>	Brown and Williamson
<i>CEO</i>	Chief Executive Officer
<i>CHAMPUS</i>	Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
<i>CoS</i>	Chief of Staff
<i>CTCA</i>	Commission on Training Camp Activities
<i>CTR</i>	Council for Tobacco Research
<i>DoD</i>	Department of Defense
<i>DRMS</i>	Defense Resource Management Study
<i>FDR</i>	President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
<i>FTC</i>	Federal Trade Commission
<i>FY</i>	Fiscal Year

<i>GHQ</i>	General Headquarters
<i>H&K</i>	Hill & Knowlton
<i>HASC</i>	House Armed Services Committee
<i>HEW</i>	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
<i>HHQ</i>	Higher Headquarters
<i>ICBM</i>	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
<i>KIA</i>	Killed in Action
<i>LBJ</i>	President Lyndon Baines Johnson
<i>MP</i>	Military Police
<i>MSC</i>	Medical Service Corps
<i>MTF</i>	Military Treatment Facility
<i>MWR</i>	Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Subcommittee
<i>NRA</i>	National Recovery Administration
<i>OCS</i>	Officer Candidate School
<i>OMB</i>	Office of Management and Budget
<i>OPR</i>	Offices of Primary Responsibility
<i>OSD/HA</i>	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs

<i>OSD/MPP</i>	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel
<i>PME</i>	Professional Military Education
<i>PR</i>	Public Relations
<i>PX</i>	Post Exchange
<i>RJR</i>	R.J. Reynolds
<i>SECDEF</i>	Secretary of Defense
<i>SSD</i>	Special Services Division
<i>TI</i>	Tobacco Institute
<i>TIRC</i>	Tobacco Industry Research Council
<i>UCMJ</i>	Uniform Code of Military Justice
<i>UMT</i>	Universal Military Training
<i>USP</i>	Unique Selling Position
<i>USO</i>	United Services Organization
<i>VA</i>	Veterans' Association
<i>VD</i>	Venereal Disease
<i>WIB</i>	War Industry Board
<i>WWI</i>	World War One

WWII World War Two

USAF United States Air Force

YMCA/The Y Young Men's Christian Association

INTRODUCTION

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

—President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 17, 1961

The military-industrial complex has been the topic of intense conversation among historians since President Eisenhower gave the phrase life during his January 1961 farewell address.¹ The term typically conjures up images of massive weapons programs involving supersonic bombers, strategic missiles, armor-plated tanks, nuclear submarines, and complex space systems. Eisenhower was concerned the vast amounts of money and power involved in the design, procurement, and deployment of these weapons would take on a life of its own, creating a dangerous relationship between the military, industry, politicians, and big business.

However, it also ironically involved one of the world's most highly engineered consumer products, the manufactured cigarette² “The Soldier and the Cigarette: 1918–

¹ Examples of scholarly works which discuss the military-industrial complex from various angles: Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and The Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York : Basic Books, 1985); Frances FitzGerald, *Way Out There In the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Aaron L. Friedburg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's anti-statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Ann R. Markusen, *The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Lisa McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2001); Herbert Stein, *Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); and Hedrick Smith, *Power Game: How Washington Works* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996).

² Cassandra Tate, *Cigarette Wars: The Triumph of the Little White Slaver* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 65; Robert Proctor, *Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and the Case for Abolition* (Berkley: The University of California Press, 2011), 29, 39–40. The manufactured cigarette (as opposed to hand-rolled) first appeared in noticeable numbers when James Bonsak invented a cigarette rolling machine in 1885. James B. Duke's American Tobacco Company bought the rights to this machine and began manufacturing cigarettes at a rate of 210 per minute. This allowed Duke to gain a

1986” describes the unique, often comfortable, and yet sometimes controversial relationship among the military, the cigarette industry, and tobacco and politicians during the twentieth century. For purposes of continuity and focus, “The Soldier and the Cigarette” centers on the manufactured cigarette smoking culture in the United States Army from 1918 to 1986 excluding other branches of service and modes of tobacco intake. The dissertation argues that initially the Army, an organization with vested interests in soldiers’ combat readiness, health, and morale, played the leading role in this relationship. Well into the twentieth century, the Army freely distributed billions of manufactured cigarettes to soldiers via combat rations, or at great discount through the military resale system. This distribution system supported a cult of smoking in the Army that effectively entrenched the relationship between the soldier, the cigarette, and the cigarette enterprise.³

After the Surgeon General issued the federal government’s first warning about health hazards associated with smoking in 1964, the nature of this relationship changed. After five decades encouraging the soldier-cigarette relationship, “The Soldier and the Cigarette” argues the Army faced formidable political, cultural, economic, and internal challenges as it sought to unhinge the soldier-cigarette bond it had helped entrench. Not only is the dissertation an exhaustive study of change over time presenting an Army

monopoly on the cigarette market. By the time of WWI, the industry was able to manufacture 480 cigarettes a minute. Today, the industry can make 19,480 per minute.

³ Allan Brandt, *Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product that Defined America* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 50. Brandt describes the moral dilemma faced by the military in the early twentieth century: “On the one hand, the military represented conventional nineteenth-century views of discipline, morality, and health as well as the conviction that the state had the essential responsibility of protecting ‘manhood’ from vice . . . the cigarette, like alcohol, was often seen as undermining the control essential to military discipline . . . and did not project a desirable image of military decorum.” Also, the term *cigarette enterprise*, or just *the enterprise*, is used throughout this work as a collective term to describe a formal and informal grouping comprised of the cigarette industry, cigarette brands, lobbyists, growers, tobacco state politicians, smokers, and other individuals or groups that have a unified stake in promoting cigarette smoking, culture, and sales.

transitioning from extreme measures to support the cigarette vice to decisive actions to restrict it, it is also a study in modern American *corporatocracy*.

The Oxford Dictionary defines corporatocracy as “a society or system that is governed or controlled [to some extent] by corporations.”⁴ The term corporatocracy is often a loaded, pejorative term. Some on the far left use it to refer to those who exploit third world countries, break up unions, start war to profit from war, and reap earnings from human misery. A more moderate interpretation defines corporatocracy as simply the reality of the modern economic arrangements that have governed the American economic system throughout most of the twentieth century.

The latter definition is the lens appropriate to the discussion of the soldier and the cigarette. Under this framework, elements of corporatocracy collectively include federal activism, too big to fail bailouts, powerful special interests, political action committees, corporate capitalists, and a political-economy that can only be described as paradoxical. The story of the soldier and the cigarette occurs where these elements of corporatocracy intersect with a host of characters possessing vested and varied interests in the cigarette enterprise. Whether bureaucrats, soldiers, lobbyists, government executives, legislators, litigators, or anti-smoking activists, they all struggled over far-reaching policy issues involving one of the most lucrative consumer products ever developed.

Under the visible hand of modern economic arrangements, these groups interacted on a field paved with irony and hemmed by special interests. Whether elected, appointed, or retained, they attempted to blend issues of conscience, commerce, and personal freedom. At the same time, they strove to incorporate the needs of big business,

⁴ *The Oxford Dictionary Online*, s.v. “corporatocracy,” accessed January 29, 2015, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/corporatocracy>.

taxpayers, the cigarette industry, and the military-industrial complex.⁵ Within this framework, the soldier and the cigarette bonded and then broke apart. This study of entrenching, unhinging, and corporatocracy is important because the cigarette-soldier relationship established by the Army in WWI, and renewed time and again thereafter, underpinned one of the most prolific social, cultural, economic, and health care related developments in American history: the rise and proliferation of the American manufactured-cigarette smoker.⁶

The relationship between the soldier and the cigarette has a rich and storied history. Dating to the close of the Civil War, Confederate sailor and tobacco farmer Washington Duke returned home to find thousands of soldiers camped on his small North Carolina farm. Duke was drafted into the Confederate Navy at age 42 and was anxious to return home and put the war behind him. Approaching his homestead, however, he was shocked to find the war in his front yard. After General Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox on April 9, 1865, the rest of the Confederate Army followed suit in North Carolina when Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston surrendered to Union General William T. Sherman on April 26, 1865, at the Bennett Farm, located just a few miles from Washington Duke's homestead. Thus, a makeshift camp materialized on Duke's land.

As the gaggle of bored blue and grey soldiers awaited orders, or pardons in the case of Confederate soldiers, Duke attempted to resume his life. Returning home

⁵ Terms like “visible hand” and “modern economic arrangements,” accesses a vast literature most completely encapsulated in the works of Alfred Chandler Harris in *The Visible Hand: the managerial revolution in American business* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1977) and Michael Lind in *Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States* (New York: Broadside Books, 2012).

⁶ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 75–76; Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 57.

penniless, necessity became the mother of invention when Duke concluded these bored soldiers, weary of camp life and thirsty for any diversion, were ideal customers for the yellow leaf tobacco stored in his barn.⁷ He and his son, James B. Duke, pitched their product to the soldiers as small packages of ribbon-cut tobacco sufficient for pipe or cigarette paper. Subsequently, Duke's blend of Carolina gold-leaf tobacco became popular among Union and Confederate veterans once they returned home and resumed civilian pursuits. When Duke founded the American Tobacco Company in 1890 and focused its energies on the emerging cigarette market, he leveraged popularity among veterans to monopolize the entire manufactured cigarette market by the early twentieth century.⁸

During WWI, American soldiers were rationed smooth smoking, flue-cured, manufactured cigarettes for the first time in American history.⁹ Through flue curing, American cigarette producers blended, toasted, and rolled cigarettes into a deeply inhalable product enabling the most inexperienced smoker or virgin starter to become a sophisticated, veteran smoker in no time. Chapters II and III ("The Rise of the Soldier

⁷ Tobacco is a unique agricultural product in that bulk, raw tobacco can be stored for years before being brought to market. Indeed this process of aging and flue curing was perfected by the cigarette industry in the early twentieth century and allowed them to bring a very enjoyable blend of cured tobaccos to the market in the form of a deeply inhalable and satisfying manufactured cigarette. So, the fact that Duke left large bundles of unprocessed tobacco leaf at his farm three years prior and returned to process it for sale to the soldiers is ironic, because that three year curing period became industry standard during the twentieth century.

⁸ "Duke Homestead," Division of Archives and History, Department of Cultural Resources, North Carolina Historic Sites, accessed January 30, 2015, http://www.dukefamily.org/Duke_Homestead.htm; Ronald Troyer and Gerald Markle, *Cigarettes: The Battle Over Smoking* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 33.

⁹ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 69. To some degree, the Army was aware of the dangers of deeply inhaling cigarette smoke as early as 1915, when West Point advised its cadets "smoking cigarettes is [no] more injurious than other forms of tobacco unless continually inhaled well into the lungs." By issuing the soldiers the new American-blended, flue-cured, manufactured cigarettes during WWI, the Army gave them the most inhalable, smooth smoking object ever created.

and the Cigarette” and “The Damn Y, the Soldier, and the Cigarette”) explore the early stages of the soldier-cigarette relationship and how it eventually erupted into an insatiable demand. Pre-WWI American smoking culture, armed progressivism, the Y Man, and the battlefield conditions that gave rise to the soldier-cigarette relationship are explored in these chapters.

If the Progressive Era was known for moralism, social uplift, association, efficiency, clean living, and “the strenuous life,” then it should be no surprise that the organizations fighting the war and supporting the war effort were a reflection of the times.¹⁰ In *The Killing Ground*, Tim Travers describes the British Officers who commanded soldiers during WWI as products of British civilian society and military culture. Likewise, American military officers, YMCA volunteers, and civilian officials who led, trained, and equipped soldiers in the Great War were products of the American progressivism associated with this period.¹¹ For example, the YMCA Men and Women who served both at home and overseas during WWI were archetypes who captured the spirit of the Progressive Era. As they served the millions of Doughboys deployed to Europe, the Y workers carried a substantial portion of work involving relief and soldier welfare during WWI.¹² Two decades of American progressivism affected War Department decisions regarding soldier welfare, how the Army was organized, who was

¹⁰ Theodore Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses* (New York: The Century Company, 1900).

¹¹ Timothy Travers, *The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare: 1900–1918* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987).

¹² Howard Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America* (The University of Michigan: Association Press, 1951), 499. Using data pertaining to resources expended, Hopkins estimates the YMCA, as compared to all the other relief agencies, performed 90.55 percent of all the civilian welfare work for the American Expeditionary Force (AEF).

responsible for various aspects of soldier morale, and important to the story of the soldier and the cigarette, whether or not soldiers received a cigarette ration.¹³

These armed progressives were relatively successful in restricting soldiers' access to prostitutes and alcohol. However, progressives not only looked the other way in the case of manufactured cigarettes, they actively participated in giving these instruments of vice to the soldiers. By war's end, relief agencies distributed over two billion manufactured cigarettes to the Doughboys. Further, through the combat ration and other means, the government furnished over five-and-a-half billion manufactured cigarettes to soldiers at a cost of \$80 million to the American taxpayer.¹⁴

Chapter IV ("General Peyton March, the Soldier, and the Cigarette") further drills into the genesis of the soldier-cigarette relationship and focuses on Chief of Staff of the Army General Payton March and the factors driving him to reverse a War Department order and initiate a cigarette rationing program one year after America entered the war. When Congress passed the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, the nation ordered millions of young men to arms and created a conscripted military service. Influenced by the tenets of the Progressive Era, Congress and the War Department took extraordinary measures to ensure these soldiers were protected from vices traditionally associated with soldiering: alcohol and prostitution.¹⁵

¹³ For a good description of Progressivism during this period, see Robert Wiebe's *Search for Order*, Michael McGerr's *A Fierce Discontent*, and T. Jackson Lears' *Rebirth of a Nation*. For a discussion regarding the problems with the term *Progressive Movement*, see Peter G. Filene's "Obituary for the 'Progressive Movement,'" *American Quarterly*, 22, no. 1 (Spring, 1970), 20–34.

¹⁴ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 75–76.

¹⁵ Edward Coffman, *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in WWI* (Louisville: The University of Kentucky Press, 1998), 357, 363. According to Coffman, 3,703,273 American men served in the Army during WWI. At the end of their service with the AEF, most were discharged rather rapidly, allowed to take only a helmet and gas mask as mementoes. During the war,

These progressives were generally successful in shielding the soldiers from the traditional vices. However in the case of the emerging cigarette vice, they either looked the other way or actively participated. When General March and the Army added their blessing with the cigarette rationing program, the nicotine addicted Doughboy veterans completely transformed the American cigarette industry and the nation's smoking culture. Most historians agree that more than any other single factor, the Great War "legitimized the cigarette" and "moved cigarettes into the mainstream of American culture . . . by linking them to an icon of manliness and civic virtue: the American soldier."¹⁶ Historians Allan Brandt and Robert Proctor argue that "WWI would mark a critical watershed in establishing the cigarette as the dominant product of modern consumer culture," Proctor adding that the war "turned smoking from a marginal indulgence of questionable morality to an unobjectionable mark of stalwart manhood."¹⁷ In the end, the decision to ration soldiers billions of cigarettes created an enduring American icon: the soldier and the cigarette.

50,475 Americans were killed in action and another 193,611 were wounded in action. By comparison to the Allied Force, and representative of the total devastation of the Great War, the total amount of US casualties for the entire war was "175,000 less than those the British suffered in the Somme in 1916."

¹⁶ Jarrett Rudy, *The Freedom to Smoke: Tobacco Consumption and Identity* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005), 110–111, 132; Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 65–66; Julian Sivulka, *Soap, Sex, and Cigarettes: A Cultural History of American Advertising* (Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 1998), 166. Rudy makes a further link between cigarette smoking and masculinity. "Ultimately, it was the association between cigarettes and First World War Soldiers, largely promoted by newspapers that made cigarettes 'manly' giving them new legitimacy." Sivulka adds yet another reason why WWI made cigarettes culturally acceptable for the first time: sanitation. "During WWI, cigarettes gained wider acceptance when both soldiers and civilians found smoking cigarettes to be more convenient, cheaper, and more sanitary than chewing tobacco." During a time when society was gravely concerned about disease (more soldiers would die from disease than combat), the idea of germ-ridden spit floating around in the bottom of a trench or on a factory floor was viewed with disdain.

¹⁷ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 51–54; Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 45.

In terms of historiography, the argument presented in Chapters II through IV of “The Soldier and the Cigarette” differs from that of the only other historian who has written on this specific topic. In *Cigarette Wars*, Cassandra Tate argues, “Congress ordered the War Department to include [cigarettes] in rations issued to soldiers overseas.”¹⁸ It was actually the military, and specifically General Peyton March, who ordered the War Department to rescind its previous decision to exclude the cigarette. The War Department then requested that Congress earmark additional funding for government-procured cigarettes.

This may seem strange to think a general officer could exert such strong influence over the civilian-led War Department. However, the War Department had been greatly fractured for over a century and had just gone through an extensive reorganization before the war, bringing the logistics and procurement bureaus under the control of the newly empowered Army Chief of Staff billet. When March assumed this office, he quickly used these powers to make extensive changes, the cigarette ration being just one of them. As a result of the military’s leadership in the soldier-cigarette relationship and pro-smoking policies, a culture of cigarette smoking infiltrated the Army. Underpinned by soldiers and veterans, the rise in the consumption of manufactured cigarettes after the war resulted in one of the “most rapid increases in smoking ever recorded” in American history.¹⁹

The ration of four manufactured cigarettes a day became the standard issue for the next 55 years, except during WWII when that number quadrupled. WWII is the focus of Chapter V (“Smoke em’ if you got em’: the Greatest Generation Goes to War”). This

¹⁸ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 66.

¹⁹ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 45. The Doughboys developed a nearly insatiable demand for cigarettes during WWI. “Per capita consumption of manufactured cigarettes in the United States nearly tripled from 1914 to 1919 . . . this is one of the most rapid increases in smoking ever recorded.”

chapter explores the continued entrenchment of the cigarette-smoking culture America inherited from the Doughboys and WWI. The chapter starts with a description of the prolific smoking culture in America fueling a WWII Army made up of conscripts. To assuage their nicotine habit, the Army went to great lengths and expense to procure and freely distribute hundreds of billions of manufactured cigarettes to the soldiers, openly encouraging them to *smoke ‘em if you’ve got ‘em.*

This chapter spends considerable time examining the proceedings of the United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program. Known as the Truman Committee, the panel convened during September and December 1944 to examine the cigarette ration, among other issues. Regarding cigarettes, the committee was specifically concerned with the Army’s procurement of large amounts of cigarettes for soldiers’ rations. The Army cigarette program drove up the price and affected the availability of cigarettes to the American public. The irony is thick . . . Americans’ demand for manufactured cigarettes had been borne on the backs of Doughboys; now the Doughboys’ GI sons siphoned off their cigarette supply and caused a shortage of immense proportions.

During the hearings, Army officials testified that they had procured nearly 100 billion manufactured cigarettes for fiscal year 1944 alone, an amount that ensured every Army soldier would receive 1.3 packs (16 manufactured cigarettes) *per day*. In the midst of the testimony presented to this panel, an Army logistics officer gave shocking testimony to the concerned Congressmen. To their surprise, he told them his department procured cigarettes under the assumption that every single soldier in uniform at that time smoked cigarettes, a premise that was not far off the mark.

No greater evidence exists for the entrenchment of the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette during and after WWI than this revelation regarding Army procurement and consumption policies during WWII.²⁰ After issuing five-and-a-half billion manufactured cigarettes to soldiers during the entirety of WWI, just 26 years later the Army issued nearly 100 billion cigarettes during a single year of WWII and required the cigarette industry to turn over 18 percent of its output for military purposes. Americans only smoked 2.5 billion cigarettes in 1900, and lung cancer was so rare (only 140 cases worldwide) it was considered an odd “treat” when medical school students could examine a cadaver with the disease.²¹ After WWI, the number shot up to 45 billion cigarettes smoked in 1920, with 2,837 cases of lung cancer reported by 1925. After WWII, the number increased again to 341 billion cigarettes smoked in 1945 with 12,130 cases of lung cancer reported. This massive groundswell of cigarette-smoking WWI and WWII veterans was instrumental in establishing America as a cigarette-smoking nation.²²

As a result of the pro-smoking environment established during WWI that continued during WWII, millions of veterans returned home acculturated to cigarette smoking, many becoming nicotine addicts.²³ Note especially that in the end, soldiers’

²⁰ *Cigarette Rations, The United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program*, 78th Cong. Part 26, page 12108, (1944), accessed January 30, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fwz24f00/pdf>.

²¹ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 3. Brandt says, “A steep rise in lung cancer—a disease virtually unknown at the turn of the twentieth century—had . . . ominously followed in the wake of the rise of the cigarette.”

²² Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 45 and 57. Cigarette smoking peaked in America in 1980 when 632 billion cigarettes were smoked. Whether coincidence or not, the first noticeable drop in cigarette consumption in the United States since 1900 was reported in 1985, the same year the Army initiated its first smoking cessation campaign and Congress attempted to pass legislation as part of the Defense Authorization Act for 1986 to end subsidized cigarettes for service personnel.

²³ A. Lee Fritschler and James M. Hoefer, *Smoking and Politics: Policy Making and the Federal Bureaucracy* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996), 10. Expressed in terms of per capita

overwhelming demand for cigarettes was not purely a function of chemical dependency driven by nicotine. Though dependency was a contributing factor, Tate argues the culture of the military, the soldier's lifestyle, and the combat environment were the primary factors driving cigarette demand. "When soldiers recorded their own thoughts about cigarettes, they emphasized the social context, smoking as a display of camaraderie, a remedy for boredom, a solace to the dispirited . . . learning to smoke was as much a part of [a soldier's] initiation into military life as learning to swear."²⁴

The *Greatest Generation* was also a prolific smoking generation transforming America from a society that smoked only about two billion manufactured cigarettes a year on the eve of WWI to a country that burned through an average of 350 billion cigarettes each year between 1946 and 1964.²⁵ Veterans were afforded every opportunity to continue their smoking habit through generous smoking benefits guaranteed them by Congress. Congressional representatives were keenly aware of the power wielded by the veteran voting bloc and fiercely guarded veterans' commissary benefits and access to cigarettes. They provided free cigarettes in Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital facilities and underwrote veterans' smoking routine by offering them low-cost, subsidized cigarettes in the Post Exchange (PX) and commissary. Moreover, despite scientific data that definitively proved that smoking caused lung cancer (1950), and the 1964 Surgeon

annual consumption, the numbers are telling. In 1900, Americans over 18 smoked on average only 49 manufactured cigarettes a year. After millions of veterans were given billions of cigarettes as part of their service during the two World Wars, the Korean War, and as a drafted military force on the Cold War frontiers, they formed the foundation of cigarette smokers in America who were by 1963 smoking on average 4,345 cigarettes per person, per year—or "11 cigarettes per day for every American over the age of 18."

²⁴ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 90.

²⁵ The 1946 to 1964 average figure is an informed estimate. However the 1945 and 1963 figures quoted earlier are accurate and verifiable.

General's Warning to smokers, the military continued to issue cigarettes to soldiers as part of their rations in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.²⁶

As an institution, the military was the cigarette industry's most reliable cradle to grave supplier of cigarette smokers and starters. However, after half-a-century entrenching the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette, the federal government began to question the military's cigarette policies. A small cabal of fiscally conservative Congressman and concerned government officials took steps to sever the relationship between soldier and cigarette in the early 1970s. They were motivated to action by the mounting data supporting the dangers of smoking and the rising costs of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). The AVF was not a use and dispose force as the drafted force had been; the AVF was comprised of long-service professionals who carried a hefty price in terms of health care expenses, as well as a myriad of other costs.

As the nation ended the draft and committed to this long-service, professional AVF, a veteran Congressman named Charles Bennett quietly took measures to end the military's requirement to ration cigarettes to soldiers. He was concerned that "the taxpayer was being taken for a ride in two directions at once" due to the requirement to

²⁶ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 149, 190, 226, and 235. Proctor provides an excellent description of the early studies that proved cigarettes caused cancer. Experiments in the early nineteenth century utilized mice and rabbits in experiments where they were forced to inhale cigarette smoke or were exposed to nicotine tar that was painted on their backs to prove cigarette smoke caused cancerous growth on tissues. Interestingly, Adolph Hitler was a leading proponent of cigarette research, as he was interested in propagating a healthy master race. In America, the University of Virginia was an early leader in tobacco experimentation, but they acted largely as an organ for the tobacco industry, as the bulk of their interest was in "defending cigarettes." However, the landmark year for definitive scientific data linking cigarette smoking with lung cancer was 1950, the year Claude Teague and Ernst Wynder separately concluded research that made the lethal connection. Wynder's research was published in the *Journal of American Medicine* in 1950. Once Wynder's research was socialized among the public health, medical, and scientific communities, it led to a reassessment of the relationship between cigarette smoke and disease. As a result, between 1950 and 1964, a host of agencies, including the American Cancer Society, the British Medical Research Council, the American Heart Association, and a litany of leading medical schools, all came to understand and support the conclusions of Wynder's groundbreaking study—smoking is deadly.

pay for the soldiers' cigarettes and the mounting health care costs attributed to excessive smoking in the military.²⁷ Thus the primary concern of fiscal conservatives committed to the removal of rationed cigarettes was the monetary liabilities presented by soldiers' association with cigarettes. Chief among these were trepidations connected to the long-term expense of cigarette-related health issues assumed by the American taxpayer when the Army transitioned to an AVF.

The Army's transition from a drafted to a volunteer force, the vast expenses associated with this transition, as well as the enterprise's concerns regarding its faithful soldier starters, is the subject of Chapters VI, VII, and VIII ("The Soldier, The Cigarette, and the All-Volunteer Force," "Soldier Starters," and "Health Care and the AVF"). America's move to replace the draft and Congress' elimination of the cigarette ration ran parallel with the cigarette industry's response to shifting cultural perceptions regarding cigarette smoking in America. Industry executives were concerned the cigarette enterprise was locked in an uphill battle against negative public opinion over the scientific data connecting cigarettes to various health hazards and diseases. If measures were not taken soon, movement up that hill would stall, and, like an airplane that runs out of airspeed and altitude at the exact same moment, the industry would crash and burn.

Just as the federal government showed alarm at the proliferation of costs associated with Americans who smoked, the cigarette industry was concerned with the loss of profits associated with Americans who did not smoke. Powerful tobacco land politicians and cigarette industry executives took extraordinary measures during this

²⁷ Charles Bennett, Note to file, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida. In the Bennett papers, Congressman Bennett includes a "Note to File" that details the exact day/time/place and circumstances that motivated him to pursue removing cigarettes from combat rations.

period to ensure cigarettes survived amidst a sustained war on tobacco, of which the battle over soldiers and cigarettes was only one front.

As the 1970s drew to a close, the battle lines were clearly drawn. The country had transitioned from a drafted force to an AVF, and government appropriators now questioned what they had bought. Specifically, they questioned the vast expenses associated with a recruited, professional, all-volunteer military establishment. As small pockets of the federal government took steps to extinguish the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette, the cigarette industry and key tobacco and politicians committed to a program guaranteed to further entrench cigarette smoking as a masculine norm among America's volunteer force.²⁸ The enterprise was rather successful in this endeavor, and statistics reveal a majority of the soldiers in the Army were avid smokers as the Carter years gave way to the Reagan Revolution.

During the 1980s, many Congressmen and Department of Defense (DoD) officials worried that the overwhelming number of smokers in the Army would represent substantial cost liabilities in the near future. The actions taken to address the growing evidence that the AVF was a prohibitively expensive force, with short- and long-term health care expenditures associated with smoking only adding to this expense, are the subject of Chapters IX, X, and XI ("Cap, Joe, and the Jesse Helms Crew Go to War," "The Cigarette Snowball," and "The End of the Soldier and the Cigarette: SFA2000 Invades the DoD"). These chapters describe the legendary struggle between career

²⁸ Fritschler and Hoefler, *Smoking and Politics*, 12. By the 1960s, the cigarette, aided by the efforts of the cigarette enterprise, was able to thrive in the face of mounting evidence linking cigarettes to cancer. Fritschler and Hoefler comment, "As scientific evidence began to document the link between smoking and ill health, pressure for regulation grew, but the tobacco subsystem proved impenetrable to these demands. Tobacco was more firmly entrenched and more richly supported than most other consumer products . . . 'if tobacco were spinach the government would have outlawed it years ago, and no one would have given a damn.'"

bureaucrat-litigators, represented by the likes of Casper Weinberger and Joe Califano, and enterprise politicians and lobbyists, represented by characters such as Jesse Helms and Horace Kornegay.

As Congress approached mid-1980s budget drills in a fiscally-constrained environment, concerned government officials were doubtful they could implement effective policies to curb smoking-related health care expenses and address the combat readiness issues presented by soldiers addicted to cigarettes. They were especially perplexed by enterprise tough men like Helms, Kornegay and Dan Daniel from Virginia. Considering the power of tobacco land politicians and the deep pockets of the cigarette lobby, whose reaction is also documented in this chapter, government appropriators faced a daunting task as they attended to taxpayer liabilities represented by the expensive smoking culture in the Army.

Fueled by Surgeon General C. Everett Koop's 1984 *Smoke Free America 2000* (SFA2000) Campaign, and a 1985 DoD study revealing 54 percent of uniformed personnel serving in the military were smokers as opposed to 32 percent of the general public, elements within Congress and the DoD initiated a broad and far-reaching campaign to substantially decrease the smoking rate among uniformed personnel.²⁹ Their actions ignited a firestorm of controversy as both sides of the cigarette debate dug in and prepared for battle.³⁰

²⁹ *The Senate Congressional Record*, August 6, 1986, at S10534, accessed February 28, 2013, <http://legacy.library.uscf.edu/tid/pxw66w00/pdf>. The goal was to reduce smoking to within five percent of the civilian smoking rate. To achieve this goal, more than one quarter of those in uniform would have to stop smoking.

³⁰ *The Senate Congressional Record*, August 6, 1986, at S10534, accessed February 28, 2013, <http://legacy.library.uscf.edu/tid/pxw66w00/pdf>.

On one side were the industry officials, pro-tobacco legislators, and concerned military smokers interested in perpetuating the special relationship between the soldier and the cigarette. Led by pro-tobacco Congressmen and industry lobbyists, the enterprise circled the wagons in a last-ditch effort to safeguard its unfettered access to the lucrative military market. They wielded extensive influence over various defense-related committees and subcommittees and railed against legislation or regulatory measures aimed at curbing soldiers' access to cigarettes. They fought the Army's efforts to institutionalize smoking cessation plans and stripped language in defense appropriations bills that would have removed commissary and PX cigarette subsidies. They utilized a finely tuned and superbly coordinated campaign to connect smoking to vitality, maturity, liberty, individual rights, and freedom of choice: all themes resonating with the military market.

The other side was represented by small elements within the DoD, as well as several elected officials who were still concerned with the expenses associated with soldiers' smoking habits and the moral liability of encouraging a practice that would ultimately destroy their heart and lungs.³¹ With the lines drawn, these officials soon discovered that severing the long-standing bond between the soldier, the cigarette, and the enterprise was a difficult, complex, and a time-consuming task.

Similar to WWI when the military, knowingly or unknowingly, took actions entrenching the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette, in the 1980s, powerful internal forces within the DoD, under the guise of soldier rights and freedom of choice, blocked efforts to unhinge the soldier-cigarette relationship. In a stark moment of

³¹ Charles Bennett, memo to Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 6, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

frankness, Secretary of Defense Weinberger described DoD's difficulty as it endeavored to implement responsible cigarette policy in a corporatocracy starved for cigarette revenue and taxes. He said, "The tobacco issue has presented the government (federal, state and local) with a *paradoxical situation* attempting to balance the *negative* health impacts against the *positive* economic impacts (Italics mine)." ³² In the end, the Army, in a bold move just as decisive as General March's decision in 1918 to issue cigarette rations, stepped through a tiny crack in Weinberger's DoD *Health Promotion Directive 1010.10* guidance to once and for all end the soldier-cigarette culture dominating Army, and by extension American culture, for nearly 70 years.

"The Soldier and the Cigarette" employs a research methodology leveraging the extensive repository of primary source documents contained in the Legacy Tobacco Documents available online through the University of California-San Francisco. The Legacy Documents contain over 70 million optically scanned documents, thousands of which relate directly to the soldiers' experience with cigarettes during the entire period covered in this dissertation. It is difficult to describe the richness of this digital archive—one could spend years mining the data, exploring any topic from representations of females in modern advertising to links between cigarette advertising and newspaper profitability.

Allan Brant, a pioneer in this area of research, offers the best description of the importance of the Legacy Documents to scholars in this field. Brant comments, "the availability of research materials limits every historical inquiry," adding that his study would have been no exception were it not for one of the great ironies of "modern

³² Office of the Asst. Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), "Department of Defense Report on Smoking and Health in the Military," March 1986, 24, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00>.

corporate history.” During the discovery process utilized during the Master Settlement proceedings, the industry employed a tactic of “vetting internal materials and policies with legal council to claim attorney client privilege” in an effort to hide the most damaging documents. This tactic backfired when judges, as part of the massive Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the industry and the plaintiff states, required the industry’s legal teams to turn over all these confidential documents, which were subsequently digitized and meticulously organized.³³

Robert Proctor, another pioneer scholar in this field, adds that research leveraging archives like the Legacy Documents “represents a new kind of historiography: history based on optical character recognition, allowing a rapid combing of the archives for historical gems (and fleas).” An archive this immense enables “research opportunities that are largely unprobed . . . [and] entirely new kinds of topics . . . [including] the history of single words or turns of phrases.” Proctor adds, “It is hard to say how this will transform historical writing, but we are likely to find new paths opening up that we could not have imagined.” “The Soldier and the Cigarette” steps into this path by using the power of the Legacy Archive to narrowly focus on one topic—the soldiers and cigarettes.³⁴

This mountain of archival documents is supplemented with a vast array of other primary sources including personal memoirs, Congressional proceedings and hearing transcripts, government studies, military regulations, oral histories, and newspaper articles from the periods covered. Finally, these archival and primary sources are

³³ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 11–12

³⁴ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 9–10.

supported by an extensive array of secondary source literature covering topics directly and indirectly related to the soldier-cigarette saga.

From 1918 to 1986, the military established a powerful sub-culture of cigarette smoking soldiers. The relationship was so entrenched it took 37 years to sever *after* the 1964 Surgeon General's Report warned Americans that cigarettes were hazardous to one's health. The manufactured cigarette, despite its simplicity in appearance, had a profound and far-reaching effect on American history. "The Soldier and the Cigarette" cuts across a broad spectrum of historical methodologies and schools of inquiry. Though it is grounded in the field of War and Society, a school seeking to understand military history with an eye toward appreciating how war affects society and culture, and vice versa, it also speaks to many other disciplines. It is at once social and cultural history as the soldier's relationship with the cigarette displays elements of class, *mentalité*, and material culture. It touches on economic and advertising history as it traces the effects of the most highly-engineered and profitable consumer product ever created. It leverages aspects of political history as it uncovers the nuances of a federal system allowing for a corporatocracy of special interest groups and politicians with specific political, economic, and agricultural interests to dominate the American legislative process. In the end, "The Soldier and the Cigarette" moves the field of War and Society into new territory as it uses the manufactured cigarette as a vehicle to explore the interaction between war, society, and corporatocracy during the twentieth century.

CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE

When America entered WWI, manufactured cigarettes were only slightly popular in America. The first nationwide manufactured cigarette campaign prior to WWI was R.J. Reynold's (RJR) debut of the Camel cigarette brand in 1913.¹ The manufactured cigarette, as opposed to the hand rolled, had first appeared in noticeable numbers when James Bonsak invented a cigarette rolling machine in 1880. James B. Duke's American Tobacco Company bought the rights to this machine, and began manufacturing cigarettes at a rate of 210 a minute. This allowed Duke to gain a monopoly on the cigarette market. By the time of WWI, the industry was able to manufacture 480 cigarettes a minute; today, the industry can make 19,480 per minute.

These new manufactured cigarettes were easy to smoke, fairly cheap, and readily available. They were easy to smoke due to the relatively new flue-curing and blending process, and were “sweet and flavorful from [their] use of candied-up air-cured burley, and . . . mild and inhalable by virtue of its incorporation of low pH flue-cured leaf.” Flue-curing and blending was a process whereby the industry perfected combining the “lower pH of flue-cured with the higher pH of sweet-flavored burley.” Cigarette historian Robert Proctor calls this industry innovation “the deadliest invention in the history of modern manufacturing,” because this seemingly minor adjustment to cigarette production created the “milder, more flavorful, and inhalable . . . American blend [that] would quickly take

¹ The American Tobacco Company's flue-cured and blended Lucky Strikes and Lorillard's Chesterfields were Camel's chief competitor in the manufactured cigarette market for decades after the Great War.

the world by storm.”² The storm was only a spot on the horizon at the start of WWI; by the end of the war it was a dark cloud, and by WWII, the storm had grown into a worldwide hailstorm of cigarettes.

Yet this hailstorm was in the distant future. Though RJR had an impressive, well-coordinated roll out of its smooth smoking cigarette, the manufactured cigarette still only garnered less than seven percent of the tobacco market on the eve of WWI.³ As it had been for centuries, the market was still dominated by cigars and pipe tobacco, followed by chewing tobacco and snuff.⁴ There are several reasons why cigarettes were not as popular as other forms of tobacco in early twentieth century America. Retailers and traditional tobacco men thought they were cheap and poor of quality. One retailer, upon hearing of a cigarette ban in his state, exclaimed “I am tired of getting off my stool 250 times a day to sell a five cent package of cigarettes and then making only ten cents on the whole lot.”

Cigarettes were also seen as “perverse” and a “moral and cultural offense.” They were viewed as a form of tobacco consumption “typically practiced by disreputable men (and boys).” The highly influential temperance movements dominating the Progressive Era both politically and culturally lumped cigarettes with alcohol, labeling them both as a despicable vice. In progressive America, they became a symbol of the “seismic . . . moral

² Robert Proctor, *Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and the case for Abolition* (Berkley: The University of California Press, 2011), 34.

³ Cassandra Tate, *Cigarette Wars: The Triumph of the Little White Slaver* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 65; Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 39-40.

⁴ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 211. Proctor calculates that “Americans smoked only 2.5 billion cigarettes in 1900 – compared to 330 odd billion smoked in 2011. Cigarettes wouldn’t surpass cigars and pipes as the dominant form of smoking until the 1920s and 1930s.”

and cultural crisis in the nation” and were associated with juvenile delinquency and criminal behavior.⁵

However the most important determinant regarding cigarette acceptability hinged upon their reception by the cult of manhood that dominated American society during the early twentieth century. Among the refined and gentlemanly, cigarettes were juxtaposed against the more culturally accepted and masculine pipes and cigars, which were typically smoked in private rooms and gentlemen’s clubs. Many American men considered cigarette smoking an effeminate vice associated with immigrant city dwellers and those unable to exercise self-control. The literature on the cult of manhood is extensive.⁶ Consistent themes in this canon include the concepts of manhood, self-

⁵ Allan Brandt, *Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product that Defined America* (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 45-48; Ronald Troyer and Gerald Markle, *Cigarettes: The Battle Over Smoking* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 35, accessed November 23, 2013, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/peu11b00/pdf>. Today, the military, several states, and many municipalities across America, are looking to ban cigarette sales once again, or at minimum discourage hiring smokers. The frustrated shopkeeper mentioned above was happy some states had banned sales a century ago due to moral reasons; today, that same shopkeeper today might be happy for different reasons that do not include morality. The modern push to ban cigarettes have more to do with public policy: who should be forced to pay for a vice that costs state Medicare budgets and private insurance companies billions every year?

⁶ Gail Bederman *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States 1880-1917* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 213. Bederman provides the definitive work on this topic of manliness, gender, and race as it applies to the generation of American men who led and fought in WWI. She posits that there was a racially based ideology of male power during this period, the embodiment of which was Teddy Roosevelt. This ideology dictated that Jack Johnson *had* to be weak and Roosevelt *had* to be strong. An intense fear existed that manliness and white male dominance were being lost in slums of city life, and that white women were drifting away while working in the city. This belief in a *slipping virile*, civilized society was also related to the cigarette: cigarettes smokers were a visible manifestation of the *problem*. The struggle to define manhood during this period pitted the Victorian ideal man (self-controlled, self-restrained, prudent, sober, and thinking) against an emerging model of modern manliness (self-indulged, rough neck brute, bonded with similar manly men, conquering, drunken, and fond of chicanery). Bederman points out that Roosevelt’s transformation from sissy to modern man is an example of the move from Victorian to Modern Manliness. For example, when Roosevelt went on his famous safari to Africa, he thought it was important to point out his restraint (old Victorian value) at killing just several hundred animals; after all, he could have killed a lot more. For an even deeper look at TR standing at the gateway between restraint and excess, old and new, see Donna Haraway, “Teddy Bear Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the Garden of Eden, New York City, 1908-1936,” *Social Text*, No. 11 (Winter, 1984-1985): 23, where she clearly describes not only this aspect of the period, but also their fear of a failing manhood (and thus their fear of the pernicious vice of cigarette smoking): “In the upside down world of Teddy Bear Patriarchy, it is in the craft of killing that life is constructed, not

control, the comparison of the dominant American white male against the immigrant, non-American factory worker, and fears that white male virility was in danger. One journalist from the period, reflecting on the rise of cigarette smoking, commented that cigarette smoking was “for a time considered a sissy habit” associated mainly with factory-bound, immigrant city dwellers whose work patterns drove a desire for “a short smoke such as a cigarette offered.”⁷ WWI Historian Tim Travers recalls British General Baden-Powell who, when commenting about the state of young men prior to WWI, “criticized loafing, hooliganism, cigarette smoking, watching football . . . and gambling – all of these [cause] loss of self-control, and hence loss of *manliness*. ”⁸

Bert Moses, a contemporary journalist from this period, commented that “somehow or other, every good, decent and manly American instinct protests against the thing [cigarettes] . . . The man with a cigar or a pipe loses none of his *manly* attributes because of the [cigar or pipe] habit.”⁹ Cigarette smoking researchers Troyer and Markle provide a similar sense of the effeminate nature of cigarette smoking, commenting that the “Cigar and pipe smokers characterized cigarette smoking as the improper use of a fine product.”¹⁰ Robert Proctor adds further nuance to the effeminate discourse surrounding

in the accident of personal, material birth. Roosevelt is clearly the perfect locus genii and patron saint for the museum and its task of regeneration of a miscellaneous, incoherent urban public threatened with genetic and social decadence, threatened with the prolific bodies of the new immigrants, threatened with the failure of manhood.”

⁷ Harry Wooten, “Cigarettes’ High Ceiling,” *Printers Ink Monthly* 42, no. 2 (1941): 36.

⁸ Tim Travers, *The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare: 1900-1918* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 39

⁹ Bert Moses “The Musings of Moses,” *The Sun and New York Herald*, February 22, 1920, accessed November 23, 2013, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytw87h00/pdf>

¹⁰ Troyer and Markle, *Cigarettes: The Battle Over Smoking*, 35. Also see Jarrett Rudy, *The Freedom to Smoke: Tobacco Consumption and Identity* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005),

cigarettes with his assessment that “Cigarettes were for dandies and sissies.”¹¹ In an article penned in 1920 by journalist Torrey Ford, he wondered at Americans “taking increased joy in more tobacco,” and concluded that WWI had changed the way American saw cigarettes: “Ten or fifteen years ago, cigarettes didn’t have much of a standing in the community. There was a neat distinction between the man who smoked cigarettes and the man who smoked cigars or a pipe. That distinction seems to have disappeared today.”¹²

Prior to the surge in cigarette smoking resulting from WWI, the anti-cigarette environment was bolstered by the overarching progressive impulse towards moderation, self-control, efficiency, and in the case of some vices, complete abstinence. The progressives’ were determined to provide American soldiers with an “invisible armor” sufficient to make their morals and conscience impervious to the designs of the enemies of decency. The invisible armor discourse was first employed in a speech by Secretary of War Newton Baker where he stated,

These boys are going to France; they are going to face conditions we do not like to talk about, that we do not like to think about . . . I want them armed; I want them adequately armed and clothed by their Government; but I want them armed with invisible armor to take with them. I want them to have an armor made up of a set of social habits replacing those of their homes and communities . . . a moral and intellectual armor for their protection overseas.¹³

Julian Sivulka, an historian of American advertising, says that “moralists blasted cigarettes, referring to them as ‘coffin nails’ and ‘gaspers’ . . . others held that cigarette

¹¹ 20-45, 110-111, 122, 132-147; and read Tate, *Cigarette Wars*.

¹² Robert Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 211.

¹³ Torrey Ford, “America Is Taking Increased Joy in More Tobacco,” *The Tobacco Leaf*, accessed October 7, 2014, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytw87h00/pdf>.

¹⁴ Fred D. Baldwin, “The Invisible Armor,” *American Quarterly*, 16, no. 3 (1964), 432-44.

smokers were most likely criminals, neurotics, or possibly drug addicts.”¹⁴ Progressives’ and moralists’ concerns regarding cigarettes and vice in general, seen in Baker’s speech quoted above, were especially alerted when it came to the gathering of America’s boys for war.

When Congress passed the Selective Service Act on May 18, 1917, drawing millions of young men for conscripted military service, progressives took extraordinary measures to ensure soldiers protection from the vices traditionally associated with soldiering.¹⁵ For example, they banned liquor sales and shut down slums around training camps. They made it a crime for any civilian to give soldiers alcohol; they could not even offer a glass of wine at Sunday dinner. There is scant evidence that the Army was concerned with tobacco or cigarettes at all in the months prior to America’s entrance into the war. This is a bit odd considering groups like the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the Anti-Cigarette League, the Non-Smokers Protective League, and the YMCA, consistently targeted cigarettes as a pernicious vice during this period.¹⁶

¹⁴ Juliann Sivulka, *Soap, Sex, and Cigarettes: A Cultural History of American Advertising* (Boston: Wadsworth-Cengage Learning, 1998), 166. Sivulka goes on the claim that “The war and multi-million dollar advertising campaigns changed all that [anti-smoking moralism]. During and after WWI, cigarettes gained wider acceptance when both soldiers and civilians found smoking cigarettes to be more convenient, cheaper, and more sanitary than chewing tobacco.”

¹⁵ Edward Coffman, *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War One* (Louisville: The University of Kentucky Press, 1998), 357, 363; John Buchanan, “War Legislation Against Alcoholic Liquor and Prostitution,” *Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 9, no. 4 (1919), 520-529. During WWI, 3,703,273 American men served in the Army. At the end of their service with the AEF, most were discharged rather rapidly, allowed to take only a helmet and gas mask as mementoes of their time with the AEF. Among Americans, 50,475 were killed in action and another 193,611 were wounded in action. By comparison to the Allied Force and representative of the total devastation of the Great War, the total amount of US casualties for the entire war was “175,000 less than those the British suffered in the Somme in 1916.” Buchanan was a zealous, young Sanitary Corps Lieutenant who was very proud of America’s attempt to legislate and demand morality during this period. He felt the war would be won with manpower, and that America must send General Pershing “clean bunches” of virile American boys.

¹⁶ Howard Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America* (The University of Michigan: Association Press, 1951), 12-13. See also Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 44; Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 45.

The Army sent all potential citizen soldiers a document to read before they arrived at training that described what to expect to help alleviate fears and shed light on the unknown. In true progressive fashion, smoking, a vice that had not yet achieved derision on par with alcohol or illicit sex, is only mentioned in context to moderation. The Army instructed potential soldiers to “cut down [and] get your wind” if “smoking immoderately” was part of their daily routine. In the same sentence, it encouraged prospective soldiers to “chew their food well . . . drink a great deal of cool (not cold) water . . . [and] don’t eat between meals.” Finally they encouraged moderation with tobacco, especially while exercising or marching . . . smokes were “much more enjoyable if you wait till you can sit down quietly during one of the periods of rest.”¹⁷ For sure, there was no plan to issue the soldiers cigarettes as part of their daily rations.

WWI would turn this relationship—at times casual, at other times hostile—between the manly cult and the manufactured cigarette on its ear. After the Great War, the manufactured cigarette in America soon became the most successful consumer item ever developed, making it a central issue to any understanding of twentieth century American culture, society, politics, or economy. Historians of the cigarette-smoking culture in America agree that the Great War “mark[ed] a critical watershed in establishing the cigarette as the dominant product of modern consumer culture,” turning

The progressive spirit had pervaded the YMCA long before the Progressive Movement overtook the United States in the early 20th Century. As far back as 1850, the YMCA insisted that “crude raw cities . . . [and] outbursts of crime broke wide open the unheard-of urban problem . . . and moved thoughtful citizens to consider reform. The prime cause of crime and urban degradation was generally considered to be the saloon, there being one for each hundred population in most cities.” Hopkins also spoke of the YMCA’s early support for “Societies . . . formed to fight demon nicotine.”

¹⁷ The War Department, *Home Reading Course for Citizen-Soldiers*, Committee on Public Information War Information Series No. 9 (Washington, DC: The U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1917), 12, 17.

smoking “from a marginal indulgence of questionable morality to an unobjectionable mark of stalwart manhood.”¹⁸

Entrenchment

It was early September, 1917. As his family back home readied for bed, Private Jonathan Lee from the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was on the move in France.¹⁹ Lee was part of the first American units marching to their assigned sectors on the Western Front.²⁰ For the AEF, this would be a day to remember: the day American combat units first entered the trench line to serve alongside hardened British and French combat veterans. The veterans Lee joined were seasoned combat veterans with three years fighting already under their belts. The Allies had fought the Germans to a standstill in several major campaigns, suffering millions of casualties. Things were certainly not going the Allies way as the first American forces deployed into the trenches. French units had already mutinied, and morale was at an all-time low.²¹ Lee’s unit was part of the leading edge of what would grow to a massive expeditionary force. In America’s 32 training camps, a multitude of conscripted soldiers were already in the pipeline. The AEF

¹⁸ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 51-54; Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 45.

¹⁹ Jonathan Lee is a fictional name. Though a fictional character, the events, images, and sensations described are real, taken from soldier’s diaries and scholarly books on the subject of trench warfare.

²⁰ Donald Smythe, *Pershing: General of the Armies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 56.

²¹ Leonard V. Smith, *Between Mutiny and Obedience: The Case of the French Fifth Infantry Division during World War One* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 181-182, 206. Smith details the mutiny of the French Fifth Infantry Division, describing it as a multi-phase crisis that started in the spring of 1917 after the failed *Chemin des Dames* Offensive. Revolts started with units who had participated in the failed offensive, then spread to units who had not. The revolt culminated with thousands of soldier-demonstrators marching on the Chamber of Deputies and demanding an end to the war. As lead elements of the AEF were preparing to deploy to France, the French military was in the midst of a witch hunt to find the leaders of the various mutinies. The Army eventually convicted 3,427 soldiers of mutiny and 554 received the death sentence, of which only 49 were actually shot.

would not reach full strength until the spring of 1919; until that time, it was up to Lee and the rest of the AEF provide relief to the Allies and join on-going operations on the Western Front.²²

For this young American conscript marching toward the sound of battle, the sights, sounds, and smells were overwhelming. Trench warfare was a grueling experience, full of danger, deprivation, and isolation. Historians Geoffrey Jensen and Andrew Wiest argue that, despite advances in technology, warfare was still essentially unchanged at its most basic level:

While industrialization improved the killing capabilities of the army, in terms of both hardware and the wherewithal to keep its troops fighting, it did little to influence the way in which the average soldier spent his time, whether in or out of the line, largely because the stationary nature of the war.²³

Though he faced a combat environment churned by the modern advances in lethality, his was similar to the age-old destiny of millions before him: cold, mud, boredom, hunger, noise, and death.²⁴

As Lee moved forward, he saw lines of French soldiers slouching towards him, going the opposite direction. Trench war was a grinding schedule.²⁵ The Allied soldiers

²² Raymond Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1958), 172. Fosdick based his planning for the CTCA on Army plans that the war would climax in 1919 with a combined offensive spearheaded by the AEF.

²³ Geoffrey Jensen and Andrew Wiest, eds., *War in the Age of Technology: Myriad Faces of Modern Armed Conflict* (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 141.

²⁴ Joseph Mills Hanson, “The Cigarette,” *The American Legion Weekly* (April 28, 1922), 3, accessed October 7, 2014, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytw87h00/pdf>. In his “ode to the cigarette,” Hansen says, “. . . the fag that burned a spot of memory in my brain was one I got one night up in Lorraine off of a long-geared chap who’d made the grade with me that night in my first trench raid. I never saw his face all through the scrap there in the dark. I’d like to see his map again, to thank him. *Wounded, cold, and wet*, it meant a lot, that mashed-up cigarette.” (Italics mine.)

²⁵ Denis Winter, *Death’s Men: Soldiers of the Great War* (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), 81. The trench rotation schedule was grinding; however not all soldiers in a given division would serve in the trench line at once. Of 20,000 soldiers in a division, for example, only 2,000 would be in the trench at any given time. The rest would be in various phases of duty, either in the support or reserve trench, or on rest status in the rear. The typical trench schedule was four days in frontline trench, four in support trench, four in reserve trench, and then two weeks in the rear. Then the soldier’s unit would once again return to the

Lee passed had completed a four day rotation in the trenches and were moving to the rear areas to rest and recuperate. They were burdened by their filth-soaked coats that weighed as much as 58 pounds with the extra accumulated dirt, grime, sweat, and caked-on blood.²⁶ They were chilled to the bone, some wounded, and others sick. They left several comrades behind, buried in miry graves behind the trench line, some having drowned in mud.²⁷ They left deceased comrades tangled in the barbed wire or at the bottom of bomb craters somewhere in no man's land. Men were missing in their formation; they were returning with fewer men than they had deployed with a month earlier. Lee was aware of the trench schedule, but he now saw the effects of that schedule firsthand as he observed these tired, worn men. He wondered if his training had prepared him for what lay ahead, or if he would survive.

Upon entering the reserve trench, Lee continued forward in communication trenches running perpendicular to the frontline. After moving through the support trenches, he moved another hundred meters, and encountered the Western Front for the first time. He smelled the trenches long before he saw them.²⁸ Years later, the stench still stung, as generations of WWI veterans recalled the smells associated with trench warfare. The sources of these pungent odors were numerous and unrelenting, namely the smells of rotting flesh. As thousands of soldiers vied for ground in the several offensives of the previous three years, they were blown to bits by millions of artillery shells hurled into

frontline.

²⁶ John Ellis, *Eye Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War One* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), 48, 51. Ellis estimated that their coats could weigh as much as 58 pounds.

²⁷ Ellis, *Eye Deep in Hell*, 44.

²⁸ Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 49.

their slow-moving lines.²⁹ Bodies were torn asunder, human remains littered the churned landscape, and into this terrain were carved hundreds of miles of trenches. An eyewitness to the destruction of the land later commented that “the ground had been so churned up and fought over that even the military graves and their occupants had long since disappeared.” In a letter home during the war, this observer said “It makes one think of the surface of the moon . . . the only figure that comes to mind is that of the gigantic spoon furiously stirring a liquid earth until it becomes frozen or rigid, and then sprinkling over the top if it bits of wood, steel, *bones*, rags, and other debris.”³⁰ Indeed, walking through the trench was walking through an open grave.

One French soldier commented, “We all had on us the stench of dead bodies. The bread we ate, the stagnant water we drank, everything we touched had a rotten smell, owing to the fact that the earth around us was literally stuffed with corpses.”³¹ The smells of human excrement, urine, and mud added to the pungent aroma. British units, for example, detailed unlucky soldiers, known as “shit-wallahs,” to act as trench sanitation agents. These special details might designate a shell crater in the trench line as the regimental latrine, simply covering it over when it was full. Sometimes empty ration tins were employed as toilet bowls and buried in mud when they overflowed.³² The effect was predictable, and the earth was rent with human excrement. The mud and squalor were so

²⁹ Winter, *Death's Men*, 81, 133. One soldier commented that “the smells of blood mixed with the fumes of the shell filled me with nausea.”

³⁰ Raymond Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1958), 176-177. Fosdick was an eyewitness to the destruction of the land. He recorded these comments in his biography.

³¹ Ellis, *Eye Deep in Hell*, 59.

³² Ellis, *Eye Deep in Hell*, 53.

atrocious, soldiers urinated in their rifle barrels in a panicked effort to break loose dirt and un-jam their main battle weapon.³³ Added to the smells of putrefaction and human waste were the body odors of thousands of soldiers who went weeks on end without showers, living under the acrid aroma of nitrate that hung in the air, the result of a million explosions.³⁴

In addition to the smells, the other horror Lee and generations of WWI veterans vividly remembered was the fear and stress of trench warfare. Their constant companions, fear and stress were sustained by prolonged exposure to the enemy and the elements. Living like cave dwellers, “Death’s Men” existed on a fine line between nervous breakdown and combat effectiveness. Death or maiming seemed to lurk around every corner. First was the combat death resulting from close contact with the enemy; killing was the business of warfare and 50,475 American soldiers died in WWI. Upon hearing the screams of wounded men, and seeing the destruction of poison gas and the results of shell shock, one observer commented on the “brutality and waste” of modern warfare saying that “the thing hits you between the eyes . . . as you watch it your mind revolts against the idea that this is the accepted and time-honored technique by which *homo sapiens*, on the pinnacle of creation, settles his little differences.”³⁵

³³ Ellis, *Eye Deep in Hell*, 48; Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 179. Commenting on the muddy existence of the AEF soldiers, Raymond Fosdick, an eyewitness observer, said “They live in the mud, they eat in the mud, they sleep in the mud. They are leagues from human habitations save those of soldiers, and the country for miles around consists of far-stretching seas of mud, crossed by water-filled trenches . . . dotted with graves, littered with the debris of battle, and showing here and there the remains of dead horses.”

³⁴ Jensen and Wiest, *War in the Age of Technology*, 148. Jensen and Wiest provide substance to this assertion that WWI soldiers must have been filthy, smelly souls: “On average, the troops might get a bath every three to four weeks.”

³⁵ Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 168. Despite his feelings about the absurdity of warfare, when Fosdick’s draft number came up after he had returned from France on his inspection trip in August

Lee spent the next four days manning the frontline trench, where he was a mere one-hundred meters from the Germans. He marked his time in constant vigilance, standing alert and participating in endless equipment repair and trench maintenance details. The environment was unforgiving and included both the harsh weather, which eroded their trenches and soaked their equipment, as well as the combat environment. More soldiers died in the trenches from German snipers than from any other source—death could come at any moment.³⁶ He endured stand-to alerts, exercises, drills, and pre-combat checks. He participated in several nighttime raids into no man’s land, and had even gone over the top as part of a general offensive.³⁷ In the vernacular of his Civil War ancestors, Lee had ample opportunity to “see the elephant,” a term used by Civil War soldiers to describe their initial experience with combat and death fifty years earlier.³⁸

However, Lee also dealt with the fear and stress associated with the intangibles of war. If he refused to go over the top when the order came, the AEF commander, General Pershing, authorized officers to shoot stragglers or deserters on site. One division commander permitted his officers to “throw bombs into dugouts of men who refused to

1918, he was ready and willing to go serve, despite the fact he was thirty-five. Newton Baker stepped in and claimed exemption for Fosdick, ordering him to continue his work as head of the CTCA.

³⁶ Winter, *Death’s Men*, 81, 90.

³⁷ *Over the top* was an all-inclusive that denoted a general offensive where divisions would *go over the top* at once. In a coordinated attack that was supported by preplanned artillery strikes that lasted for hours and even days before the general offensive, the men would move out into no man’s land by the thousands, often literally kicking off the offensive with a soccer ball.

³⁸ James Lee McDonough, *Shiloh: In Hell Before Night* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1977), 4. McDonough describes the eagerness of soldiers to get into combat early in the Civil War at the Battle of Shiloh in early April 1862, commenting that “soldiers who had been eager to ‘see the elephant,’ as they commonly referred to combat, would never feel so anxious for a fight again.” It was the first battle of the Civil War with massive casualties on both sides.

go over the top.”³⁹ In addition to these, he also had to face the dual threats of disease and accidents, both of which together killed 63,195 American soldiers.⁴⁰ If these factors were not enough to drive a man crazy, random death could come at any moment, a fate that added to the stress and fear. A soldier might peer through one of the many lookout portals in the trench wall, as he had a hundred times before, only to have his eye, and then his head, instantly pierced by a well-placed shot from a German sniper. The results were horrifying. Historian Denis Winter observes that witnessing death in this manner had a profound effect on the soldiers, as there are “references without number to the depths of fear soldiers felt when confronted with death in its most tangible form.”⁴¹ One soldier spoke of the sheer indiscriminate nature of the killing, recalling an officer who was struck down by a chance artillery shell while on a leisurely stroll in the woods miles from the frontlines.⁴² Another soldier was killed when a stray bullet was cooked off in a fire, piercing the man’s gut. With his comrades helplessly watching, he died an agonizing death.⁴³

To make matters worse, even when combat ended on November 11, 1918, the stress of Army service did not end with the war as rampant rumors frayed the soldiers’ already shattered nerves. Some were convinced they would go to Russia next to fight

³⁹ Ronald Schaffer, *America in the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 167; Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 180-181.

⁴⁰ PBS in association with The Imperial War Museum, “Deaths from disease during World War One,” accessed November 22, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html.

⁴¹ Winter, *Death’s Men*, 81, 133.

⁴² Winter, *Death’s Men*, 81, 131.

⁴³ Winter, *Death’s Men*, 81, 131. Another tragic story involved a British Tommy on his maiden voyage to the trench, confident of the safety provided by the bulletproof waistcoat his parents had furnished him. He was subsequently, and tragically, shot through the forehead on his first step to the firing line.

against the Bolsheviks. On top of the stress of uncertainty, Pershing added the additional requirement that soldiers had to drill at least 25 hours a week. One morale worker commented on the sheer absurdity of such a program: “Most of the men were not looking forward to any career as soldiers . . . to see a Battery that has fired 70,000 rounds in the Argonne fight going listlessly through the movements of ramming an empty shell into a gun for hours at a stretch, or training the sights on an enemy that does not exist, is depressing enough to watch, and its effect on the spirits of the men is apparent.”⁴⁴ Long hours of boredom, stress over the unknown, and mandatory, senseless drill, increasingly meant one thing: copious amounts of cigarette consumption.⁴⁵

Such a dangerous and unpredictable environment meant that nearly everyone was on edge – especially at night. Shrouded in darkness, soldiers like Lee moved about the trench at night calling out the watch word every five steps, weary of the nervous trench dweller who might shoot at them by mistake. Despite these precautions, many were killed by their fellow soldiers who mistook them for German raiding parties who came to kill them in their sleep. One soldier told a story about “one of the finest sergeants in one of the companies . . . greatly respected and loved by all his comrades . . . [that] did not respond to the sentinels call, and in a moment he was lying dead in the trench.” A particularly optimistic, if grave, soldier recalled that it was better to be shot at night by

⁴⁴ Schaffer, *America in the Great War*, 167; Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 180-181.

⁴⁵ Jensen and Wiest, *War in the Age of Technology*, 142. Jensen and Wiest comment that when veterans of WWI were asked about their “overriding memories of the war, many have cited boredom as the predominant impression.”

your own men because their aim was diminished in the low light conditions and aid stations were relatively free at that hour.⁴⁶

Lee slept in catacomb-like chambers dug into the walls of the trench. He lived in constant fear of a direct hit by artillery that would easily bury him alive in his sleep if it did not instantly turn him into atoms. The Germans fired thousands of artillery rounds each month, and Lee weighed his probability of survival. He was constantly awakened by the sound and smell of men's feet shuffling by on the duck boards forming the floor of the trench. Rats and lice were omnipresent. The rats were enlarged from gorging themselves on human remains. Cats were deployed against these giant rats, and the cats were never seen again; they were presumed killed in action (KIA), eaten by their prey. Some were so familiar with the rats they named them, not even phased when they ran across their bodies as they slept.⁴⁷

After four days enduring the frontline trench warfare environment, Lee went through a back-out procedure as his unit moved to the support trench line for four days. He then moved to the reserve trench line for another four, and finally, Lee emerged caked in mud, just like the British and French units he observed a month earlier, as he marched to the rear area. As described by soldier-poet Siegfried Sassoon, Lee had finally obtained what his "animal instincts" desired above all else: "freedom from . . . oppressiveness."⁴⁸

⁴⁶ John Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man* (Franklin, Indiana: SI-s.n., 1919), 143; Winter, *Death's Men*, 81, 88.

⁴⁷ Ellis, *Eye Deep in Hell*, 54, 57; Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man*, 146. Ferguson said one soldier had promoted one of his rats, even awarding medals, so that it "had three service strips and two wound chevrons."

⁴⁸ Siegfried Sassoon, *Memoirs of An Infantry Officer* (New York: Coward, McCann, Inc., 1930), 45-46. One of the more famous and accomplished soldier-poets of WWI, Sassoon provides a vivid description of war that encapsulates many of the devices used in this chapter to describe the world of the trench soldier (sight, sound, smell, memory, savagery): "I was watching the smoldering sunset and thinking

The AEF soldier would continue in this schedule until the war was won, or he was killed or wounded—whichever came first.⁴⁹

The Soldier and the Cigarette

It was from these dangerous, dirty, smelly, deadly trenches and combat conditions that an insatiable demand for cigarettes emerged among the AEF.⁵⁰ In the cigarette, Lee and his Doughboy comrades found a source of solace that calmed their fears, steadied their hands, and helped them pass the time. In 1920, Torrey Ford said,

Any soldier would trudge fourteen kilometers and run the risk of being declared A.W.O.L. on a slight rumor that American cigarettes could be bought at a certain station. No man thought it a waste of time to spend four hours standing in line on his free afternoon for the opportunity of buying a couple of packages of cigarettes . . . they said an army ‘traveled on its stomach,’ but it seemed more to the point that it proceeded along with its cigarettes.⁵¹

that the sky was one of the redeeming features of the War. Behind the support lines where I stood, the shell-pitted ground sloped somberly into the dusk; the distances were blue and solemn, with a few trees grouped on a ridge, dark against the deep-glowing embers of another day endured . . . the evening star twinkled serenely. Guns were grumbling miles away . . . Moments like those are unpredictable when I look back and try to recover their living texture. One’s mind eliminates boredom and physical discomfort, retaining an incomplete impression of a strange, intense, and unique experience. If there be such a thing as ghostly revisititation on this earth, and if ghosts can traverse time and choose their ground, I would return to the . . . sector as it was then. But since I always assume that spectral presences have lost their sense of smell (and I am equally uncertain about their auditory equipment) such haunting might be as inadequate as those which now absorb my mental energy. For trench life was an existence saturated by the external senses; and although our actions were domineered over by military discipline, our animal instincts were always uppermost. While I stood there then, I had no desire to diagnose my environment. Freedom from its oppressiveness was what I longed for.”

⁴⁹ Captain O. N. Solbert (USA) and Captain George Bertrand (French Army), “Tactics and Duties of Small Units in Trench Fighting,” *Infantry Journal*, XIV, no. 7 (1918), 473-492. This document provides a very detailed description of the regimented life of a trench warrior, including the RIPTOA (Relief in Place—Transfer of Authority) procedures and back out procedures. It also highlights one of the less obvious stressors on the trench soldiers—silence! The document contains guidance that “Silence is one of the essential rules of the trench . . . silence in a sector enables the chief to rapidly transmit orders, and the men to accomplish the same without delay.”

⁵⁰ Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man*, 93, 98. Cigarettes were in such high demand, along with the “jam and chocolate their mouths desired,” that they served as money during the initial phase of the AEF deployment to France. Part of this economy of tobacco was driven by slow pay operations—the soldiers didn’t have any money. Ferguson also records the drunken mayhem that occurred when the soldiers finally did get paid for the first time in France: “No more convincing temperance lesson was ever taught to me . . . in truly American custom to disobedience to law, rowdiness, and drunkenness . . . there were fights and brawls . . . [the saloon] covered with bottles, many of them broken.”

⁵¹ Torrey Ford, “America Is Taking Increased Joy in More Tobacco,” *The Tobacco Leaf*, accessed October 7, 2014, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytw87h00/pdf>.

Another journalist from the period penned an article shortly after the war also extolling the virtues of the cigarettes in warfare:

A spiritless army is doomed in advance to retreat. And the one thing that more than any other keeps an army on the go is tobacco . . . Our boys were willing to forget trench feet and cooties and shellshock as long as they were allowed the consolation of inhaling tobacco. One of the most popular of their trench songs advised, ‘Smile boys, smile, while you’ve a Lucifer to light your fag’ . . . and they did.⁵²

If the French soldiers were known for their state-sponsored brothels and the British for their daily rum rations, the Doughboy and his cigarette quickly became the enduring American image of WWI.⁵³

The historical record is replete with examples of the unique relationship each of the allied countries had to vice. Through film, the cultural image of the American soldier with the cigarette was established very soon after America entered the war. In Charlie Chaplin’s 1918 film “Shoulder Arms,” Chaplin “chose a rifle, a gas mask, and a cigarette as essential props for his portrayal of a Doughboy.” One historian describes how the “French and British officers gave their men a measure of rum or brandy before they were ordered to attack; American officers passed out cigarettes instead.”⁵⁴

YMCA volunteer James Shillinglaw records one particularly unfortunate event regarding the Tommies and the Rum: “at six the Germans came over the top and by nine

⁵² Morrie Ryskind, “Rolls Into Its Own,” October 29, 1921, accessed October 7, 2014, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytw87h00/pdf>.

⁵³ *The Infantry Journal*, vol. 14, pt 1, 54, 855. In an ironic oversight considering America’s dryness, the U.S. Army Infantry Journal reprinted and published a British Officer’s checklist for combat and service in the field; step 25 reads, “Are my men as comfortable as I can make them? Do I always see that the rum is correctly issued?” In another portion of the Infantry Journal, a British Officer’s guidance regarding “Infantry Work on Western Front” encourages officers to give the rum issue “at stand down in the morning if all is reported clear by patrols and sentries. Keep some extra for men who have done good work on patrol, etc.; they may return rather exhausted and an extra tot to those deserving of it is much appreciated. See to the issue of the rum ration yourself and be present when it is dished out, otherwise there is sure to be trouble through some section commander or noncommissioned officer not playing the game over it.” Again, this is all very humorous considering the lengths progressives and the army was going to prohibit the rum issue and block access to alcohol both stateside and in France.

⁵⁴ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 84, 88.

they were past the third line of defense. By the end of the night they had gone 15 kilometers and probably captured 35,000. British officers were drunk. To think of this stupidity, and after four years' experience with the Hun."⁵⁵ However, in all fairness, other historians have recorded that this German advance in 1918 slowed to a halt when German soldiers stopped to imbibe upon British rum. With no such state-sanctioned access to rum or women, historian Richard Schaffer describes the growing relationship between the American soldier and cigarette the best:

Americans did not issue alcoholic rations before battle . . . nicotine was their [the Americans] drug of choice – as tranquilizer and stimulant . . . observers noted the power of tobacco . . . Lieutenant Frank P. Isensee watched officers and men . . . leaving their jump off point . . . smoking their cigars and cigarettes and shouting commands . . . advancing while shells landed among them, most of the men smoking cigarettes; all were calm, not talking much.⁵⁶

To understand the Doughboys' and subsequent generations of soldiers' commitment to the manufactured cigarette, one must understand the pharmacology of nicotine. Half a century after the soldier-cigarette bond was first cemented, the cigarette industry sponsored scientists at a gathering to articulate and record why people smoked.⁵⁷ In doing so, their papers and essays were gathered in a conference report explaining in vivid detail why a soldier would reach for his cigarette first, and his food, water, or a blanket second.

⁵⁵ David Lee Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA, 1917-1920*, ed. Glen E. Holt (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 100.

⁵⁶ Schaffer, *America in the Great War*, 165. David Kennedy describes how the soldiers were less than enthusiastic about the Army's purity campaigns and posters that relayed messages such as "A German bullet is cleaner than a whore," "How long could you look the flag in the face if you were dirty with gonorrhea," and "a soldier who gets a dose is a traitor." David Kennedy, *Over Here* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 186.

⁵⁷ William L. Dunn, Jr., ed., *Smoking Behavior: Motives and Incentives* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), 1-3. By the time the enterprise-sponsored scientists met in 1972 on St. Martin Island in the Lesser Antilles, Americans were smoking hundreds of billions of cigarettes a year. However, the number had slipped for the first time since statisticians started reporting cigarette consumption numbers in 1900. These scientists were determined to get to the root of consumption so they could better position the industry for a more focused effort to initiate starters to make *adult choices* in the future.

The report found that “cigarette smoking was a diversional activity,” a general adaptation to stress when flight is not an option, and a “defense mechanism” that has a “tranquilizing effect” and offers a sense of euphoria.⁵⁸ Smoking was presented as a scientifically proven way to steady the hands and calm a person down, even while increasing heart rate so one is more alert. Smoking was proven to reduce aggression.⁵⁹ It was even described as providing a level of “pulmonary eroticism,” an apt way to describe the euphoria and release of a smoke.⁶⁰

Prior to the war, the cigarette had gone through a bit of a revolution. Through a process called flue-curing, American tobacco was blended, toasted, and rolled into a smooth and deeply inhalable product.⁶¹ When inhaled in this manner, besides creating addiction if done repeatedly over extended periods, it also creates a deep sense of euphoria as the blood vessels are constricted and the nicotine absorbed. Science also had proven that chronic smokers could take considerably more shock than a non-smoker.⁶² Hollywood was quick to pick up on this smoking theme; the report described how John Wayne “could take more on the chin” with a cigarette as without.⁶³ All of these traits and physiological benefits of smoking were absolutely essential to soldiers involved in

⁵⁸ Dunn, *Smoking Behavior*, 1-3.

⁵⁹ Dunn, *Smoking Behavior*, 34, 45.

⁶⁰ Dunn, *Smoking Behavior*, 291.

⁶¹ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 69. The Army was aware of the dangers of deeply inhaling cigarette smoke as early as 1915, when West Point advised its cadets “smoking cigarettes is [no] more injurious than other forms of tobacco unless continually inhaled well into the lungs.” By issuing the soldiers the new American blended flue-cured manufactured cigarettes during WWI, they gave them the most inhalable, smooth-smoking object ever created.

⁶² Dunn, *Smoking Behavior*, 149.

⁶³ Dunn, *Smoking Behavior*, 216.

combat conditions presented in WWI, or any war for that matter. The report acknowledged this soldier-cigarette connection as well, singling out soldiers as the prime examples of the benefits of smoking at one point: “Soldiers smoke before a battle . . . to quiet themselves under stress.”⁶⁴

The enterprise scientists’ bottom line was clear: science proved that for a soldier in combat, a cigarette can deliver certain physiological effects that will allow him to cope, make him a better shot, calm his nerves, and increase his ability to take shock and risks. In a war that placed men in the direct line of fire for weeks of shock over an extended period, the most significant driver of the demand for cigarettes by far in WWI was this relation to nerves.⁶⁵ Soldiers were told not to speak about fear, so they dealt with fear by smoking cigarettes. One soldier, recalling a terrifying seven hour artillery barrage during the Battle of Ypres, declared that he “smoked eighty cigarettes,” adding that he did not know “what I should have done without them.”⁶⁶

One medical officer recalled a soldier who entered his tent on a stretcher, grievously wounded, missing a hand, and suffering from a crushed leg. The doctor observed that the only comfort for this poor fellow were the cigarettes he enjoyed,

⁶⁴ Dunn, *Smoking Behavior*, 2.

⁶⁵ Count Corti, *A History of Smoking* (London: George G. Harrop & Co, 1931), 261. In Corti’s history of smoking, he recalls a story by Tolstoy where the author expounds upon the habit of smoking, wondering if men smoke for what it does for the nerves and the stifling of conscience, both very important in a brutal war like WWI: “In one of his shorter essays, Tolstoy sought for an explanation of the enormous popularity of smoking, and believed he had found it in a man’s desire to stifle the voice of conscience. ‘The brain’ he wrote ‘becomes numbed by the nicotine,’ and the conscience expires. He goes on to tell a gruesome story of a certain cook who attacks his aged mistress with a knife and wounded her badly, but at the last moment shrank from killing her outright. He then retired to another room and smoked two cigars to calm his nerves . . . his brain became so dazed that he went back and completed the murder.”

⁶⁶ Rudy, *The Freedom to Smoke*, 141.

“lighting each cigarette from the stump of the old one.”⁶⁷ There are graphic images of soldiers, blinded and burned by gas warfare, their heads wrapped in bandages, with only their lips protruding, a cigarette delicately placed between the lips. In a strange way, cigarettes kept men connected with compassion and helped them stay linked with the peaceful world they had left behind.

In addition to these pharmacological effects of nicotine on the soldier’s ability to persevere in combat, there were also very practical reasons why they appealed to millions of soldiers like Lee. The “little white slavers,” as industrialist Henry Ford described them, helped cover up the horrific odors of the battlefield.⁶⁸ Cigarette smoke dulls the sense of smell and leaves only the sweet aroma of tobacco in the nostrils. The smell of tobacco was preferred over the disgusting smells that would have invaded their senses otherwise. One group of German soldiers, for example, demanded a double ration of cigarettes after the Verdun offensive to “mask the overwhelming stink of the corpses” and putrefaction encountered when they overran the pulverized French defensive lines.⁶⁹

Another practical aspect of smoking was the connection it gave the soldier to dignity and humanity at a time when he was often surrounded by neither. While living what many saw as a cruel, animal-like existence in the trench, an important aspect of the

⁶⁷ Winter, *Death’s Men*, 81, 129.

⁶⁸ Ellis, *Eye Deep in Hell*, 59; Henry Ford, *The Case Against the Little White Slaver* (The University of Michigan Library, 1916), accessed November 22, 2013, <http://medicolegal.tripod.com/ford1914.htm>. German soldiers, for example, demanded double rations of cigarettes after the Verdun campaign to cover up the smell of death and putrefaction.

⁶⁹ Ellis, *Eye Deep in Hell*, 59; Richard Traxel, *Crusader Nation*, (New York: Knopf, 2006), 221. Traxel describes how the British had to prohibit America from exporting tobacco to Germany through neutral countries. This was particularly detrimental to Wilson’s political economy, which included strong support from Southern tobacco growers. However, England, through its own experience, realized that “smoking helped German soldiers endure the privation of war” and they did not want North Carolina tobacco farmers aiding and abetting the enemy.

soldiers' connection to humanity was his ability, and freedom, to smoke. Caught up in the savagery of killing and maiming, a smoke provided a solemn moment of reflection and a bit of relief from the shock of the battlefield. In this way, cigarettes helped the soldier maintain his composure in the midst of horrific circumstances, giving him fortitude and bearing.⁷⁰

As the soldiers' devotion to the physiological and practical aspects of cigarette smoking grew stronger during the war, they became particularly agitated with the various temperance organizations tirelessly working to take the cigarette from their hands. One soldier, who came from a family of moralistic progressives, wrote his anti-cigarette brother a particularly scathing letter upon seeing a mangled soldier soothed by a cigarette. He told his brother, who was active in the anti-cigarette movement, not to dare talk to him about the supposed evils of the cigarette habit. He then claimed that if Jesus were to come to the frontlines, He would surely be the first to hand out cigarettes to the soldiers, adding that the "cup of cold water in my name" referred to in the Biblical parable would likely "be a cigarette" if Christ was to visit the Western Front.⁷¹

A Y Man, as men who volunteered for service with the YMCA were known, once exposed to the conditions in the trenches, commented to a fellow Y Man, "If I have a Bible and a packet of cigarettes in the trenches, I'd give a boy the cigarettes."⁷² One might disagree with their theology; however, their commentary expresses the seriousness of the soldiers' feelings about cigarettes during the Great War. Finding humor in the

⁷⁰ Rudy, *The Freedom to Smoke*, 132-134, 141.

⁷¹ Rudy, *The Freedom to Smoke*, 140.

⁷² Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA*, 87. In response to this comment made by Fred Smith at a meeting of Y secretaries, Shillinglaw records that Smith was given "a good talk on need for more religious fervor."

midst of war, historian and veteran infantryman Paul Fussell tells how WWI soldiers who wanted to ensure their packages of tobacco and cigarettes made it through used a unique labeling trick to ensure delivery. Soldiers instructed their family to write “Army Temperance Society Publications Series 9” on the box containing the much-needed cigarettes. Since a vast majority of soldiers wanted nothing to do with the various cigarette and alcohol temperance societies, their cigarette delivery was almost guaranteed when labeled in this manner.⁷³

With this understanding of smoking pharmacology and practicality in place, it is not hard to understand why demand for cigarettes grew by leaps and bounds during WWI and subsequent wars. Popular culture was quick to pick up on this link as well. One journalist from the period said that, “All in all, the war turned some millions of men back into civilian life with a more or less set habit of driving in the daily ‘coffin nails.’”⁷⁴ In an article written for the *Tobacco Leaf Journal* soon after the war, an unknown author describes the soldier’s militancy toward the “anti-cigarette” crowd:

Every now and then we hear rumblings and grumblings for the camp of . . . small minded people who entertain the silly hope of placing the prefix ‘anti’ before . . . ‘tobacco’ . . . but as the Doughboy just returned . . . says ‘they haven’t got a chance in the world – there are too many sensible people left in America to let a little crowd of hard-boiled fanatics put over a thing like that! . . . can you blame the returned soldier for becoming somewhat of a cynic about his homeland when he is greeted in this way after the sacrifices he has made? Is it any wonder that the young chap who has just gotten back into civvies is inclined to question just how much the nation appreciated what he and his fellows have done?

⁷³ Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, 66.

⁷⁴ Ford, “America Is Taking Increased Joy in More Tobacco.”

This particular author concludes by quoting a just returned Doughboy who described this link between smoking, liberty, and patriotism by exclaiming “keep the home fags burning!”⁷⁵

Understanding the soldier’s demand for cigarettes is one thing; however understanding why, in one of the war’s great ironies, the willingness to supply them was even greater is a bit more difficult.⁷⁶ By war’s end, the United States government provided over 5.5 billion manufactured cigarettes to the Doughboys, aide groups like the YMCA providing an additional two billion.⁷⁷ This drastic reversal of pre-war policy requires further exploration for any understanding of the powerful political-military-industrial themes that grew to characterize the soldier-cigarette relationship during the twentieth century. After WWI, the bond between soldier and cigarette was continually reinforced and became increasingly entrenched over the next eight decades. The relationship between the soldier and the cigarette, forged in the trenches on the Western Front, subsequently had a profound effect on American history as it resulted in the world’s first mass wave of newly addicted nicotine consumers, a group that grew exponentially both in number and influence in the decades following WWI.

⁷⁵ “Ask the Doughboy What Tobacco Did for Him,” *The Tobacco Leaf* (Aug. 5, 1920), accessed October 7, 2014, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytw87h00/pdf>. This document includes a cover letter note from the Advertising Manager of the *American Legion Weekly* to Mr. George E. Mainardy of the American Tobacco Company: “Straws show how the wind blows. The enclosed reprints . . . tell their own story . . . 800,000 reader-owners of the *American Legion Weekly* support its advertisers.”

⁷⁶ Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man*, 150. Ferguson records that the demand was so great that when stocks ran low in the hut and a shipment of tobacco products came in, that he had to ration out how much each soldier could buy. When the delivery truck driver suggested that Ferguson let each soldier buy all he wanted, Ferguson commented that he “knew nothing of the American soldier. Even with our huge supply we could not have supplied half our line had we let men buy what they desired. Every man would have taken a box of cigars, or a carton of cigarettes . . .”

⁷⁷ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 75-76.

CHAPTER III

THE DAMN Y, THE SOLDIER, AND THE CIGARETTE IN WWI

During WWI, this combination of physiological, cultural, and practical stimulants to cigarette smoking ensured that demand grew to enormous proportions. Despite this insatiable demand for cigarettes among the American soldiers of the AEF, it may be surprising to learn that the American government did not issue cigarette rations to the Doughboys until nearly a year into America's participation in the war. What ultimately drove the military to take decisive measures and issue general orders placing manufactured cigarettes into all combat rations? As with many of history's questions, the answer to this one is more complex than one might imagine.

The soldiers' demand for the machine-rolled cigarette created an odd situation that caught the US Army by surprise at the start of the WWI. The soldiers possessed an ever-increasing demand for cigarettes, yet initially, the Army refused to issue them. This forced the YMCA, a civilian relief agency active in the anticigarette movement, to step in and become soldiers' sole cigarette purveyor during the war. In order to understand why the YMCA became so involved in the soldier-cigarette distribution system, and why this eventually led to the Army's entrance this transaction, one must first understand the awkward relationship between the soldier, the cigarette, and the Y Man.

If the Progressive Era was known for moralism, social uplift, associational affiliations, efficiency, clean living, and *the strenuous life*, the YMCA men and women who served both at home and overseas during WWI were archetypes that captured the spirit of the times. David Lee Shillinglaw, John B. Ferguson, and Katherine Mayo were

just three of 12,800 Y Men and Y Women who served the AEF overseas.¹ Employed by the YMCA to serve the millions of Doughboys fighting in Europe, they carried the lion's share of work related to relief and soldier welfare during WWI.² Shillinglaw was a 28-year-old man who dreamed of joining the Army and fighting in the Great War. Problems with his vision eventually ended his prospects of serving in the military, so he volunteered for service as a Y Man. He entered France on September 24, 1917, and was immediately placed in charge of Y Hut construction. He moved about France building the huts where the soldiers drank coffee, purchased cigarettes, and participated in morale and welfare programs.³

The Y Huts Shillinglaw built were the hubs of morale activity during WWI, and one of the chief activities was group singing, by far the most popular activities the Y Hut sponsored.⁴ Singing activities may seem strange, but was considered a vital part of Army morale by the armed progressives. These armed progressives were Army officers and leaders greatly influenced by the progressive impulses toward efficiency, social welfare,

¹ Howard Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America* (The University of Michigan: Association Press, 1951), 486, 488, and 492. Hopkins breaks the numbers down as follows: "A total of 25,926 persons carried on these multifarious tasks, almost equally divided between those who worked at home and those who went abroad. Of those who went overseas, 3,480 were women." The head of the YMCA, Mr. Mott, contacted President Wilson on the day he declared War on Germany and offered the services of the YMCA. Four days later on April 10, 1917, he called Y Men and Women across the nation to volunteer for service as Y Workers among the soldiers both training in American and serving overseas. A little more than two months later, on June 25, 1917, the first Y Workers set sail from New York bound for France. Y Men and Y Women also served the soldiers preparing for the war in England, but for purposes of this study, I will only discuss those who served in France.

² Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 499. Using data pertaining to resources expended, Hopkins estimates that the YMCA, as compared to all the other relief agencies, performed 90.55 percent of all the civilian welfare work for the AEF.

³ Shillinglaw spent over two years in France, staying after the armistice to supervise the YMCA's salvage operations. He kept a detailed diary during his time in France, which was rediscovered in 1970, edited, and published as *Shillinglaw—an American in the Army and YMCA, 1917-20*.

⁴ Russell V. Morgan, "Music and Morale," *Music Supervisors Journal*, 6, no. 3 (1920): 22–28; Commission on Training Camp Activities, "War Songs in the Schools," *Music Supervisors Journal*, 5, no. 2 (1918): 24–28.

morale, and good governance during this period. General Leonard Wood was a typical armed progressive. Besides implementing progressive programs such as schools, sanitation, and municipal reforms as military governor of the Philippines, Wood also believed singing was a vital aspect of soldier morale. He once commented that “it is just as essential that the soldiers know how to sing as that they know how to carry rifles and shoot them. It sounds odd to the ordinary person when you tell him every soldier should be a singer. . . [but] there isn’t anything in the world . . . that will raise a soldier’s spirits like a good catchy marching tune.”⁵ When French and British military advisors came to America to advise the Army training camps, they too insisted that the AEF train the soldiers in group singing. Many of the more traditional senior officers like Peyton March were skeptical about the singing programs, but this did not change the fact that the AEF became not only a fighting force, thanks to the efforts of the Y Men, they became a singing force as well.⁶

John B. Ferguson was a Presbyterian pastor from a country church in Franklin, Indiana. He was too old for the draft yet still yearned to serve and was excited about the prospect of working with the boys of the AEF as a Y Man. He saw Y service as a great opportunity to assist the AEF, and, as a trained evangelical pastor, he saw an even greater

⁵ John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army: A Detailed Account of Legislation, Administration and Opinion in the United States: 1915-1920* (New York: The Century Company, 1922), 223.

⁶ Raymond Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1958), 155-157, 163-164; General March would come to forcefully disagree on this and many issues with General Wood, a progressive who believed in Universal Military Training as opposed to a professional army grounded in the West Point cult. Adding to this strained relationship was the fact that Wood was *raised* in the Medical Corps as opposed to one of the Combat Arms Branches (infantry, cavalry, artillery, and later, armor) from which senior ranking Army officers traditionally hail. Fosdick comments of his first meeting with March: “My own relations with March got off to a stormy start . . . [when] he demanded to know how many . . . song leaders we had in the camps. I told him and he snapped: ‘We’re not running a circus or a grand opera. Take them out.’” Fosdick commented that he left the meeting and commented to Secretary Baker “From what zoo did you get him?” Fosdick grew to greatly admire March and said his leadership in the war was “outstanding.”

opportunity to spread the gospel. He entered training to become a Y Man in September 1917, and soon after was working in the stateside training camps. He was eventually transferred to France and served in the Y Huts near the frontline. He ventured forward into the trenches and brought candy and chocolates to the soldiers and sold them the cigarettes they so desperately needed. Wanting to give account of his sabbatical to his church congregation and leave a record of his service during the war for his children to read, Ferguson's journal of his time as a Y Man was published in 1919 in *Through the War with a Y Man.*⁷

Katherine Mayo was one of 3,480 women who served with the YMCA overseas. She was invited by the Head of the Overseas YMCA, Edward C. Carter, to work as a public relations specialist and press agent. Her job was to give Americans an account of how the Overseas YMCA was using donations to support the soldiers. She was able to travel to several different Y postings in France and was a keen observer and unashamed admirer of Edward C. Carter. Former President of the United States William Howard Taft's edited, multi-volume *Service with Fighting Men* describes Mayo as a press agent for the Y on "whom the public has learned to rely for accuracy and truthfulness."⁸ Taft's

⁷ John Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man* (Franklin, Indiana: SI-s.n., 1919), 8. In his journal, Ferguson adds more details regarding his desire to take up the pen. His recorded reason for writing his book was motivated by the story of Joshua and the Children of Israel who piled up stones when they crossed the Jordan River so their children, whenever they passed by, would "remember the goodness of God." Ferguson said, "When my children take down this book I want them to understand that not one page could have been written had it not been for their mother . . . who counted not her own pleasure or comfort or fears a matter for concern when God and nation needed the services of her husband."

⁸ William H. Taft, *Service With Fighting Men: an account of the work of the American Young Men's Christian Associations in the world war*, ed. Fredrick Morgan Harris, (New York: Association Press, 1922), 1:233. Taft's *Service With Fighting Men* is an exhaustive study of the service of the 26,000 Y Men and Women who served in both the United States and overseas during WWI. Though a valuable study, it is a general reference work that covers a breathtaking amount of material. As to why a former president of the United States was so interested in the Y Men, Taft's forward to the first volume make it clear. As the progressive successor to Teddy Roosevelt in 1908, and again as the Republican Party's nominee in 1912, Taft, along with Roosevelt, was the standard bearer for progressivism during this period, and this volume

description of Mayo speaks to her *bona fides* as an accurate eyewitness to the operations of the Overseas YMCA and the origins of the “that damn Y Man” moniker. In 1920, Mayo published a chronicle of her experience with the Y Men in her book *That Damn Y.*

Shillinglaw, Ferguson, and Mayo, as well as all the Y workers, received some rudimentary training before deploying to France. Unlike the AEF soldiers, they were not taught how to kill with the bayonet or hit center mass from 500 meters with the standard infantry rifle. Their training generally consisted of classes on YMCA procedures, how to run a Y Hut, and how to set up and teach Bible studies. Y Men were screened for alcohol and tobacco use, and were banned from participating in these vices while under the auspices of the YMCA. Of the thousands of Y workers who served the AEF in France, many were affiliated with Christian services, religious education, or church work before the war. Most sought to engage in “practical Christianity,” putting hands and feet to their faith. Shillinglaw captured this spirit best in a letter home where he commented that his work in the Y hut was “worthwhile . . . It is practical Christianity” that acknowledges his “responsibility wherever American soldiers are to uphold their moral and spiritual welfare.”⁹

Some were pacifists or came from religious traditions that discouraged war. Many were too old to serve or deemed physically unfit for the draft. Of course women were not eligible for the draft at all and saw service as Y workers as the best way to contribute to

reads as an apologetic for progressive policies near and dear to progressives during this period. He states that the four volume set will “preserve the marvelous story of American *energy, executive genius, enduring patience, self-sacrificing Christian spirit* and saving *common sense*”—all watchwords of the Progressive Era. (Italics mine.)

⁹ David Lee Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA, 1917-1920*, ed. Glen E. Holt, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 33, 83. In a letter to his lady friend Lydia a few days after arriving in France, Shillinglaw was amazed at the number of soldiers who were anxious to use Y facilities and participate in Y programs and included the comments quoted in this paragraph.

the war effort. Others appeared as adventurers wanting an all-expense-paid tour of France. However, the majority were competent, conscientious men and women who wanted to do their part and share in the dangers of war. Ferguson recalls inspiration gleaned from the words of a YMCA executive before he boarded his ship for France: your job is to “render a definite service for men involving a real love for men; to help win the war in which there is no place for pacifist or socialist; to set forth the kingdom of God in unmeasured terms.”¹⁰ In many ways, they were merely answering their nation’s call, when men such as General Pershing, Secretary of War Baker, YMCA Chairman Dr. John R. Mott, and Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) Chief Raymond Fosdick challenged the Y Men and Women to rise up and support the war effort.

The Y Men provided services that, at least on the surface, appear vital to the Doughboys. However the Y Men were often the objects of ridicule, criticism, even rage among the soldiers they served.¹¹ Unfortunately, despite the good and kind intentions of

¹⁰ Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA*, 11; Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man*, 42. Shillinglaw recalled the form letter from the YMCA informing him that he had been accepted for service said the Y “expected [volunteers] to have the same devotion and willingness to accept hardship, discipline, and sacrifice, as is required of the men they wish to serve—men who may also be called upon to lay down their lives . . .”

¹¹ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 501. As the reader will see in the stories that follow, the “damn Y Man” was, unfortunately, a moniker that would stick with the Y Men throughout the war. Pershing praised them before, during, and after the war, even extolling them in his after action report. However soldiers, among many other accusations, blamed them for high-priced cigarettes and for avoiding frontline service as a combatant. Some generals, like Peyton March, accused the Y Men of shirking their duty as perfectly healthy men that should be among the ranks of infantry. Fosdick and Baker, largely responsible for bringing the Y Men into the AEF, would come to regret their decision after the war, not necessarily because the Y Men did not perform well, but because it placed the Y Men in an unwinnable situation. They sent them into the mouth of the lion and gave them responsibilities that they would come to feel were the Army’s. A certain level of differentiation between Y Men and Y Women must also be understood. I found *no* evidence that any soldier, officer, or general ever used any words or imagery even close to “that damn Y Woman.” Historian of the YMCA C. Howard Hopkins said that “it should also be repeated that no word of criticism were ever leveled against the women who served in the Association uniform.” The men loved having women around, of this there was no doubt. Some generals like Peyton March thought that they should not be so near to the front, but that is a different matter. For this reason, the remainder of the text will generally deal with the Y Men, as the Y Women were excluded from the angst

the majority of these workers, they were, in the end, rejected by the military and war department leadership that had cried out for their support.¹² The volunteers' motivation to serve as Y Men instead of riflemen was called into question. They were often labeled money grubbers and do-gooders and were falsely accused of marking up cigarettes, only to then give soldiers Biblical lessons on charity and love for fellow man. As a result, in addition to *hypocrite*, the Doughboys came to refer to them as "the damn Y Men." Why were soldiers cursing the men sent to serve them? As is often the case, the truth is buried somewhere between fact, fiction, and myth.

The Facts Concerning the Y Workers

The facts are quite clear. The YMCA's interaction with the AEF dates back to the Mexican Border Expedition of 1916 where the YMCA was active in the Army camps that dotted the border.¹³ Though the camp conditions were deplorable and many men habitually frequented the liquor "resorts" and prostitute houses hastily constructed just outside many of the camps, the YMCA did what it could to provide positive, wholesome

the soldiers had toward the Y Men.

¹² Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 184. Besides notables like Baker and March, even Fosdick was critical of the volunteer effort during the Great War. He said it was not coordinated well, had too much religious sectarianism, and caused different groups to fight for the attention of soldiers and win them over to their views. After the war he advocated for a "lowest possible minimum the number of organizations working directly with the troops in camp or in the field." He added that "all work which directly touches the troops within the training areas or on active service in the field . . . can safely be entrusted to the government to operate." These statements, which lay dormant in Fosdick's after action report for twenty years, was dug up by General George C. Marshall during WWII and guided the Army's administration of soldier morale and welfare. Prompted by Fosdick's guidance, Marshall created the Special Services Division (SSD). The SSD served as an Army Branch that replaced the CTCA and the YMCA.

¹³ Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 140; Taft, *Service With Fighting Men*, 1:57–59; Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 486. While serving on the Mexican Border Expedition, General Pershing displayed an early acceptance of YMCA morale work, asking "Association facilities to follow the punitive expedition into Mexico, having come to expect them to be 'as much a part of army equipment as the army mule or the commissary cook.'" His connection with the YMCA would be displayed once again in WWI when Pershing essentially deeded soldier morale and welfare work to the Y.

outlets for the soldiers who chose to partake.¹⁴ When America declared war on Germany on April 2, 1917, Secretary of War Newton Baker immediately formed the Commission on Training Camp Activities (CTCA) to ensure the AEF Training camps were free of the moral depravity associated with the border expedition. To help guide the Army, Baker appointed Raymond Fosdick to chair the CTCA.

Fosdick was a tireless progressive and was familiar with the soldier morale and welfare mission. During the Mexican Border Expedition, Baker had sent him to inspect the conditions in Army camps, and Fosdick was appalled by what he found. Though Fosdick spoke highly of General Funston, the commander of the border force, he eventually labeled Fosdick “The Reverend” because of his do-gooder mission, and Funston grew suspicious of Fosdick’s methods. This was a similar fate that awaited Y Men who served in France during WWI. Other senior army officers questioned Fosdick’s intentions even more directly, informing him that “men were men, and sissies were not wanted in the Army.” In the end, Fosdick was backed by Secretary of War Newton Baker and President Woodrow Wilson, and the CTCA program moved forward forcefully.¹⁵

Fosdick’s staff grew to thousands, and included a vigorous law enforcement branch to enforce *Sections 12 and 13* of the *Draft Law*, which forbade soldiers access to liquor and prostitutes, and allowed for the punishment of anyone who involved soldiers in either of these vices. The government would go on to incarcerate 30,000 prostitutes during the war, shut down hundreds of red light districts, and disband all saloons within

¹⁴ Ann R. Babbert, “Prostitution and Moral Reform in the Borderlands: El Paso, 1890–1920” *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 12, no. 4 (2003): 575–604.

¹⁵ Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 137, 146, and 147.

ten miles of any Army training camp.¹⁶ The government did this by force, if required, and dispatched Marines to patrol the streets of Philadelphia and threatened the removal of training camps, and government funds, in cities that were slow to comply with Fosdick's instructions. In the CTCA and the power the organization wielded during the war, one can see the extent to which progressives were able to impact all areas of American society, including the mission of training for war.¹⁷

Fosdick's sole responsibility was to guarantee the 32 Army camps training the conscripts, regulars, and guardsmen provided an environment conducive to good morals, social hygiene, and progressive efficiency. To succeed in this massive endeavor, Fosdick asked various civilian agencies like the YMCA to provide personnel, supplies, and expertise. It should come as no surprise that there was grumbling among the institutional Army as old met new. Among pockets of the old Army—men who had cut their teeth fighting Indians on the American frontier and insurgents in the Philippines—all this “molly-coddling” was anathema. George T. Fry, the military editor of the *New York Journal* and former Colonel of the Tennessee National Guard, was one of the old guard. In an article for the *Infantry Journal*, Fry laments that the nation was saturated with progressives:

obsessing themselves with the idea that unless the American Army is thoroughly molly-coddled the world won't be any safer for democracy than a bottle of rum is if found in transit through Idaho; and they are working overtime to turn a perfectly good husky, built and geared for a scrap, into a Little Lord Fauntleroy preparing for an evening's entertainment in the nursery. If all of the misdirected energy that is being wasted on plans to rescue the morals of the young fighter and protect his chest, throat, indigestion, and home-cooking appetite from ruin were devoted to providing the essential things for a real army, the aggregation that followed Old Man Xerxes over

¹⁶ Elizabeth Clement, *Love for Sale: Courting, Treating, and Prostitution in New York City, 1900-1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 114. As I point out in the WWII chapter, it is ironic that the YMCA was the one banned from operating on or near Army training camps during WWII.

¹⁷ Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 137, 146, and 147; Clement, *Love for Sale*, 114.

the plains would look like the Salvation Army compared to the Army of Freedom, and the Boche would be sending distress calls.¹⁸

However adamant they were about not “molly-coddling” the new Army, the old guard was overruled. When the AEF deployed to France, the CTCA’s spirit of moral activism and soldier welfare work followed the men across the ocean. Once in country however, CTCA functions fell under the auspices of the YMCA, and came under the direct supervision of Edward C. Carter.¹⁹ Picking up the CTCA’s extensive morale and welfare mission, the YMCA subsequently became intimately involved in the life of the Doughboys, and hordes of Y Men descended upon France during the war.²⁰

One of Katherine Mayo’s earliest memories of the AEF was a near riot averted on account of the swift action of a fellow Y worker, Mr. Frapwell. Mayo and Frapwell, along with many Y workers, had deployed to France as advance echelon teams (ADVON) to prepare for the arrival of the AEF. They were busy securing administrative facilities, logistical contacts, and building materials when the Doughboys began to arrive. As the first AEF soldiers disembarked in France, those already hooked on nicotine found no place to obtain gold leaf relief. Mayo recalled “one wild cry” for smokes among these panicked smokers. An alarmed Y worker ran up to Edward Carter, eyes wide, “shivering with tension,” visibly distraught about the mayhem brewing at the port facility. The disturbed man told Carter, “I tell you sir, they’ve simply got to have it. This thing has

¹⁸ George T. Fry, “Molly-coddling the Army,” *Infantry Journal*, XIV, no. 7 (1918): 752.

¹⁹ Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 165; Dickinson, *The Building of an Army: A Detailed Account of Legislation, Administration and Opinion in the United States: 1915-1920* (New York: The Century Company, 1922), 229. Fosdick himself deployed to France in May of 1918 on a mission similar to his Mexican Border inspection in 1916. In France, he toured the combat zone and graded the AEF effectiveness in safeguarding the moral, social, and physical well-being of the soldiers. Though he was the face of these activities, the YMCA was the organization that was charged with the responsibility of executing them in country.

²⁰ Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 148–149.

reached its limit. If you could only see those boys!” Prior to the AEF’s arrival, Carter’s ADVON team frantically queried the YMCA home office in New York about various logistical issues related to cigarettes and other sundries. However, the home office was too embroiled in a moral dilemma regarding the prospect of providing cigarettes to soldiers to respond.²¹ Carter and his ADVON team averted the nicotine riot through purchases of drastically marked up cigarettes for soldiers’ consumption during this early stage of the war, however this was an unsustainable solution.

For years, the YMCA proudly backed and even led various temperance movements, including the anti-tobacco movement. Now, in one of the great ironies of the war, as the soldiers deployed to the trenches they began fielding requests for millions of packs of cigarettes to stock the shelves of the Y Huts. Moreover, as the demand for cigarettes increased exponentially once the full weight of the AEF had experienced time in the trenches, civic groups in America pushed the YMCA to sponsor charity drives to provide the soldiers with gifts of cigarettes. Howard Hopkins, historian of the progressives, argues that the war had a profound effect upon the YMCA and “association thinking.” He says, “Some superficial attitudes underwent a degree of modification, such as the previous intolerance of the use of tobacco which became untenable when the Associations found themselves the largest distributor of the article in the world through the canteen service.” The editor of the YMCA journal *Association Men* declared “we may not like it, but we have no business criticizing those that do.”²²

²¹ Katherine Mayo, *That Damn Y: A Record of Overseas Service* (Boston: Houghton, 1920), 39.

²² Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 516–517. Hopkins argues that the war had a profound effect upon the YMCA and “association thinking.” He says, “Some superficial attitudes underwent a degree of modification, such as the previous intolerance of the use of tobacco which became untenable when the Associations found themselves the largest distributor of the article in the world through

Essentially, the Y was forced to choose between the lesser of three evils: alcohol, prostitutes, or cigarettes. Historian Cassandra Tate describes the conundrum saying, “the goal of both organizations [YMCA and CTCA] was to divert the men from drink, drugs, lust, and gambling by providing ‘substitute attractions’ such as athletics, groups singing, inspirational movies and books—and tobacco, including cigarettes.”²³ Jarrett Rudy argues the cigarette presented the temperance societies with a choice as to “where a man would go if he was not allowed to smoke indoors—a tavern. And if a man had to go to a tavern to have a smoke, he would be exposed to more serious temptations, such as alcohol or other unnamed vices.”²⁴ However Robert Proctor probably captures the nature of the shift in policy best with his comment that the cigarette critics were summarily “silenced during the First World War . . . why should anyone worry about cancer or emphysema thirty years down the road, when bullets are whizzing overhead?”²⁵

While the YMCA sorted through these moral, cultural, and institutional issues presented by this strange turn of events, Y workers paid enormous markups to obtain cigarettes from the French market—costs they passed on to the soldiers. Commenting on the Y’s reliance on local markets for goods such as cigarettes and the price inflation that resulted, Mayo says that “the Y alone, in its first three months of buying, practically exhausted the war-drained markets of the French.” Mayo also attributed the price inflation to the fact that the Army quartermasters and the YMCA were bidding against

the canteen service.”

²³ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 72.

²⁴ Rudy, *The Freedom to Smoke*, 34.

²⁵ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 44.

each other on the local market, a habit that “bid prices up on each other, and thereby reduced the purchasing power of the people’s funds.”²⁶

Stung by frustration over supply and angered over cigarette prices, as the soldiers deployed to their training areas in France, and eventually into the trench lines, the relationship between the Y Men and the Doughboys quickly soured. Army officers, over-tasked with the responsibilities of fighting the war, planning for troop deployments, and attending to General Pershing’s never-ending list of demands and queries, begged the Y workers to come to the front and give attention to the soldiers’ waning morale. Expressing the severity of the situation, one particularly agitated commander exclaimed to a Y Man, “for God’s sake come down here before it is too late and do something for my men!”²⁷

The Y workers quickly responded and were soon found among the soldiers on the frontline. Initially lauded by the AEF, especially considering the lengths which they went to provide cigarettes and move Y Hut operations forward, the Y Man soon became the object of ridicule and mockery—even hate.²⁸ After the war, Pershing once commented that “the welfare organizations obtained prestige in reverse relation to the share of

²⁶ Katherine Mayo, *That Damn Y: A Record of Overseas Service* (Boston: Houghton, 1920), 68–69.

²⁷ John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army: A Detailed Account of Legislation, Administration and Opinion in the United States: 1915-1920* (New York: The Century Company, 1922), 233.

²⁸ *Infantry Journal*, vol. 14, pt. 1, 54, 893. The friction between the Y Man and the Doughboy seems to have developed rather quickly. In a letter written by an AEF soldier “Lambert” in France in November 1917, just a month after AEF forces deployed to the trench line for the first time, he lauds part of an article that says, “this war is not going to be won by YMCA workers or relief societies . . . but by big, two fisted fighting men, six feet tall and wearing size 10 shoes, who can fight and work for 18 hours, eat a huge meal, go to bed and get up and do it all over again.” He goes on to blast the YMCA and the Y Men, “they have comfortable quarters and fixed hours and are safe, yet their letters are probably full of their privations . . . in my estimation a man of good physique who goes into any other hard work than the line of the army . . . is a slacker. It is the men with rifles on their shoulders and packs on their backs who alone can beat the Boche . . . it is the man with the bayonet who can win this war.”

services given.” Pershing was expressing the sentiment of many progressives after the war who felt the YMCA gave the most, but was also hated the most, and were offered “doomed ungratefulness [for] the task” they were given. Upon hearing a report from an overjoyed Y Man who reported that he overheard some soldiers say they were pleased with the work of the YMCA, Edward Carter commented, “I am glad there are some who are saying good things, and that the whole world is not against us.”²⁹ Summing up these sentiments, law professor, historian, and future Undersecretary of Commerce in FDR’s administration John Dickinson, writing in 1922, recalled that the Y Man soon thereafter became the “best loved institution in the Army and the most violently criticized [hated] institution in the Army.”³⁰

The Loved

Stories of the Y Men’s selfless acts motivated by love and compassion abound, and many involved cigarettes and the Y’s collective desire to serve and attend to the soldiers’ morale and welfare. Regarding the desire to act in service to fellow man, Shillinglaw confided in his diary that he was particularly affected by a sermon given at a church service in France for all Y workers preparing for field service. The pastor said, “Four of ten commandments deal with love of God, six with fellow men, then two in the New Testament with same thing.”³¹ In a strange way, Y Men often performed this service of dispensing smokes to the soldiers motivated by the desire to serve fellow man, despite

²⁹ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 499; Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 77; Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA*, 117–118.

³⁰ Dickinson, *The Building of an Army*, 237–238.

³¹ Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA*, 100, 89.

their personal beliefs about the moral, spiritual, and health hazards associated with smoking.

Mayo recalls the story of one Y Man who was a conscientious objector and served men in an aid station near the frontlines. He had never smoked a cigarette in his life, and was personally opposed to the habit. Receiving wounded soldiers into the first aid tent, he gently helped a grievously wounded soldier place a cigarette between his lips, laboring to light it for him as cigarette lighting was not a skill the Y Man had ever attempted, much less perfected. Successful in his task, he watched as the soldier drank in the tobacco, the effect noticeable and immediate: instant calm in the midst of this soldier's panicked battle to stave off death. He soon realized he had used his last match, and became flustered as he observed many more wounded soldiers clambering about for a cigarette and a light. So he did something unthinkable a year earlier: he lit a cigarette for himself, using this soldier's now lit cigarette, and began puffing, and coughing no doubt, in order to light other soldiers' cigarettes one after the other—with his *own* cigarette. He had seen them do this a thousand times; he now joined the ritual. When his cigarette burned down, he lit another and then another, off the stumps of his own with the skill of a seasoned chain smoker. In this way he lit “hundreds of cigarettes for wounded soldiers, one after the other, all day long.”³²

In like manner, Ferguson recalls the story of a colleague who was a particularly pious pastor before volunteering as a Y Man, who overcame his own crisis of conscience as he shook hands with his call to serve the soldiers. As he operated his mobile vending station, selling cigarettes and candy to the soldiers, he mused about what his congregation back home might think about their pastor selling cigarettes to the soldiers he had sworn to

³² Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 108.

look after both morally and physically. He also grieved over the YMCA engaging in such sinful activities on Sunday, something he felt would never happen back home. However he overcame these emotions, as well as his personal grief over the soldiers' constant cursing, in order to bring a sense of comfort and relief to the men who had seen and experienced the horrors of the active trench line. On the subject of smoking and cussing, vices that often went hand-in-hand, Ferguson commented that "swearing seems to go with army life . . . the American soldier soon became . . . adept" at the ancient art of cursing in uniform. Ferguson added that the boys cursed so much he "soon found [himself] swearing in my dreams."³³ He also wondered at the irony of the whole scene: an ordained pastor, screened for smoking and drinking "alcoholic beverages" as a condition of employment, selling cigarettes on Sundays to cursing soldiers.³⁴

Shillinglaw also engaged in a bit of ironic discourse when he mentioned that despite these strictures, some of the Y Men picked up the smoking habit as soon as they were at sea in the Atlantic headed to France. The head of his shipboard group was alarmed at the sight of Y Men smoking, a specter that caused a bit of a "storm in a kettle." He said the storm soon subsided, and "the narrow men are keeping their injured feelings to themselves and the others are smoking."³⁵ Most Y Men, Ferguson and

³³ Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man*, 75, 94.

³⁴ "Alcoholic beverage" was the common name for spirited drinks during this period, the assumption being that if you partook of the beverage, you were, or would soon be, an "alcoholic." For more on this topic, see Daniel Okrent's *Last Call: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition* (2010).

³⁵ Dickinson, *The Building of an Army*, 238; Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA*, 26.

Shillinglaw included, cloaked themselves in the notion, or myth, that at least in the end, the soldiers were protected from the greater evils of wine and women.³⁶

The Hated

If the Y Men were acting in love and service, much of their activities were eventually met with hate and consternation. Pershing's insistence that the YMCA take over canteen operations in France initiated this atmosphere of disaffection with the Y Men. Pershing's Adjutant General described the reason behind Pershing's firm desire that the Y take a leading role: "the Commanding General *does not* approve of the establishment of canteens by the [military] organizations themselves . . . because it will take officers and men away from their proper functions of training and fighting, but *will be glad* to have them established by the YMCA."³⁷ The nature of this decision is a hotly contested issue in the historical documents. Mayo describes the Y's association with the canteen as a forced one for which "we had no choice," and as a relationship that was the "deadly tester of souls."³⁸ Historian Howard Hopkins offers a different angle, claiming the Y's chief executive in France, Carter, willingly accepted the Army's request to take over the canteen service. Hopkins was a historian, as well as a booster of the progressive culture in America during this period, so it is understandable that he was slanted toward portraying the Y as eager and capable.³⁹ The truth is somewhere in the middle.

The facts are relatively clear. The mission to run the Army's canteen service was an operation many in the YMCA felt wholly unqualified to perform, but nonetheless a

³⁶ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 72; Rudy, *The Freedom to Smoke*, 34.

³⁷ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 497-504.

³⁸ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 66-67.

³⁹ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 497-504

mission they assumed under the mantle of selfless service. Carter accepted the canteen mission despite advice to the contrary from the Y's own financial and legal counselors.

Mayo comments,

Y counselors, themselves large business men, had strongly disapproved. The work would involve from twelve to fifteen million dollars of capital . . . a trained organization of from five to six thousand grocery stores installed . . . and maintained under conditions more difficult and hazardous than any known to the world before.⁴⁰

As supervisor of hut construction, Shillinglaw added to Mayo's assessment. He was particularly affected by Carter's decision and felt it was the source of a great many of the Y's problems in France:

During and immediately after WWI, the YMCA was subjected to a good deal of criticism for its conduct of the war work . . . the major difficulty from the time the organization committed itself . . . was the size of the operation. Because the YMCA accepted the canteen responsibility, it had to get into areas in which it had little familiarity. The job got bigger and bigger until it became the largest monetary and organizational effort ever made by a voluntary philanthropic group.⁴¹

From these comments and others, the Y's leadership was obviously worried about taking on such a large enterprise. Mayo frankly admits that it was impossible for Carter to say no; how could he back down from the task for which he was sworn ... to serve the soldiers at all costs? How could he respond with "No—the price is too high?" He would not, and did not, despite the Army breaking many promises regarding their relationship.⁴²

Carter's willingness to accept the mission was underpinned by certain key assumptions that he would receive shipping support, exclusive merchandising rights, and the opportunity to defray costs with profits. This was not an unfounded assumption; the Adjutant General had already commented that in running the canteen system, the YMCA should expect to make "a small profit" that it could use to defray the cost of other YMCA

⁴⁰ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 75, 77.

⁴¹ Shillinglaw, *An American in the Army*, 37, 47, 71.

⁴² Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 75, 77; Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA*, 37, 47, 71.

amusement and morale programs.⁴³ Thus, Carter's response to Pershing's request indicated the pecuniary nature of their affiliation with canteen operations. Carter said he realize[d] that if we undertake to render the Army this service, it would involve us in a huge task, involving a very large staff and several millions of capital, but, as we have assured you, we have come to France to serve the Army in every possible way, and if our undertaking this job relieved or aided the Army in any way, we would be glad to consider it.⁴⁴

When Carter submitted his plans and conditions regarding the YMCA's assumption of PX duties, Pershing responded: "I have carefully considered the headings and heartily approve the program."⁴⁵ Though many in the YMCA felt wholly unqualified and understaffed for this mission, in the interest of the troops' morale and welfare and their desire to support the Army, they put their hand to the work. However they did so armed with an understanding that they would receive logistical support from the Army and profits to defray the added costs.⁴⁶

The final judgment on who was responsible for the Y's assumption of Army morale and welfare functions was settled after the war in hearings and investigations purposed to discover how the YMCA handled (or some said mishandled) funds. Pershing's Assistant Chief of Staff Colonel Frank R. McCoy, when asked about Carter's assumption of canteen duties, responded, "We were making [the] most of desperate efforts . . . to think of every way we could save combat personnel. We decided to put it

⁴³ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 497-504.

⁴⁴ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 66-67.

⁴⁵ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 497-504.

⁴⁶ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 497-504; Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 66-67. The term PX, Y Hut, and Canteen were used interchangeably during this period and often refer to the same thing: sites where soldiers' morale and welfare needs were attended to. The idea of selling cigarettes to fund morale and welfare would be a recurring theme throughout the history of the soldier and the cigarette.

up to M. Carter.” When asked if Carter had suggested that the YMCA take over canteen operations, McCoy indicated “Colonel Logan and I put that up to him first.”⁴⁷

In the final analysis, the historical record clearly states that the Army, led by Pershing, recruited the YMCA to take complete control of morale, welfare, and canteen services during the war.⁴⁸ On September 6, 1917, Pershing granted the YMCA full authority to “establish exchanges for the American troops in France,” adding that they were “intended to fill” the place of Army-run post exchanges so the military could focus on their “paramount military function of training and fighting.”⁴⁹ Commenting on this momentous decision that tended to distract the Y Men from their core mission, Ferguson said, “the Y did stand for some real spiritual and ethical ideals altho (*sic*) at times it seemed our whole duty was the work of the canteens.”⁵⁰

With the operational framework and proper authority to take over the morale mission in place, Pershing next expressed his desire that the Y canteens be “pushed as far to the front as military operations will permit” so that soldiers in the trenches could receive “comforts and conveniences” where they were needed most.⁵¹ A key feature of

⁴⁷ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 487.

⁴⁸ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 487.

⁴⁹ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 72.

⁵⁰ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 72; Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man*, 95; Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA*, 163. Mayo would lament this decision, saying it took away from the Y’s mission to freely serve the men, and turned them into cash-strapped storekeepers. Mayo would argue that the word “grant” needs qualification. “Grant” assumes the Y had asked for permission, which they had not. Pershing had “asked” the Y to take over the canteens, which, coming from a four-star general, meant he was ordering the task. The YMCA would run the Army’s canteen system until March 31, 1919, when the Army took back control of its canteens. The Y was happy to give the canteens back to the Army. Shillinglaw records in his diary the Army’s *General Order 33*, issued on September 6, 1917, which formally made the YMCA the Army *defacto* morale vendor.

⁵¹ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 72.

this agreement was the Army's commitment, by order of General Pershing, to remove any and all Army Quartermaster or Service of Support Corps morale related facilities from every part of the theatre where the YMCA operated canteens.⁵² This sequence of events, culminating with the emergence of Y Canteens and Y Huts across the allied sectors, effectually removed the Army from attending to the morale and welfare of the soldiers, placing this burden wholly and completely on the backs of the Y Men and Women.⁵³

As it had since the AEF had arrived in France, now that the link between the Y Men and the soldiers was officially recognized and sanctioned by the Army, the relationship between the soldier and the Y Men plummeted even further.⁵⁴ In accordance with their agreement, besides giving the YMCA exclusive rights to operate canteens, the Army was to allocate the YMCA precious shipping tonnage so they could transport the goods needed to outfit the canteens, cigarettes being a vital commodity in these seaborne shipments. However, on January 13, 1918, the Army informed Carter of its decision to decrease the Y's shipping allocation by fifty-three percent. How could the Y serve one hundred percent of the troops with only forty-seven percent shipping capacity? The answer was they could not. As a result, Mayo lamented "fifty-three percent of the troops,

⁵² Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 73. Adding further emphasis to the nature of this agreement, Mayo comments the structure of their agreement was "thus again and again, recognized and reiterated, not only by the Y, but the Army."

⁵³ General March would come to forcefully disagree with this decision since it removed the morale of the soldier from the purview of the *military* commander and gave it to a civilian volunteer organization.

⁵⁴ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 498. The relationship between the YMCA and the soldiers became so heated that after the war, Dr. Mott "asked for a governmental investigation . . . [and] there ensued more than four years of study, hearings, reports, counter-investigation, and much plumbing of memory and record . . . [that] fill dozens of volumes."

then, must remain un-served.”⁵⁵ However the soldiers did not know about the dire shipping situation or the fact that all shipping had been dependent on the activity of the German submarine fleet. To the soldier, the YMCA’s management of the canteen “made [them] appear to be a commercial and mercenary welfare organization” and they cursed their “appointed purveyor because of his [the soldier’s] empty hands.”⁵⁶

By March 1918, Carter was feeling the pinch caused by the shipping restrictions.⁵⁷ He complained in a letter to the AEF Service of Supply Division (whose chief, Charles Dawes, became Vice President of the United States during the Coolidge Administration) that there was “constant complaint from commanding officers and men throughout France, particularly at the front, regarding [the] utter inadequacy [of] Post Exchange supplies.” Carter’s warning went unheeded, and the soldiers’ cries “increased in volume and bitterness.” Further, Mayo claims that GHQ instructed Carter to “go on in silence doing your best, and let them [the soldiers in the AEF] scold.” Mayo is adamant in her assertion that GHQ was never at any moment unhappy with the YMCA’s performance in running the canteens, despite the Y’s damnation by the enlisted men and their officers.⁵⁸

In addition to empty hands, the soldiers blamed the Y Men for their empty pockets. The source of their angst was almost wholly related to concerns over the price of

⁵⁵ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 78, 80, 81.

⁵⁶ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 498.

⁵⁷ John J. Pershing, *The Final Report of General John J. Pershing* (Washington, DC: The US Government Printing Office, 1919), 91. In Pershing’s final report on the war, he said, “The YMCA undertook the burden of supplying needs of the entire AEF. Their efforts were in many respects limited by a lack of tonnage . . . shortage in tonnage, transportation, or personnel, meant inability to carry out completely their appointed tasks.”

⁵⁸ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 78, 80, and 81; Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 498.

cigarettes. Despite the Y's agreement with the Army regarding the suspension of quartermaster morale operations in areas where Y canteens operated, the Army still maintained some PXs in the vicinity of Y canteens. Because the Army did not have to account for any overhead or shipping costs in the price of their cigarettes, soldiers obtained cigarettes at much cheaper prices in the Army PX system as compared to the Y Canteens. This gave the Army PX a marked advantage and presented soldiers with the impression the Y Men were only in France to cheat soldiers and pursue profits. Soldiers who had earned their meager paychecks in muddy trenches lined with the shattered and broken bodies of their comrades were not happy shelling out money to the "damn Y Men." They were under the impression that the YMCA had "obtained large amounts of money from" Americans to perform free welfare services among the soldiers, and the soldiers envisioned that "considerable more would be given away . . . than was actually the case."⁵⁹ Add to this the Salvation Army's free cigarettes in the same areas and the Red Cross' free smokes at aid stations, and the fate of the Y Man was sealed.⁶⁰ However the sources of the soldiers' disgust with the Y Men did not end there.

Donation Downfall

In a shocking change of heart that historian Cassandra Tate found particularly ironic, the YMCA decided to cast aside its prewar fight against smoking, throwing its full weight behind various donation campaigns that collected millions of cigarettes for the

⁵⁹ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 500.

⁶⁰ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 500. In the Army's official investigation of the YMCA after the war, it claimed "at least one other welfare organization took advantage of the fact that the YMCA was handicapped by the canteens. It adopted for its slogan the phrase 'everything free' and impliedly invited comparison between its free service and that of the YMCA."

soldiers.⁶¹ Allan Brant describes how this decline in anti-smoking fervor during the war was informed by the notion that “the campaign against tobacco . . . now appeared prudish and out of tune with the moment. In the face of war’s bloodshed, the traditional notions that a prohibition on tobacco protected the troops from moral harm and health risks seemed frivolous.” Brandt claims that “few transformations in our culture are so vividly clear as the shift from the bitter opposition to cigarette smoking voiced by the YMCA before the war and its enthusiasm for distributing cigarettes during the war. Many YMCA workers returned from their outposts in France as dedicated smokers.” Americans jumped at the chance to support their Doughboys, and the YMCA and other Progressive Era social welfare organizations happily assisted them with this endeavor.⁶²

In addition to the cigarettes, the YMCA encouraged campaign participants to slip personal notes to the soldiers in each pack of cigarettes they donated. These donated cigarettes were boxed and shipped overseas where they were supposed to be given away to the soldiers. It was only a matter of time before the overstretched Y Men, now running the Army’s massive canteen system, accidentally sold packs of donated cigarettes to the soldiers. One can only imagine the response when these soldiers, already cursing the Y Man for the high prices they paid for canteen cigarettes, returned to their tents to find a nice note from a complete stranger gushing over the opportunity to give the Doughboys free smokes. The response was automatic, hateful, and nearly universal by that point—*That damn Y Man!*

⁶¹ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 76–80; Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 51; Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 516–517.

⁶² Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 76–92; Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 51. Tate discusses at length the other anti-smoking groups such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army that readily participated in cigarette distribution to soldiers. Brandt also quotes G.K. Chesterton, who once exclaimed “we might as well discuss the perils of gluttony in famine as those of nicotine on a battlefield.”

Memory, Myth, Legends, and Soldiering

The “donation downfall,” along with soldiers’ real or perceived conceptions regarding Y Men and high price cigarettes, contributed to various forms of memory, myth, and legend that worked against the Y Man. The way soldiers remember combat and the myths and legends to which they fall prey during war are topics of great interest to new military historians. In Paul Fussell’s excellent work *The Great War and Modern Memory*, he recalls the Doughboys’ penchant for engaging in myth, legend, and rumor. This habit is as old as soldiering itself. Be it a Roman fortress along Hadrian’s Wall or a Civil War encampment near the Rappahannock River, soldiers throughout time have sat around fires and pontificated over several standard questions and engaged in all manner of rumor and conjecture. Where will the Army march next? When are they going to go home? Why did another unit receive combat citations and theirs did not? WWI soldiers were quick to join in this time-honored military tradition. Always on the alert for an attack or preparing for the next offensive, soldiers supplemented their trench duties with countless hours ruminating over the day’s happenings or engaging in spirited story telling contests. In this way they created an environment ripe for some tall tales.

Fussell was a decorated infantryman in WWII and was imminently qualified to give account of myths and legends among WWI. One legend told of Germans taking the bodies of dead soldiers and cutting out the fat and boiling it down to produce much needed heating and lamp oil, as well as other industrial chemicals. Another legend claimed there was a zombie company of Allied and German soldiers that lived among caves in no man’s land and only came out at night to gorge on the dead and wounded.

Yet another accused the Germans of crucifying a poor Canadian soldier captured between the lines during a raid.⁶³

Besides these legendary myths, rumors regarding future combat actions or deployments to other sectors circulated among the soldiers. As the end of the war appeared at hand, many of these speculated that the AEF would go to Russia to deal with the Bolsheviks. The soldiers spread other rumors detailing the pending revocation of their draft status, a dreaded fate that would force them to remain in the Army permanently. In his diary, Ferguson records many of these rumors as well. Soldiers thought they were moving on to Italy because “had not the overcoats been called in?” Or maybe it was Russia: “had there not been an issue of blankets?”⁶⁴

Much of this rumor and legend was connected to the Y Man and the nature of his service in France. In all fairness, Katherine Mayo, one of the Y Man’s staunchest allies, admits that she had no connection to the YMCA when she went to France and that even she was a bit prejudiced against the Y Man when she first arrived in France. It was a sentiment that “intensified . . . into violent resentment” after her first few weeks in France listening to soldiers’ “wrath and loathing” of the Y Men and “heartbreaking accounts of the meanness, the stupidities, [and] the little big cruelties of that damn Y.” She confessed that had she written an account of Y Men during this period, it would have simply echoed the “green lies,” myths, and legends she was already aware of. However she gave it time and soon based her recollections in “the most considered thought that I can give, on the

⁶³ Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 114-154.

⁶⁴ Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 179–182; Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man*, 149–150.

widest and most sifted material available." Grounded in what she felt was informed objectivity, she gave an account that praises the work of the Y Men, despising the injustice they suffered at the hands of ungrateful soldiers.⁶⁵

Mayo describes one rumor particularly devastating to the already maligned reputation of the Y Men. Soldiers were spreading the rumor that Y men denied cigarettes and other sundries to wounded soldiers who did not have the money, or even the physical ability, to pay for the items they so desperately desired. Listening in on a conversation between two soldiers, Mayo overheard one recalling his experience at Belleau Wood when he observed a stretcher team hurrying by with a wounded officer. The grievously wounded soldier had his bottom jaw blown off and was in terrible shape. At that instant, a Y Man passed by carrying a backpack loaded with cigarettes and chocolate cakes. Noticing some sort of commotion between the stretcher bearers and the Y Man, the soldier approached to see what was happening. The stretcher team told him that "the captain, here, wants a cake of chocolate. He hasn't eaten for two days but this fellow won't give it to him because he hasn't got the price." Enraged, the soldier turned to the "damn Y scoundrel," pulled his gun, and demanded that the Y Man give the wounded captain whatever he wanted. The soldier described the "big tears of thankfulness a-rollin' down his cheeks" when the wounded captain realized what this soldier had done for him by putting the "damn Y Man" in his place.⁶⁶

Elsie Janis and the Y Men

The distaste for the Y Men did not end with the men of the AEF; it bled over to the women as well, which was a particularly painful blow. Already suffering from the

⁶⁵ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 7, 380–389; Dickinson, *The Building of an Army*, 238.

⁶⁶ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 388–389.

frustration that accompanied every jeer and jab from battle-hardened Doughboys, the Y Men also suffered the sarcasm of the AEF's most beloved lady: Elsie Janis.

Janis was a well-known entertainer who went to France to entertain the boys of the AEF during the summer of 1918. Janis meandered about the French countryside in her sleek Cadillac touring car, escorted by her mother and a traveling entourage of escorts. Writing about her experiences with the AEF soon after she returned home, her stories are filled with sarcastic references to the Y Men. Her text overtly favored the AEF soldiers over the "young Christians," her mildly sarcastic name for the Y Men. The AEF boys, in her opinion, were the real representatives of American virile masculinity in France. She was confident that she had become intimately familiar with the Doughboys jargon, songs, myths, and stories. She ventured into the trenches and even pulled the lanyard on an artillery piece, pulling it over and over until "the observation posts reported that there was nothing left of the positions we had been shelling."⁶⁷

Thoroughly familiar with the soldiers' likes and dislikes, she became aware of their loathing for Military Police (MPs). She described the MPs sarcastically as the "[men] who tells the AEF how not to behave."⁶⁸ Nursing veiled contempt for the Y Men, she made light of their do-gooder activities and was convinced they were frustrating her efforts to gain close access to the young soldiers of the AEF.⁶⁹ In a typically cynical story, she describes an instance when she overtook Edward Carter's "Young Christian Packard" in her Cadillac. Janis described Carter as "kicking up more dust than any

⁶⁷ Elsie Janis, *The Big Show: My Six Months with the American Expeditionary Forces* (New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corp., 1919), 73.

⁶⁸ Janis, *The Big Show*, 64.

⁶⁹ Janis, *The Big Show*, 94.

Christian car should kick up.” Determined to show up the “young Christian,” Janis ended their “short but sweet argument as to who owned the road” by leaving him in the dust, giving him some of the “thickest AEF Cadillac dust that ever flew.”⁷⁰

Much of her jeering and jabbing of the Y Men was tongue-in-cheek humor. However, Janis concludes her recollections of her time with “the boys” with a particularly telling statement informed by her months of close observation of the AEF grunts. In a passage that must be read with deference to context and due consideration given to her previous statements about the Y Men, Janis concludes:

Most of the men liked the War, and most men will always like war, and as long as there are women to fight for, men will fight, so if they really want to do away with war they must exterminate women. We must not kill the spirit that won the War; we must not forget that for every dear lad who was lost at least ten were *made into real men* . . . Oh, war had its good points!⁷¹ (Italics mine.)

This statement is thick with double meaning. Many of the Y Men did not like war, yet they chose to serve in a way that satisfied their conscience and was true to their convictions, answering the nation’s call for volunteer welfare workers. The Y Men’s status as brave, virile men was called into question by many of the soldiers they served, and now Janis was extolling the virtues of men who would fight and protect women—a statement that seems to exclude the Y Men. Finally, she lauds the “spirit that won the war . . . [and] made real men,” a spirit the Y Man, at least in Janis’ estimation, did not possess.⁷²

The Day of Reckoning: The Y Man Meets the General

⁷⁰ Janis, *The Big Show*, 110.

⁷¹ Janis, *The Big Show*, 225.

⁷² Janis, *The Big Show*, 225.

Whether truth, fiction, rumor, or legend, the “damn Y Man” found he was the object of intense ridicule—even hate. The facts concerning his service in France were fairly clear, at least to the Y Men and the upper echelons of Army leadership, including General Pershing and Secretary Baker. The majority of Y Men had every good intention in volunteering, and they had dutifully responded to the Army’s requests. Yet their decision to run the Army’s canteen and morale operations was a good deed that, in the end, opened them up to slander and accusation.⁷³

All of this frustration, hate, and sarcasm regarding the Y Men had a predictable effect. Soldiers in every corner of the battlefield, from the trenches to the support areas, loved to hate the Y Men. Shillinglaw was aghast at the criticism and sarcasm. Describing how the Y Man was often blamed for logistic and pricing issues that were out of their hands, he says,

Most of the soldiers who used the YMCA facilities had no knowledge of these problems and they quickly criticized the organization for all manner of ills. In their bitterness over the conditions which they found in the trenches, the soldiers were quick to cry “slacker” or “shirker” at a Y canteen secretary.⁷⁴

Shillinglaw further lamented that one of his fellow Y Workers, who was too old for the draft, couldn’t take the harsh ridicule anymore: “a good man resign[ed] his Y assignment because of this criticism. C.D. Jackson was actually over draft age, but he looked young

⁷³ Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA*, 183; Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man*, 103. Ferguson recalled, after the war, the Y Man “lived with the army and yet he was not a vital part of it . . . his standing was always problematic . . . [he] gave of his best self . . . may have undergone many more dangers and hardships than many a soldier . . . he feels himself in a way outside the organization of the army . . . not exactly part of the AEF.”

⁷⁴ Shillinglaw, *An American in the Army and YMCA*, 71.

enough to be eligible. He worked hard . . . but he could not take the brutal criticism which he got from the soldiers.”⁷⁵

Ferguson remembers well his first encounter with stiff criticism. Despite the Y’s tireless efforts to keep bringing in supplies as thousands of soldiers withdrew to rest areas after their trench rotation, the Y Men could not keep up with their demands and “some men began to complain bitterly.”⁷⁶ They cursed the Y Man for bleeding them dry with marked-up cigarettes, and they cursed the Army for not issuing them free cigarettes. Cigarettes were the one item, in addition to bullets, that soldiers needed to win the war according to Pershing, and soldiers despised giving their hard-earned pay to Y Men to obtain them. Regarding the military necessity for cigarettes, top staff aide to Pershing, Major Grayson M.P. Murphy, once said that “a cigarette may make the difference between a hero and a shirker . . . in an hour of stress a smoke will uplift a man to prodigies of valor; the lack of it will sap his spirit.” Ironically, Murphy was essentially saying that “shirkers” (Y Men) were providing cigarettes to soldiers to help them avoid being “shirkers.”⁷⁷

In the midst of the soldiers complaining about cigarettes, commanding officers extolling the benefits of tobacco, and a glaring absence of government cigarette rations, a tall, ramrod straight, West Point-trained artillery officer stepped into the trenches in February 1918. He was there to inspect the troops one last time before returning home to

⁷⁵ Shillinglaw, *An American in the Army and YMCA*, 71.

⁷⁶ Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man*, 172.

⁷⁷ Richard Kluger, *Ashes to Ashes* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1996), 58; Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 71. Once when asked what the nation could do to help the war effort, Pershing quipped, “You ask me what we need to win this war. I answer tobacco, as much as bullets.”

assume command of the Army.⁷⁸ This officer was General Peyton March, the newly appointed Army Chief of Staff (CoS), and he was on his way to Washington, DC. As the new CoS, March subsequently took swift action to ensure the soldiers looked to the Army for their well-being and morale—not the damn Y Man. His actions to address this morale problem would have profound effects on twentieth-century America that still echo to the present day.

⁷⁸ Peyton March, *The Nation at War* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co, 1934), 36. Before leaving for GHQ, March was detailed by Pershing to inspect the frontlines, and he also met with the AEFs chief supply and purchasing agent General Charles Dawes.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL PEYTON MARCH, THE SOLDIER, AND THE CIGARETTE

When Major General Payton March inspected the trench-dwelling soldiers of the AEF one last time in February 1918, he had been in France for seven months serving as General Pershing's Chief of Artillery. To his great dismay, he was recalled to Washington, DC, by Secretary of War Newton Baker to become the new Chief Staff of the Army. Secretary Baker had his eye on March for quite some time and informed General Pershing that he desperately needed Pershing's Chief of Artillery, saying, "I feel it urgently necessary to have him." March's recall to Washington, DC, was covered by the media outlets who hailed him the "foe of red tape" and a "real soldier in his prime." Baker's desperation and the statements by the media belie the state of the Army General Headquarters (GHQ) during this period: bogged down in red tape, mired in bureaucratic bickering, and led by archaic generals whose time had long ago passed.¹

Like any true Army combat-arms professional, March longed for the sound of battle and men to lead. When he eventually met Secretary Baker for the first time as the new Army Chief Staff, March informed Baker that he was "sick at the stomach" at his removal from combat duty in France, adding that it was a matter that "was never referred to again in all our long service together."² However, he knew the job to which he was called was very important, and he appreciated the opportunity. March appealed to Baker because he had experience downrange and was personally acquainted with the soldiers'

¹ Edward Coffman, *Hilt and Sword: The Career of Peyton March* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 50; Peyton March, *The Nation at War* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co, 1934), 366.

² Coffman, *Hilt and Sword*, 50; March, *The Nation at War*, 366.

needs.³ He also liked that March was known as a very direct ramrod (the “foe of red tape”) fully capable of fixing the deadlock in Army GHQ and addressing the staff’s inability to make decisions or see things through to conclusion.⁴

The previous two chiefs, Generals Tasker H. Bliss and Hugh L. Scott, were deemed too outdated to handle the complexities of modern war and were quietly removed from office.⁵ As March visited the troops and inspected the lines, some innate instinct combined with his months of experience in France and informed his belief that something was wrong. Considering the prioritization of his actions upon taking the helm as the Chief of Staff, what he observed in the trenches convinced him that the Army was not attending to the soldiers’ most basic needs. While visiting with the AEF staff in France prior to departure, he realized the chasm between the GHQ and the AEF was extensive both in distance and ideology. As he prepared to return home, he wrestled with his conviction that drastic changes were in order to ensure the Army’s General Staff and Supply Service Corps were properly oriented on the AEF soldiers on the frontlines. As fate would have it, one of the bold decisions March made within days of taking command of the Army has had profound economic, social, cultural, political, and health effects he could never have fathomed.⁶

³ “Downrange” is military jargon for deployed to the combat zone.

⁴ March, *The Nation at War*, 44 and 50.

⁵ Coffman, *Hilt and Sword*, 40, 44, and 50; March, *The Nation at War*, 367.

⁶ Vast amounts of literature are available on the economic, social, cultural, political, and health effects of cigarette smoking in America. Smoking is a habit nearly all historians familiar with this topic and public health experts who research tobacco policy agree became entrenched in America as a result of cigarette smoking during WWI. See Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*; Brandt, *Cigarette Century*; Tate, *Cigarette Wars*. These are just a few examples of the volumes of material available on these subjects.

As March sailed across the ocean, he processed all he had seen and experienced in France, as well as the enormous task that lay ahead of him.⁷ First, he thought of death. By the time he left France, millions of Allied soldiers and thousands of AEF soldiers had perished in combat, with no end in sight. Tragically, he had once again experienced the pain of death firsthand. His first wife Josephine had died while March was overseas in 1904, and now his eldest son and namesake, Peyton Jr., had met a tragic death while his father was away. Peyton Jr., was a lieutenant in the Army and was killed in an aircraft accident just before March set sail to return home. He drew comfort from President Theodore Roosevelt, who sent him a letter expressing his grief over March having “drunk the waters of bitterness,” adding that he might soon “have to drink of them” as well, for he had sons in combat. Ironically, Roosevelt did eventually have to drink of these waters, as his son Quentin was killed while engaged in air to air combat with the Luftwaffe. A gracious, if gregarious man in life and death, Roosevelt later encouraged both March, and himself, to “hold our heads high when we think of our sons.”⁸

March also drew additional support from Generals Pershing and Dawes, two men with immense experience in grief and loss. Pershing had lost his wife and daughters to a house fire in 1915 while serving on the Mexican Border Expedition, later commenting when selected for Major General that “all the promotion in the world would make no

⁷ March, *The Nation at War*, 38. March could not return home to take his position as Chief of Staff until he had first safely exited the combat zone, a prospect fraught with danger considering the menacing German U-Boat squadrons. Before March’s ship was able to break free of the harbor and slip out into the Atlantic, his boat was turned around by a British submarine destroyer. The Germans had caught wind of March’s return to America to assume his position as Chief of Staff and had placed a welcome party of attack submarines just beyond Belfast Harbor to greet him. After some delay back in port so the threat could be cleared, March finally set sail.

⁸ March, *The Nation at War*, 346.

difference now.”⁹ Pershing was forced to leave his young son, the only remaining survivor of his family, with relatives when he took command of the expedition to France. General Dawes, the Chief of the Service of Supply, had lost his twenty-two year old son in a drowning accident at Lake Geneva in 1912. These men were tough Army officers and men of their times—but they were also human. Dawes’ diary reveals an emotional exchange between Dawes and Pershing about the pain they both shared in losing sons. Dawes records a telling conversation in his war diary that he had with General Pershing while together in a carriage in France:

I hope I do not fail him [Pershing]. We have both passed through the greatest grief which can come to man. As we rode up together there occurred an instance of telepathy . . . neither of us was saying anything, but I was thinking of my lost boy and of John’s loss and looking out the window, and he was doing the same thing . . . we both turned at the same time and each was in tears. All John said was, ‘Even this war can’t keep it out of my mind.’”¹⁰

Despite the tragedy and death of the past, March had many challenges and opportunities to welcome him upon dropping anchor in America. Upon disembarkation, he promptly gave his daughter Vivian away in marriage to an Army Captain in New York on March 1, 1918. Moreover, despite his “disgust” with having to leave his field command in the AEF, he was soon to take charge of his beloved Army, an organization to which he had given the greater portion of his life.¹¹ After the war, March recalled that “the declaration of war found the United States thoroughly unprepared for the great task

⁹ Donald Smythe, *Pershing: General of the Armies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 2.

¹⁰ Charles G. Dawes, *A Journal of the Great War Volume One* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), 22-23; Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*; Mitchell P. Roth and James Stuart Olson, *Historical Dictionary of Law Enforcement* (West Port, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001), 119. Experiencing family tragedy seems to be a common theme in many of the characters’ lives in this story. Besides Theodore Roosevelt, Pershing, March, and Dawes, Fosdick experienced this fate in 1934 when his wife shot and killed their two children in their sleep, then turned the gun on herself.

¹¹ Coffman, *Hilt and Sword*, 53; March, *The Nation at War*, 35. March commented that he was “disgusted with the prospect of having to return to America, although, of course, it was a great compliment and a promotion.”

which confronted it.”¹² He had experienced this unpreparedness in France, and now he knew a mountain of work awaited him. He heard reports that the GHQ was a failing organization, a rumor he found hard to dismiss. One officer even predicted that the GHQ would soon collapse and “break down.”¹³ The responsibilities were immense, for added to the task of fixing the GHQ were the needs of a million men under combat arms and additional millions at military training camps across the United States.

During his trip across, March also pondered one of his most deeply-held beliefs regarding Army organizational culture. Dating to his days serving in Japan in 1904 as a military observer of the Russo-Japanese War, March grew in his conviction that the “American General Staff was a long way from being the effective agency the Japanese General Staff was.”¹⁴ March was known to his peers as an Uptonian, a professional military officer that followed and revered the teachings of Army General Emory Upton. Upton was a West Pointer, decorated Civil War veteran, and staunch supporter of a strong, large regular army structured around a professional, rigorously trained officer corps. They were conservatives in the Army that believed in the Professional Military Education (PME) system, expansion of the military academies, a general staff system based on the German model, and a large standing army expanded by a supplemental draft

¹² James L. Abrahamson, *America Arms: The Making of a Great Military Power* (New York: Free Press, 1981), 158.

¹³ Coffman, *Hilt and Sword*, 43.

¹⁴ Coffman, *Hilt and Sword*, 32.

in wartime. According to historian John Whiteclay Chambers, they were “distrustful of ‘instant’ soldiers as compared with ‘reliable’ regulars.”¹⁵

The opposite of the Uptonians were the progressive UMTers who believed in a Universal Military Training system. They supported a small but professional officer corps and expansion via universal conscription during war. They saw UMT as not only a national defense measure, but a citizenship and moral training initiative—a proclivity that belied their true roots in progressivism. President Teddy Roosevelt, General Leonard Wood, and General Pershing were *UMTers* who stood in opposition to many of March’s conservative views regarding America’s military establishment.¹⁶

With this conviction regarding the profession of arms, it followed that even at an early date, long before the Great War, March advocated a reorganization of the Army. He firmly believed that the Army staff was out of touch and irrelevant. Based on his earlier experiences observing the efficiency of the Japanese General Staff, which was based upon the German General Staff, he said he “knew, before I came back to America, precisely the changes which I proposed to put into effect when I took over the Office of Chief of Staff.” Interestingly, during his earlier experience observing Japan at war, March predicted the Japanese aggression the allies were forced to confront 40 years later with

¹⁵ John Whiteclay Chambers II, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to America* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 240.

¹⁶ Coffman, *Hilt and Sword*, 32; Robert K. Griffith, *Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: America’s Experience with an All Volunteer Army Between the World Wars* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), 10. The Uptonian vs. UMT debate also entered into the March vs. Pershing controversy and the debate over cigarettes and soldier morale. March was the staunch professional who believed that morale was a military command function. Pershing saw morale differently, claiming that officers’ professional responsibilities lay elsewhere; he supported the “sub-contracting” of morale efforts to volunteer civilian agencies.

blast, heat, and fragmentation. March said then that the Japanese “hated all white races” and would find satisfaction with “nothing less than predominance in the Pacific.”¹⁷

March mostly took contention with the old staff system constraint of appointing an officer to the Army Staff, and then leaving him there for the rest of his career. This system tended to “solidify each . . . department into a compact bureaucracy preserving its own unbroken traditions . . . and independence . . . from each other . . . and the rest of the Army.”¹⁸ This system ensured a dearth in trained staff officers. Moreover, they were not only in short supply, they were so removed from the line they were ineffective at best, detrimental to the mission at worst. This situation was addressed incrementally with a suite of acts rolled out between 1901 and 1913 that streamlined staff functions by creating the General Staff Corps and the Army Chief of Staff position, as well as the detail for duty system which detailed an officer to staff duty for four years and then returned him to the line.

These reforms started with the innovations of Elihu Root, who served as Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904. Historian James L. Yarrison declares these Root Reforms “of great importance for the Army and its future,” because Root had spent time studying the lessons learned from the war with Spain and concluded that “most of the mistakes made during the war were the product of faulty organization and planning.”¹⁹ Replacing the weaker Commanding General of the Army billet with the new General Staff headed by a

¹⁷ March, *The Nation at War*, 40; Abrahamson, *America Arms*, 92. Unfortunately, Asian peoples by the millions, like the citizens of Nanking, China, found out that the Japanese hated them as well.

¹⁸ Griffith, *Men Wanted for the U.S. Army*, 10, 16; Dickinson, *The Building of an Army*, 253–258, 288.

¹⁹ James L. Yarrison, “The U.S. Army in the Root Reform Era, 1899-1917” The U.S. Army Center for Military History Website, accessed December 1, 2013, <http://www.history.army.mil/documents/1901/Root-Ovr.htm>.

“Chief of Staff of the Army,” Root centralized the power to command operations, supply, logistics, and planning in one office.

Moreover, General Leonard Wood commented that the Detached Service Act of 1913, a follow on to the Root Reforms, was crucial because it established the aforementioned detail system, ensuring that staff officers had “practical knowledge of the needs of the [Line] troops . . . and appreciation of the conditions under which they are living . . . [as] officers permanently detached from troops eventually lose touch with their needs.”²⁰ Though March and Woods came to despise each other, the detail system was something upon which they readily agreed. Despite these needed changes that had occurred during the two decades after the Spanish American War, staff dysfunction was still rampant when March assumed command in 1918.

The greatest area of concern to March was not just the gridlock built up in the staff, but the physical and ideological divisions between the line AEF units and the GHQ staff. Regarding these unnecessary divisions, nothing caught March’s ire more than the Sam Browne belt, an unauthorized uniform item that was the physical manifestation of all he believed was wrong with the Army. March hated the Sam Browne belt because it was rooted in the British aristocracy. He was particularly averse to the belt because the Browne Belt cult painted staff officers in Paris as veterans and war heroes and staff

²⁰ Dickinson, *The Building of an Army*, 253–258 (specifically 257); Griffith, *Men Wanted for the U.S. Army*, 10, 16; 288; James L. Yarrison, “The U.S. Army in the Root Reform Era, 1899–1917,” The U.S. Army Center for Military History Website, accessed December 1, 2013, <http://www.history.army.mil/documents/1901/Root-Ovr.htm>; Russell Weigley, “The Elihu Root Reforms and the Progressive Era,” in *Command and Commanders in Modern Military History: Proceedings of the Second Military History Symposium*, ed. Lt Col William Geffen (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 24. Eminent military historian Russell Weigley argues that army reforms of this era must be viewed as an overall part of the progressive era. The argument that a nation’s army, and the way it fights war, are a reflection of the nation itself has become a foundation of the new military history’s desire to understand the relationship between war and society.

officers performing similar duties at the GHQ as “slackers” and “swivel chair officers.”

To March, a true combat veteran, these distinctions were anathema, and were fits of drama that directed attention away from the soldiers serving in the trench.²¹

However Pershing quickly adopted the Sam Browne belt and authorized it only for AEF officers.²² Edward Coffman, March’s biographer, commented that “a small difference in uniform, the Sam Browne represented a larger difference between March and Pershing.”²³ March also felt the belt was a waste of war industry material at a time when leather was a rationed commodity in the United States. March was a staunch fiscal conservative and estimated the Sam Browne belts would cost over two million dollars if the war had gone on through 1919.

Moreover, he reasoned they were not only costly, they served no use to the soldiers in the trenches, where enlisted soldiers carried rifles with shoulder straps and officers, in true American fashion, used pistol belts and suspenders. March insisted that the staff needed to focus time and resources on the needs of the soldiers in the trenches, not the silly Sam Browne belt mafia. He asked Pershing to do away with the belt soon after taking command of the Army. Pershing refused, his Chief of Staff General adding that March was “narrow” and that going without the Sam Browne belt “was like going without one’s pants.”²⁴ To March, such elitism represented disconnects between the AEF Staff officers in France and the GHQ Staff in Washington that went much deeper than a

²¹ Coffman, *Hilt and Sword*, 162.

²² Smythe, *Pershing*, 93. Smythe says that “in time [the Sam Browne belt] became a caste symbol, setting off the AEF officer from both the enlisted man overseas and the officer at home—and universally detested by both.”

²³ Coffman, *Hilt and Sword*, 82.

²⁴ March, *The Nation at War*, 175; Smythe, *Pershing*, 93.

simple piece of leather. Even worse, it distanced the AEF staff officers from the men in the trench.²⁵

With these anti-elitist sentiments in mind, March returned to the United States in March 1918 and took command. Rather than focusing on soldiers' needs and killing Germans, March saw many officers and leaders more concerned with inter-Army cultural wars and distracted by the staff-versus-line quagmire that had plagued the Army for decades. March was determined to eliminate the apparent disconnects that fueled the GHQ and AEF staffs' lack of focus and internal dysfunction.²⁶ He found the situation worse than he thought. When he disembarked, he went directly to GHQ and was shocked to find offices empty and dark:

I came down to the War Department that night and found the General Staff Offices dark, nobody was there; I wandered along the deserted corridors . . . I found the corridor piled high with unopened mail sacks . . . I finally found one officer on duty . . . and he was the only officer I did

²⁵ Anton Myrer, *Once an Eagle* (New York: Harper Collins, 1968), 215. One of the finest novels on military leadership, *Once An Eagle* was first published in 1967 at the height of the Vietnam War. The book is still required reading for all West Point military cadets and on the professional reading list at all Army PME schools. The protagonist in the book is Sam Damon, a *soldier's soldier* who enlisted and subsequently won a battlefield commission and Medal of Honor in WWI. Damon rose all the way to Major General and Division Command in WWII. Damon had particular distaste for the elitism and separation represented by the belt. In a classic scene from the *New York Times* bestselling novel, Damon's platoon is readying for a dangerous attack across no man's land. Several AEF staff officers with little actual combat experience had come down to observe and were attempting to lead the troops. Damon, a grizzled veteran, was frustrated with the staff attention. As he readied his men for the attack, he ordered them to assemble light combat packs with only the essentials (bullets and cigarettes). After looking to his men, "Damon . . . removed his Sam Browne belt and was buckling in its place a cartridge belt and extra bandoleers, like any infantryman. 'I'll wear it in camp because its regulations [Damon said] but I'm damned if I'll ever wear it in combat.' He dropped the shiny leather belt on the grass. 'The boys know me by now—or if they don't they'd better.'" Later, General Caldwell, Damon's soon-to-be father-in-law and another *soldier's soldier*, referring to Pershing's mistakes and distraction with dogma, elitism, described "The spit and polish in the billets [AEF Staff], [and] this silly Sam Browne belt business" as evidence of a staff not in touch with the line. Throughout this classic novel, the Sam Browne belt is used as a symbol of military elitism, staff versus line, and the animosity between chain-smoking trench officer infantrymen and staff "weenies."

²⁶ Though March was not able to remove the Sam Browne belt as a uniform item for AEF officers, he was able to change the organizational structure of the GHQ to make it more efficient and responsive, which he expressed in the way he recalled his staff's quick and efficient handling of the cigarette rationing issue. Also, to break up the *us vs. them* culture, he initiated a GHQ-AEF staff-to-line exchange program.

find. The next night the entire General Staff were on duty, and they stayed on duty at night until the end of the war.²⁷

March took swift and decisive action. March, as an Uptonian, was a staunch proponent of a professional, productive GHQ and a highly qualified officer corps. He put an end to the lax nine-to-five schedules and initiated twenty-four hour, ‘round-the-clock operations for the remainder of the war.²⁸ He reorganized GHQ staff and made it more efficient and responsive to the AEF. He implemented a staff-to-line exchange to improve morale and create synergy. This program afforded staff officers with the opportunity to go downrange in exchange for select AEF officers who would return stateside to serve on the GHQ staff.²⁹ One of his most controversial decisions was to remove former Chief of Staff General Scott from command of Fort Dix. Scott had been retired in September 1917, one month prior to the AEF’s combat deployment to France, but as a close friend of President Wilson, Scott was recalled to active duty and given command of Fort Dix. Despite Scott’s political connections, March removed him from command to make way for younger, more qualified Regular Army officers.³⁰ Additionally, he ended the archaic system of politically appointed officers. He insisted that only properly trained, combat-ready officers could have the privilege of leading his men.

Though he angered many Congressmen, March stuck to his plans to build a professional Army purged of aged retirees and well-connected political appointees. Thus, March was the target of considerable angst from Congress. No decision was more

²⁷ March, *The Nation at War*, 40.

²⁸ Coffman, *Hilt and Sword*, 54.

²⁹ March, *The Nation at War*, 50; Smythe, *Pershing*, 93–94.

³⁰ March, *The Nation at War*, 42–43.

controversial than his decision to block General Leonard Wood's appointment to command in France. Wood was a well-heeled political favorite of Teddy Roosevelt, and a nasty fight ensued when March sacked Wood and placed him on the inactive retirement list. Further, his policy of ending political promotions and not helping Congressmen obtain draft deferments for their sons, did even less to endear him to certain elected officials. After the war when Pershing and March were nominated to retain their war rank as full generals, Congress approved Pershing and denied March. Despite this indignity, March believed his Army purged of political appointees and inappropriate political influence was a first in the history of modern war.³¹

After reorienting the General Staff on the soldiers, winning the war, and addressing Army organizational and cultural issues, March turned to soldier morale issues. He reinforced the newly formed Morale Branch, a Newton Baker initiative hatched before March arrived. Though fully sanctioned by Baker, the GHQ staff drug its heels for months, essentially ignoring the new branch and sticking to the time-honored policy of allowing commanders in the field the leeway to command.³² March was a true

³¹ March, *The Nation at War*, 52, 56; Coffman, *Hilt and Sword*, 59.

³² Jennifer Keene, "Intelligence and Morale in the Army of Democracy: The Genesis of Military Psychology during the First World War," *Military Psychology*, 6, no. 4 (1994), 245; Thomas Camfield, "Will to Win—The U.S. Army Troop Morale Program of World War I," *Military Affairs*, October 1977, 125–128; Jensen and Wiest, *War in the Age of Technology*, 112; "Morale-Building Should be Eliminated for Morale," *The Science News Letter*, 41, no. 26 (1942), 411. Camfield details how much of the early efforts to establish focused morale programs at the unit level and under the auspices of the General Staff were based on captured German documents that described Axis morale programs. These programs were resisted because "the suggestion that the American military should imitate the enemy did not sit well with the Chief of Staff," the Chief of Staff being March's predecessor General Hugh Scott. The Chief's office responded to requests to establish a morale branch: "Disapproved. All divisions are commanded by officers of long experience and are in direct contact with their divisions." They later added, "The divisional commanders are men of experience and good judgment; they are on the ground and in much better position to tell what is needed than theorists who do not come in contact with the individuals they are trying to educate." The topic of morale management in age of science and technology is a hot topic among new military history circles—is it an art or a science? In *War in the Age of Technology: Myriad Faces of Modern Armed Conflict*, G.D. Sheffield posits that "despite the 'scientific' nature of warfare in 1914–1918, the gauging of morale remained an art rather than a science, as it had been throughout history. The use of

believer in this command adage. However he viewed the morale branch through a slightly different lens. He viewed the branch as a way to regain control of the morale mission. In order to spur the staff to action and show the importance he placed on soldier morale, he promoted the Morale Branch Chief Colonel Edward Munson to the rank of general. With the branch and the newly minted general under the General Staff, March was happy to absorb the CTCA into the Army chain of command and once again exercise full oversight over soldiers' morale and welfare.

March later claimed that the systematic management of soldier morale and welfare was one of the greatest new achievements of the war.³³ Though an enthusiastic supporter of soldier morale, he had his limits. In many ways, he was still the old Indian fighter who resisted programs that, in his opinion, turned disciplined military training into "summer camp."³⁴ For example, he did not approve of a measure to rid the Army of saluting. He still believed in rigid discipline and thought such uninformed measures would only lead to Bolshevism.³⁵ He did not like the singing programs touted by Munson

statistics was fraught with danger, while, conversely, the opinions of regimental and even staff officers, however subjective, cannot be lightly set aside." Dr. R.E.L. Faris, a research sociologist from the WWII era, probably stated it best: "The best way to keep up American morale is to eliminate morale-building programs—letting high morale grow naturally from the successes of an efficiently organized nation." Faris goes on to describe the true source of morale in any military organization as being grounded in confidence that: 1) leaders, officers, and officials have the required ability to lead; 2) those with whom one is fighting alongside will also do their part; 3) those appointed over you exercise proper coordination.

³³ Camfield, "Will to Win," 125–128. Camfield adds that the Morale Branch was significantly reduced in size during the post-war demobilization, and eventually disappeared. However, and more significantly, "the concept of a systematic military morale program survived."

³⁴ Keene, "Intelligence and Morale in the Army of Democracy," 247.

³⁵ March, *The Nation at War*, 211–212, 47. March was correct, at least according to the *Infantry Journal*, that removing the salute would lead to a breakdown in discipline, as the Russian Army had already experienced: "The Russian Soldiers and Workmen's Congress passed this resolution, 'The men will not in the future salute officers.' Now isn't that a trifle? Yet that small trifle has led to the telegram that reads, 'The troops have left the trenches. The artillery is being sold. Officers are serving as cooks and orderlies.'" See "Editorial Department: Discipline," *Infantry Journal*, XIV, no. 7 (1918): 711. In addition to these changes addressing organization and morale, March also created the Inventions Branch

and Fosdick.³⁶ Upon meeting Fosdick for the first time, March ordered him to remove all singing programs and athletic instructors at the training camps. He told Fosdick, “we’re not running a circus or grand opera – take them out!” However, in time, he came to recognize the value (in theory) of the CTCA’s work under the auspices of the Army Morale Branch and often sought compromise.³⁷

Despite these moves to orient his staff on soldier morale issues, March was still disturbed that the GHQ and the AEF staff had nursed a culture where morale was seen as a task for civilian agencies like the YMCA and the CTCA. March wanted no progressive relief agencies serving in combat zones. March, the staunch Uptonian, felt the combat zone was reserved for military professionals, not civilian volunteers. March was careful to praise the *work* of the civilian morale workers, while at the same time claiming that it was work reserved for *the Army* in combat zones.³⁸

March had considerable distaste for Baker and Pershing’s decision to subcontract the morale of the soldiers to the YMCA. Simply put, he despised the Y Men. March firmly believed soldier morale was the commanding officer’s responsibility and that it

to cut through red tape and ensure the latest technology was immediately available to the soldiers on the frontlines. He also made a Statistics Branch to measure GHQ efficiency and their ability to attain goals and objectives oriented on winning the war.

³⁶ “Varied Ground: Singing in the Training Camps,” *Infantry Journal*, XIV, no. 7 (1918): 540–542. In this area, March’s resistance to group singing seems to have been out of place with the times. Even the *Infantry Journal*, a trade publication of the hardened, company and field grade infantry officers that serviced a rather conservative readership, acknowledged the importance of group singing in the camps. The journal states, “Among the facts that have been established in the training camps this year is the fact that every soldier likes to sing. It doesn’t matter in what direction his other preferences tend—he may or may not care to read or go in for athletics or attend the movies—but he does like to join a dozen, or a hundred, or a thousand other fellows in the songs they all know. Commanding officers of long experience have recognized this fact in building the new American Army . . .”.

³⁷ Fosdick, *Chronicle of a Generation*, 164. In the end, on issues like singing in camp, Fosdick won out and March generally deferred to the morale experts like General Munson and the Morale Branch, as well as Fosdick and the CTCA.

³⁸ March, *The Nation at War*, 211.

was off limits to any subcontracting scheme, especially in a war zone. March believed “in time of war there should [not] be any organization serving with the troops in the field which is not militarized.”³⁹ Pershing and March were noticeably incongruent on this matter. Pershing was happy to subcontract morale so his officers could “fight the war.” March would argue that morale was the war.⁴⁰ He did not like the Y Men serving among his soldiers and he “drew blood all along the line” when he registered his official opposition to Y workers while he was the AEF’s Chief of Artillery. Angered over men who appeared as healthy, “husky men” serving as morale workers instead of carrying rifles, he said he believed “at the start that no man should be permitted to enter or become a member of any noncombat organization who was capable of carrying arms.”⁴¹

Further, he accused the Y Men of having a higher Venereal Disease (VD) rate than his own soldiers, which caused immense excitement at Y headquarters in Paris. March was satisfied with the work the YMCA was doing at the stateside training camps, but he declared that for “any army in the field, to achieve success, it is necessary to have the commanding general in complete control of the entire personnel.”⁴² He demanded that Fosdick, head of the CTCA, wear provisional military rank and a uniform when he was in France. He deplored soldiers looking to others for their morale in the combat zone,

³⁹ March, *The Nation at War*, 212.

⁴⁰ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 409.

⁴¹ March, *The Nation at War*, 212–213, 216.

⁴² March, *The Nation at War*, 212–213, 216. Though he complemented the Y work being done in the camps, March took their tasks over as well when he moved the CTCA under the Morale Branch.

and insisted that “military morale was a problem for the Army itself to solve . . . the commanding officer of an organization is its real morale officer.”⁴³

After the war, March described how Baker eventually reversed his position on soldier morale and embraced March’s morale doctrine. He said, “As the war proceeded, [Baker] completely changed his mind about the matter and came to the conclusion that he had been wrong in his organization of these welfare bodies for war service. He became a convert to the necessity of completely militarizing all such bodies.” Baker himself repeated these sentiments in a speech he delivered to the Army War College in 1929. He told the audience that if he were Secretary of War again, he “would not have with the Army in the field any collateral welfare organizations” and was “persuaded that [morale work] would have been, and in the future should be, done as well by the Army itself as by outside agencies.” Baker argued that conducting morale operations in this manner would allow the Army to “avoid a number of things that are highly undesirable.”⁴⁴

March had a keen eye for detail. His experiences in France, culminating with his inspection of the trenches before departing, left him with a particular conviction that the greatest symbols of the Y Men’s connection to his soldiers were cigarettes. To soldiers, cigarettes were instant morale and welfare. They were relaxation and serenity in a clean, sanitary, disposable stick—“dream sticks [that] help you to pass away many a dreary and home-sick hour.”⁴⁵ March saw the agitation and discord created by soldiers angered over

⁴³ March, *The Nation at War*, 212–213, 216.

⁴⁴ March, *The Nation at War*, 217–218. March wanted to be clear that he was not “hostile to all this welfare work.” However he felt that Baker had made a mistake allowing civilian agencies to take over this important military function.

⁴⁵ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 69.

the “slackers” and “shirkers” they had to depend on for their cigarettes.⁴⁶ Falling prey to many of the rumors and legends about the Y Men, March developed a fairly harsh set of beliefs himself. He freely admitted that he had “impatience with individuals who hid behind this service [Y work] to avoid carrying a gun, or used it to obtain special favors for themselves.”⁴⁷ He felt they did “the work of women” and should carry a rifle or go home.⁴⁸ Morale was a command responsibility, sacred as the units’ battle standards or unit guide-ons. March felt the progressive-oriented, civilian-led morale and welfare programs had gone too far. Soldiers more focused on getting goodies and treats in the trench, distracted by endless bickering over the cost of cigarettes instead of focusing on the enemy in front of them, were not properly focused according to March. The Allies had spent years in the trenches waiting for their next rum ration or trip to the brothel. The Doughboys were in France for one reason: to shoot straight and kill the Boche. In General March’s view, morale in the trench was a five-hundred-meter head shot, a bayonet through the ribs, hot rations once a day, and copious amounts of free, government-supplied manufactured cigarettes.

Peyton March and the Cigarette Ration

When March took command of the Army, he was also in sole command of the War Department for his first months, as Secretary of War Baker was in France on an

⁴⁶ Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA*, 71.

⁴⁷ March, *The Nation at War*, 217.

⁴⁸ Mayo, *That Damn Y*, 393–394, 409–410; March, *The Nation at War*, 213. Mayo was skeptical of March’s belief that the Army could do all the morale work. She commented, “Our government today holds that the Army can take over all its own welfare work—can cut out the volunteer aid and do a better job by itself . . . yet let welfare work become a matter of mechanical routine—let it lose its free soul . . . and the result will be dearth and disaster. Not by a General Order . . . can [morale] be flashed into operation. The real thing is a growth of spirit and from within.”

inspection visit. After taking the previously mentioned steps to address GHQ battle rhythm and work shifts, fire or demote incompetent officers, and make organizational changes to ensure efficiency and better staff response times, March had immediately moved on to important soldier morale issues. At the top of his list was the cigarette ration. March noticed that the staff reacted to difficult issues by giving excuses, shifting the task to another department or agency, or giving reasons why a particular action was not possible. March observed that “well-meaning and zealous officers came to me to tell me I couldn’t do this or that thing because of some decision or regulation.”⁴⁹

March did not suffer fools lightly and was disgusted by the staff’s *can’t do* culture. He interpreted his position as the head of the Army to mean he “could do anything necessary to carry out the military program” and determined he “would not have any such officers” serving on his staff. March was going to enforce a paradigm shift that would root out incompetence and reward men of action. According to March, nowhere was this subsequent paradigm shift more evident than in the prompt, *can-do* response by the staff to an order he issued in early March 1918. In this momentous order, he directed the Army to procure stocks of manufactured cigarettes to issue as standard daily rations to the soldiers in France. At the time, March could not realize the long-term impact this order would have on the cigarette smoking culture in America.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ March, *The Nation at War*, 367.

⁵⁰ March, *The Nation at War*, 366–377; Abrahamson, *America Arms*, 161. March was able to accomplish this swift move to cigarette rations because Baker had finally supported March in his move to get rid of the “bureaucratic inertia” represented by aging generals, staff gridlock, the outdated bureau system, and “uncoordinated and competitive purchasing practices.” Through powers given to March by the Overman Act, March was able to “reorganize the War Department, at last giving the General Staff a significant measure of control over the department’s military bureaucracy and modernizing the unwieldy system for making military purchases that had hindered mobilization of the economy.”

When Secretary Baker returned to the War Department on April 16, 1918, he quickly noticed that March had ordered a cigarette ration for the AEF in his absence. Baker politely informed March that he had explicitly ordered that cigarettes *not* be included in the soldiers' rations a year earlier. He knew March was a man of action, but was surprised that he had countermanded his guidance. In his recollections of the war, March indicated he did not know of such an order by Baker when he gave the command to initiate a cigarette ration. Moreover, he said the fact his staff officers had not balked at his orders was rather satisfying because it "showed the distance that the War Department had progressed along the lines I had marked out for it." Rather than telling March why he could not issue the cigarette ration or that the Secretary of War had already provided guidance on the issue, the staff officers simply obeyed and "went out and did it on the run."⁵¹ As to Baker's query regarding March's apparent insubordination, March told Baker:

I had become convinced, during my service in France, that the use of tobacco by the troops there needed regulating. Tobacco was obtainable by the soldiers only by buying it [from Y Men], and many tired men were deprived of the use of this solace because they had no money, while more fortunate comrades with means of their own were getting all the tobacco . . . [therefore] I directed that an order be issued making tobacco a part of the ration for issue to the soldiers.⁵²

Baker supplied no objection, and with that, it was done: the manufactured cigarette and the American soldier were officially linked, for the first time, through a daily meal ration. This relationship with a tap root in WWI became deeply entrenched over the next six decades.⁵³ The tobacco ration was set at "four ready-made cigarettes"

⁵¹ March, *The Nation at War*, 367.

⁵² March, *The Nation at War*, 366.

⁵³ The United States Surgeon General's Office, *Smoking and Health in the Americas: 1992 Report of the Surgeon General* (Atlanta: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control, 1992), 2-36, 4-2, 4-3. In this report, the Surgeon General argues that "In the twentieth century, tobacco consumption increased during wartime . . . wartime conditions reinforced the efficacy of cigarettes,

per day.⁵⁴ When the *New York Times* heard about March's decision, they reported, "A wave of joy swept through the American Army today . . . this step has been long hoped for by the soldiers . . ."⁵⁵ The demand for cigarettes among the soldiers was so great the government secured "the entire [1918] output of Bull Durham [cigarettes] for distribution to the troops." When shortages ensued, the *Times* encouraged Americans complaining about the empty shelves at their cigarette retailer: "There is a remedy! Enlist and all will be well!"⁵⁶

Entrenched

After the Armistice, most of the Y leadership, including YMCA Overseas Chief Edward Carter, left France rather quickly. Unfortunately the Army thanked the YMCA for running the Army's canteen system during the war by accusing the civilian relief agency of profiteering and other nefarious activities. These accusations ignited a fairly extensive investigation that lasted four years.⁵⁷ Y Man David Shillinglaw was left to deal

which were less cumbersome than were other popular forms of tobacco. WWI entrenched the cigarette in popular culture . . . this phenomenon is well documented in North America . . . after WWI, many adolescent and young adult males started smoking . . ." (Italics mine.)

⁵⁴ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 52; Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 75.

⁵⁵ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 52.

⁵⁶ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 52; Edwin L. James, "War Department Will Issue Tobacco Rations," *New York Times*, May 23, 1918; Edwin L. James, "Makings for the Front," *New York Times*, April 26, 1918; Edwin L. James, "And War Is Indeed Terrible," *New York Times*, April 5, 1918.

⁵⁷ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 498; Donald H. Riddle, *The Truman Committee: A Study in Congressional Responsibility* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 25. Hopkins says, "It was inevitable that criticism would be raised against an operation of this magnitude, regardless of who managed it . . . little criticism was heard before the summer of 1918 but the crescendo rose to such a point . . . that Mott (YMCA General Secretary) . . . asked for a governmental investigation at the end of 1918. There ensued more than four years of study, hearings, reporting, counter-investigation, and much plumbing of memory and record . . ." Of these investigations, historian Donald H. Riddle describes Truman's motivations for having Defense Investigations during WWII as opposed to *after*: ". . . there seems to have been a general recognition that the 116 post-mortem investigations of WWI constituted an exercise in futility. Nothing very constructive came of those investigations and there was no reason to expect salutary results from another set to be conducted after WWII."

with the Army's investigators and white-gloved bean counters. He became the object of intense scrutiny despite the fact his only experience was in building the Y Huts and salvaging Y equipment after the war. In this high stakes game of musical chairs, the music had stopped and Shillinglaw was the last one standing. The scrutiny and accusations were so intense Shillinglaw eventually had a nervous breakdown and returned home where it took him two years to sufficiently recover. Shillinglaw was never officially accused of any wrongdoing; much of his anxiety was related to fear, intense pressure, and his overwhelming desire to do a good job.⁵⁸

Whether Shillinglaw and his fellow Y Men did a good or bad job, or were servant-purveyors or pusillanimous profiteers, are questions that may never find adequate answers. However, there is little doubt that WWI completely transformed the American cigarette industry and the culture of smoking in America.⁵⁹ Most historians agree that more than any other single factor, the Great War "legitimized the cigarette" and "moved cigarettes into the mainstream of American culture . . . legitimitiz[ing] cigarettes by linking them to an icon of manliness and civic virtue: the American soldier." Historian Jarrett Rudy adds fidelity to this post-war link between cigarette smoking and masculinity: "Ultimately, it was the association between cigarettes and First World War

⁵⁸ Shillinglaw, *An American in The Army and YMCA*, 183; Ferguson, *Through the War With a Y Man*, 103.

⁵⁹ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), "Department of Defense Report on Smoking and Health in the Military" (March 1986), accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00>. Not only did WWI transform America's smoking habits, it transformed WWI veterans' health. The decline of WWI soldier's health was noted in the DoD's 1986 release of their report *The Department of Defense Report on Smoking and Health in the Military*. In it, the DoD cites a study of surviving WWI veterans who said, "A study of smoking among WWI veterans reported in 1959 gave one of the earliest indications of the association between lung cancer and smoking. From a 16-year follow-up evaluation of these US veterans, Murray, Public Health Reports 1980, reported that the effects of smoking on respiratory function are dose related and progressive."

soldiers, largely promoted by newspapers that made cigarettes ‘manly,’ giving them new legitimacy. The First World War has been seen by some as marking a trend away from ‘rugged masculinity’ toward a ‘domestic masculinity.’” Rudy argues that after WWI, inner-city, urban-dwelling labor men, for example, could achieve the same level of perceived masculinity as rough-and-tough cow punchers or soldiers by simply smoking a cigarette.⁶⁰ Finally, historians Allan Brandt and Robert Proctor argue, “WWI would mark a critical watershed in establishing the cigarette as the dominant product of modern consumer culture,” Proctor adding the war “turned smoking from a marginal indulgence of questionable morality to an unobjectionable mark of stalwart manhood.”⁶¹

Proctor further posits that the cigarette critics were summarily “silenced during the First World War . . . why should anyone worry about cancer or emphysema thirty years down the road, when bullets are whizzing overhead?”⁶² The Doughboys grew to possess a nearly insatiable demand for cigarettes during WWI: “Per capita consumption of manufactured cigarettes in the United States nearly tripled from 1914 to 1919 . . . this

⁶⁰ Rudy, *The Freedom to Smoke*, 110–111, 132; Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 65–66; Sivulka, *Soap, Sex, and Cigarettes*, 166. Sivulka adds yet another reason why WWI made cigarettes culturally acceptable for the first time: sanitation. “During WWI, cigarettes gained wider acceptance when both soldiers and civilians found smoking cigarettes to be more convenient, cheaper, and more sanitary than chewing tobacco.” During a time when society was gravely concerned about disease (more soldiers would die from disease than combat), the idea of germ-ridden spit floating around in the bottom of a trench or on a factory floor was frowned upon.

⁶¹ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 51–54; Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 45; Sivulka, *Soap, Sex, and Cigarettes*, 137; and Anthony J. Badger, *Prosperity Road: The New Deal, Tobacco, and North Carolina* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 17. Sivulka adds, “the war had changed another social habit by causing large numbers of men to switch from cigars, pipes, and chewing tobacco to cigarettes.” Badger argues that “In 1910, for example, only one-twentieth of the tobacco leaf purchased in the United States was used for cigarette production.” After a “boom in cigarette smoking after WWI . . . the production of small cigarettes increased by over 1300 percent . . . by 1929 cigarettes accounted for 53.6 percent of the value of tobacco products, as compared to 16.6 percent fifteen years earlier.”

⁶² Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 44.

is one of the most rapid increases in smoking ever recorded.”⁶³ The Great War had established a smoking habit that would grow exponentially during the twentieth century.⁶⁴ One commentator from the period observed:

if there were any among all those millions of soldiers who were non-smokers when the War began there were none by the time it was over. The officers in command fully recognized the value of smoking as a means of deadening the men’s susceptibilities to the fearful strain to which they were constantly exposed, as well as of mitigating the danger of periods of enforced idleness, and they used every possible effort to ensure a constant supply of the requisite materials.⁶⁵

The ration of four manufactured cigarettes a day became the standard issue for the next 55 years, except during WWII when that number was bumped up quite drastically to

⁶³ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 45; The War Industry Board, *American Industry in the War: A Report of the War Industries Board* (Washington, DC: The Government Printing Office, 1921), 208. During WWI, the Army’s demand for and subsequent rush on the cigarette market drove the Army to create a Tobacco Section in the WIB on April 26, 1918. This section was created in response to March’s order to procure cigarettes for rations and “in response to a growing concern over the price and supply of tobacco not only for the armed forces but for the civil population.” In this report, it was estimated that “men in service used on an average 60 to 70 percent more [tobacco] than they did in civil life.” This pattern of the Army creating a Tobacco Section to coordinate procurement of tobacco, a national asset, was continued during WWII. The section was called before Congress to give testimony in 1944 regarding the Army’s procurement of nearly 300 billion cigarettes during the first four years of WWII. Preston Herbert was Chief of the Tobacco Section in the Quartermasters Department for this effort during WWI.

⁶⁴ Carl Avery Werner, “The Triumph of the Cigarette,” *American Mercury* (December 1925). The astonishing increase in manufactured cigarette smoking in America was a phenomenon that those of the period were quick to recognize as well; it’s not just a cultural shift modern observers alone note. In a feature piece for *American Mercury* written by journalist Carl Avery Werner, he asks, “Do you remember when they called it the coffin nail, and it was a common practice for austere gentlemen of Christian principles to snatch it from the fingers of young smokers and trample it underfoot, and all the moral States began passing laws against it, and the highest medico-ethical opinion held it to be a sure forerunner of heart disease, tuberculosis, dipsomania and sin? What a change today! By the most conservative estimate, nine out of ten American men of voting age now smoke cigarettes as regularly as they brush their teeth, and at least five in every hundred of the females of the nation, past adolescence, do precisely the same thing. Eighteen years ago there were consumed in this country, in round numbers, 7,000,000,000 cigars a year and 7,000,000,000 cigarettes. This year, 1925, the number of cigars smoked will still be only 7,000,000,000, but the number of cigarettes consumed will run to 75,000,000,000 . . .” Regarding the genesis of this remarkable increase in manufactured cigarette smoking, Werner directly points to WWI: “Then came the war of 1917. Five million men, physically the flower of American manhood, were hurled into a maelstrom of hardship, deprivation, danger and destruction. Smokers and non-smokers alike were collected and thrown haphazard into the field. Sound young non-smokers witnessed husky, healthy and hard-boiled cigarette smokers. Cigar and pipe smokers with a grudge against the ‘fags’ found their prejudice slipping away. The general tendency was aided by the exigencies of the new and strange existence. The bulk and fragility and frequently the unavailability of cigars, pipe tobaccos and pipes, on the one hand, and the convenience, plentitude and general adaptability of cigarettes on the other, were circumstances that favored the latter. And so the last vestiges of opprobrium that public understanding had not already removed were dissolved in the training camps and trenches.”

⁶⁵ Corte, *A History of Smoking*, 264.

sixteen cigarettes a day. Americans' smoking habit, which would reach staggering levels after WWI and not peak until 1980 in terms of billions smoked per year, was born during the Great War.⁶⁶ When General Peyton March decided to move the Army into the cigarette rationing business, he initiated a storied relationship between the Army, the soldier, and the cigarette that would be renewed time and again. The soldier and the cigarette subsequently became the *official national symbol* of American warfare and military service during the twentieth century.⁶⁷ After the war, in what amounts to an ode to the cigarette, Joseph Mills Hanson provides a final, telling description of the way the soldier felt about the cigarette in WWI:

You played the game with fighting men? Why this is good! You've seen the big show then. Here, have a Lucky. It's the Doughboys drag. And always good to taste. But, say, the fag that burned a spot of memory in my brain was one I got one night up in Lorraine—off of a long-gearred chap who'd made the grade with me that night in my first trench raid. I never saw his face all through the scrap there in the dark. I'd like to see his map again, to thank him. Wounded, cold, and wet, it meant a lot, that mashed-up cigarette.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 57. The data reveals the following pertinent statistics: cigarettes smoked per capita, per adult peaked in 1965 at 4,259 per adult, per year; after a decline in the per capita figure, there was a sharp increase in 1975 to 4,123; in terms of billions of total cigarettes consumed, the peak was 1980 with 632 billion; the first noticeable drop in total billions of cigarettes consumed was in 1985 when the aggregate dropped to 594 billion. After two billion smoked in 1900, the number peaked out at 632 billion 80 years later. This was quite a successful run for the manufactured cigarette.

⁶⁷ Troyer and Markle, *Cigarettes: The Battle Over Smoking*, 123. Though the soldier and the cigarette had developed a tight bond overseas, they returned to an America where that bond, and their iconic soldier-cigarette image, was still working its way through American society and culture. He was "encouraged to smoke on the battlefield [and] often found the same behavior prohibited when he returned home." When the anti-cigarette crusaders, who had looked the other way during the war, attempted to revive the movement, they were met head on by pro-smoking forces that rallied "cigarette manufacturers, merchants, and voluntary associations . . . to repeal prohibitory legislation. By 1930 every single prohibitory law had been repealed."

⁶⁸ Joseph Mills Hanson, "The Cigarette" *The American Legion Weekly* (April 28, 1922), 3, accessed October 7, 2014, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytw87h00/pdf>.

CHAPTER V

SMOKE EM' IF YOU'VE GOT EM': THE GREATEST GENERATION GOES TO WAR¹

In December 1943, Ann Dettori was twenty-two years old. Two inches shy of five feet in height, she always walked tall on the way to her job as a riveter at the Grumman Aircraft bomber factory on Long Island. A first-generation Italian-American Catholic, she was proud of her contribution to the country's war effort. That particular day she was doubly proud. Responding to an appeal by management, she had decided to participate in a cigarette drive for the soldiers. On her way to work, she stopped at the corner store to spend some of her hard-earned money on a carton of cigarettes to send overseas. When she arrived at the factory, she found a slip of paper and scribbled a handful of words that changed her life: "Good Luck and a Very Merry Xmas, Ann Dettori, #94 Roslyn L.I." Hoping her note would produce a pen pal, she carefully placed it in one of the packs of cigarettes going over there and began the work day proud that she had done "something decent."

Sometime around Christmas of 1943, Staff Sergeant Clinton Putnal was going about his day serving with the Army in North Africa. Putnal was a tall, Southern boy from an evangelical protestant family in rural, central Florida. He served as a medic-crewman aboard an Army Air Corps bomber flying medium-range missions against the Germans. Happy to receive a carton of smokes from the good folks back home, he was even happier when he discovered the nice note from an Ann Dettori. As he enjoyed a good smoke, he decided to write her. Several months later, Ann, having forgotten about the note, was surprised to receive a letter from her new pen pal, Staff Sergeant Clinton Putnal!

¹ Tom Brokaw, *The Greatest Generation* (New York: Random House Publishers, 1998). The term "Greatest Generation" was coined by Tom Brokaw in this book.

The two began exchanging letters regularly. After several months, Clinton informed her that he was being transferred to California where he would contact her later. He eventually wrote and asked her to visit him there. She refused because her brother had recently been killed fighting in Italy, and she felt she could not abandon her mother during this time of grief. On February 20, 1945, Ann received the surprise of her life. While visiting a friend on Long Island, she received a message from her mother to come home quickly; a young man in uniform named Clinton was on the doorstep! Ann rushed home, and found her mother waiting for her.

While Clinton washed up, Ann's mother admonished her not to "jump in his arms like a hussy," because she had raised her better. Of course, the first thing Ann did upon seeing the handsome, tall soldier was to jump right in his arms. Seventy years later, Putnal says she "can still feel his arms" wrapping tightly around her, adding that "when he held me in his arms that day, I knew that was it." That day, he asked Ann to marry him. The next day, they married at the courthouse. Within two hours of her nuptials, Ann found herself on a troop transport train headed back across the US to California in the arms of her handsome soldier, along with hundreds of others. Clinton and Ann were married for 54 years. On the day he died, she found in his wallet the note she had sent in that fated carton of cigarettes; he had carried it with him for over half-a-century. Next to Ann's name on the message she had sent, Clinton had scribbled the following: "+ Clinton Putnal Always Together."²

This incredible, true story of life, love, soldiers, fate, and cigarettes is full of irony and human interest. WWII would bring Americans together as no other event in US history before or since. That a pack of cigarettes could bring two vastly different people together in a world falling apart is one among a legion of paradoxical and exciting human interest stories that occurred the

² Ann Putnal, interview by Joel R. Bius, September 2014, transcript, Center for Culture and Oral History, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS.

world over during WWII. Only two decades after the war to end all wars, it was tragically ironic that Ann built bombers for Clinton to fly over North Africa as part of a *second* world war in the span of just two decades. America once again harnessed all areas of industry and society to join a war in Europe in its third year, just as it had in 1917 when they sent thousands like Jonathon Lee to the trenches of the Western Front. By 1942, millions of draftees fought in a war that spread from the jungles of the Pacific to the deserts of North Africa, with fortress Europe in between. Women entered the foundries and worked alongside men making hundreds of thousands of tanks, airplanes, ships, and other war materials. The mobilization for WWII was on a scale unlike any the world had ever seen.

It was striking that the YMCA and organizations like the CTCA, which had played such an integral part in WWI mobilization, were roundly denied direct access to WWII soldiers. When Army planners exhumed the mothballed mobilization plans from WWI, they discovered an abundance of after action reports (AAR) which subsequently informed WWII planning. In these AARs, the WWI morale planners lamented decisions to subcontract morale to the YMCA and other progressive relief agencies.³ In short, Newton Baker and Peyton March's renunciation of civilian relief work substantially influenced the generation of military and civilian planners who led mobilization for WWII.

As a result, the YMCA's access to the soldiers was severely curtailed. Neither Y Men nor Y Women were allowed on any Army training camps, nor were they permitted to work amongst the soldiers downrange in any WWII operational theatre. Y Camps were allowed near Army Posts, but ironically were restricted like the bars and brothels of WWI, in terms of distance and

³ Jennifer Diane Keene, "Intelligence and Morale in the Army of a Democracy: The Genesis of Military Psychology During the First World War," *Military Psychology* 6, no. 4, (1994): 249–250; March, *The Nation at War*, 217–218.

proximity to WWII soldiers.⁴ The Army ran its own canteens leaving the YMCA to run Bible studies and recreation leagues in facilities off-post.

Even more ironically perhaps, the Army wholeheartedly assumed the morale by vice mission it was happy to subcontract during WWI. Instead of working in concert with civilian agencies to limit soldiers' access to instruments of vice, the Army actually insisted on issuing them millions of condoms and billions of cigarettes from the outset of WWII. Minor grumblings in the War Department in favor of a campaign against vice similar to that of WWI progressives was ignored. In the case of condoms, the Army conceded that "we cannot stifle the instincts of man, we cannot legislate his appetite. We can only educate him to caution, watchfulness and perpetual hazards of promiscuous intercourse; and furnish him with adequate preventative measures."⁵ The Army slogan became *if you can't say no, take a pro*. Allan Brandt calculates that the Army, through free distribution and PX sales, provided as many as fifty million condoms each month during the war, "an important reversal of WWI military policy" and "an implicit recognition of the inability of officials to control the troops' sexual drives."⁶

In the case of cigarettes, it is no secret that WWII soldiers smoked copious amounts of whatever brands they could obtain. The unique relationship between soldier and cigarette during WWII is captured in the simple fact that four of the Army's massive demobilization camps were named for the war's most popular cigarette brands: Camps Lucky Strike, Twenty Grand, Old

⁴ Hopkins, *History of the YMCA in North America*, 712–713.

⁵ Allen Brandt, *No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States since 1880* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 164. Brandt quotes naval medical officer, Medal of Honor recipient, and most highly decorated medical officer in the history of the US Armed Services Joel Thompson Boone.

⁶ Brandt, *No Magic Bullet*, 164.

Gold, and Phillip Morris.⁷ Soldiers' unfettered access to billions of manufactured cigarettes during WWII required a massive mobilization and troop sustainment program. In addition to adequate venereal disease preventative measures, in WWII, the Army also determined to furnish the soldier with adequate smoking measures. If *take a pro* was the slogan associated with the soldier and the condom, *smoke 'em if you've got 'em!* became the slogan associated with the soldier and the cigarette.

The American G.I. was a product of the cigarette-smoking WWI Doughboy plus two decades of profuse cigarette smoking among Americans that followed. These G.I.s wanted to *smoke 'em* and they didn't have to go far to *get 'em* during WWII. The Army supplied soldiers with nearly half-a-trillion manufactured cigarettes through meals and daily rations. This avalanche of cigarettes was supplemented by billions more purchased at greatly reduced prices through the canteen system or given to soldiers as care packages by generous Americans like Ann Dettori. If during WWI soldiers developed an insatiable demand for manufactured cigarettes, the soldiers of WWII possessed this insatiable demand from the beginning. They brought this demand to basic training, and carried it with them to the far-flung battlefields of WWII.

Thus, the nation entered WWII as a great generation of smokers, and this had a marked influence on the way the Army mobilized for war and procured the cigarettes needed to supply millions of soldiers. Moreover, it was not just the soldiers who needed smokes; millions of Americans back home demanded them as well. As Americans adapted to food rations, empty shelves, and barren pantries that accompany total war mobilization, they came face-to-face with the magnitude of the soldier-cigarette relationship. With one-quarter of the nation's entire

⁷ W. Paul McKinney, et al., "Comparing Smoking Behavior of Veterans and Nonveterans, *Public Health Reports*, 112, no. 3 (1997), 215.

cigarette supply eventually earmarked for soldiers, drastically limited availability created consternation among war workers and nervous Americans who needed cigarettes more than ever. To understand how Americans dealt with cigarette shortages, the nature of the soldier-cigarette relationship during WWII, and the herculean lengths to which planners went to supply them smokes, one must first grasp the power and pervasiveness of smoking in America during this period.

A Great Generation of Smokers

Americans of the Greatest Generation were prolific cigarette smokers. A marginal habit when the nation went to war in 1917 had ballooned to an immense vice as much a part of American culture as baseball or apple pie. In 1944, a representative of the cigarette industry commenting on this rapid rise, said:

The First World War had a pronounced effect on the smoking habits of the American people and the present war has had an equally profound effect. More persons of both sexes, old and young, are enjoying the pleasure, satisfaction, and comfort of cigarettes than ever before. Glance back a quarter century. From 1914 to 1918, the period of World War I, cigarette consumption increased 300 percent. Yet, despite this prodigious gain, in 1920 the per capita consumption of cigarettes was only 414. Today the per capita figure . . . has reached the almost incredible figure of 2,240—a gain of 540 percent in less than 25 years. About 60 percent of this per capita increase has materialized since 1940 and—please note this carefully—this figure would be still higher if there were enough cigarettes for everybody today.⁸

In 1935 with the US in the throes of depression, Americans smoked 134 billion total cigarettes. Ten years later the numbers had risen to near astronomical levels: in 1945 alone, Americans smoked 341 billion cigarettes.⁹ From a rate of 1,564 a year in 1935, then 2,240 cigarettes a year

⁸ The United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Part 26, “Cigarette Rations” September–December 1944, 12283, accessed November 15, 2013, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fwz24f00/pdf>.

⁹ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 57. Later, evidence is presented that shows in 1944, the industry was advancing 400 billion as the number of cigarettes needed for civilian and soldier-smokes through 1945 into FY 1946 if the war continued.

in 1944, by 1945 the rate had risen again to 3,449 annual cigarettes for every adult in America.¹⁰

These figures lead to the question: why were Americans smoking so much?

Norms and Nerves

A host of commentators, journalists, and enterprise insiders from the WWII period were interested in this question regarding Americans and smoking behavior. Moreover, many historians since have sought to understand WWII America in terms of culture, consumption, and economic policy as they relate to smoking habits. Of all the answers offered as to why Americans smoked so much during this period, they generally fall into two categories: norms and nerves. The normalcy of cigarette smoking in America during this period is well documented. By 1941, cigarette smoking had become a completely normal, culturally accepted vice among Americans. Whereas progressives were aghast at young men, much less young women, smoking before WWI, WWII it was so prevalent among Americans that one WWII veteran recalls smoking in the locker room with his coach and the rest of his team during the halftime of a pre-war junior varsity basketball game!¹¹ In fact, *abnormal* would describe *not* smoking during this period. One industry representative, when asked why people consumed so many cigarettes during WWII, said that smoking simply afforded the average American “comfort, solace, and pleasure” in the midst of a world spun out of control.¹² By the end of the decade, eight out of every ten American men were avid smokers.

¹⁰ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 57.

¹¹ Frank Dayton, interview by Joel R. Bius, April 2014, transcript, Center for Culture and Oral History, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS.

¹² United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Part 26, “Cigarette Rations” September–December 1944, 12120, accessed November 15, 2013, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fwz24f00/pdf>.

If smoking had become a normative American vice by WWII, it was also a nervous habit. After suffering through the Great War, the Great Depression, and now another world war, Americans were on edge.¹³ Just as the cigarette had become the craze in the trenches of WWI where it calmed nerves and made the unbearable manageable, cigarette smoking took on even greater vigor in the foundries, factories, homes, basic training camps, and battlefields associated with WWII Americana. Using fear and security as unifying themes in his *magnum opus* on the WWII era, *Freedom from Fear*, historian David Kennedy describes the conditions driving American citizens to such nervous habits as chain smoking billions of manufactured cigarettes:

Not since the great surge of pioneers across the Appalachian crest in the early years of the Republic had so many Americans been on the move. Fifteen million men and several hundred thousand women—one in nine Americans—left home for military training camps . . . Another fifteen million persons—one out of every eight civilians—changed their county of residence . . . By war's end, one in every five Americans had been swept up in the great wartime migration . . . endless workers poured into the great metropolitan centers of defense production—Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, San Diego, Los Angeles, Oakland, Portland, and Seattle.¹⁴

One observer noted that “War conditions increase the tendency to use tobacco products . . . soldiers at the front . . . war plant workers . . . the general population . . . girls left at home . . . wives left at home . . . mothers . . . [all] very strongly increased demand.”¹⁵ The consumption of cigarettes tracked “almost exactly parallel” with the rise and fall of industrial output during WWII. When workers worked, they smoked. When soldiers fought, they smoked. When workers had money in their pockets, they consumed cigarettes. WWII was one of the most productive, labor-intensive eras in American history; American workers reaped the rewards of steady

¹³ This theme of edginess can be found in two of the major book titles on the period: David Kennedy's *Freedom from Fear* and Ira Katznelson's *Fear Itself*, as well as, of course, FDR's message from his first inaugural address: “We have nothing to fear but fear itself.”

¹⁴ David Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 747–748.

¹⁵ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12152.

employment and good pay. And when working under pressure of war, whether in industrial or combat conditions, their reward often came as a pack of cigarettes.¹⁶

The demand for cigarettes among the American populace grew to incredible proportions. Attempting to describe the nearly insatiable demand for cigarettes during WWII, tobacco lobbyist Joseph Kolodny said in 1944 that it was impractical even to predict a ceiling for cigarette consumption in America. He claimed that WWI and WWII had a significant impact on cigarette consumption, stating: “The production and consumption of cigarettes has leaped to astronomical heights in recent years, yet the saturation point is not yet in sight. As a matter of fact, no one is capable of forecasting when a point of saturation will be reached. It is rather silly to even contemplate any limit on cigarette consumption.”¹⁷

Kolodny further claimed that given an adequate supply of cigarettes, the demand for them “has virtually no limits.” He also observed that civilians and soldiers under the wartime conditions and pressures described above would sacrifice much in terms of rationing of supplies and food; however they would not put up with degradation of their steady access to cigarettes. Indeed Americans would “go nuts” without them.¹⁸

Recalling this “smoke or go nuts” theme, one veteran Marine Corps fighter pilot remembered doing aileron rolls while on a strike mission over the Pacific so he could reach his pack of smokes lodged in the floor plates of his aircraft. He may have been on oxygen at 15,000

¹⁶ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12182.

¹⁷ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12283.

¹⁸ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12285.

feet over enemy territory, but he was ready for a smoke!¹⁹ The Chairman of R.J. Reynolds added to revelations regarding consumption mania, stating that “we are making approximately 330 billion cigarettes this year . . . and to top that, there is [still] a whole lot of unsatisfied demand.”²⁰ *Business Week* magazine provided an appropriate summation of the triangular relationship among nerves, disposable income, and consumption on the American worker and soldier: “the combination of war nerves and war prosperity continues to pile up a record demand for cigarettes.”²¹

That Americans consumed copious amounts of cigarettes during WWII is a well-established fact statistically and culturally. What did this consumption look like? During the war, *Business Week* meaningfully described the enthusiasm for cigarette smoking and the fears nursed by Americans deprived access to favorite brands. It characterized this dearth of smokes as a “cigarette famine.” Using geography as a literary device, journalists described how L.A. cab drivers might volunteer to get your cigarettes for you and help you avoid “the trouble of waiting in line.” It was not the fact that cab drivers offered this service; rather, it is important to note the long lines forming for cigarettes. This same journalist described how in Dallas, a girl waited patiently for the mail to arrive from her soldier-brother in India to receive a carton of much sought after Lucky Strike cigarettes. The irony was clear: unable to obtain premium cigarettes in America, this girl had to depend on her brother to send them from half-a-world away.²²

¹⁹ A.J. Jones, interview by Willie Tubbs, April 2014, transcript, Center for Culture and Oral History, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS.

²⁰ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12149.

²¹ *Business Week*, “Formula Trouble” (May 13, 1944), 31.

²² *Business Week*, “Cigarette Famine” (October 14, 1944), 19.

Another journalist described the long lines at Macy's in New York City where lines of "cigarette-starved New Yorkers" had become so long that the store had to close down its tobacco department and resort to a complex rationing scheme.²³ Finally, and most sarcastically, the enemy happily joined in on all the lamenting about cigarette consumption anxieties in America. In Tokyo, a Japanese journalist cheerfully quipped that "American women are smoking pipes because they can't get cigarettes."²⁴ Though Japanese awareness of Americans' frustrations over shrinking access to manufactured cigarettes was frustrating, they apparently failed to account for Americans' ability to adapt and overcome—in more ways than one. The Brown & Williamson's roll-your-own cigarette machine was a device born of depression-era ingenuity, and sales of this machine soared from an average of 15,000 a month at the start of the war to a record-breaking 100,000 a month by the end.²⁵

However, all was not bleak. One journalist reported a silver lining contained in the cigarette shortage crisis, noting that the shortage would drive smokers to abandon "brand consciousness in his frenzy to buy anything that can be smoked."²⁶ Moreover, civilian consumers could take pride in their ability to endure extreme cigarette shortages or lack of access to premium brands as a form of patriotism. Many civilians in America took comfort in thinking a shortage in smokes on their side of the ocean possibly meant a G.I. on the other side had plenty of gold leaf relief. On the other hand, just as many citizens did not take solace in this form of tobacco patriotism. At best, they simply grew weary of cigarette shortages. At worst, they accused the Army of overkill based on rumors of barges and warehouses packed to the brim with

²³ *Business Week*, "Macy's Rations Smokes" (February 3, 1945), 31.

²⁴ *Business Week*, "Cigarette Famine," 19.

²⁵ *Business Week*, "Roll Your Own" (Dec. 2, 1944), 21.

²⁶ *Business Week*, "Cigarette Famine," 19.

thousands of stockpiled cartons of cigarettes, presumably wasting away. Alarmed at the growing emergency, these cigarette-starved consumers began to complain to their elected representatives. Soon, these complaints were loud and numerous enough to gain the attention of one of the Senate's most powerful leaders: Harry S. Truman.

The Truman Committee, the Soldier, and the Cigarette

Historian Donald H. Riddle describes the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, better known as the Truman Committee, as “the most important single Congressional committee dealing with the mobilization program of WWII” as well as “one of the most responsible investigating committees in recent history.”²⁷ It was formed through an act of Congress on March 1, 1941, to exercise oversight over the enormous defense build-up. Recognizing the more-than-ample opportunity for graft, price-gouging, war profiteering, corruption, waste, and political patronage, the committee met regularly and held hearings for the next seven years, ultimately disbanding on April 28, 1948.

The committee wielded considerable influence and received testimony from some of the leading industrialists and economic planning experts in America. It had a substantial impact on policy and reflected the values and concerns of the nation as a whole, not just those engaged in war fighting or war material production. In short, the Truman Committee was a reflection of America—its concerns were America’s concerns. Thus, the issues upon which the Committee chose to focus, as well as its findings, must be understood in that context. The Committee left a mountain of reports and transcripts generated from an impressive array of hearings, both public and private. In total, the Committee’s work was prodigious: “51 reports . . . totaling 1,946 pages

²⁷ Donald H. Riddle, *The Truman Committee: A Study in Congressional Responsibility* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1964), vii.

. . . 432 public hearings at which 1,798 witnesses made 2,284 appearances producing 43 volumes of printed testimony totaling 27,568 pages.”²⁸

One of the more notorious Congressional investigating committees in American history was the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. During the Civil War, this committee acted as the sounding platform for Radical Republicans determined to overshadow President Lincoln’s activities as Commander in Chief. The Joint Committee investigated nearly every aspect of the Civil War. Truman had seen war, and being a student of history he determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Joint Committee. Thus, different from the Civil War Joint Committee, the Truman Committee “conducted investigations on almost all phases of the war effort except those matters having to do with military strategy and tactics.” Prominent topics included everything from rubber rations to labor-industry relations.²⁹

With Truman’s characteristic determination as guide and his desire just to help the President “win the war,” the committee mainly concerned itself with the “domestic side of the war effort—the industrial mobilization.” With total mobilization on such a massive scale,

²⁸ Riddle, *The Truman Committee*, 4, 9; Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear*, 791. In American history, Congressional investigative hearings have a long and storied heritage. Dating back to the first Congressional Investigation in 1792 involving the shocking defeat of General Arthur St. Clair at the hands of rebellious Indians in the Northwest Territory, by 1941 when the Truman Investigative Committee was formed Congress had conducted hundreds such inquiries. Through Constitutional powers, precedence set over a century and a half of such investigations, and experience as the nation’s purse holder, Congress had established itself as the nation’s preeminent overseer of business.

²⁹ Riddle, *The Truman Committee*, 9, 26, 28. Truman was determined *not* to be the stalwart obstacle the Joint Committee had been during the Civil War. He was fond of referring to Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s contention that the Joint Committee was “worth two divisions” in his own Army. Truman was determined to be no such hindrance to WWII generals. In all its years of existence, the Truman Committee never mentioned a single military matter “not related to supply” except on one occasion in September 1942 when Truman was loath to mention what appeared to be a lack of unity of command among the services—a subject that would plague the armed services for the rest of the war. The problems with unity of command and inter-service rivalry, painfully sidestepped by the committee during WWII, were not addressed to any lasting degree until 40 years later when the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 forced “jointness” and unity of command on the armed services. Other than this one minor incident, the record is absent of the “strategy and tactics” debates that plagued the Joint Committee’s proceedings. Famous for direct and frank discourse, Truman stated that his only objective was simply to “help the President win the War.”

conflict was bound to exist as “the armed services clashed with civilian agencies over mobilization policies, and the role of the military in industrial mobilization.”³⁰ The majority of the complaints that reached the Committee originated with private citizens and arrived by mail, in person, or telephone.³¹ Some of the topics were immense in their scope and complexity. One that never reached the official attention of the committee was the Manhattan Project, the covert venture to produce the atomic bomb. When the committee was perplexed by the deluge of complaints regarding what appeared as strange, secretive military-industrial work in places as varied as Tennessee and New Mexico, Truman approached Secretary of War Stimson for answers. Stimson told him that “it was an undertaking paralleling a German project and that the first country to succeed would probably win the war.” Truman subsequently dropped the matter and mentioned it no more.³²

Other topics and complaints were often silly and trivial. A particularly interesting group contained citizens’ war-winning strategies or suggestions for ingenious weapons that would smite the enemy with a single blow. One pestered the committee with his idea for a fleet of single-seat air planes with soil enough to “bury Japan in defeat.” Another suggested the manufacture of huge steel spheres with spikes to roll along and chew up armies like a “meat grinder.”³³ By 1944, however, the committee began to receive a mountain of complaints involving an escalating crisis that directly affected Americans’ ability to persevere through the long war. In a war with such high stakes, this problem, characterized by one Senator as a

³⁰ Riddle, *The Truman Committee*, 11.

³¹ Riddle, *The Truman Committee*, 37.

³² Riddle, *The Truman Committee*, 37.

³³ Riddle, *The Truman Committee*, 38.

“crisis,” received the attention of a full committee hearing in late 1944.³⁴ This crisis was an issue of great import not just for the servicemen in Europe, Asia, or training camps stateside, but also the men and women on the streets and in the factories. The issue was cigarettes.

The Army, the Soldier, and the Cigarette in WWII

When the committee convened in December 1944 to discuss the nature of the cigarette shortage as well as possible solutions, it leaned heavily on the US Army to provide testimony regarding the scope of cigarette procurement for soldiers. They also called leading cigarette industry executives and logistics experts to testify regarding the cigarette enterprise’s efforts to match demand. The Committee was particularly alarmed not only by the complaints from civilians stateside, but also rumors of grumblings from soldiers about the availability of cigarettes in theatre.³⁵ A close reading and interpretation of the proceedings of this cigarette shortage panel goes far to reveal the true nature and enormity of the soldier-cigarette relationship during WWII.

The first business of the Committee was to ascertain the immensity of the soldier-cigarette rationing schedule. By creating an entire branch within the Army Service Forces to husband the Army’s cigarette procurement program, the Army signaled its remarkable commitment to cigarettes. Department Chief Colonel Fred C. Foy provided the Committee meticulous details on the size and scope of his department’s activities. The first bombshell was the fact that by late 1944, the Army’s adjusted consumption rate had swollen to a projected 114 billion cigarettes for FY 1944, which represented the planning number it would assume for FY

³⁴ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12161.

³⁵ These “grumblings” were largely unfounded and mainly had to do with access to premium brands. Also, similar to the shipping issues central to soldier-cigarette grumbling in WWI, the fact that billions of cigarettes sat on barges off the coast of Italy and France in 1944, waiting for port space, did not help things.

1945. This figure can be extrapolated from data supplied in the testimony showing the Army's initial request for 68 billion cigarettes in 1944 had fallen woefully short and was supplemented with another order of 24 billion cigarettes bringing the total to 92 billion.³⁶

Further, Foy reported that consumption in Army training camps and stateside required accounting as well. Reporting that 800 million cigarettes covered only thirteen days of consumption stateside, Foy estimated the Army needed roughly 22 billion cigarettes a year to cover stateside requirements.³⁷ The grand total of 114 billion cigarettes *for the Army alone* is astonishing considering the fact that the *entire* United States adult population smoked only 134 billion cigarettes just a decade earlier, and the Army had only procured 21 billion cigarettes in FY 1943.³⁸

The testimony also contains data uncovering the Army's consumption rate. To meet their requirements, the Army had requested 23 percent of America's entire run of cigarettes for FY 1944.³⁹ However, the industry testified that based on the Army's sustained, steadily growing consumption rate, it felt the Army would require 30 percent of the entire run in FY 1945. This would necessitate the industry's production of an unprecedented 400 billion cigarettes in FY 1945 to meet both civilian and military requirements.⁴⁰

³⁶ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12107, 12270, 12272.

³⁷ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12109.

³⁸ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 57; United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12284.

³⁹ *Business Week*, "Cigarette Famine," 19.

⁴⁰ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12116, 12130, 1228.

These huge consumption numbers, both planned and real, were not random guesses. They were based on planning estimates generated in theatre by Army combatant commanders who were given wide latitude to determine cigarette consumption requirements. By 1944, they had pegged that figure at one pack per soldier, per day. This was codified in *War Department Circular 285*, which established the one-pack-per-day consumption rate authorized for soldiers on combat rations, as well as an additional one pack per day soldiers could purchase at the commissary.⁴¹ This drove Foy's requirements, and he reported that his procurement strategy was guided by a 16 cigarettes per-soldier-per-day supply requirement.

Seeking fully to understand these figures and assumptions, a panelist at one point interrupted Foy and asked him the question on everyone's mind: "Do you just assume that every soldier in the United States Army smokes?" To which Foy promptly replied with an emphatic and frank "Yes!"⁴² This consumption calculus is what drove the Army to siphon off 23 percent of all cigarettes produced in America. Camel alone designated 51.5 percent of its entire run for soldiers in 1944.⁴³ Regarding all these production and consumption figures, the Senators and the Army officials on the panel never wavered in their determination to do whatever was required to assure soldiers' unfettered access to cigarettes. The Army was quite clear on its intentions: "we are committed to buying whatever the demand is in theatre."⁴⁴ The Senators on the panel echoed this commitment: "If the theatre commanders, if the boys, are getting all the cigarettes that they

⁴¹ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12111, 12270.

⁴² United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12108.

⁴³ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12148.

⁴⁴ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12112.

require, then we are off to a good start . . . but we want to be sure that they are getting the cigarettes first, and in sufficient supply to meet their demands.”⁴⁵

Hence the soldier-cigarette relationship was elevated to the highest levels of importance during WWII. With these figures in mind, as well as the military-industrial-political commitment to cigarette smoking soldiers, one can understand why the civilians back home in the panelists’ Congressional districts and home states were perplexed that one-quarter of all cigarettes produced, and possibly more in the future, was going to the armed forces.⁴⁶ Though encouraged in their patriotism by American Tobacco, whose packages of Lucky Strikes were sans green dye because “Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War,” there was still consensus among the civilian smoking populace that times were not good.⁴⁷ Considering that during this period over 80 percent of all Americans were smokers, this was a substantial outcry.⁴⁸

Those who took in *Business Week* and the local and regional papers that reprinted their syndicated articles during WWII found a steady stream of news and data supporting their fears regarding the size of the Army’s cigarette procurement program. The magazine reported in 1944 that “consumption is too high . . . and the civilian does not get a nod from the manufacturers until military demand has been satisfied.”⁴⁹ It also reported that the Army had squeezed RJR for an additional 150 million of the popular Camel brand cigarettes per week. RJR worked out a flex

⁴⁵ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12111.

⁴⁶ *Business Week*, “Cigarette Famine,” 19.

⁴⁷ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 89

⁴⁸ Susan King “The Long and Winding Tobacco Road (Hollywood),” *The Los Angeles Times*, October 12, 1999.

⁴⁹ *Business Week*, “Cigarette Famine,” 19.

schedule with its labor union, but that would only account for an additional 65 million per week.

The remaining 85 million came out of production earmarked for civilian consumption.⁵⁰

In addition to the soldier-cigarette “squeeze” on the cigarette supply, senators in the Truman Committee were shocked to learn that behavior akin to a shark feeding frenzy was informing consumer behavior late in the war. Civilians apparently bought and consumed cigarettes even if they did not smoke simply because they were scarce and seen as valuable. Like consumers who purchase something simply because it is on sale, whether needed or not, some smoked or hoarded just because they could.⁵¹ Between soldiers’ burning up America’s stock of cigarettes, leading to a cigarette shortage, and this form of complex, frenzied consumer behavior, America found itself in a cigarette crisis in 1944. The next logical question the Committee asked the cigarette enterprise, why do you not just produce more cigarettes to meet demand was complex with no simple answer.

The Field-to-Lip Foxtrot: The Effects of Tobacco Aging, Labor Relations, and Echoes of the New Deal on Cigarette Production

Scholars of the New Deal are forced to sort through the issues of production and consumption as they related to the causes of and extraction from the Great Depression. This is especially true regarding the issues presented by the soldier-cigarette issue and associated shortages. Consumption oriented economists subscribe to the hypothesis that free markets are not structured to provide full employment and sustainable distribution of wealth, and large-scale government intervention in the economy is required in modern, industrial nations. During and after the Great Depression, the federal government attempted to fix the failures of the free market

⁵⁰ *Business Week*, “Cigarette Famine,” 19.

⁵¹ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12135-136.

and the problems created by the business cycle by engaging in deficit spending and manipulating consumption.

With a renewed emphasis on consumerism, purchase power, government intervention, and deficit spending, an American political economy emerged during this period that was actually the completion of a half-century long move from a conservative production economy to a liberal consumption economy. The purchase power of the middle class was henceforth a crucial element of the American economy. In short, after the upheaval of the Great Depression many saw a new America whose economy would rise or fall on the backs of wages and consumption. These consumption oriented theorists reasoned that an industrial nation can produce all it wants, but if there is irrational production, a deficiency in money supply leading to empty pockets, or if prices go through the floor, destroying profit incentives, a modern economy will soon sink.⁵²

An example of this irrational production is found in the Ford Motor Company's production of the Model T during the Roaring Twenties. What was a production rate of a Model T every 14 hours ballooned to a car every 10 seconds on the eve of the Great Depression. David Kennedy comments that America's "fabulously successful [production] strategy," represented by the Model T Ford, "had its limits . . . mass production made mass consumption a necessity."⁵³ Many historians agree that irrational production on this scale and ignorance regarding the middle

⁵² The literature available on the New Deal is immense to say the least. For readings that delve into America's shift to a consumption economy and the Great Depression as a downturn rooted in the production-consumption conundrum, see the following works: William Leach, *Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture*; Daniel Horowitz, *The Morality of Spending: The Attitudes Toward the Consumer Society in America (1875-1940)*; Charles Sellers, *The Market Revolution*; Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War & Liberalism and its Discontents*; Fraser *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order*; David Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear*; James Patterson, *Grand Expectations*; and Michael Lind, *Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States*.

⁵³ Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear*, 21.

class purchasing power conundrum created the conditions that sent America spiraling toward the massive business cycle backlash correction known as the Great Depression.

If a regulated consumption economy was what many New Dealers were looking for, they found it in the manufactured cigarette. Legislators, the cigarette enterprise, and economists were keenly aware that the cigarette was the prime positive example of consumption theories dominating economic thought during this period. When Americans consumed cigarettes at WWII levels, it resulted in a host of secondary and tertiary benefits. Growers received top price for their leaf; flush with cash, they engaged in material consumption that supported local and state micro economies.⁵⁴ The enterprise was more than happy. Buttressed by an infinite customer base, the astronomical quantities of cigarettes consumed during WWII ensured they could sell them at price splits that guaranteed sustained consumption and lucrative profit margins. The vast cigarette industry profits, second order transactions, advertisement revenue, and wealth in cigarette industry stock had a profound effect on America's twentieth century macro economy.

The federal government had no shortage of the spoils either. Cigarette purchases were taxed transactions that brought billions in revenue to the government which in turn funded the social welfare and recovery programs central to Roosevelt's extended New Deal program. Cigarette consumers were happy, the enterprise and its investors were ecstatic, and the federal government had a golden goose that would produce fruits in the billions for the remainder of the twentieth century. All these measures and supposed benefits were Keynesian in nature and

⁵⁴ Anthony J. Badger, *Prosperity Road: The New Deal, Tobacco, and North Carolina* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 16, 65. Badger discusses the positive impact of cigarette consumption on tobacco and local economies: "The whole business community . . . was geared to tobacco production and sales. Banks, retail merchants, and car dealers were all aware" of the purchase power of the cash happy tobacco grower. Later he describes how as a result of government intervention in the tobacco-cigarette business, when "farmers crowded into stores to spend their new-found wealth, supply merchants reported that business was double that of the previous year. Necessities like shoes and sheets could be purchased for the first time in many months . . . used car lots were cleared for the first time in a decade . . . railroad traffic increased, bank deposits in some areas doubled, and taxes were being paid three times as fast as in earlier years." This was modern, consumption based corporatism in action.

formed the core of the New Deal program. The manufactured cigarette, sought after by soldiers and hoarded by civilians, offers a unique lens to analyze the interplay among production, consumption, managed economy, and political-industrial-military relations during this most momentous period of American history.

The Field-to-Lip Foxtrot

As much as the New Deal political-economy appeared, at least to some, to dig America out of the Depression, it acted as a juggernaut to the increased cigarette production required to meet soldier and civilian demand during the height of WWII. The Truman Committee clearly saw that America was the world's "Arsenal of Democracy" during WWII, but why the nation could not become the *Sultan of Cigarettes* and supply the world over with an endless stream of smokes was not so obvious.⁵⁵ The nation's industrial production numbers during WWII were nothing less than astonishing. The American labor force produced 295,486 airplanes, 60,973 tanks, 12.5 million rifles, and 41 billion rounds of ammunition during WWII.⁵⁶ Historian David Kennedy observes during the waning years of WWII, "every American combatant . . . could draw on four tons of supplies" per man; by comparison, his Japanese opponent could count on only two pounds per man.⁵⁷

To meet the skyrocketing demand, cigarette production had escalated to record levels as well. The American Tobacco Company, makers of Camel cigarettes, had doubled its cigarette production since the start of the war. RJR had already worked to flex production schedules and

⁵⁵ "The Arsenal of Democracy" was a slogan used by President Franklin D. Roosevelt during a radio message in December 1940 to refer to America's program of aid to keep the United Kingdom afloat in their fight against Nazi Germany. See also Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear*, 468–469.

⁵⁶ The National WWII Museum, "By the Numbers: Wartime Production," accessed November 14, 2014, <http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-numbers/wartime-production.html>.

⁵⁷ Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear*, 668.

labor arrangements to meet the Army's demand for more cigarettes.⁵⁸ Production numbers for 1943 had been 290 billion cigarettes and were 325 billion in 1944.⁵⁹ To meet the demand, and right the cigarette shortage, why couldn't the industry produce a few billion more cigarettes? Because the industry was limited by three factors: tobacco aging, labor relations, and echoes of the New Deal.

Tobacco Aging

The most obvious reason why the enterprise could not produce billions and billions more cigarettes in 1944 is that production was tied to the 1941 tobacco crop. Since manufactured cigarette producers perfected the flu curing and blending process that elevated the cigarette as the most appealing and lucrative consumer product ever made, the industry had been tied to a strict three-year aging process. Back in 1941, the enterprise had forecasted demand for 1944 and then contracted for enough tobacco leaf to meet that 1944 demand. The enterprise did not foresee the epic rise in cigarette smoking that occurred in the intervening three years; it in turn was left short-handed in 1944. As much as the enterprise might have wanted to make more cigarettes in 1944, it simply did not have enough raw materials.

During the Truman hearings, some questioned whether the industry could merely use unaged tobacco and borrow from the 1942 and 1943 crop that was aging at that time. *Business Week* reported in 1944 that gossip on the street was that the industry may sacrifice this three-year aging cycle to meet the door-busting demand. The magazine reported:

It's a matter of trade gossip that many of the producers have cut quality to be certain of meeting volume demand. One of the large companies is said to have cut by 50 percent the amount of scarce Turkish tobacco which goes into its products . . . to get immediate relief, some manufacturers are represented as planning to slash the aging process one year.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ *Business Week*, "Cigarette Famine," 19.

⁵⁹ *Business Week*, "Cigarette Famine," 19.

⁶⁰ *Business Week*, "Cigarette Famine," 19–20.

Despite this “trade gossip,” executives involved in the Truman Committee hearings made it clear that the enterprise was not willing to sacrifice quality. Cutting down on Turkish tobacco in their blend was one thing; using un-aged tobacco was another. Responding to this pressure to use un-aged tobacco, the chairman of RJR stated emphatically:

We are refusing to destroy our brand and disappoint the American taste and develop an absolute necessity of more acute shortage in the future by using green, unusable tobaccos . . . American cigarette taste demands cigarettes made not out of green tobaccos, but out of cured tobaccos. The important brands of this country are built on a basis of that taste and that demand . . . it is a sealed fact . . . there is just so much tobacco that was grown and acquired. It is in the inventories and in the warehouses and there is no way to increase it.⁶¹

In terms of raw materials for cigarette production, the facts are clear. The industry had plenty of machinery and only a limited quantity of leaf; it was producing as much as possible considering the imposed cultivation limitations. However, in the process of the hearings, other factors emerged that further limited cigarette production in 1944.

Labor Relations

Labor supply was a major issue during WWII. To produce the mountain of material and supplies to support the war effort, America required an incredibly large labor force. Over twelve million men and women were already in uniform, and the rest of the nation was left to supply the labor market. Only so many skilled and unskilled workers were available to go around, and this forced Congress, the War Department, and other federal agencies to work together to develop schedules of workers considered key and essential at home and exempt from military service. This tight labor situation generated unique problems within the cigarette enterprise that often stood in the way of its ability to increase cigarette production in 1944.

First, tobacco growers and associated farm labor was considered key and essential, because the government deemed that the leaf provided “comfort, solace, and pleasure” to soldier

⁶¹ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12142.

and citizen alike—it was an “essential commodity.” However, though the cigarette, as opposed to the leaf, was the business end of this “comfort, solace, and pleasure” transaction, workers in the cigarette industry were not considered key and essential. In effect, the farmer was exempt from military service, but the machine operator in the cigarette factory was not. The industry wanted both farmer and industry workers designated key and essential so that cigarette manufacturers could receive more labor allocations.⁶²

Addressing this apparent contradiction, one industry representative opined that “although the growing of tobacco has been declared essential, the manufacturer of cigarettes . . . is officially rated non-essential.” He complained the industry was being denied “sufficient manpower to produce and make available cigarettes,” and it was “inconsistent to designate the raw material as vital to the Nation’s welfare and yet deny the manufacturers and distributors sufficient manpower to produce . . . cigarettes.” Enterprise officials were quick to point out that female workers were already being leveraged in the industry in an effort not to impede war work—they were “not the type which can be well utilized in the war industries such as heavy munitions plants.” However, they were emphatic that without a substantial increase in labor allocation, no additional cigarette production capacity could be achieved.⁶³

Business Week magazine was keen to cover this issue of labor scarcity in the cigarette industry. Two months before the Truman Committee met to discuss the cigarette shortage, the magazine reported:

Labor is Scarce—harvesting the crop is the most acute problem confronting Kentucky tobacco growers who are short on labor. Close to 2,000 German prisoners of war are at work in the fields. Many schools

⁶² United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12120, 12285.

⁶³ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12120.

postponed opening for a week or two to allow students to help, and one county judge dismissed the September court term to free jurors and attendants for the tobacco harvest.⁶⁴

In addition to restrictions placed on cigarette production due to tobacco aging, the industry was also limited by these labor issues. Though these were enough in themselves to thwart industry efforts to surge production in 1944, the final limiting factor proved decisive. Despite a demand curve that appeared to have no ceiling, farmers actually resisted increased production. They were new farmers with a new deal, and they did not want to tamper with a good thing.

Echoes of the New Deal

Historians have debated the nature of the New Deal for all of the eight decades since Roosevelt took extreme measures to save America's sinking ship. The scholarship has generally focused on three areas: relief, recovery, and reform.⁶⁵ Relief efforts were intended to meet the most urgent needs and involved assistance from the government to put money directly in family's pockets. As previously mentioned, part of this direct assistance was practical Keynesianism designed to spur consumption.

The recovery and reform activities were a mixed bag of government programs, initiatives, and legislative measures intended to stabilize the American economy and address the factors that drove it into the ground in the first place. The federal government's involvement in issues like finance reform, economic stabilization, job creation, price controls, production schedules, and farm assistance were of primary importance. In short, the New Deal was America's shift to some level of planned economy, a move a century in the making that many now call modern economic

⁶⁴ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12283.

⁶⁵ For a sample of recent scholarly works on the New Deal, both positive and negative, see David Kennedy *Freedom From Fear*; Ira Katznelson, *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origin of Our Times*; Elliot Rosen, *Roosevelt, The Great Depression, and the Economics of Recovery*.

arrangements.⁶⁶ Several components of the recovery and reform programs installed in the 1930s form echoes of the New Deal that reached out and directly affected the cigarette industry's ability to increase production during the 1940s.

The most substantial echo was the New Deal crop control and allotment programs. These programs were well received by tobacco growers, the vast majority happy to participate in any scheme that would rescue them from the dismal Great Depression price free-fall. Implemented as part of the suite of New Deal recovery and reform programs aimed at stabilizing farm commodity prices, these programs formed a mountainous barrier that made any real or imagined cigarette production surge difficult if not impossible. Though industry executives were gushing over seemingly unlimited demand, declaring that it was "silly" even to envision a ceiling, tobacco growers had vivid memories of near zero demand just a decade earlier.⁶⁷ Whether cotton, tobacco, hogs, or beef, during the Great Depression the market was flooded with agricultural and farm products that were either not needed, not wanted, or for which there was no money supply to purchase even if there was want or need. As cotton bales piled up on docks and tobacco leaves sat idle in warehouses, prices had gone through the floor. In an effort to keep up, farmers increased production to make up for the loss in price, which drove prices down even further. This was the death spiral into which the government stepped during the New Deal to arrest the fall and stave off the collapse of farming in America.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Michael Lind, *Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States* (New York: Harper Books, 2012), 453.

⁶⁷ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12283.

⁶⁸ Badger, *Prosperity Road*, 21. Badger points out that before 1933, there was a "chronic tendency to overproduce" as growers became locked in a production death spiral. When prices were good, they produced more to reap the profits; if prices were bad, they produced more to make up for the deficit. This led to the over production conundrum at the heart of Badger's book.

One of the first things the government did was pass the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA). In simplistic terms, this act offered some level of government guarantees in exchange for forced decreases in agricultural production and rationalized shortages. In turn the removal of surplus and run-away production generated price increases, price stabilization, and confidence in the market; which encouraged investment, wages, and consumption. Though the AAA was eventually struck down by the Supreme Court, the crop control and allotment programs were revived in the Soil Conservation & Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. In the end, these government compulsory control measures were only part of the maturation of an activist federal government and long-term reform measures that resulted in wholesale transformation of farming and a fundamental renegotiation of capitalism in America.⁶⁹

The measures were extreme in some eyes. For example, at the height of the Great Depression when many families were starving, across America millions of hogs were destroyed and left unprocessed, thousands of acres of cotton were plowed under, and farmers were forbidden to place additional acreage into production. Weary of chasing the business cycle and farm prices for nearly a century of upturns and downturns, 99.9 percent of tobacco farmers elected to enroll in the allotment program.⁷⁰ As a result of this New Deal allotment regime, and in the face of a demand curve that was increasing at a rate of 15 percent per year during the war,

⁶⁹ This last sentence is informed by a close reading of Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear*; Lind, *Land of Promise*; and Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*, and his other book *Liberalism and its Discontents*. Additionally, for a focused treatment of the evolution of compulsory crop control oriented on a bottom-up, as well as top-down lens, refer to Anthony J. Badger's *Prosperity Road: The New Deal, Tobacco, and North Carolina*.

⁷⁰ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12165; and Badger, *Prosperity Road*, 133. Badger points out farmers were will to do just about anything to obtain sustained, stabilized price increases; even trade in their historic attachment to Jeffersonian classic liberalism for government oversight of their land use and production.

tobacco acreage was capped by the government at a seven percent annual growth rate.⁷¹ Moreover, rejecting the free market principles of *laissez faire* so much a part of their Jeffersonian roots, growers were more than content to pursue happiness through steadfast adherence to these government imposed crop size and land use restrictions. These would have been anathema to Thomas Jefferson; however, they were lifeblood to the modern farmer. The nature of this allotment program and the growers' staunch resistance to increased production is crucial to any final understanding of why cigarette production failed to accelerate during the waning years of WWII.

Enterprise insiders and tobacco growers drained by the disastrous price fluctuations that had plagued them for decades repeatedly told the Truman Committee that growers were not in the least interested in sacrificing crop support programs for increased acreage.⁷² Some on the industrial side of cigarette production were pushing for “more manpower and more acreage” in response to Congressional and War Department demands for “more cigarettes.”⁷³ Yet farmers were not budging. They were exceedingly happy with the allotment program and government oversight of the tobacco crop. They voted FDR into office, gave him his planned economy mandate, and felt they were entitled to the full benefits of the allotment program. They were content to make a living off of three acres and a government allotment check—and it was not a bad living. Even if this meant they might miss out on the promising opportunities for growth represented by the remarkable expansion in cigarette consumption during WWII, they could not

⁷¹ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12176.

⁷² United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12144, 164-172.

⁷³ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12140.

be budged. Decades of boom and bust had driven them to this determined resistance to the free market; they were no longer willing to chase demand and trust in the invisible hand. Tobacco farmers had fallen in love with FDR's managed economy, and came to rely on crop allotments as a substantial portion of their annual income.⁷⁴

The industry, minus a few exceptions, actually took the side of their growers on this issue.⁷⁵ It joined the farmers and generally resisted any dramatic plans for increased acreage and industry leaders were not afraid to testify to as much before the Truman Committee. One executive stated, "I assuredly would not recommend under present circumstances that all controls be eliminated. I know nobody who is willing to face again the conditions that we had in 1930–1932 in leaf tobacco . . . when farmers were going all but hungry."⁷⁶ Another said that a situation whereby farmers were once again chasing demand would be considered a "disaster" and that growers would not permit a situation creating the price fluctuations and unpredictability they were accustomed to before allotment.⁷⁷

Moreover, this was not a problem isolated to just the pit of the Great Depression. Grower and cigarette producer alike were keenly aware that as recently as 1939 farmers had produced the largest flu-cured tobacco crop on record, of which the industry only bought 53.9 percent. When

⁷⁴ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12164, 12166. Many historians have pointed out the fact that one of the main cultural symbols of the New Deal was the pictures of FDR that adorned the homes of many rural farmer's living rooms during this period.

⁷⁵ Badger, *Prosperity Road*, 104. Like all issues involving management and labor, the cigarette industry and its growers had by no means enjoyed such a *chummy* relationship in the decades leading up to the 1944 cigarette shortage. However, Badger points out that the higher tobacco prices generated by federal price supports, crop control, and allotment programs had healed many wounds. Good tobacco prices, like good wages, brought "tremendous change" to the relationship between growers and the industry.

⁷⁶ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12144; and Badger, *Prosperity Road*, 22. Badger gives figures showing that North Carolina flu-cured tobacco growers received \$93.4 million in 1928, and only \$34.9 million in 1932.

⁷⁷ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12171.

asked what happened to the 46 percent that was not purchased for flu-curing and cigarette production, enterprise executives shifted the conversation to one of risk assumption. Sure, the growers could go back to maximum land usage and high levels of production—but who would assume the risk for over production? Should farmers assume the risk of low prices, or the manufacturer who over-purchased and risked stocks of aging, low-price tobacco rotting in their warehouses? Or should the government be on tap for these risks?⁷⁸

Regarding the government's ability to assume the risk of unfettered tobacco production, enterprise experts pointed out the major problem associated with any government-set general minimum. If the government set a price at which it would guarantee the farmer it would step in and buy his tobacco if the bottom fell out, the industry would simply wait and buy tobacco from government auctions at rock bottom prices. This is the nature of a healthy wealth strategy—buy low and sell high. Tobacco was particularly susceptible to this general minimum scheme because it could sit in a government warehouse for years and still retain value to the industry, which would wait patiently and then scoop up leaf pennies to the dollar.⁷⁹

Thus, the Committee was clearly aware that allotment and crop control was here to stay. A benefit fiercely guarded by tobacco state politicians, it became a juggernaut political issue of great importance to generations of Southern legislators. *Business Week* consistently covered allotments and farm policy as they were issues near and dear to the American agricultural community. In July 1944, it reported that even though the industry

can't meet demand—tobacco growers are theoretically sitting pretty. Ever since the Depression, when overproduction and foundering prices forced Washington to intervene with acreage and crop control,

⁷⁸ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12172.

⁷⁹ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12182.

growers have welcomed outside help. The result, however, is that current crops won't stretch to cover a 50 percent increase in demand.⁸⁰

Regarding this allotment program loved by farmers who were "sitting pretty" and high on the hog, Senator Homer S. Ferguson provided a telling explanation of mid-twentieth century political economy. Ferguson, a conservative, pro-business Republican from Michigan, was quick to indicate the root of the 1944 shortage was the 1934 New Deal allotment program at the heart of Roosevelt's federal expansion. Hamstrung by what he saw as a forced, anti-free market measure frustrating capitalism's invisible hand, Ferguson was annoyed at the lost opportunities to exploit exploding demand; demand largely driven by the soldier-cigarette duo. Sensing the true nature of the problem, Senator Ferguson sarcastically asked, "Isn't it true that we paid growers *not* to grow tobacco in 1943 . . . and we penalized other growers for growing too much tobacco . . . which could be used for cigarettes?" Of course the answer was a resounding "yes." According to Ferguson, this was the sickening irony of the entire cigarette shortage episode the committee had met to discuss: the US government paid exorbitantly for the lower production from 1941 to 1944 that was at the core of the cigarette shortage they were desperately trying to overcome at this late hour in the middle of a world war.⁸¹

Americans were undoubtedly consuming legendary amounts of cigarettes during WWII, and civilians at home and soldiers at the front were more than willing to *walk a mile for a Camel*. Further, there is no doubt that during the Truman Committee's proceedings, the government and the enterprise expressed a full understanding of this demand, as well as the importance of cigarette consumption to a modern, industrial, post-Great Depression US economy. One enterprise executive was rather frank in his assessment of the cigarette's link to a fiscally

⁸⁰ *Business Week*, "Tobacco Revolt" (July 29, 1944), 22.

⁸¹ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12126.

healthy, if not physically healthy, consumer economy. RJR Chairman S. Clay Williams had much to say about cigarette consumption in a modern American economy. In addition to his position at the helm of one of America's most powerful cigarette companies, Williams had also acted as the de facto head of FDR's National Recovery Administration (NRA) as chairman for industry on the National Labor Board (1933–1934), and was a member of the US Department of Commerce's Business Advisory Council (1933-1949). Williams said that America's full employment concerns were married to consumption, and that enough cigarettes on the market were needed to ensure "maximum land use, the maximum manpower use, whether it be growing, or transporting, or warehousing, or manufacturing, or distributing . . . and the maximum volume of business for everybody's benefit."⁸²

Senator Ferguson, already frustrated at his inability to break through allotment schemes and increase production, added to this cigarette-driven economic policy with his contention that a substantial portion of America's thriving consumption economy was linked to the production and consumption of manufactured cigarettes. He was one of many Republicans and conservative Democrats of this era who wanted to roll back the production restrictions and government codes associated with Roosevelt's New Deal central planning philosophies and let the free market horses run.⁸³ They reasoned that if Americans wanted billions of cigarettes, then by all means produce billions of cigarettes. At one point, when asking about the prospects of cigarette advertising to increase cigarette consumption among soldiers, he posed the question, "If we are going to have any prosperity at all" aren't the "boys . . . at the front" and "people all over the

⁸² United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12152.

⁸³ For more on this subject, see Alan Brinkley, *Liberalism and Its Discontents* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

country” going to have to smoke more? Of course, the enterprise representative receiving this line of inquiry was happy to respond to Senator Ferguson’s question with a hearty “We hope so!”⁸⁴

These were not just the opinions of a lone, pro-business Senator on the Committee or one of several enterprise executives supplying testimony. In their summary statement after the Cigarette Shortage hearings were complete in 1944, the entire Truman Committee offered the most substantial, far-reaching statement acknowledging its beliefs about the vast economic importance of cigarette consumption in America. In closing, the Committee stated:

It can’t be denied that the successful distribution of cigarettes and other tobacco products is vital to the successful operation of our economy and the effective prosecution of the war. Any deterrent to the orderly and efficient distribution of these products serves to make more difficult the task of the government in maintaining morale and confidence.⁸⁵

The Greatest Generation of Smokers: The Goose that Laid the Golden Egg

Despite the challenges presented by the cigarette shortage in America during WWII, the truth is evident: as a result of cigarette rationing in America and the Army’s focused efforts, soldiers serving overseas or training stateside saw absolutely no cigarette shortage. In contrast to their American friends and family, who for the reasons presented above were never able to receive the fruits of any marked increase in cigarette production, soldiers experienced a cigarette *avalanche*. The enterprise, Congress, and the Army worked overtime and with much enthusiasm to ensure that every soldier who donned the uniform was given at least one pack of cigarettes a day for the duration of the war, and had access to at least one other pack through PX sales where

⁸⁴ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12181.

⁸⁵ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12280.

available.⁸⁶ To say the industry was ecstatic at this business boon is an understatement. Enterprise executives were pleased to emphasize to the Truman Commission that Army soldiers were their greatest clients. When asked if the twelve million men drafted into the service were good for business, the Chairman of RJR said that “according to our observation [they were]... good smokers, but they became very much *better smokers* when they went into the Army, and the folks left at home became very much better smokers when the war broke out.”⁸⁷ In this way the enterprise benefitted from a two-for-one deal: the soldiers who left home smoked copious amounts of cigarettes, and their nervous families back home joined them.

In what would become a habit, the industry was swift to attach much patriotic emotion to the soldier-cigarette relationship, soon to be the veteran-cigarette relationship. In addition to the famous advertisement that “Lucky Strike Green Has Gone to War with the Soldiers,” the industry also added other patriotic statements to the record. Regarding the Army’s need to supply heroic soldiers with a steady stream of cigarettes, one executive testified that “the minute you begin to supply to the Army—they want a good stock on this side of the ocean to draw from . . . this is no critical expression, for they have to do it this way—the army can’t take chances with men who are fighting wars!”⁸⁸ Another testified, “everyone will agree that our fighting men

⁸⁶ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 1944, 12110-12111.

⁸⁷ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12148.

⁸⁸ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12150.

deserve and should have unlimited quantities of smokes.”⁸⁹ The soldier was the enterprise’s best friend.

Moreover, in the soldier-cigarette duo, the industry also gained a proven agent for overseas expansion. Industry leaders testified to the Truman Committee that they were glad that soldiers were acting as missionaries for the cigarette industry abroad, building up a lucrative post-war market for American cigarettes. One industry representative testified:

The men in our armed forces—striding audaciously across the global map with their omnipresent cigarette—unconsciously are doing a super job of selling the rest of the world on the unmatched qualities of American tobacco. Lend-lease exports of leaf tobacco likewise contribute toward the building up of a vastly expanded post-war market which the American farmer should be ready to cultivate and supply . . . all this missionary work of incalculable value, will go for naught if the production of leaf tobacco is not stepped up sufficiently to allow for a large exportable surplus after the war.⁹⁰

In subsequent years, cigarettes became a key component of such massive programs as the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Airlift; Europe soon came to value American tobacco in ways never imaged before the war. Considering the regional, national, and global nature of the soldier-cigarette relationship, an exchange between Senator Joseph Hurst Ball (R-MN) and RJR Chairman Williams provides a clear, concise summary of how important the soldier was to the cigarette enterprise. Ball, like Ferguson, was a conservative, pro-business Republican vehemently opposed to labor unions and managed economy schemes; he was determined to point out the fallacy of New Deal limitations on cigarette production. Ball wanted to know if the demand curve over the last 40 years showed that the age group in the Army was the largest group of real and potential cigarette consumers. Williams’s response is telling. He replied, “soldiers in

⁸⁹ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12285.

⁹⁰ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, “Cigarette Rations,” 12285.

the active service are the most diligent consumers of cigarettes as a group in the population" of America.⁹¹

Ball was attempting to point out the dangers and incompatibility of overly-managed economy in America. In a Republic notionally founded upon free market principles, the invisible hand of the market must follow the business opportunities as they are presented, unfettered by the visible hand of government.⁹² These diligent soldier-smokers presented a massive group of lucrative cigarette-consuming smokers which grew to epic proportions over the remaining decades of the twentieth century. This growth transformed them into the most profitable, *greatest generation of smokers* in American history. Ironically, many of the pro-business, free-market legislators that criticized the managed economy that limited Americans access to cigarettes were, or became the intellectual fathers of a generation of elected officials who applauded federally subsidized smoking in the military and perpetual renewal of government tobacco allotments and price supports.

The Greatest Generation of Smokers: WWII and Beyond

In *Bad Habits: Drinking, Smoking, Taking Drugs, Gambling, Sexual Misbehavior and Swearing in American History*, historian John C. Burnham provides detailed analysis of the enduring impact smoking has had on American culture, society, and economy in the decades after WWII. The war subjected the Greatest Generation to substantial physical, emotional, and social pressure; all these translated into smoking pressure. Cigarettes calmed nerves and steadied hands, and generous amounts were freely given in foxholes, aid stations, chow halls, and USO

⁹¹ United States Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, "Cigarette Rations," 12151.

⁹² For a discussion of the visible versus the invisible hand, see Alfred Chandler Harris, *The Visible Hand* and Michael Lind, *Land of Promise: An Economic History of the United States*.

facilities. They were valued items shared in cafeterias, factories, and coffee klatches back home. Tobacco farmers were exempt from the draft. Women were bombarded with images of Rosie the Riveter working the pneumatic jack with cigarette in hand. All these cultural, physiological, and environmental stimulants meant one thing to the Greatest Generation: smoke em' if you've got em'.⁹³

And smoke they did. As WWII ended and soldiers returned home and life normalized, 80 percent of all American men became or continued smoking. The percentage of women who smoked doubled during WWII.⁹⁴ In 1900, cigarettes represented only two percent of the tobacco market, with chewing tobacco the most prevalent form of intake at 48 percent. By 1952, cigarettes represented 81 percent of this market, with chewing tobacco dropping all the way to last place at three percent.⁹⁵ Burnham argues that the enterprise eventually co-opted this massive groundswell of soldier-veteran cigarette smokers and their American Legion organizing arm as a powerful voting bloc. Similar to the Democratic Party co-opting Irish-American urban voters after the Civil War and the Republican Party co-opting the Grand Army of the Republic, the cigarette enterprise recruited the American Legion after WWII and grafted them into its campaign to link smoking with freedom.⁹⁶ This unique connection between the industry and the veteran would surface time and again in the remainder of the twentieth century as the enterprise

⁹³ John C. Burnham, *Bad Habits: Drinking, Smoking, Taking Drugs, Gambling, Sexual Misbehavior and Swearing in American History* (New York: NYU Press, 1994), 189.

⁹⁴ Burnham, *Bad Habits*, 189.

⁹⁵ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 97.

⁹⁶ For a discussion the Irish American-Democratic Party connection and the GAR-Republican Party connection, see Susannah Ural, *The Harp and the Eagle: Irish-American Volunteers and the Union Army (1861-1865)* and Stuart McConnell, *Glorious Contentment: The Grand Army of the Republic, 1865-1900*.

continued to use soldiers, veterans, patriotism, and liberty overtly and covertly to advance its interests.⁹⁷

Money buys influence, and the billions generated through cigarette related transactions and commerce gave the cigarette enterprise enormous influence over twentieth century American political economy. This influence was visible in the way government, businesses, and advertisers bowed in reverence to the powerful cigarette firms in the decades after WWII. The enterprise generated a rich, renewable source of tax revenue and advertising dollars, a relationship that Robert Proctor deems a “tax addiction.”⁹⁸ Politicians from the municipal to the federal level had to square any anti-cigarette initiative with the fact that taxes and duties directly or indirectly related to the production and sale of cigarettes underwrote a substantial portion of their agenda.

Like other statistics related to the growth of cigarette smoking in the twentieth century, the numbers regarding the business case for cigarettes and the “tax addiction” are quite telling. By 1950, “cigarettes accounted for 1.4 percent of the gross national product and a remarkable 3.5 percent of all consumer spending on nondurable goods . . . tobacco was the fourth largest cash crop in the nation, and in Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia, it ranked first.”⁹⁹ As Brandt says, “If the cigarette was deeply insinuated into American culture by the middle of the century, it had also become central to the modern nation’s industrial economy.” The “triumph” of the cigarette “was complete.”¹⁰⁰ For the remainder of the twentieth century, advertisers and politicians quickly and consistently seized on the triumphant soldier-cigarette

⁹⁷ Burnham, *Bad Habits*, 96.

⁹⁸ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 49.

⁹⁹ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 97.

¹⁰⁰ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 97.

tandem and linked it to that “undefinable something” the American soldier fought for in all of America’s wars: the American spirit of independence.¹⁰¹ Yet, how much were Americans and their elected representatives willing to *pay*, both monetarily, morally, and health wise, for the free, independent, iconic soldier-smoker? This dilemma would come to dominate the soldier-cigarette discourse for the second half of the twentieth century.

¹⁰¹ Burnham, *Bad Habits*, 103.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOLDIER, THE CIGARETTE, AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The Military, Transition, and the AVF

Monday, June 30, 1973: the end of an era, in more ways than one. On that day, Dwight Elliot Stone became the last man drafted in America. Stone, a twenty-four-year-old plumber's apprentice from Sacramento, California, spent years trying to avoid the draft. He was first drafted in 1969, but avoided service because of complications from a car wreck. Drafted again in 1970, he tried unsuccessfully to acquire a student deferment. He avoided the local draft officer for two more years but was eventually indicted for draft evasion. When his name came up again in late 1972, he decided to stop avoiding his obligation and took steps to join the service. Stone was delayed for several months while his previous evasion charge was cleared. He eventually entered the Armed Forces Induction Station in Oakland, California, at two o'clock in the afternoon on June 30, 1973, raised his right hand, and "took the ritual step forward to signify his induction" as the newest member of the United States Army.¹

Three decades before Dwight Elliot Stone was forced to enter the service, a young lawyer left his lucrative position in a Florida law firm, where he had been a partner since 1934, and volunteered for duty as a line private in WWII. The young lawyer was Charles E. Bennett, and he served as a combat infantryman fighting in the jungles of the Philippines and New Guinea. He earned the Bronze and Silver Stars in recognition of his valorous service. He also contracted polio during his time fighting in the Asian jungles, a disease leaving him crippled for the rest of his life. Undaunted by his physical limitation, he won election as a Florida Democrat to the US House of Representatives in 1949 and retained his seat for twenty-one straight election

¹ David Wood, "Last Draftee, Who Tried to Hide, Now Believes In Service," *The Seattle Times*, June 22, 1993; United Press International, "Last Draftee Doing Duty," *Boca Raton News*, September 13, 1973, 5B.

campaigns. He was known by his colleagues as “Mr. Clean” for his staunch adherence to ethical standards. He was a prolific legislator, introducing legislation that added *In God We Trust* to American currency in 1955 and installed the first Code of Ethics for Government Service in 1958. House records reveal he never missed a Congressional roll call. He was a firm fiscal conservative and refused to take Congressional pay raises. He insisted on returning his veteran’s disability pension and Social Security payments to the United States Treasury, exercising personal responsibility for what he viewed as the nation’s most disturbing liability: the national debt.²

With this spirit of fiscal and moral responsibility in mind, Congressman Bennett quietly began questioning the decades old practice of providing at government expense free cigarettes to soldiers as part of their daily field rations. He was motivated to action after a conversation with his legislative assistant Roger Hilkert in early March 1973. Hilkert told Bennett of an encounter with Warrant Officer Kent Miller at the offices of the 1/380th Infantry Battalion at the Washington, DC, National Guard Armory. Miller was a “heavy, heavy smoker,” and was in the midst of a coughing spell when Hilkert commented that Miller “wouldn’t have gotten that cough if there hadn’t been cigarettes in the Individual Combat Rations served in the field.” Hilkert’s remark to Miller was just a passing comment, but later Hilkert gave the conversation more thought. He did some checking and came to the conclusion that “it [was] obvious that the taxpayer was being taken for a ride in two directions at once.” The two different rides refer to the

² Charles Bennett, Smathers Library, University of Florida, accessed November 15, 2013, <http://www.uflib.ufl.edu/spec/pkyonge/Bennett.htm>; “Charles E. Bennett: A Noble Life,” *The Florida Times-Union*, September 9, 2003, accessed October 31, 2014, http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/090903/opi_13479868.shtml.

taxpayers' requirement to pay for soldiers' rationed cigarettes in addition to paying for the health-related expenses associated with smoking.³

Hilkert subsequently discussed this issue with Congressman Bennett and pressed him to take action, but cautioned him regarding the "political aspects of the decision."⁴ Based on the events of the next thirty years, there is little doubt about the nature and veracity of the "political aspects" Hilkert brought to Bennett's attention. A seasoned congressional liaison, Hilkert was referencing the opposition Bennett could expect from tobacco state politicians and the cigarette industry lobby if he decided to attack the cigarette ration. Despite these cautionary warnings, Bennett, with little if any fanfare, issued a letter to the DoD on March 6, 1973, requesting information regarding why "C, K, and combat rations included free cigarettes." As a former infantry soldier and smoker, Bennett had firsthand experience with the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette. Bennett argued a young man's only justifiable reason for obtaining cigarettes in the field was if he was addicted to the use of tobacco. However even considering nicotine addiction, Bennett reasoned that the nation was no longer at war, and soldiers had ample opportunity to buy cigarettes out of their own pockets due to advances in modern battlefield logistics and the close proximity of supply points. Therefore, there was no reason for the taxpayer, through the federal government, to continue providing "free cigarettes" to soldiers.⁵

Interestingly, Bennett's chief concern in this initial inquiry expressed his desire to "know what the cost of these [government rationed] cigarettes may be" to the taxpayer, rather than the

³ Charles Bennett, Note to File, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida. In the Bennett papers, Congressman Bennett includes a "Note to File" that details the exact day, time, place, and circumstances that motivated him to pursue removing cigarettes from combat rations.

⁴ Charles Bennett, Note to File, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

⁵ Charles E. Bennett Memo to Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 6, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

detrimental effects cigarette smoking had on soldiers' health and combat readiness.⁶ As a member of Congress, and in accordance with the US Constitution, Bennett's job was to exercise oversight of the federal purse.⁷ As a public servant, his primary concern with health policy was grounded in his duty to monitor the expenditure of public funds. However, in addition to Bennett's primary fiscal justification for removing cigarettes from field rations, Bennett, like Lucy Paige Gaston and the Progressives of the early twentieth century, added a moral justification.

Lucy Paige Gaston was the cigarette industry's chief opponent before WWI and established the anti-cigarette league of America in 1899. Her organization swelled to 300,000 members during the years prior to the Great War. She argued cigarettes were hazardous to health, particularly threatening to the young, and were a springboard to other social ills such as gambling, alcoholism, prostitution, and crime. Her movement was ultimately unsuccessful as Progressives lost interest when the Volstead Act was passed (Prohibition). Adding to the demise of the movement was the popularity of the cigarette among the soldiers in WWI, a popularity that followed them home and influenced American smoking culture.⁸ By 1973, Gaston's progressive anti-cigarette torch, once bright, was now barely visible. However, Bennett picked up where Gaston left off with his assertion that the cigarette ration was a moral contradiction. He

⁶ Charles E. Bennett Memo to Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 6, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

⁷ US Constitution, art. 1, sec. 7 and 8.

⁸ Tate, *Cigarette Wars*, 39-45.

argued it was objectionable to force the “taxpayer to pay for free distribution to soldiers of something which the Surgeon General has found to be injurious to human health.”⁹

The end of the cigarette ration came rather quickly. On March 21, 1973, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Major General George J. Hays, responded to Bennett’s inquiry and confirmed the DoD does indeed still carry the requirement to buy cigarettes for soldiers. He justified the continuation of this policy, describing it as a program designed to “ease the logistics burden” on the Army. This rationing program ensured that small packages of cigarettes were supplied in each individual ration with no concern as to whether the soldier smoked or not. Additionally General Hays included the cost figure of 2 ½ cents per cigarette.¹⁰ Not satisfied with this response from the military, Bennett contacted the Surgeon General’s office and “pitted [the SG] in the debate against DoD.”¹¹

On April 30, 1973, acting Surgeon General S. Paul Ehrlich responded to Congressman Bennett’s request, stating he “share[d] your concern about routine indiscriminate distribution of cigarettes” to soldiers. He agreed with Bennett’s assertion that providing free cigarettes to soldiers was irresponsible, stating the “evidence of the serious health consequences of smoking continues to accumulate.” Where Bennett was most concerned with the cost, Ehrlich was most concerned with “distribution of cigarettes to non-smokers,” stating the current policy was “certainly undesirable.” Like a true and seasoned bureaucrat, Ehrlich recommended further study

⁹ Bennett Memo to Immediate Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 6, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

¹⁰ General Hays Memo to Bennett, March 21, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

¹¹ Charles Bennett, Note to File, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida..

of the DoD's cigarette rationing policy. He urged the DoD to weigh any rationing policy against the "costs of making it easy for non-smokers to begin to develop the habit."¹²

Bennett forwarded his March 6 memo, along with General Hays's and Surgeon General Ehrlich's response to Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson on May 2, 1973 and requested Richardson to provide his "thoughts on the matter."¹³ On May 17, 1973, the Secretary of Defense's office took action in response to Congressmen Bennett's inquiry. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul H. Riley informed Bennett he did "agree that it is time the Department of Defense finds a better way to distribute cigarettes to smokers." Further, he indicated he had asked each of the armed services to comment on his plan to remove cigarettes from combat meal rations.

In a memo dated the same day to each of the armed services, Riley laid out his case for removing the cigarettes. First, he addressed the reason for the congressional inquiry, stating the cost of the cigarette rationing program, estimated at \$682,000 for Fiscal Year 1973, was no longer an acceptable expense. Addressing the health issue second, along with the Surgeon General's concerns regarding nonsmokers, Riley stated that "with our present national effort to reduce smoking, it is inappropriate for DoD even to appear to be in the position of encouraging smoking by the indiscriminate distribution of cigarettes to nonsmokers."¹⁴ This statement regarding nonsmokers, along with Ehrlich's previous statement, placed substantial weight behind the argument that the Army, through its nearly 50 year program of supplying cigarettes to non-

¹² Ehrlich Memo to Bennett, April 30, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

¹³ Bennett Memo to Richardson, May 2, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

¹⁴ Riley Memo to Bennett, May 17, 1973 and Riley Memo to armed services and Director, Defense Supply Agency, May 17, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

smoking soldiers, had, without knowing, created a vast number of smokers for the cigarette industry.

Riley received no substantial objections from the services, and on June 6, 1973, he informed Congressman Bennett “the requirement for cigarettes [was] deleted from the specification and from the procurement” of combat rations.¹⁵ With that, the nature of the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette took a sharp turn. The military’s policy of supplying free, rationed cigarettes to soldiers, established 55 years earlier by General Peyton March during WWI, came to an end.

In a press release dated June 6, 1973, Congressman Bennett announced the demise of the rationed cigarette program, permanently altering the relationship between the soldier and the cigarette. Bennett repeated his reasoning that an end of combat operations in Vietnam and soldiers’ more than adequate access to cheap cigarettes in their post exchanges signaled the end of the government’s requirement to provide cigarettes. Bennett insisted it was time to stop forcing taxpayers to subsidize cigarettes for soldiers, a requirement that had cost them millions of dollars over the decades since they were first saddled with this fiscal responsibility in WWI.¹⁶ The removal of the cigarette ration was largely a quiet affair achieved through a running conversation between Bennett and mid-level DoD officials. It was never raised as an issue on the floor of Congress and never put to a debate. In the future, Congressmen seeking to unhinge or limit the long standing soldier-cigarette relationship even further would find themselves blocked at every turn by a powerful cigarette enterprise determined to prolong the soldier-cigarette bond.

AVF Sticker Shock

¹⁵ Riley Memo to Bennett, June 6, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

¹⁶ Bennett Press Release, June 12, 1973, Cigarettes Folder, Box 93, Bennett Papers, Smathers Library, The University of Florida.

Post-war defense cuts and the enormous personnel costs associated with plans to replace draftees with long-service professionals ensured close scrutiny of all military budgets. Many sought to rein in the profligate spending long the norm during a decade of war. Bennett was a seasoned legislative veteran and ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee and was painfully aware of the budget battles looming on the horizon. One of the major reasons why Congress had voted to continue the draft year after year was because it was relatively inexpensive. In *The Draft*, historian George Flynn argues that the draft was advertised as a low-cost alternative to a large, garrisoned, long-service professional Army because it “simply taxed young men a service time in exchange for the security that had been bought by earlier generations of males.”¹⁷ As America wrestled with ending the draft and replacing it with a system structured around an AVF, there were grave fiscal concerns.¹⁸ Bennett was able to address some of the fiscal concerns associated with this transition by removing the cigarette ration. Yet the savings this generated were a mere pittance compared to the enormous cost of fielding a volunteer force—an endeavor that turned out to require the “outlay of bewildering sums of money.”¹⁹

When Dwight Elliot Stone reported for training at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in July 1973, he entered a military establishment in transition. The removal of cigarettes from combat rations was just one of many drastic changes the military faced over the next decade. Principal among these changes was the implementation of the AVF. In 1969, America took its first earnest steps toward

¹⁷ George Q. Flynn, *The Draft: 1940-1973* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 8.

¹⁸ David Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military Today* (Garden City, New York: Anchor-Doubleday Press, 1975), 172. Cortright characterizes this shift as “one of the most important developments in the history of the American military . . . designed to maintain worldwide commitments without the social upheaval resulting from conscription.” His criticism of the expense of the AVF, though grounded in truth in terms of cost figures, must be tempered with an understanding that he is an avowed peace activist and a scholar of peace activism.

¹⁹ Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt*, 180.

an AVF. President Richard Nixon appointed Thomas Gates to chair a commission to study the prospects for ending the draft, as well as the feasibility of a volunteer force. Gates was the former Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration and was intimately familiar with the draft as well as calls to end it.

Two driving factors were behind Nixon's AVF push: politics and class considerations. Nixon had made a campaign pledge to end the draft, and with the next presidential election just around the corner, he had to take action.²⁰ At the height of the Vietnam War, many Americans were increasingly disturbed by the perceived class inequities of the draft system. The deferment criterion had become large and unwieldy, exempting nearly everyone except for working class poor and minorities who could not afford to go to college, had no inside connections with state National Guard units, or could not afford to fund an extended trip to Canada even if they wanted to dodge the draft.²¹

In short, the draft was “an unfair tax on young men which could no longer be rationalized on military, political, or economic grounds.”²² Charles Moskos, the leading scholar and sociologist of the AVF and the American enlisted force, provides the most concise assessment that combines both the political and class features of Nixon’s AVF policy. He argues that America’s move to the AVF was not grounded in military grand strategy “aimed at improving the nation’s future capabilities *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union or its clients. Essentially, the decision

²⁰ Flynn, *The Draft*, 271. Flynn argues that Nixon ended the Draft because the AVF would make “his reelection more likely.”

²¹ Christian Appy, *Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 6-7.

²² James L. Lacy, “Whither the All-Volunteer Force?” *Yale Law & Policy Review*, 5, no. 1 (1986): 41.

was political: Washington's response to growing middle-class reaction to Selective Service and the past burdens of war itself.”²³

After years of debate, President Nixon determined to end the draft, effective the first day of July 1973. However Nixon's decision was not a slam dunk. There were many who doubted the move to a volunteer force, and their chief concern was expense. An entire chorus of government officials argued that a volunteer force was prohibitively expensive. As early as 1966, Thomas D. Morris, Democrat from New Mexico, argued in Congress it would take an additional \$17 billion and a 280 percent increase in military pay in order to compete with the civilian labor market and transition to an AVF.²⁴ Other officials began denouncing the entire philosophy behind an AVF driven by free market economics and vague funding strategies.

The editor of *Army Magazine*, L. James Bender, led this vocal opposition to the AVF philosophy, saying it “translated military service into a marketable commodity” and that assumptions regarding young Americans’ eagerness to enlist in an incentive-ridden, cash-happy AVF were “hogwash.”²⁵ In 1967, the House Armed Services Committee’s Civilian Advisory Panel on Military Manpower Procurement advised that an AVF was “exorbitantly expensive”

²³ Charles Moskos, “The All-Volunteer Force,” *The Wilson Quarterly*, 3, no. 2 (1979): 131. Moskos was an avowed critic of the volunteer force concept. He advocated restoring the military draft and insisted an enforced, shared military experience for a diverse America comprised of different classes, races and economic backgrounds forged a sense of common purpose. In this way, he was an advocate of classic republicanism, a political philosophy grounded in disinterested service to the state and virtue. For political nature of Nixon’s decision, also see John Whiteclay Chambers, II, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to America* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 258, 272. Chambers says, “In Vietnam, the United States tried without success to use an army composed largely of short-term draftees to fight a long-term expeditionary war in a region unrelated to American security. Largely as a political consequence, the United States abandoned the draft and turned instead entirely to voluntarism and a large professional standing army.”

²⁴ Flynn, *The Draft*, 262-264. Thomas Morris served in Congress from 1961 to 1968.

²⁵ Flynn, *The Draft*, 267.

and generated fears the defense of the nation would be left up to “mercenaries.”²⁶ The Gates Commission actively worked to refute these claims regarding the tremendous expense of a volunteer force. The Commission instead argued a modest increase of \$4 billion in defense appropriations was sufficient.²⁷ They were wildly inaccurate with their predictions.

The Commission derived its cost projection figures from economist Milton Friedman. Friedman argued the military could meet recruiting quotas by utilizing “traditional market incentives,” an argument that made him the antithesis to popular New Deal economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynesian economics ascribes to the hypothesis that free markets are not structured to provide full employment, and large-scale government intervention in the economy is required in modern economies. Keynesian thought prevailed after the Great Depression, when the precedent for large scale and sustained economic intervention by the federal government was established and then normalized in the decades since.

As time passed, a reformative correction to Keynesian theory was inevitable as well as a call to return to classic *laissez-faire* economics. A proponent of Adam Smith’s free market, Friedman wanted to use a combination of market forces, economic incentives, and young Americans’ innate sense of patriotism to underpin a volunteer force. Between 1950 and 1980, when America was in the midst of an intense debate over the Draft and funding a volunteer force, Friedman was the leading economist calling for a return to classic free market economics, advocating for a “broad . . . rollback of Keynesian heresy.”²⁸ However, Friedman was not

²⁶ Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt*, 180.

²⁷ Flynn, *The Draft*, 262-266.

²⁸ Paul Krugman, “Who Was Milton Friedman,” *The New York Review of Books* (February 15, 2007), accessed January 27, 2015, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/feb/15/who-was-milton-friedman/>.

immune from criticism. His market-driven recruitment scheme drew fire from many traditionalists, like Charles Moskos, who were suspicious of Friedman's business case:

The difficulties of the all-volunteer force do not originate in the death of conscription or in the efforts of service recruiters. The crucial flaw has been an informal redefinition since 1971 by Congress (informed by Friedman's theories) . . . of military service as a function of "supply and demand variables" as a "job" to be filled through "market incentive" . . . in the final analysis, reliance on the market system is not the way to recruit or sustain an all-volunteer force, nor is it the way to strengthen the armed services for increasingly complex and demanding tasks on behalf of the larger society.²⁹

Regardless of such critiques in terms of both theory and expense, Freidman's market driven concepts were the guiding light for AVF policy during this period. The central tenet in Freidman's economic policy involved "what he considered the uselessness and counterproductive nature of most government regulation." Freidman was a firm believer that the military-industrial complex could run by itself, generating recruits without massive government intervention or subsidy. He insisted that if "a money tax rather than a physical tax (conscription) was spread throughout the population, enough money was available to raise military pay to a level competitive with the private sector." With conflicting data represented in a myriad of government studies about America's ability to "buy an alternative to the draft," it was left to Congress to wade through the figures and determine the best course of action.³⁰ In many ways, Congress' decision, regardless of the recommendation of the Gates Commission, was determined before the commission even convened—America, led by President Nixon, was moving to an AVF no matter what, even if it "bankrupt[ed] the country."³¹

²⁹ Moskos, "The All-Volunteer Force," 140, 142.

³⁰ Moskos, "The All-Volunteer Force," 140.

³¹ Flynn, *The Draft*, 260, 261, 264. Flynn provides copious documentation in this section of the *many* government officials that claimed any move to an AVF would be prohibitively expensive and might bankrupt the country.

The Gates Commission's final report was heavily influenced by Friedman's economic theories, projecting a relatively meager \$2.7 billion a year in additional appropriations.³² This estimate is incredible considering the mounting evidence of an enormously expensive AVF. As many predicted, the report was overly optimistic on many levels, and expenses began accumulating. Over three decades, the Army had grown used to a steady stream of draftees filling the ranks; the military enterprise had a seemingly limitless supply of soldiers. Moreover, drafted soldiers were easy to train and easy to replace.³³ Now the Army had to attract recruits in a post-Vietnam America that harbored negative perceptions about military service. A soldiering career was often looked down upon, and more extreme elements of American society even considered such employment criminal.

The repeal of the draft turned the Army's recruiting operations into a sales pitch fraught with expenses and newfound challenges. To meet these challenges, a wave of newly minted Army recruiters armed with bonuses and benefits waded into a hostile environment in an all-out effort to fill the ranks of the new AVF.³⁴ Some worried about the future of an Army marketed as a job choice as opposed to a noble act of service. According to historian David R. Segal, the repeal "dealt a mortal wound to the principle of obligation by explicitly identifying financial inducements as the major incentive for voluntarism."³⁵ Americans paid a hefty price to recruit and retain its service personnel after 1973, and the Army had to rely on expensive monetary

³² Flynn, *The Draft*, 266; Gates Commission, *The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, February 1970), 7.

³³ Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), 14.

³⁴ Bailey, *America's Army*, 101-103, 185. Bailey details the extreme pressures on these new recruiters as well as the fact that the number of recruiters and recruiting stations doubled in the first half of the 1970s.

³⁵ David R. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 17.

inducements, bonuses, expanded benefits packages, and costly advertising campaigns to meet yearly quotas throughout the 1970s.

This resulted in exponential increases to recruiting budgets, a line item the Army was forced to increase by 600 percent during the 1970s.³⁶ Despite spending billions to recruit *quality* volunteers and assumptions by the Gates Commission that longer term enlistments would save money, it did not work as predicted. Partly due to demographics, societal reaction to the Vietnam debacle, and the period's teen culture, all beyond the scope of this study, the military found it very difficult to attract and retain quality recruits. Compared to pre-Vietnam figures, the desertion rate doubled during the first decade of the AVF. During the draft, roughly 20 percent of all draftees failed to complete their first year. By the late 1970s, that number had doubled. An astounding 600,000 were discharged for misconduct or other various reasons, and over 20 percent of the force admitted to using drugs at least once a month. The Army reported that 16,000 soldiers were admitted to alcohol abuse programs in 1979, and another 24,000 in 1980.

During the same time period, the number of Army soldiers incarcerated increased by 47 percent.³⁷ The Army also had to spend large sums of money and time on remedial courses to bring vast portions of the AVF recruits up to speed: nearly 25 percent of all Army recruits in 1977 read at or below the sixth grade level.³⁸ Though the long term healthcare savings derived from smoking cessation would eventually become substantial, in 1979 the million dollars Bennett saved by removing cigarettes from soldiers' rations seemed a trivial sum when compared to the multi-billion dollar price tag of recruiting and retaining the new AVF. And

³⁶ Bailey, *America's Army*, 67, 72.

³⁷ Flynn, *The Draft*, 274; Bailey, *America's Army*, 124.

³⁸ Moskos, "The All-Volunteer Force," 134.

recruiting and retention expenses were just beginning to amass. By the end of the decade, a whole portfolio of additional expenses emerged and continued to grow.

From 1967 to 1975, military pay was increased by 87 percent, with the bulk of the increase occurring when the draft ended in 1973. Military pay expressed as a percentage of total defense spending rose from 34 percent in 1964 to 40 percent in 1973. By 1974, the military was spending 56 percent of its budget on manpower costs alone. In the Army, for example, manpower costs had increased by 30 percent, despite the size of the force decreasing by 37 percent during the same period. In 1978, the Carter Administration added another 11.7 percent pay raise to shore up a string of recruiting shortages. Reagan added 11.1 percent in 1981 and 14.3 percent in 1982. These “catch-up raises” were effective (military pay was raised by roughly one-third) but again, were expensive.³⁹ Cortright, a scholar and critic of US defense policy, argues that the AVF “created an unprecedented crisis in the defense budget and . . . contributed to severe manpower difficulties . . . fail[ing] to attract a sufficient volume of recruits to maintain force strengths.”⁴⁰

The AVF also brought a relatively new conundrum appropriators had to face: In buying an AVF, the government bought not only the soldier, but his or her dependents as well. The drafted force was an overwhelmingly single force. During the draft era, social and cultural patterns dictated that young men completed their obligation of military service and then returned home to settle down, start a family, and pursue a life in the civilian sector. Though the draft affected many areas of American social life, to include “the caliber of major league baseball . . . the survival of liberal arts colleges [and] the rate of procreation of American males,” the institution of marriage and family were largely left untouched by the draft boards. Due to a

³⁹ Lacy, “Whither the All-Volunteer Force?”, 47.

⁴⁰ Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 69; Flynn, *The Draft*, 264, 271; Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt*, 182.

deferment system reflecting America's social and cultural values, single men were called first, and husbands and fathers were given a pass. It was felt that in the "American patriarchal home," married men were the "bedrock of the Republic" providing "moral leadership and protection."⁴¹

Friedman had argued a volunteer force would rid the nation once and for all of the class distinctions and deferment controversies inherent in an armed force that exempted husbands, fathers, students, and preachers from duty obligations. He posited the draft and associated deferment inequities were "un-American and wasteful" as they "jam colleges, raise the birth rate and fuel the divorce courts."⁴² He was sure the AVF would attract quality recruits and give lower classes a chance for social uplift, an assumption that proved correct over time. However, this quality volunteer force emerged as an overwhelmingly married force with expensive healthcare needs, which was yet another expense associated with the AVF.

Gates and Freidman considered a quality recruit as someone looking for a "career" and envisioned a new Army comprised of long-term professionals.⁴³ However career men were married men that came with a hefty bill in the form of dependents and long-term health care liabilities. These cost factors were not significant in the drafted force, as it was largely comprised of short-service, single males. From a rate of near zero during WWII, the marriage rate had increased to 33 percent in 1953. The numbers steadily increased throughout the transition to the AVF, and by the late 1970s, 60 percent of all military members were married and had families.⁴⁴

With the shift from a drafted to a volunteer force, as with any major policy change of this magnitude, these unanticipated second- and third-order effects were sure to materialize. However

⁴¹ Flynn, *The Draft*, 271, 279, 20, 30.

⁴² Flynn, *The Draft*, 265.

⁴³ Flynn, *The Draft*, 268.

⁴⁴ Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 84.

the drastic increase in dependents was a substantial development with manifold policy implications. Moskos comments, “One unanticipated consequence of the shift to an all-volunteer force—and higher pay—has been a marked increase in marriage among the junior enlisted ranks.”⁴⁵ These married AVF soldiers came with dependents, or quickly produced dependents while in the service, and dependents required care at the government’s expense. By 1979, the Army had to account for the evacuation of 160,000 wives and children in case of a Soviet attack in West Germany. Moskos cites personal experience in his comment that the orderly room “babysitter” was a common sight throughout his tours of Army units in Germany during this period.⁴⁶ The costs associated with dependent care, especially as it relates to the healthcare of a cigarette smoking AVF, became an increasingly expensive endeavor in the future. This issue is discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.

In addition to these possibly more obvious expenses associated with fielding a professional volunteer Army, there were also the not-so-obvious. One rather substantial example is the proliferation of civilian contractors in the post-draft Army. Since professional soldiers were no longer required to do the menial work associated with service in the drafted force, the Army had to add expanded contracting services to its budget requirement. Soldier-led kitchen patrol, latrine duty, and grounds maintenance tasks were a thing of the past. The *pickle suit potato peeler* was replaced with a kitchen services technician; the latrine private was swapped for the sanitary engineer. Professional soldiers who volunteered for service, the rationale went,

⁴⁵ Moskos, “The All-Volunteer Force,” 136.

⁴⁶ Moskos, “The All-Volunteer Force,” 137.

needed to spend time in more efficient ways by training to do their jobs and learning how to operate the new, expensive weapons of war—not peeling potatoes or scrubbing toilet bowls.⁴⁷

As a result of all these additional expenses, elected officials experienced sticker shock. Congressmen weary of the AVF's price tag talked openly about “unacceptable cuts in the Defense program” to fund the AVF. They feared the AVF was impossible without “causing a big deficit or higher taxes.” In short, they argued the Gates Commission had “seriously miscalculated” the cost of the AVF.⁴⁸ And they were right. In 1978, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported the AVF cost the government \$18 billion more than a drafted force of the same size would have cost.⁴⁹

When combined, the issues of pay, bonuses, incentive money, dependent obligations, recruiting budgets, contractors, advertising expenses, desertion wastage, and a myriad of other expenses created formidable challenges for appropriators tasked with funding America’s military enterprise.⁵⁰ Yet astonishingly, despite the billions of dollars they carved out to fund the force, the Army was still missing recruiting goals. An Army recruiter in Massachusetts offered a \$1,500 bonus for each enlistment contract. Even with the local paper misprinting the advertisement as a \$15,000 bonus, not a single recruit darkened the door.⁵¹ In 1974, the Army

⁴⁷ Bailey, *America’s Army*, 57,62.

⁴⁸ Flynn, *The Draft*, 270.

⁴⁹ Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 69.

⁵⁰ Moskos, “The All-Volunteer Force,” 138. Moskos comments that “post-entry disillusionment relates directly to the extremely high rate of attritions (wastage) in the all-volunteer force. Since 1973, more than one in three recruits have failed to complete their initial enlistments: they were discharged for disciplinary reasons, personality disorders, or job inaptitude.” Further, “the desertion rate in the all-volunteer force is twice as high as that in the pre-Vietnam period—17.8 [percent] per thousand enlisted personnel in 1977 compared to 7.9 percent in 1964. What makes the current desertion figures especially troublesome, of course, is that they occur on top of the high attrition rates.”

⁵¹ Flynn, *The Draft*, 271.

was short again despite spending an additional \$68 million, a price tag that produced only 63 percent of their recruiting goal.⁵² Even more shocking, despite the billions spent during the 1970s on the AVF, in 1979 Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer dropped a bombshell when he informed Congress that the force it had bought was not the professional, quality force Congressmen thought they were getting—to the contrary, it was a “hollow” force.⁵³

In *Prodigal Soldiers*, a book describing the difficulties of the post-Vietnam military, author James Kitfield offers a telling account of Army Chief of Staff’s admission to the Armed Service Committee that the Army was a broken force. General Meyer described how the Army could not meet its mission requirement to have ten reinforcing divisions deployed to Europe within fourteen days. He told the President that the Army could barely muster four divisions to support this requirement. Meyer also informed the President of failures to successfully incorporate the Reserves and National Guard into the active Army (Total Force concept), the chronic drug and alcohol problems in the Army, as well as the low numbers of high school graduates entering the force. Kitfield describes the dramatic close to General Myers’s testimony. “Mr. President,” Meyer summarized after glancing in the direction of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, “what we have is a hollow Army.”⁵⁴ The bloated military budgets associated with the *hollow force* of the early-to-mid 1970s were unique in American history because, “for the first time military spending increased at the conclusion of a major war.”⁵⁵ This was an

⁵² Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 37; Bailey, *America’s Army*, 273; Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt*, 178.

⁵³ James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 1997), 198–199.

⁵⁴ Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers*, 198–199.

⁵⁵ Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt*, 178.

unparalleled occurrence that bewildered many; the AVF, as opposed to Gates' modest predictions, was an "immensely expensive proposition" with mounting costs.⁵⁶ And one must not forget that as America was coming to grips with the proposition of *buying* an AVF, it was still footing the bill for the Republic of Vietnam's Army to the tune of a billion dollars between 1971 and 1972.⁵⁷ As the costs associated with a professional volunteer force tasked to police the world and contain Communism spiraled out of control, Congress took notice. Many showed signs of buyer's remorse and regretted purchasing an expensive Army where only 64 percent of its recruits made it through their initial enlistment.⁵⁸ In 1979, Senator Sam Nunn summed it up best when he commented that the AVF was "a luxury the United States could no longer afford."⁵⁹ Despite the talk of a professional force recruited from the best and brightest and paid "luxury" wages commiserate with civilian professionals, the Army was in near-crisis mode. As the Army started to comprehend the cost of recruiting the AVF and the short-term costs of meeting its

⁵⁶ Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt*, 176.

⁵⁷ Andrew Wiest, *Vietnam's Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN* (New York: NYU Press, 2009), 232; James Wilbanks, *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 202, 229. Compounding expenses associated with the nation's post-Vietnam move to the AVF, the country was still paying for its Vietnam experience. In addition to the nearly five billion dollars in aid and equipment for South Vietnam in 1973 and 1974, Congress had to produce several extra-budgetary supplementals to pay to replenish a physically and morally broken Army. Wilbanks argues that domestic economic factors contributed to President Ford's decision to abandon Vietnam, "rising unemployment, ballooning national debt, and the continuing energy crisis." Financing the AVF in the midst of fiscal uncertainty proved to be problematic.

⁵⁸ Bailey, *America's Army*, 172.

⁵⁹ Roger Mils Folsom, "Can Conscription Work?", *Cato Policy Analysis No. 1* (May 15, 1981), accessed November 26, 2013, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa001.html#2b>. Senator Sam Nunn was a member of the Senate's Armed Services Committee and was chairman of its subcommittee on manpower and personnel in the ninety-sixth congress. In 1979, Nunn famously concluded that the problems in recruiting qualified men and women for military service, especially in the Army's combat arms, showed "the All-Volunteer Force is in trouble now and the problems are going to get worse during the 1980s. No facile solutions are at hand . . . the AVF may be a luxury that the United States can no longer afford." Further he lamented the "very large" costs associated with the AVF, saying the "Federal bureaucracy is not knowledgeable enough or capable of administering such a program [the AVF]."

manpower goals, it also began to consider the long-term cost of the AVF. Many of these soldiers volunteered under the assumption, and indeed were encouraged, to make the military their profession and stay around for retirement. Unlike the drafted force, who did their hitch and then returned home to start families and take civilian jobs, the new Army was made up of career men. When the country transitioned from the draft to the AVF, the government bought, and now owned, several million young men and women, along with their families, their hopes, and their futures. Similar to real estate, extensive costs are associated with ownership, and America's experience with the AVF proved that notion. As contentious as the AVF expenses were, ownership of a smoking AVF, along with the nature of the health care *promise* made to late draft-era and AVF soldiers, the majority of whom were smokers, was even more controversial.

CHAPTER VII

SOLDIER STARTERS

Can the Industry Afford Losing “Starters”?

Congress's concerns about the costs associated with an AVF grew and soon included anxiety over the specter of a smoking, then retiring AVF; in North Carolina and other key tobacco states, the cigarette industry faced a related crisis. If the AVF was a *luxury* the nation could not afford, failing to recruit a steady stream of smoking starters, many of whom traditionally resided in the ranks of the Army, was a situation the cigarette industry could not afford. As a result of the 1964 Surgeon General's Warning and subsequent efforts by the FTC to place warnings on cigarette packages, the industry was aware its acceptability margin was beginning to slip once again. The data was in: 1970 saw the first ever *drop* reported in total manufactured cigarettes smoked by Americans.¹

Adding to the burgeoning crisis, while Congress was debating the merits versus the mounting cost of an AVF, Congressman Bennett had slipped in measures to remove the cigarette from soldier rations. Industry executives were concerned the cigarette enterprise was locked in an uphill battle against negative public opinion over the scientific data connecting cigarettes to various health hazards and diseases. If measures were not taken soon, movement up that hill would stall, and like an airplane that runs out of airspeed and altitude at the exact same moment, the industry would crash and burn. Four industry and advertising executives, or the firms they founded, played a key role in efforts to stabilize the cigarette industry's position in America during this period: Burns Roper, Ted Bates, Fred Panzer, and Horace Kornegay.

¹ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 57. From 1965 to 1970, total cigarettes smoked in America dropped by nearly 300 million total cigarettes. This was the first drop in manufactured cigarette smoking ever recorded in America since cigarette statistics were first collected and reported in 1900.

Burns Roper was a decorated WWII veteran who piloted B-17 bomber aircraft over Germany during the Combined Bomber Offensive, racking up a total of thirty-five combat missions.² After a particularly dangerous mission, he received an air medal for landing his heavily damaged aircraft operating on just one engine, back at his home base in England. After leaving the service, he returned home to Massachusetts and joined his father's marketing research firm. The Roper Marketing Research Agency established an extensive affiliation with the cigarette industry. It conducted a total of eight separate survey-based studies over a thirty-year period to help the industry understand Americans' smoking behaviors, lifestyle choices, and perceptions regarding smoking-related health hazards.³ The industry depended on marketing research from agencies like Roper & Associates to inform its long-term strategic assessments on which millions of dollars in advertising expenditures, as well as billions in profits, relied.

Ted Bates was also an influential cigarette industry advertiser and is a member of the Advertising Hall of Fame. After graduating from Yale in 1924, Bates worked in the banking industry before forming his own ad agency in 1940. With initial clients like Colgate-Palmolive and Continental Baking, Bates was a leader in advertising innovation during the 1940s and 1950s. One of his groundbreaking advertising concepts involved development of a Unique Selling Position (USP) for each of the product brands the firm represented. A USP is used to identify a "unique feature of each product and connect it in the minds of consumers with the brand name." When Ted Bates & Co., contracted with the cigarette industry to provide marketing research and advertising guidance, his firm

² Burns Roper Biographical Information, accessed November 1, 2013, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/center/bud_bio.html.

³ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 313.

supplied a USP-based marketing plan to help the industry attract teens to smoking. This plan became a central piece in one of the industry's most controversial and litigious marketing strategies.⁴

Fred Panzer was the vice president of the Tobacco Institute from 1972–1980. Panzer played an important role in steering the cigarette industry through a time of increased pressure from anti-smoking groups both in government and the private sector. Characterized as eager, “highly intelligent,” and possibly a bit “insecure,” Panzer started out as a staff writer preparing tobacco histories in booklet form for each state that grew the golden leaves.⁵ These booklets stressed the historical importance of tobacco in America, as well as tobacco’s impact on the American economy. Both of these were key talking points for the tobacco industry and tobacco state politicians throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and Panzer was at the center of this public relations strategy. Panzer soon expressed interest in legislative work and was promoted to liaison. In this capacity, he continued as a staunch promoter of tobacco interests on the floor of Congress. A bright and savvy power broker, Panzer was elevated to vice president of the Tobacco Institute in 1972 and become one of the tobacco industry’s chief lobbyists. To the delight of many trial lawyers, Panzer also authored some of the industry’s most damning documents linking confidential and controversial industry marketing strategies to a wide cigarette industry audience.

⁴ Tina Gant, “History of Bates Worldwide,” *International Directory of Company Histories* (Detroit, Michigan: St. James Press, 2000), vol. 33, accessed November 22, 2013, <http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/bates-worldwide-inc-history/>.

⁵ “Deposition of Horace Kornegay,” Norma R. Broin v. Phillip Morris Companies, Inc., 91-49738 CA (22), (11th Cir., 1994), accessed January 27, 2015, <http://www.legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ckz75a00>. In a deposition taken in Greensboro, North Carolina, by lawyers representing Norma R. Broin, Kornegay attempts to distance himself from Panzer and the Roper Memo in order to limit his personal liability for participating in the highly litigious marketing program outlined in the Roper Memo.

Finally, Horace Kornegay was also heavily involved in the tobacco lobby and was the colorful and engaging president of the Tobacco Institute from 1970 to 1981, and the Chairman from 1981 to 1987. He interrupted his law school education at Wake Forest in 1942 to enlist in the Army, served as a machine gunner in France, and was awarded the Purple Heart. He was elected as a North Carolina Democrat to Congress in 1961, and represented his district's tobacco farmers for four consecutive terms. After leaving Congress, he joined the Tobacco Institute as legal counsel in 1969 and became president of that organization in 1970.⁶ Kornegay was an ardent supporter of tobacco farmers and used his contacts in Congress to ensure the cigarette industry was well represented in the halls of government during his tenure as president of the institute.

The controversial plans and strategies these advertising and cigarette industry executives developed to address public perception issues and the starter crises were grounded in extensive market research and expert observations by industry insiders. Their ideas, research, and marketing strategies eventually made their way into fundamental cigarette industry documents. These documents were part of an enterprise-wide strategy to orient marketing efforts on the three things the cigarette industry must create if it was to survive the crisis: notions of smokers' rights, doubt, and new starters.

Smokers' Rights and Doubt

For years, industry advertising had focused on the pleasure, and even the *health benefits* derived from smoking cigarettes. In the 1930s, government-funded researchers began to dismantle these myths with early experiments showing inhaled smoke and cigarette tar caused cancer in and on mice and rabbits. During this period, Adolph Hitler

⁶ Tobacco Industry Source Watch, "Horace Kornegay," accessed January 27, 2015, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Horace_R._Kornegay.

was actually a leading proponent of cigarette research owing to his interest in propagating a healthy master race. Smoking in Nazi Germany, at least according to Hitler and his sycophants, was “a violation of National Socialist ethics . . . one’s ‘duty [was] to be healthy’ and to serve the nation and its Fuhrer.”⁷ In America, the Medical College of Virginia was an early leader in tobacco experimentation but acted largely as an organ for the tobacco industry. Proctor comments their collaboration with the industry was “so deep, and so all-encompassing, that it is sometimes hard even to find a clear line dividing the work of the college from the business of defending cigarettes.”⁸

However, the landmark year for definitive scientific data that linked cigarette smoking with lung cancer was 1950, the year Ernst Wynder concluded research that made the lethal connection. Wynder’s research was published in the *Journal of American Medicine*, and once his research was socialized among the public health, medical, and scientific communities, it led to a reassessment of the relationship between cigarette smoke and disease. As a result, a host of agencies, including the American Cancer Society, the British Medical Research Council, the American Heart Association, and a litany of leading medical schools, all came to understand and support the conclusions of Wynder’s groundbreaking study—smoking is deadly.⁹

The industry was no longer able to simply look the other way or quietly deflect attention away from harmful scientific evidence. Their initial response to these reports was to dig in and deny. Moreover, to present a façade of concern and customer

⁷ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 163.

⁸ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 190.

⁹ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 226–227, 235.

stewardship, the industry encouraged objective scientific inquiry into environmental hazards that could plausibly cause the problems scientists were now connecting to smoking. Accordingly, in a bold move to gain control of the conversation, the industry contracted with public relations firm Hill & Knowlton (H&K) to fight back. In what Robert Proctor describes as the “magna carta of the American [cigarette] industry’s conspiracy to deny any evidence of tobacco harms” and the “most widely publicized—and expensive—advertisement . . . in human history,” the cigarette enterprise began its earnest campaign to foment doubt and spread the discourse of personal choice.¹⁰

The “Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers” appeared in 448 major newspapers on January 4, 1954, and “sought to establish the industry as reliable, responsible, and fully committed to the public’s interest . . . reassure[ing] smokers by promising them that the industry was absolutely committed to their good health.”¹¹ The Frank Statement strategy was guided by the industry’s new research arm and mouthpiece—the Tobacco Industry Research Council (TIRC).¹² Though the TIRC was initially seen by the industry as a temporary measure, by 1958 it was apparent the enterprise was in for what would become a sustained effort to monitor and control cigarette messaging, research, and negative press. The enterprise soon discovered the TIRC was not sufficient to manage both the scientific research and public relations aspects of this now long-term, industry-wide campaign.

¹⁰ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 251, 259.

¹¹ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 170.

¹² The TIRC eventually became the Tobacco Institute, the firm for which Panzer and Kornegay worked.

This revelation resulted in the formation of the Tobacco Institute in 1958. The Institute assumed the industry's public relations and lobbying functions, and the TIRC was reformed as the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR).¹³ The CTR, now under the umbrella of the Tobacco Institute, continued the TIRC's core mission to provide funding for scientific research.¹⁴ The TIRC, and then the Tobacco Institute, was relatively successful in overcoming the initial flurry of negative anti-smoking press. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, one out of two Americans chose to continue smoking cigarettes. Despite the data arrayed against it, these statistics tell the story of an enterprise that mastered the narrative and dodged negative press unfriendly to the cigarette agenda.¹⁵ However, in the wake of the 1964 Surgeon General's Report warning Americans about the dangers of cigarette smoking, the enterprise swung into action. By the late 60s, they were once again in a fight to control negative press and stave off efforts by the FTC to regulate the industry.

In a memo between highly placed executives within cigarette firm Brown & Williamson (B&W) dated August 21, 1969, the industry acknowledged its continued commitment to a doubt strategy. Generated in the aftermath of renewed negative perceptions about cigarettes, smoking, and the industry, the memo relayed the bleak reality:

¹³ The TI was funded by contributions from the American cigarette companies at a level commiserate to their sales volume. In the TI, they had a one stop shop for cigarette-friendly research, lobbying and government relations, marketing research, and advertising strategy.

¹⁴ New York State Education Department, "Tobacco Industry Records: Council for Tobacco Research Administrative History" accessed November 3, 2014, http://www.archives.nysesd.gov/a/research/res_topics_bus_tobacco_adminctr.shtml.

¹⁵ U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Smoking Prevalence Among U.S. Adults, 1955–2010," accessed November 4, 2014, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0762370.html>.

Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the body of fact that exists in the mind of the general public. It is also the means of establishing that there is a controversy. If we, B&W, are successful in establishing a controversy at the public level, then there is an opportunity to put across the real facts about smoking.¹⁶

This basic doubt scheme was integral to the Tobacco Institute's core mission and by 1970, some cigarette industry executives began to feel the institute, especially its research arm, needed extra prodding to focus efforts on this mission to reassure smokers and create doubt. Helmut Wakeham, Vice President and Director of Research and Development for Philip Morris, suggested that the Tobacco Institute needed reminding that "the industry publicly and frequently denied what others find as 'truth.'" He went on to warn the industry and anyone lobbying or researching on their behalf need to "face it, we are interested in evidence which we believe denies the allegation that cigarette smoking causes disease." The industry, through membership fees, was paying the Tobacco Institute and its CTR research arm handsomely to prove the *safety* of cigarette smoking, or at least create enough doubt that such research would yield the same result: a continuation of cigarette smoking in America. Wakeham suggested that if the CTR could not deliver on this "truth" regarding the industry's interests, they should be "terminated" and denied any more funds from industry giants like Phillip Morris.¹⁷

As a result, the Tobacco Institute renewed efforts to advance the industry's interests in an environment apparently growing steadily averse to cigarette consumption. All of this was occurring during the pivotal years when America was tinkering with the way it recruited and retained soldiers in its armed service. Subsequent efforts to retain

¹⁶ J.W. Burgard, memo to R. A. Pittman et al. (August 21, 1969); quoted in 1981 Press Release Query and several FTC subpoena document, accessed November 3, 2014, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rpr83f00>.

¹⁷ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 263; Helmut Wakeham, memo to J. F. Cullman, "Best Program for CTR," December 8, 1970, accessed January 27, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/alz54e00>.

smokers and starters in the AVF were essentially a continuation of a much larger program to keep America smoking. This program was initiated back in 1954 with the *Frank Statement* and continued through 1958 with the formation of the TI. Evidence of the program to create doubt, retain smokers, and recruit starters, is found in documents such as B&W's 1969 *Doubt is Our Product* memo, and PM's 1970 *Let's Face It* memo. To these, the industry would add the 1972 *Roper Proposal* and the 1975 *Bates Memo*. Both of these documents, and the on-going, industry-wide strategy they represented, had a direct impact on the military smoking market and guided strategies the enterprise pursued in the 1980s as elements within the DoD and Congress attempted to unhinge the soldier-cigarette relationship.

With this foundation in place, Kornegay and Panzer developed several new initiatives to address the core elements of the crisis surrounding smokers' rights and doubt between 1972 and 1975. Roper & Associates' April 1970 *Study 53-0414* played a key role during this period.¹⁸ *Study 53-0414*, a groundbreaking marketing research project, uncovered several useful attitudinal aspects involved in cigarette consumption and starter decisions. Grounded in this study's findings, the TI initiated an enhanced doubt and smokers' rights program. Set forth in a memo from Panzer to Kornegay dated May 1, 1972 (*The Roper Proposal*), Panzer argued the industry was losing the war for public opinion and had to make substantial changes to address the key issues of smokers' rights and doubt. Panzer frankly admitted the industry's long-standing commitment to the doubt and smokers' rights scheme and that they had worked "brilliantly." However, he opined that these schemes were only part of what amounted to a holding strategy. Panzer

¹⁸ Roper, *Study 53-5414*, April 1970, accessed October 31, 2014, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/yrd39d00/pdf>.

reasoned that the time was right to develop a plan for victory in the “twenty year war against the tobacco industry.”¹⁹

Despite the two decades of turbulent struggle between the industry, anti-smoking groups, and unfriendly elements on Capitol Hill, Panzer expressed that lobbying efforts linking cigarettes to the American values of rights, liberty, and freedom of choice were achieving results. After all, during this period roughly half of all American men and one out of every three women were still smokers.²⁰ He was supportive of the industry’s consistent message regarding objective research, and was quick to juxtapose the industry’s enlightened concern for their customers’ health and their rights against the government’s *subjective* un-scientific research and intrusive policies.²¹ Panzer advised that this responsible research and rights *smoke screen* should continue as planned, and were even subject to expansion.

However, in the area of “create[ing] *doubt* about the health charge without actually denying it,” Panzer posited there was room for improvement. He argued that despite the statistical success in terms of profits and cigarette consumption during the two decades since the *Frank Statement*, the industry was still employing a holding strategy that could not last forever. Similar to military strategy, the industry dug in and was positioned to hold ground, but it was not actively engaging in measures to take new ground. In such an attrition oriented strategy, Panzer reasoned the industry could never

¹⁹ Fred Panzer, memo to Horace Kornegay (*The Roper Proposal*), May 1, 1972, 1, accessed November 15, 2013, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/quo14e00/pdf>. Kornegay and Senator Helms used this *twenty year war* imagery many times in many speeches.

²⁰ U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Smoking Prevalence Among U.S. Adults, 1955–2010,” accessed November 4, 2014, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0762370.html>.

²¹ This supposed juxtaposition involving rights and objective research formed a core message that became the mainstay of lobbyist and tobacco state politicians during the next two decades.

win. He argued for new plans to move the industry from a status quo holding position to a winning one.²²

Using a Vietnam War example to provide additional clarity, Panzer observed that America's Vietnam experience proved it was not possible to hold US public opinion on a middle course for any length of time. Just as President Johnson found it increasingly difficult to pursue a holding strategy to maintain public approval for the Vietnam War after 1968, Panzer reasoned the industry could not count on public favor much longer if adjustments were not made to enhance the enterprise's public image. Panzer argued that an increasing number of Americans were no longer willing to look the other way when confronted with the overwhelming scientific data linking cigarette smoking to health problems. He felt it was crucial to influence the public to an even greater extent than previous decades when branding and product differentiation were the main focus, not issues involving the acceptability of smoking and moral perceptions about a consumer product that appeared to cause bodily harm. Panzer was concerned that the public not only represented potential smokers, it represented a potential jurors. In this frank observation, Panzer saw the writing on the wall: the industry must prepare for war in the courts.

Panzer argued that up to that point, and despite its success, the existing doubt strategies still lacked a necessary focus and grounding in a modern understanding of marketing and consumption psychology. It provided smokers with "too little in the way of ready-made *credible* alternatives" that would "sustain their opinions that smoking may

²² Panzer, *Roper Proposal*, 1; Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 5–6.

not be the causal factor" in smoking related illness.²³ (Italics mine.) These were not the same smokers who four decades earlier had made brand decisions based on the kind of cigarettes their doctors smoked. This was an informed public increasingly looking to the federal government for research, statistics, welfare, and well-being. The old rules were gone. However Panzer advised there was still opportunity to capitalize on smokers' lingering reservations regarding smoking. The enterprise now had to go about this mission in a *smarter* manner.

Against all odds, the data appeared to support Panzer and Kornegay's plan to capitalize on the public's still enduring doubt regarding the hazards of smoking. Despite decades of scholarship to the contrary, Roper's April 1970 survey based *Study 53-5414* showed that doubt lingered. It found that "a majority (52 percent) believed that cigarettes are only one of the many causes of smokers having more illness." Further, half of those surveyed believed smokers were somehow genetically different than non-smokers and that "heredity" could largely explain lung cancer and other health issues.²⁴ The enterprise only needed to continue to feed smokers the alternatives they needed to help justify their smoking habit. As opposed to the stable of blunt tactics the industry had employed for decades (including categorical denial and general doubt tactics), it needed credible alternatives that were sharp and addressed the information-rich environment in which consumers lived. In 1975, Ted Bates & Co., supplied the industry with the razor sharp plan it needed to give the industry the edge it sought. The *Bates Memo* helped the enterprise articulate a plan to keep veteran smokers smoking and attract new smokers by positing:

²³ Panzer, *Roper Proposal*, 2.

²⁴ Panzer, *Roper Proposal*, 3; Roper, *Study 53-5414*.

Smoking is, in a way, a very strange human activity, a very strange habit. This is one of the very few things that people who do it are fully aware of its negative value, are not really happy with it, not really proud of it, do not see much good in it, perhaps even hate it—but still do it . . . [smokers are] very stupid. . . illogical, irrational people [that] find it hard to go throughout life with such negative presentation and evaluation of self . . . [their] saviors are rationalization and repression.²⁵

The industry aimed to provide just enough of this rationalization and repression for the smokers to continue to indulge in what it labeled a “stupid” habit which made the industry billions. Bates also encouraged the enterprise to remember “smokers don’t like to be reminded of the fact that they are illogical and irrational . . . they don’t want to be reminded by either direct or indirect manner.” Certainly the enterprise had to act; however it had to creatively find ways to attract smokers through advertising without reminding them constantly of their “illogical” habit. Under the auspices of this new and improved doubt strategy, the alternatives offered were packaged as the Constitutional and Multi-factorial Hypotheses.²⁶

The Constitutional Hypothesis gave voice to controversial data supporting a “constitutional makeup” alternative linking smoking illness with genetics. This portion of the new doubt strategy never gained much traction, and was kept quietly tucked away. However, the Multi-factorial Hypothesis was proudly rolled out for the entire world to see. This theory suggested smokers and non-smokers alike should consider the cigarette industry’s position that “as science advances, more and more factors come under suspicion as contributing to illness for which smoking is blamed—air pollution, viruses, food additives, occupational hazards, stresses,” as well as industrial work conditions, air

²⁵ Kennan, N., “Action Oriented Research for Discovering and Creating the Best Possible Imagery for Viceroy” (Bates Memo), Ted Bates & Co., March 1975, 1, accessed November 15, 2013, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ubh04f00/pdf>.

²⁶ N. Kennan, Bates Memo, 3.

conditioning units, and asbestos.²⁷ Bringing the Roper Proposal from 1972 full circle, Panzer advised the enterprise to redouble efforts to provide “objective scientific research” to support the Multi-factorial Hypothesis. Panzer frankly postulated that “best of all, it [the objective scientific research] would only have to be seen—not read—to be believed.”²⁸ The industry only needed to develop, coordinate, and execute an enhanced doubt strategy loosely based on science that provided smokers with a small measure of reassurance. In the end, if the enterprise wanted to survive, it had to help existing smokers comfortably rationalize their choice to continue smoking.

Armed with this bold new plan to win tobacco’s image war, the enterprise rapidly adopted the smokers’ rights and renewed doubt strategies in its public statements. The cigarette enterprise soon thereafter began offering a series of strategically targeted propositions to the consumer public. These messages were designed to stir up the smoking and non-smoking public’s angst against the intrusive federal government *big brothers* whom the cigarette enterprise claimed was watching their every move. In statements often transmitted through tobacco state politicians on the floor of Congress, the enterprise asked Americans if they needed the federal government to intrude in their personal lives. Executing the core tenets of the Roper-Bates enhanced doubt strategy, politicians asked if they need the government to make smoking decisions for them—especially considering the subjective nature of the government’s “faulty scientific data.” Did Americans need a “brass nanny” to watch over them and dictate what was or was not

²⁷ Panzer, *Roper Proposal*, 2–3.

²⁸ Panzer, *Roper Proposal*, 4.

healthy?²⁹ If the government banned cigarettes, what was next—air conditioning, industrial factories, fiberglass insulation, and French fry grease? Was not smoking a matter of personal choice?

Appealing to emotion and patriotism, they asked the American public if this is what their forefathers intended—a state denying its citizens individual freedom and the right to pursue happiness.³⁰ These messages were powerful and effective, capitalized on long-standing doubt strategies, and enabled the cigarette enterprise to develop a culture of smokers' rights. It provided reasonable alternatives to government science linking cigarettes to disease. Moreover, the enterprise firmly linked smoking to freedom. This part of the strategy directly informed industry efforts to latch on to soldiers as cigarette puffing freedom fighters, a maneuver it had perfected during previous wars. This angle required perfection again if the enterprise was to retain the solder-cigarette relationship so vital to the industry's bottom line. However, in order to address the long-term survival of the cigarette enterprise, the enterprise had to address a much larger issue as well: starters.

Starters

In addition to providing the industry with *Study 53-0414* in 1970 which was instrumental in helping Panzer and Kornegay develop the enhanced doubt campaign,

²⁹ Samuel D. Chilcote, Tobacco Institute Memorandum, January 9, 1986, accessed November 26, 2013, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/gxd03f00/pdf>. The term “brass nanny” was used by Congressman Dan Daniel in the 1980s when he worked tirelessly block anti-cigarette legislation in Congress. Specifically, he worked to keep subsidized cigarettes in PXs and Commissaries on military bases. Chilcote was a tobacco lobbyist and reported, “The most notable reaction to date has come from Congressman Dan Daniel, chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Forces, and chairman of the Panel on Morale, Welfare and Recreation. In a statement issued in response to the original Washington Post article, Daniel said ‘ . . .the last thing the men and women in the armed forces need is a brass nanny.’”

³⁰ *Senate Congressional Record*, August 1, 1975, S15020, accessed January 27, 2015, <http://www.legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qsu84f00>. See Kornegay’s speech printed by Helms in the Senate Congressional Record for August 1, 1975 where Kornegay uses strong, patriotic, pro-South language.

Roper & Associates also supplied Philip Morris with the *1970 Benchmark Study*. This study, similar to *Study 53-0414*, focused on smokers' attitudes towards brands and smoking in general. However, PM was not completely satisfied with the marketing research presented in this rather extensive report. They were concerned the data upon which they were basing important and far-reaching advertising and investment decisions was missing one key element: the teenage starter.

The industry was keenly aware that smoking and brand decisions were made by the age of eighteen. During the 1970s and 80s, the issue of attracting and retaining brand-loyal young adult smokers was a major, if veiled, component of industry marketing strategies. For example, a management summary created by industry leader R.J. Reynolds to guide development of marketing campaigns directly addressed this crucial, industry-wide issue:

Younger adult smokers have been the critical factor in the growth and decline of every major brand and company over the last 50 years. They will continue to be just as important to brands in the future for [the] simple reason . . . The renewal of the market stems almost entirely from 18-year-old smokers. No more than 5 percent of smokers start after age 24 . . . Younger adult smokers are critical to RJR's long-term performance and profitability. Therefore, RJR should make a substantial long term commitment of manpower and money dedicated to younger adult smoker programs. An unusually strong commitment from Executive Management will be necessary [because] younger adult smokers are the only source of replacement smokers.³¹

With so many brands from which to choose, and the American public increasingly aware of the dangers of smoking, the industry had to take decisive action to address teen smokers, a segment of the population it referred to as *starters*. If the industry was to survive, much less achieve market differentiation among the brands, cigarette companies needed to know how to attract and retain teen smokers. With these issues in mind, PM,

³¹ R.J. Reynolds, Management Summary, "Younger Adult Smokers: Strategies and Opportunities," 1984, accessed November 15, 2013, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/sbf76b00/pdf>.

makers of the popular Marlboro brand, queried Roper about the prospects of successfully addressing this gap in the marketing research.

Sensing PM's desire to move quickly on this issue, Roper & Associates wasted no time in responding to PM's query regarding young teen smokers. Roper suggested a wide-ranging effort that leveraged Roper's access to three key markets: college students, early-teens, and young military members. Regarding college students, Roper opined that PM should wait until the fall to start doing conclusive survey work on campus since summer students were not a good sample. However, he did provide some optimism with his suggestion that his firm could "take some immediate steps that will provide some fairly good indications" of the success of PM products on campus by positioning Roper agents at tobacco outlets near campus to do initial marketing interviews.³²

In terms of the early-teen market, Roper voiced a shocking revelation that became a bane for the industry and a boon for litigators. Roper advised PM to give careful and sustained attention to market "share among 14–17-year-old teenagers not covered" in the original Roper study. In a humorous yet damning exchange, Roper recommends a strategy to access the 14–17 year old market by:

interviewing young people at summer recreation centers (at beaches, public schools, lakes, etc.). This will provide a projectable sample of people in this age group, and it has several advantages. The low at-homeness of this group combined with their incidence in households would make house-to-house interviewing quite expensive. In addition, true answers on smoking habits might be difficult to elicit in the presence of parents . . . we suggest having interviewers obtain interviews with those who appear to be between the ages of 14 and 21 . . . we would have interviewers ask the age of the respondent, but if she disagrees or thinks the reported age is too high, we would have her record her guess as to correct age.³³

³² Bud Roper and Shirley Jones, memo to Steve Rountaine, "Suggestions for Research to Answer Questions Raised on Philip Morris Benchmark Study," June 12, 1970, 2, accessed November 15, 2013, (<http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hwv75c00/pdf>). The language in this document confirms it was the *industry* that initiated the study on young smokers, not the Roper Agency.

³³ Roper and Jones, memo to Steve Rountaine, 3.

In addition to gaining access to college kids and young teens, Roper planned to obtain data from the military by “stationing interviewers near high traffic areas for military personnel near military bases (bus stations, airports, etc.) [at] places where large military bases are located.”³⁴

These statements regarding starters and many more comprise a body of documents linking the industry to teen and young adult smoking. The industry’s military and teen programs in general, and the young teen agenda specifically, indicate the drastic measures taken to ensure the survival of the highly profitable cigarette business and smoking in America. Since the military was largely comprised of the teens and young adults the industry so desperately needed, the soldier-cigarette relationship would play a key role in this survival strategy.

Soldiers Starters

By the mid-1970s, the Marlboro Man had become an icon of the cigarette industry. Ironically, Marlboro cigarettes were positioned as a cigarette for women in the years leading up to 1955 when the Marlboro Man was introduced to the world. Before the Marlboro Man, the Marlboro was marketed as “mild as May” and capped with “ivory tips to protect the lips.” The Marlboro Man was something completely different—an image that appealed to young men and soldiers. Whereas Winston Salem’s wildly successful Joe Camel campaign of the late 1980s was directed toward young men seeking to appear “urban, easy, funny, wild, partying, and non-threatening,” Phillip Morris’ Marlboro Man dominated the market during the 50s, 60s, and 70s with a completely different set of

³⁴ Roper and Jones, memo to Steve Rountaine, 4.

images.³⁵ Marlboro Men were “hard, serious, outdoors, the best—only a select few, handsome, respect[ed], long lasting, and married.” If the Joe Camel image was represented by “Mickey Rourke, Dana Carvey, . . . and Mick Jagger,” the Marlboro Man ideal was found in characters like “John Wayne, Charles Bronson, Clint Eastwood, Chuck Norris, and Steven Segal.”³⁶ With the Marlboro Man cult leading the way, PM’s Marlboro cigarette experienced “the most spectacular rise of a single brand in cigarette history” from 1965 to 1976. On the back of the Marlboro Man, Marlboro brand cigarettes had surpassed Winston by 1976 to become America’s “most popular cigarette” and soon vaulted to top position as the world’s “number one brand.”³⁷

It is not important to this study the brand of cigarettes that soldiers chose, or the fact that during the period when America was fielding a volunteer force, Marlboro became the world’s top selling cigarette brand. There is no relation between these two events. What is important is the *perception* of smoking and masculinity in America during this period, a period when young men were choosing to join a volunteer Army with thoughts of staying, and smoking, for a career. Both of these choices, staying and

³⁵ The images that appealed to young men in the Cold War Era (roughly 1950 to 1990) as opposed to the images that appealed to the follow-on generation is a fascinating cultural history study that is an important part of works such as Heather Stur, *Beyond Combat: Women and Gender in the Vietnam War Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Susan Jeffords, *The Remasculinization of America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); Christian Appy, *Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993); and Meredith Lair *Armed with Abundance: Consumerism and Soldiering in the Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

³⁶ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 80-82.

³⁷ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 399. Proctor also argues that PM’s mastery of the *cracking* process whereby ammoniated tobacco was *cracked*, making it an addictive chemical, also played a major part in Marlboro’s sales success. However, he does concede that “it is impossible to say how much of the success of Marlboro is due to freebasing and how much to the sophisticated marketing of Marlboro Country and the Marlboro Man.”

smoking, were expensive endeavors individually. However, as discussed in the next chapter, when combined they are exponentially more expensive.

The imagery represented by the iconic, horse-bound, leathery Marlboro Man did much to drive home the message of rugged independence and carefree virility that were hallmarks of the young adult market and smoking in general. What would Charles Bronson or John Wayne do? They would join the volunteer Army and smoke cigarettes. Therefore, this Marlboro Man message supplemented the familiar figure of the cigarette-wielding American soldier that had existed in American culture for decades. Together, these images had immense influence on the young soldiers who formed a significant portion of the industry's client base during this period—a base the industry fought to retain.

The industry was ready and willing to exploit this young military client base, and the images to which they were attracted. The nature of this exploitation, and to what extent it directly targeted young Americans whether soldiers or civilians, is a controversial issue at the center of countless lawsuits and public policy debates. In the early 1980s, journalists, trial lawyers, and public health officials began to put the pieces together: the industry was courting young starters. In an investigative report by staff writer Mike King, a journalist with Louisville, Kentucky's *Courier Journal*, King posed the question, "Is the industry aiming its message at teens?" After examining evidence pertaining to the industry's marketing practices, King was intrigued that, despite the plethora of negative information available about the dangers of cigarette smoke, teen smoking rates had begun to increase again after a marked decline in the mid-1970s. Though it was difficult to find an airtight smoking gun at the time, King had a hunch that,

despite the industry's protestations to the contrary, somehow it was behind this marked increase in teen starters. Historical data and industry archives reveal King was right in his speculation.³⁸

Smoking, Machismo, and the AVF

According to data maintained by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, if young people do not make their decision to start smoking by 18, they will likely never begin smoking. Additionally, the likelihood of an adult choosing to smoke after the age of 25 is near zero. Therefore marketing researchers argued the window to influence the smoking decision was the 17–19-year-old age group. If teens fail to choose smoking by 18, then the industry faced the grim reality of a dwindling market as the current smoker group aged out and died.³⁹ The cigarette industry was keenly aware of this statistic and had initiated research to confirm the smoking decision window and develop strategies to influence young smokers to start smoking. As seen in Roper's study proposal for PM in June 1970, they were not afraid to go as low as 14 to influence this decision.

In 1975, cigarette manufacturer Brown & Williamson (B&W), maker of popular brands Lucky Strike and Kool menthol cigarettes, joined PM and confidently waded into the young adult and teen research markets as well. They contracted with Ted Bates & Co., to provide youth marketing strategies for the launch of the firm's Viceroy brand. In a March 1975 document referred to as the Bates Memo among litigation circles, Ted Bates presented B&W with a marketing strategy to reach new smokers.⁴⁰ B&W subsequently

³⁸ Mike King, "Is the Industry Aiming Its Message at Teens," *The Courier Journal*, June 12, 1983, A1, accessed November 22, 2013, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qp81d00/pdf>.

³⁹ RJR Management Summary, "Younger Adult Smokers: Strategies and Opportunities."

⁴⁰ N. Kennan, "Action Oriented Research for Discovering and Creating the Best Possible Imagery for Viceroy" (Bates Memo), March 1975, accessed November 15, 2013,

used this information to create marketing concepts for their Viceroy line of cigarettes. Continuing with the overall assessment laid out in the Roper Proposal, the marketing plans outlined in the Bates Memo ceded that the industry was fighting a “losing war” in the battle against negative public perception.⁴¹ Just as the Roper Proposal had, the Bates Memo advised the industry to take greater, more aggressive measures to reach the young smoking market, and more importantly, create new smokers.

The Bates Memo insisted the industry had to implement a plan to attract these new smokers in spite of and in response to the growing anti-smoking environment gripping the nation. A marketing strategy moving young people from the non-smoker to “starter” category was of greatest necessity.⁴² Citing well-known industry and government data, as well as proprietary industry research, the Bates team reasoned the choice of whether to smoke or not happened at the same time a young person attempted to make a declaratory statement about independence and self-identity. This activity happened when a young person was transitioning from teen to adult. With this in mind, Bates suggested a four-part strategy.

<http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ubh04f00/pdf>; Federal Trade Commission, “Staff FTC Report on the Cigarette Advertising Investigation, Excerpts from Chapter II: Cigarette Advertising,” May 1981, accessed January 27, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fij03f00>. The document referred to as the Bates Memo by litigators was actually derived from a report generated by a Bates subcontractor. The document’s official title is “An Action Oriented Research Program for Discovering and Creating the Best Possible Image For Viceroy Cigarettes.” It was prepared for Ted Bates Advertising by N. Kennan, Marketing and Research Counselors, Inc.

⁴¹ N. Kennan, Bates Memo, 17.

⁴² N. Kennan, Bates Memo, 29. In this document, see entire section entitled “How Can We Influence Starters and Switchers to Our Brand.” “Starter” became the preferred industry slang for “young adult smokers”—which in essence were teenagers. The industry was well aware of the data that showed people did not start smoking after 18; so by definition, a “starter” smoker was any person under the age of 18. So whenever reading industry documents from the period, one must keep in mind that every time the word “starter” is mentioned, it is a reference to teenage smokers and teenage potential smokers.

First, advertisers should present smoking as one of the few initiations into the adult world. The industry countered charges that it was marketing to minors by claiming it only used adults in their commercials; this is exactly what the Bates strategy encouraged the industry to do. Young teens who see glamorous, sexy, confident adults smoking will indeed see smoking as a gateway to adulthood. Bates challenged the industry to ask the philosophical, age-old question: what makes a man a man—or a woman a woman? If it could connect industry products with the answer to this age-old question, it could unlock the young adult market.

Second, the industry must connect smoking with maturity and success. Again, this form of advertising forced industry officials to think deeply about the youth of America and the generation coming of age in the late 70s and early 80s. If the industry could decipher what teens wanted and experiences they valued, it could design advertising strategies to address these needs. Bates envisioned a strategy that accounted for: how young American adults felt about the world around them, their place in that world, their status in society, and how they signaled their status in American society. In short, Bates wanted to access and address teen *mentalité*.

Third, Bates told B&W executives if they wanted “starters” to buy Viceroy, or non-smokers to become “starters,” they needed to relate their products to other perceived adult activities like sex and drinking alcohol, thus reinforcing the first part of the strategy. Finally, in conformance with tenants of the Roper Proposal, Bates suggested the industry not try to fight the “cigarettes are bad for you” argument, because it was a “losing war.” Similar to Roper’s suggestion to create doubt about anti-smoking data without ever actually denying it, Bates told the industry to “skirt the issue” by providing other positive

reasons for smoking such as “social acceptance, positive self-image, and maturity.” In fact, Bates suggested the industry must completely and deliberately avoid *any* reference to health or health-related activities. Essentially, and in line with prevailing cultural attitudes of the time, Bates suggested a self-gratification campaign projecting the message: if it feels good, do it.⁴³

Enterprise strategies presented in Roper and Bates’ confidential industry documents and marketing studies make it clear the industry was aware the youthful American soldiers of the AVF were prime starter candidates. In a memorandum from Lorillard, an American cigarette company, its marketing team highlights the importance of the military market. Lorillard produced the Newport brand and their marketing team insisted that targeting the soldier market was required because:

. . . the plums are here to be plucked. The military approximates the size of New York, yet our marketing effort in the military is only a fraction of what we put behind the Brand in Region #2. Our cost per thousand cigarettes, and our cost per thousand targets reached in the “Military City” has got to be dramatically lower than any other market in the country. And there isn’t a market in the country that has the sales potential for Newport like the military market.⁴⁴

In a capitalistic business world focused on the bottom line, this statement provides a concise assessment of the calculus behind the industry’s attraction to the AVF: easy and cheap access to a young soldier market where there is unmatched bang for the buck.

This was not rocket science. The manufactured cigarette already had a rich, established relationship with the American soldier dating to the trenches of the Western Front during WWI. This heritage was reinforced by images of the Marlboro Man and the

⁴³ N. Kennan, Bates Memo, 17; Bruce Schulman, *The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo Press, 2001), 145. When describing the 1970s generation, historian Bruce J. Schulman says: “Pundits and historians portrayed the Me Decade [1970s] as the antidote to or repudiation of the activist, altruistic 1960s . . . [referring to the 70s as] the so-called Me Generation . . .”

⁴⁴ G.R. Telford, Lorillard Memorandum “Newport Planning,” January 26, 1983, 2, accessed November 15, 2013, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/koh41e00/pdf>.

grizzled, chain-smoking veteran. American soldiers entering the AVF met the prime profile for the starter category. On average they were 17–19 years old and leaving home for the first time. They were looking to define themselves in the world as they transitioned from teen to adult. Young soldiers were extremely susceptible to the peer pressures associated with barracks life and time in the field with the boys. Bates recognized the power of the cult and argued that “with only very few exceptions, young people start to smoke because of their peer group . . . almost every young smoker started his smoking life by bumming cigarettes from friends prior to starting to buy his/her own.”⁴⁵

Further, a young soldier wanted his peers to think of him as rugged and self-sufficient. In a military environment where Army recruits were subjected to social leveling, forced removal of personal identity, and a culture of strict adherence to orders, soldiers sought small ways to exercise agency and display their macho identity. In the Marlboro Man’s cigarette, they found this agency and macho identity. If the manufactured cigarette was primarily comfort and solace to the trench-dwelling Doughboy of WWI, it was macho status and cult acceptance to the modern volunteer soldier.⁴⁶

Long aware of this connection between smoking cigarettes and soldierly masculinity, the industry developed extensive marketing programs and promotions to continue attracting the military market and further entrench the soldier with the cigarette.

⁴⁵ N. Kennan, Bates Memo, 29-30.

⁴⁶ As previously stated however, smoking as primary group, cult behavior has formed a substantial aspect of starter motivation throughout the relationship between the American soldier and the manufactured cigarette. The difference here is that smoking and vice during the 1970s and beyond had a much greater cultural and masculine meaning than it did to the WWI soldier and the early generation of smokers. One must remember that before WWI, the preponderance of American men considered cigarettes as effeminate and a vice associated with sissies.

However, since cigarettes were removed from field rations in 1973, and the smoking culture in general had come under renewed attack during this period, the industry had to redouble its efforts to initiate soldiers to smoking. The enterprise had to find ways to turn soldiers from green horns into starters who would hopefully become the chain smoking, grizzled non-commissioned officers (NCOs) the industry coveted. These experienced soldier-smokers not only formed a substantial customer base for the industry, as primary group leaders wielding considerable influence, they also propagated the military smoking culture.

It is abundantly clear from confidential industry documents that the starter campaigns during this period placed great reliance on youth smokers, and by extension, the young soldiers that comprised the AVF. For decades, the soldier market had provided the industry with a steady stream of fresh recruits and potential starters who were profoundly influenced by the masculinity, independence, and freedom represented in manufactured cigarettes. The cigarette enterprise was dogged in its determination to hang on to this lucrative market, initiate starters in the military, and preserve the culture of doubt in America. This commitment would have profound political, economic, and health related implications and play a decisive role in debates over cigarette consumption in the AVF.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 57. The data reveals the following pertinent statistics: cigarettes smoked per capita per adult peaked in 1965 at 4,259 per adult per year. After a decline in the per capita figure, there was a sharp increase in 1975 back to 4,123. In terms of billions of total cigarettes consumed, the peak was 1980 with 632 billion; the first noticeable drop in total billions of cigarettes consumed was in 1985 when the aggregate dropped to 594 billion. In hindsight, it is possible to make the basic inference from these numbers that Roper, Burns, Kornegay, and Panzer were correct in the 1970s in their observation that a drop in cigarette smoking was indeed staring the industry in the face. From a business perspective, they were absolutely correct in their efforts to target young starters and soldiers in an effort to stave off a sharp decline in consumption. Their marketing research and knowledge of smoking America informed their efforts. At the rate consumption was growing in the 1960s and 70s, the industry was on track for selling a trillion cigarettes a year in America by the turn of the millennium. Instead, due to efforts of the anti-

Both sides of the cigarette debate were soon engaged in a running fight that eventually spilled over onto the floors of Congress. Just as they had to confront the potential dangers of an American public averse to cigarette smoking, politicians were beginning to deal with the expense of the AVF, and more specific to this study, a smoking AVF. In order to pay for the technologically advanced equipment entering the military arsenal in the decades after Vietnam *and* the professional long-service volunteers required to operate and maintain it, Congress took a hard look at military spending and engaged in contentious cost-cutting measures.⁴⁸ When Congressmen and DoD officials mounted efforts to sever the expensive relationship between the soldier, the cigarette, and expensive government health care liabilities, the enterprise assumed battle stations in a last ditch, all-out effort to sustain its most reliable source for cigarette starters.

smoking enterprise, and despite the dogged determination of the cigarette enterprise, the consumption rate dropped by 300 billion over the next two decades. As of 2010, the per capita consumption dropped back to numbers commiserate with what they were in the decade after WWI (1,500).

⁴⁸ James Wilbanks, *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 202, 229. Compounding expenses associated with the nation's post-Vietnam move to the AVF, the country was still paying for its Vietnam experience. In addition to the nearly \$5 billion in aid and equipment for South Vietnam in 1973 and 1974, Congress had to come up with several extra-budgetary supplementals to pay to replenishment a physically and morally broken Army. Wilbanks argues that domestic economic factors contributed to President Ford's decision to abandon Vietnam: "rising unemployment, ballooning national debt, and the continuing energy crisis." Financing the AVF in the midst of fiscal uncertainty proved to be problematic.

CHAPTER VIII

HEALTH CARE AND THE AVF

In 1980, soldier health care expenses, once a sacred cow, were uncovered as debatable policy issues. No longer considered off-limits in budget drills, it was only a matter of time before certain Congressmen and federal officials linked cigarette smoking among the AVF with significant physical and fiscal liabilities. When the cost of a chain-smoking AVF ran up against the interests of the cigarette enterprise, a legendary Congressional struggle ensued, revealing the true nature of an American political economy grounded in corporatism.

Before discussing this unique political economy as it pertains to the soldier and the cigarette, the scope of the health care promise made to late-draft era and AVF military professionals must be addressed. This health care pledge was and is a hotly debated issue and is crucial to understanding the soldier-cigarette saga because it sheds light on the *mentalité* of fiscally conservative Congressmen concerned with the cost liabilities represented by a cigarette-smoking AVF. In the early 1980s, several elected officials added the fiscal millstone represented by an AVF hooked on manufactured cigarettes to a list of variables contributing to rising military health care costs. Even the most elementary of actuarial drills informed their argument that the costs of an unhealthy AVF, both in the short-term as active-duty soldiers and the long-term as they transitioned to military retiree status, were unsustainable. Moreover, this cost liability was not just the smoking habit of the member, but his or her dependents as well.

Though the cigarette ration was removed in 1973, the Army was doing little to discourage the cigarette smoking culture or prevent industry access to young soldiers.

Furthering entrenchment, Congress continued subsidizing cigarettes in the PX and commissary as part of the military compensation package. This program enabled soldiers to conveniently obtain cigarettes in bulk at half the cost. To comprehend the liabilities presented by the specter of a chain-smoking AVF, one must access several debates regarding the modern military health care system. As was the case with the Doughboys' rejection of the Y Man in WWI, the truth regarding the size, scope, and nature of Congress' health care commitment to the modern soldier, dependent, and retiree is buried somewhere between fact, fiction, and grim reality. Further, the truth is frequently wrapped in an emotional myth regarding veterans' rights, and well-intentioned, but often ill-informed rhetoric. An understanding of this debate informs the current discussion on the potential health care and financial liabilities associated with a smoking AVF. Moreover, it also enlightens subsequent discussions about the cigarette enterprise's strategy to manipulate patriotic sentiment and veterans issues in response to Army programs implemented to unhinge the soldier-cigarette relationship during the decade of the 1980s.

Soaring AVF Health Care Costs & Problems with the Delivery of Benefits

By 1985, Congress and the DoD had maintained a near-constant 30-year-long conversation regarding strategies to "contain . . . costs" associated with the military health care program, as well as the best way to deliver benefits. The tone of this conversation ranged from legislators gently encouraging to aggressively directing the DoD to take action on soaring health care costs and an apparent breakdown in delivery of

benefits.¹ During the 1980s, the cost of American health care in general increased across the board, not just in the military health care system.²

However, Congress and military appropriators began to perceive a “dramatic increase” in medical budgets over and above this general, across-the-board increase. Modern military readiness is costly in terms of equipment and personnel. In 1985, the DoD asked for Congress for over \$9.6 billion for “military medical operations” which represented a “sizeable increase over previous years.”³ The hefty defense bills associated with the transition to the AVF in the 70s and Reagan’s massive defense build-up in the 80s had once again given Congress sticker shock. As the full extent of the Reagan’s proliferation was digested, many gasped at the seemingly endless spiral of deficit spending and sought solutions to contain costs. The medical readiness price tag was particularly alarming—a price tag the DoD referred to as “an impressive sum of money.”⁴ For example, Congress was asked to absorb a 25 percent increase in the military’s medical readiness and personnel accounts, and stomach a medical operation and maintenance budget that doubled during this period. The DoD asked Congress for an

¹ Michelle Dolofini-Reed and Jennifer Bebo, “The Evolution of the Military Health Care System: Changes in Public Law and DoD Regulations,” (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis, July 2000), 28.

² Dolofini-Reed and Bebo, “The Evolution of the Military Health Care System,” 31.

³ *Readiness of Military Medicine: Hearing Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, September 18, 1985), 15; *Medical Readiness of the Armed Services: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel*, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, May 1982), 65. The Army’s share of this request was the largest: \$3.4 billion. In 1983, Senator Roger Jepsen commented on these very large budgets directed to the health care of the force, as well as Congress’ responsibility to exercise close oversight of such large sums, “We are holding these hearings because the President has requested \$6.7 billion for health care for fiscal year 1983, and I am certain that each of you understands the accountability of Congress to the taxpayers for every dollar, especially in these austere times.” As noted, in just two years the request for health care would grow by \$3 billion.

⁴ *Readiness of Military Medicine: Hearing Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, 15.

additional \$500 million in medical readiness funding in 1985 and was forced that same year to pull \$2 billion from other programs to support medical readiness shortfalls projected through 1990.⁵

Further, the runaway costs were not just a result of fielding and servicing a credible, capable active force; a substantial portion of military health care costs were shifting to retirees and dependents. These costs increased by 150 percent, and by the end of the decade, costs associated with retirees and dependents consumed half of all the military's medical expenditures.⁶ In his closing statement to the Investigations Subcommittee, the Honorable William Mayer, M.D., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) provided even further bad news regarding not only the military dual mission of readiness and benefits, but also the growing expense of the contract care initiatives. Despite the additional appropriations to defense in general and to military medical readiness specifically through 1985, Mayer concluded the DoD and the services were still struggling to meet the dual nature of the military health care mission:

One thing that has become clear to me is that our reliance on our direct care system [MTF] to accomplish both our wartime readiness and our mandated peacetime benefit mission has placed significant strains on our ability to accomplish either one of those missions effectively. Pressed by a demand to provide comprehensive health care to some 10 million beneficiaries, we have not been able to assure top priority to wartime readiness . . . and . . . our civilian care services, such as CHAMPUS, are too costly.⁷

In addition to the soaring costs, Congressmen were also alarmed at what they perceived as a rapid deterioration in the quality, competency, and availability of military

⁵ *Readiness of Military Medicine: Hearing Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, 11.

⁶ Dolofini-Reed and Bebo, "The Evolution of the Military Health Care System," 44–45.

⁷ *Readiness of Military Medicine: Hearing Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, 14.

health care.⁸ Even more dreadful, this deterioration had a tremendous price tag and several in Congress were exasperated about what the bloated military health care budget had actually bought them. From 1974 to 1986, Congressmen, government officials, and concerned citizens flocked to hearings to express frustration, anger, fear, and resentment over the perceived and real failures in military health care.⁹ Congressmen read letters from veterans and retirees deprived of medical treatment, stripped of dignity, or told they did not qualify for the benefits they felt they had earned. Military spouses and retired officers relayed horror stories involving long lines, broken promises, diminished access, and increased costs. It certainly appeared something was gravely wrong with the whole system.

In these hearings, statements by concerned legislators and citizens contained a variety of words and statements to describe the apparent “breakdown.” Representative Charles Rose from North Carolina complained that he had retirees in his district who were “slowly and surely [being] cut off from military medical attention” and that he feared “an impending breakdown of military medical care.” Rose was so perplexed that he was ready to institute a draft for good doctors since the system was in such a “mess.”¹⁰

⁸ *Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military Compensation Committee*, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, June and September 1979), see opening statements, and following statements by Panetta, Rose, and Nichols for example.

⁹ Specific hearings referenced for this chapter contained extensive information on this topic: *Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military Compensation Committee; Medical Readiness of the Armed Services: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel; Readiness of Military Medicine: Hearing Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services; Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, July, September, and October 1987).

¹⁰ *Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military Compensation Committee*, 334, 335; *Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee*, 153.

To a great extent, the discourse of discontent centered on a running dialogue regarding “broken promises” and “breach of trust.”¹¹ Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina even called the Reagan Administration “first class liars” for failing to provide the health benefits soldiers, veterans, and their dependents were promised.¹² One retired Lieutenant Colonel expressed the feelings of many when he voiced his desire to:

go on record as one who feels that . . . promises have been broken . . . promises were made. I think the most important one was the promise of medical care for that member and his family as long as he lived . . . I stayed in the service for one reason: medical care for my family and myself. The Armed Forces constantly tell us about the benefits of making a career in the service . . . the medical care is paramount in their campaign to keep people in the service, in the all-voluntary service. I think it behooves the Congress and the President to live up to these promises and expectations.¹³

Congressmen were quick to pick up on the emotional “broken promise” theme in the discourse. Regarding the nature of the “promise” made to soldiers and their families, Representative H. Martin Lancaster of North Carolina stated that military health care was:

taken for granted for so long as part of the bargain they made when they decided to devote their lives to serve the United States of America. Some 45 years ago there were names like Normandy, Anzio, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Midway. Young men in their early 20s scrambled into the surf from landing barges, squeezed into cramped, tail gunner nests of bombers, advanced at the wave of a hand into lethal machine gun fire. They left their homes and families to defend this nation knowing full well that a large part of their number would never return at all. These brave fighting men, plus many more who served with distinction in Korea and Vietnam, are now being turned away . . . along with their dependents, and the dependents of those who serve on active duty . . . When you ask a young man to step from a landing barge into the face of enemy fire, to stick to his guns when his ship has taken a hit, to build a bridge with mosquitoes and dive bombers vying for his attention, or even to be a clerk in some lonely, cheerless foreign place, a debt is incurred.¹⁴

¹¹ *Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military Compensation Committee*, 11.

¹² *Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee*, 316–317.

¹³ *Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee*, 314–315.

¹⁴ *Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee*, 154.

Lancaster added that this seemingly pathetic situation had “generated . . . pain and bewilderment” beyond comprehension.¹⁵ Representative Arthur Ravenel, Jr., of South Carolina used his personal experience as a Marine grunt in WWII to add to the emotional debate:

Well . . . all of us old Marines were told that when you join the Service, the health care needs of you and your family are going to be met. After you retire, if you put in the required number of years, you will be taken care of until you go to your reward in the sky, and also the dependents who survive you.¹⁶

To a casual observer, it appeared the American taxpayers were taken for a ride and sold an expensive military health care system that was inefficient, broke, bleeding out, and robbing soldiers, veterans, and dependents of dignity. However one must dig deeper in order to access truth and gain an appreciation for the problems inherent in a modern military health care system. Especially a system that had experienced nearly exponential growth in terms of size, complexity, and cost since it was first conceived in the waning years of WWII.

The History of Veterans Benefits and Modern Military Health Care

American historiography contains rich literature on the topic of veterans, their relationship to the federal government, and benefits. Several historians connect the growth of federal government during the twentieth century to the expansion of veterans’ benefits after the Civil War. In *This Republic of Suffering*, Drew Gilpin Faust argues the seeds of federal expansion are found in the government’s response to death and dismemberment during and after the Civil War. The government entered the Civil War with no plan to respond to the thousands of dead bodies strewn across the broken

¹⁵ *Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee*, 154.

¹⁶ *Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee*, 153.

landscape of battlefields, nor the families they represented. Awakened by the news of haphazard burial details and devastation wrought by the loss of thousands of fathers, husbands, and sons, the federal apparatus eventually swung into action. By the end of the war, the government had created various commissions and agencies to spend appropriated money to gather bodies, build mass cemeteries, purchase prosthetic limbs, fund pensions, and build memorials. As the federal government made provisions for the thousands of families affected by death, disease, dislocation, and dismemberment caused by the war, the bureaucratic scaffolding of a modern federal government was erected.¹⁷

In *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in United States*, Theda Skocpol discusses this theme of federal expansion and looks at the exponential growth in Union pensions in the decades after the Civil War. Veterans' groups such as the Grand Army of the Republic were extremely influential during this period. At one point late in the nineteenth century, pension payments consumed greater than 40 percent of all federal receipts, demonstrating the size and impact of such groups. Skocpol argues the greatly expanded pension program was the foundation of a social welfare state in America that predated the New Deal and Europe's embrace of federal social welfare by decades. Progressives and muckrakers weary of government pension and patronage corruption eventually put an end to what had become a corrupt, free-wheeling veterans' pension racket in some areas of government.¹⁸ Regardless, the foundation for federal government expansion was already in place. To a great extent, its cornerstone was comprised of the war veterans, the interests they represented, and the

¹⁷ Drew Gilpin Faust, *This Republic of Suffering*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008).

¹⁸ Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: the political origins of social policy in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), 107–115.

debts accrued to them when they served the Republic as uniformed members of the armed service.

In *Doughboys: the Great War and the Remaking of America*, historian Jennifer Keene argues that the millions of conscripted soldiers who served the Republic during WWI continued this tradition and created a massive, vocal, national constituency, the likes of which the nation had never seen. Legislators took notice of this large group of voters and accommodated veterans' interest groups with expansionist federal programs, a Bonus Bill, and the continuation of taxpayer funded pensions.¹⁹ Most significantly, Keene shows how a generation of WWI soldiers paved the way for the GI Bill and made the WWII generation the most privileged veteran generation in American history. The WWI generation laid the foundation for the modern US Army, a service increasingly concerned with soldier welfare and morale in addition to the core mission of combat effectiveness.

Thus a close reading of Faust, Skokpol, Keene, and many other scholars of modern US history reveals that many of the social welfare institutions and federal programs associated with the modern American Republic are rooted in expansive veterans' benefits programs.²⁰ These health care benefits grew to become a substantial and costly component of Congress' funding requirements after WWII. Whereas the pension debate dominated the veterans' discourse between the Civil War and WWII, the health care debate dominated in post-WWII America.

¹⁹ Jennifer Keene, *Doughboys: the Great War and the Remaking of America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

²⁰ Other works on this topic include David Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) and Ronald Schaffer, *America in the Great War: The Rise of the War Welfare State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

Comprehensive health care for soldiers, dependents, and retirees as a benefit of uniformed service to the Republic is a relatively modern occurrence. Older than the nation itself, the Army Medical Corps was conceived during the Revolutionary War and was rather limited in scope.²¹ Whether on or off the battlefield, regimental surgeons cared for soldiers assigned to their units, offering limited, organic services, comprising the extent of soldiers' health care benefits during America's first century. In 1884, as part of legislative appropriations funding Army operations, Congress mandated "the medical officers of the Army and contract surgeons shall whenever practicable attend the families of the officers and soldiers free of charge."²² This was the general extent of guidance Congress provided to the Services on soldier and dependent health care and remained the accepted interpretation for decades.

WWII changed the nature and scope of this relationship. Even before the war ended, Congress had already addressed issues regarding the health and welfare of the returning soldiers by passing the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944. Easing the transition from soldier to civilian, the act formed a baseline philosophical relationship

²¹ Richard V.N. Ginn, *The History of the US Army Medical Service Corps* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 1997), 3. The MSC dates itself to the creation of hospitals for the Continental Army gathering around Boston during the summer of 1775.

²² Colonel D.E. Casey Jones, M.D., USA., "Unification of the Military Health System: A Half-Century of Unresolved Debate" (unpublished paper, Army War College Strategy Research Project, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks Pennsylvania, 2001), 7; Statutes at Large, "Army Appropriations Act," Chapter 217 at 111–112, 48th Cong. (1884), accessed January 28, 2015, http://www.constitution.org/uslaw/sal/023_statutes_at_large.pdf. The original 1884 legislation reads, "MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. For purchase of medical and hospital supplies, expenses of purveying depots, pay of employees, medical care and treatment of officers and enlisted men of the Army on duty at posts and stations for which no other provision is made, advertising, and other miscellaneous expenses of the Medical Department, two hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars. And not over thirty-six thousand dollars of the money appropriated by this paragraph shall be applied to the payments of the civilian employees of the Medical Department. That officers of the Medical Department shall take rank and precedence in accordance with date of commission or appointment, and shall be borne on the official Army Register: *Provided*, That the medical officers of the Army and contract surgeons shall whenever practicable attend the families of the officers and soldiers free of charge."

between the modern soldier and the state, establishing the “principle that entitlement to benefits could be achieved through service to the nation, not merely through cash contributions.”²³ After an initial drawdown at the close of WWII, the Truman Administration, followed by the Eisenhower Administration, steadily grew the size and capabilities of the military in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. As the draft and massive defense budgets increased the size of the Army, the responsibilities of Congress to provide for the health, welfare, readiness, and morale of the force, in addition to the well-being of dependents and retirees, experienced parallel growth.

The baseline size, scope, and nature of Congressional responsibilities to soldiers, veterans, retirees, and dependents emerged as a hot topic during the AVF transition period. This discussion was of utmost importance to many legislators weary of the high price tag of the AVF, Reagan’s defense build-up, runaway costs associated with soldier health care, and the apparent breakdown in delivery services. In 1979, a panel of experts convened on Capitol Hill and attempted to push through the emotion and drama that had come to characterize the acidic discourse on fiscal issues associated with the AVF. According to this panel, the health care benefit proved an especially sensitive issue. Their mission was to arrive at an understanding of what the baseline health benefit actually was so Congress and DoD officials could engage in discussion about fiscal stewardship rooted in fact rather than emotionally charged distractions.²⁴

²³ David R. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 8. Prior to this act, the normal expectation was that employees had to make cash contributions to a defined benefit system.

²⁴ Major General Benjamin Baker, USAF (Ret), et al., “Supporting Papers: Military Health Care,” (unpublished working papers, Defense Resource Management Study, Muir S. Fairchild Research and Information Center, February 1979), i. This expert panel was called the Defense Resource Management Study (DRMS) and was “commissioned by the Secretary of Defense in November 1977 in response to a request by the President . . . The President wanted a ‘searching organizational review’ into several resource

In general, Chapter 55, Title 10, USC, Sections 1071–1087 states that Congress shall establish a military health care system with the purpose to “maintain high morale . . . by providing medical care for members and certain former members of . . . services, and their dependents.”²⁵ The statute is clear; however, the details of implementation proved difficult to say the least. The first statute since 1884 to specifically address dependent and retiree health benefits did not come until 1956. As big business boomed in post-WWII America, major American firms started offering comprehensive health care plans for employees and dependents in order to attract quality talent. In accordance with this trend, the military followed suit as it too sought to attract the best and brightest. The Dependent Medical Care Act of 1956 was Congress’s initial attempt to close the gap between the health care benefits available to service members as compared to their civilian counterparts.²⁶ This act was crucial to deciphering the true costs associated with military health care since, for the first time, Congress had provided statutory, specific, funded guidance regarding dependent and retiree health benefits.

Based upon existing Army regulations and customs circa 1956, as well as this Dependent Medical Care Act, the 1979 Congressional panel was able to establish a baseline understanding of eligibility for this long-standing, often misunderstood

management issues.” In addition to the military health care system, the DRMS also looked at resource allocation as part of the budget decision process, weapon system acquisition, logistics, and enlisted military careers in the AVF.

²⁵ Baker, “Supporting Papers: Military Health Care,” 137–138.

²⁶ Jones, “Unification of the Military Health System,” 8. Colonel Jones found in 1956, the “Department of Defense estimate was that 40 percent of active duty dependents did not have access to federal facilities due to distance, incomplete medical coverage at the federal facility or due to the saturation of services at military treatment facilities. Congress responded by the creation of what later became the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) [The Dependents Medical Care Act of June 7, 1956, ch. 374 [PL 569, 84TH Congress], 70 Stat.250 (1956)]. When initially created, this program covered only active duty dependents and the medical benefit was limited.”

“promise” in the benefits discourse: 1) Active duty soldiers; 2) The spouse or child of an *active duty* member, or a Reservist on 30 day orders; 3) Retirees of the uniformed service and their living spouse or child, and 4) The survivor(s) of a person who died on *active duty* or was a retiree of uniformed service. For purposes of continuity, this group (1 through 4) was collectively referred to as the “beneficiaries.”²⁷

The initial baseline excluded nonmilitary male spouses of servicewomen who could not prove that they were at least 50 percent dependent on their spouse for support. Initially, no provision was made for divorce; if a female spouse divorced her male active duty service member husband, she did not receive any accrued health care benefits, regardless of how long they were married.²⁸ Also of note, the initial baseline only included provisions for care at the on-post Military Treatment Facility (MTF) for all beneficiaries, with uniform members receiving priority and the rest given access to care on a Space Available (Space-A) basis. Finally, the baseline included off-post, contract civilian care for uniformed members only on a very limited and needs-specific basis, and included no such provision for dependents and retirees.

After sifting through thousands of documents, reports, studies, and sworn testimony, the panel concluded that the only real guarantee ever made to retirees and dependents was access to care.²⁹ The promise of “free health care for life” was never

²⁷ Baker, “Supporting Papers: Military Health Care,” 144.

²⁸ Dolofini-Reed and Bebo, “The Evolution of the Military Health Care System,” 11–12.

²⁹ *Access* and *free* are two different things. *Access* includes a comprehensive system of access to the MTF, supported by copay driven access to civilian care off-post.

made for any of the beneficiary groups listed above—there was no “broken promise.”³⁰ The fact that the health care benefit was initially structured around access to the MTF was often the source of the “broken promise” narrative that emerged along with the AVF. When soldiers and retirees first started taking advantage of the provisions of the 1956 act, they and their family members received care on post nearly 100 percent of the time. It was generally not a problem to acquire Space-A appointments in those days. The perception of a “lifetime access” guarantee to free MTF health care services was not a *de facto* guarantee based in federal law; it was instead a *de jure* proposition based in practice.³¹ Senator Floyd V. Hicks, in testimony given just a year after the implementation of the AVF, commented that “while it may not be legally accurate, all retirees . . . are absolutely convinced that they were promised as a benefit for serving in the military until retirement age, medical care at military installations . . . the promises offered them as inducements to serve are being whittled away.”³²

He is correct in stating that many of the aspects of the promise myth were not grounded in legal accuracy. If anything, they were rooted in long-established Army custom and the fact that in the late 1950s, the population of actual Army retirees and dependents was quite small. In a November 1957 report given to conferees at the American Public Health Association at the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting, Army Major General Paul I. Robinson, Executive Director of the Army’s Dependents’ Medical Care Program, reported that after a year’s experience with the new 1956 provisions, there were

³⁰ *Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military Compensation Committee*, 11.

³¹ Jay Stanley and John D. Blair, eds., *Challenges in Military Health Care: Perspectives on Health Status and the Provision of Care* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 110.

³² Baker, “Supporting Papers: Military Health Care,” 58.

only 800,000 eligible dependents and retirees from all Services in the program.³³ With a pool of this size, giving everyone who needed health care benefits access to free MTF services was quite feasible, subject of course to stipulations and coverage categories in the 1956 legislation. However this was never a guaranteed service. That beneficiaries could access free MTF coverage was merely a product of demographics, the nature of the draft, and the fact that many did not stay around for retirement. The nature of the draft was particularly important because, as discussed, the drafted force consisted of single males who did not stay long and had few, if any, dependents.

As the list of services, treatment options, and the pool of eligible beneficiaries grew exponentially over the next two decades, the military health care system was eventually overwhelmed. The MTF system simply could not keep up with demand. Due to this proliferation of beneficiaries and services, followed by diminished access to care on post, beneficiaries in and out of uniform began to perceive an “erosion of benefits” and a “breaking of faith.”³⁴ In reality, they were stuck in a system that was unable to keep up with exponential growth.

Beneficiary, Services, and Cost Creep (1956-1986)

After the 1956 baseline was established, the pool of eligible beneficiaries had grown steadily throughout the 1960s and 70s. By the late 1980s, the pool had ballooned from the initial 800,000 Major General Robinson had identified to 9 million eligible beneficiaries!³⁵ Several reasons existed for this remarkable growth. First, as the military

³³ Paul I. Robinson, Major General, USA. “The Dependents Medical Care Program” *American Journal of Public Health*, 47 (December 1957), 1555.

³⁴ Baker, “Supporting Papers: Military Health Care,” 58.

³⁵ Dolofini-Reed and Bebo, “The Evolution of the Military Health Care System, 8.

transitioned from a drafted force to a long-service volunteer force, more soldiers made a career out of the military—a career that typically involved marriage and children as previously discussed. Adding to this demographic phenomenon was that in general, people were living longer. Whereas average life expectancy for white males was 61 in 1935 when the old-age insurance program was established, by 1985 that number had increased to 75 for the male, female, white, and black beneficiaries in the military health care system.³⁶ The net effect was predictable: more long-term service members, with more dependents, who became retirees with dependents, and were all living longer, equaled a drastic increase in the beneficiary pool.

In addition to growth of this nature, the extent of services offered grew as well. Before Vietnam, the major concern in the military health care system was trauma and wounds on the battlefield, as well as sickness and disease among the force. Essentially, surgeons and the medical staff were concerned more about soldiers fighting on the battlefield, in maneuvers, or bivouacking than with servicing their families' needs. The dependent beneficiary mission was a distant secondary mission. With the experience of Vietnam and the subsequent creation of the AVF, the scope of the health care mission expanded considerably. For example, the requirements grew to include Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, drug and alcohol addiction (of both active duty and dependents), family practices services associated with the married volunteer soldier, unique female health care services, HIV/AIDS, and other treatment and service options.³⁷

³⁶ National Center for Health Statistics, *National Vital Statistics Reports*, "Life Expectancy at Birth by Race and Sex, 1930–2010," accessed October 31, 2014, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005148.html#ixzz3HkZklUWB>.

³⁷ Stanley and Blair, *Challenges in Military Health Care*, viii.

Ironically, whereas the Army was concerned with soldiers' underweight condition and supplying them with cigarettes during WWII, in the post-Vietnam AVF they became increasingly alarmed with the overweight condition of soldiers as well as the adverse effects of excessive cigarette smoking. If a soldier was slightly *soft* upon arrival at basic training during WWII, a rare occurrence, it was assumed his training experience would get him in shape. No body weight standard for basic training even existed until 1960 and no weight standard for retention until 1976.³⁸ However with the AVF, issues of weight and health were much more important than they were with the WWII conscripts or the Cold War draftees. As the Army settled in with the AVF, they were deprived of the "use and discard" options they exercised with draft era soldiers.³⁹ The modern volunteer force presented a much greater challenge in terms of health and readiness: they required treatment, longevity, and a quick return to service in the field.

As the WWII generation grew in maturity and influence, both in Congress and among the electorate, and as the nation grappled with the political challenges of the Vietnam War, the door was flung wide open to a much more expansive and inclusive military health care system. The most dramatic example of this growth is found in the Military Medical Benefits Amendments of 1966. This act was an extension of the 1956 legislation and brought the entire military health care system under the umbrella of a program called the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). After the 1956 legislation, the CHAMPUS legislation represents the next major step in the growth of the military health care system. As with other issues regarding the military health benefit, the CHAMPUS program, and its TRICARE follow-

³⁸ Stanley and Blair, *Challenges in Military Health Care*, 55.

³⁹ Stanley and Blair, *Challenges in Military Health Care*, 183.

on, is the subject of much scrutiny, conjecture, confusion, and misunderstanding. One report described CHAMPUS as a “Rosetta Stone” of complexity. It was intricate in language and scope, but also offered government administrators who could master the language a prism that might finally translate the complex military health conundrum into a workable benefit system:

Much controversy exists regarding the intent of CHAMPUS legislation—whether it is a supplement to or a substitute for the direct military health care system . . . [finding the truth] seems akin to the discovery and application of the meaning of the Rosetta Stone. It is presumed that when the fundamental truths are understood they will be the key to determining the ‘one best way’ of administering CHAMPUS.⁴⁰

Despite the confusion, CHAMPUS’s initial mandate is rather basic and can be discerned through a close reading of the initial legislation. Simply stated, the 1966 CHAMPUS expansion “broadened the authority of the military services to contract with civilian providers to supplement MTF health care [and] expanded the military health care benefit both in terms of eligibility and covered services.”⁴¹ Though it structurally recognized the MTF as the basic building block and delivery platform of the military health care system, the CHAMPUS expansion opened the door for beneficiaries, including retirees, to access a large network of civilian providers subject to a copay system. This copay device, designed initially to force beneficiaries to rely on the MTF and cut costs, eventually became the root of many cost overruns in the program. When the MTF was no longer able to handle the size of the beneficiary pool, the government was forced to rely on the contract feature of CHAMPUS and pay for beneficiary care off-post. The copay system emerged as the go-to feature of the CHAMPUS benefit, and was also the root of the *broken promise* discourse. Copays and civilian contract care directly

⁴⁰ Baker, “Supporting Papers: Military Health Care,” 135.

⁴¹ Dolofini-Reed and Bebo, “The Evolution of the Military Health Care System,” 17.

conflicted with many retirees' understanding of a free health care promise. However, the initial legislation clearly states that copays and contract care were organic to the CHAMPUS benefit from the start; they were "access" features—not "free health care" features.⁴²

Since 1966, Congress has amended the explanation of services covered by CHAMPUS on many occasions. These changes have "tended to expand rather than limit the level of services covered." Examples of this expansion between 1966 and 1986 include inpatient care for all beneficiary categories, outpatient hospital-based services, acute care physician services, obstetrics, mental health, diagnostic tests and services, ambulance services, durable medical equipment such as oxygen therapy, medically necessary dental care, physical exams, pharmacy benefits, family planning, and elective reconstructive surgery.⁴³

If the details and nuance regarding coverage, copays, intent, and broken promises are debated, the fact that CHAMPUS greatly influenced the size and cost of the military health benefit is not debated. One major study of the military health care program concluded that the greatest source of expense in the entire history of the military health program was the extension of CHAMPUS coverage to retirees in 1966. By the 1980s, this

⁴² Baker, "Supporting Papers: Military Health Care," 54-55. Legislators trying to uncover the root of this *broken promise* discourse pointed to a spate of recruiting literature from the 1960s and 70s that appeared to make promises that were unfounded; some even accused the military of a "bait and switch" scheme. "The impression one gains from such advertisements is that all medical needs will be met ... in actuality, the medical benefit entitlement has very specific stipulations and are limited to 'dependents and survivors of active duty members . . . subject to availability of space . . . and staffing capability.'" Retired members "may be given medical care" on post but are "subject to availability" and staff capabilities as well. The same goes for the dependents of the above. Finally, much of this care is not free as it is subject to "deductibles and co-payments of 25 percent . . . CHAMPUS is not free, but, because of the sweeping language of many enlistment and re-enlistment ads, the subtleties of the legal provision is lost on the beneficiary." Retirees had a "perception of erosion and cuts" based on "unrealistic expectations," "poorly defined" terms, and an "impression of entitlements not found in statutes."

⁴³ Dolofini-Reed and Bebo, "The Evolution of the Military Health Care System," 15-17.

extension in coverage was consuming upwards of two-thirds of the entire CHAMPUS bill charged to Congress every year.⁴⁴ In order to further understand the *mentalité* of Congressmen as they addressed smoking-related expenses associated with the AVF in the 1980s, a deeper understanding of the nature of this CHAMPUS bill is required.

The CHAMPUS Bill

Congress became painfully aware of CHAMPUS's immense growth in terms of size and cost in 1976. The next 25 years saw near constant hearings on Capitol Hill in an ongoing effort to control spiraling CHAMPUS expenditures and budget requests.⁴⁵ In 1979, then-Congressman from California and future Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said retirees were forced onto CHAMPUS due to lack of space in the MTF had a "tremendous cost" to the taxpayer and the government.⁴⁶ Other Congressmen lamented the "very high cost" of the CHAMPUS program; they were largely responding to the reports showing that the "largest percentage of growth" in Defense-related health care costs "has occurred in CHAMPUS."⁴⁷ Making matters worse, Congressmen realized that the cause of this proliferation was not just the 1966 CHAMPUS expansion or the growth of the retirement population in general. In addition to these, it was also the product of an

⁴⁴ Dolofini-Reed and Bebo, "The Evolution of the Military Health Care System," 52.

⁴⁵ Dolofini-Reed and Bebo, "The Evolution of the Military Health Care System," 1.

⁴⁶ *Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military Compensation Committee*, 337.

⁴⁷ *Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee*, 5; Baker, "Supporting Papers: Military Health Care," 2.

expanded AVF and their dependents crowding MTFs after 1973.⁴⁸ This combined growth presented Congress and the Army with a difficult, multifaceted problem.

An example of the difficulty military officials faced in controlling CHAMPUS costs after just a decade with the AVF is found in what military health professionals described as the “CHAMPUS Opportunity Cost” conundrum.⁴⁹ Responding to growing costs, by the mid-1980s Congress had taken responsibility for CHAMPUS away from the DoD and placed it squarely in the lap of the services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Marines depend on the Navy for their medical services). This move was informed by the bureaucratic dictum stating that an organization forced to pay for a program with funds organic to that organization is more likely to control and monitor their program costs. If the source of funds is external to the organization, like the DoD, organizations tend to exercise much looser cost control measures. This is known as the OPM concept: other people’s money.

After Congress implemented these cost control measures, services were forced to take CHAMPUS cost overruns out of hide. This meant that the Army would have to shift money from other funding streams or accounting lines to cover unbudgeted cost overruns associated with dependent and retiree non-MTF medical bills. It was quite possible that

⁴⁸ *Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee*, 318; *Readiness of Military Medicine: Hearing Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, 3–5. Testimony in the hearing stated that CHAMPUS program costs had soared over the years “because of an increase in the cost of care as well as an increase in the use by military dependents and retirees, who often seek medical care in the civilian community under CHAMPUS after they are turned away from crowded military hospitals.” However it must also be noted there was a combination of other factors (in addition to the growth of the beneficiary pool) that drove this mass of beneficiaries away from MTFs and onto CHAMPUS. In 1985 testimony given by Representative Robert Regula (R-OH), he pointed out 21 studies existed on this issue (problems in military health system). These studies uncovered low occupancy rates in clinics due to poor or unqualified staffing, 20 percent of the military’s doctors practicing without proper licenses, and services failing to work together to administer the health care benefit. Regula opined the most glaring example of services not working together was the Grenade operation when Navy ships refused to receive wounded Army soldiers.

⁴⁹ Stanley and Blair, *Challenges in Military Health Care*, 149.

an Army appropriator would have to choose between elements of operational mission readiness (such as fuel and bullets) and funding CHAMPUS cost overruns. By the mid-80s, these out of hide charges had grown so large, the services could no longer simply shift money or absorb them without seriously affecting mission accomplishment and combat readiness. With bills from unbudgeted cost overruns running as high as \$525 million in some years, Congress grew alarmed at the unfunded liability bills the military services were presenting in the form of unpaid, unbudgeted CHAMPUS cost overruns.⁵⁰ This was the nature of the CHAMPUS cost.

However, the CHAMPUS opportunity cost resulted from the blowback. Congress, weary of these out-of-budget bills, pushed back on the Services and forced them to develop allocation schemes that gave rise to an opportunity cost mechanism. For example, the Army's primary medical mission is the readiness of the active duty soldier, with the benefits mission running a close second.⁵¹ In order to give Army medics and doctors relevant experience to enhance and enable the primary mission, the Army Medical Corps needed to move doctors, or deploy them from time to time, to give them exposure to the field conditions, wounds, and operations tempo they could expect in a combat zone. However, the benefits of such operational experiences had to be weighed against the monetary costs in terms of CHAMPUS assignments. If an Army doctor was not available at the MTF (i.e., he was in the field or training), the CHAMPUS beneficiary (dependents, retirees, etc.) received care off-post, resulting in a charge to the CHAMPUS

⁵⁰ *Military Medical Care: Hearings Before the Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee*, 318.

⁵¹ *Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military Compensation Committee*, 1.

budget. In the end these enhancement missions associated with combat and medical readiness were often sacrificed for the secondary mission of beneficiary services in efforts to avoid CHAMPUS “opportunity costs.”⁵²

Ironically, retaining good Army doctors in an environment where they were denied relevant field experience became very difficult. As many doctors left the service after their mandatory terms, they still drove up the CHAMPUS opportunity cost, as their absence forced a mountain of CHAMPUS assignments. Many reasoned they would rather make better money in the civilian sector than as managed care providers in uniform. Thus the gaping hole at the MTF created the CHAMPUS opportunity cost after all. In addition to this, by 1979 Congress was forced to enact very expensive measures to keep doctors in the service through bonus money and other programs. In another bit of irony, Congress ultimately had to spend money in order to avoid losing money to the potential budget draining CHAMPUS *opportunity cost* scenario. One wonders if it was really a wash in the end.⁵³

The Reality of a Smoking AVF

By the early 1980s, Congress was acutely aware of the mounting bills associated with AVF health care and the CHAMPUS program. The air was thick with cost-cutting schemes. This cost-averse, budget-sensitive environment influenced the mindset of military and government appropriators as they addressed the reality of rising military health care costs in general, and health-related expenses associated with a cigarette

⁵² Stanley and Blair, *Challenges in Military Health Care*, 149.

⁵³ *Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military Compensation Committee*, 1-12 (opening statements for the hearings); Stanley and Blair, *Challenges in Military Health Care*, 149. The subject of how to recruit and retain high quality doctors was the major theme of the 1979 hearings regarding the military health care system and the bill then being debated in committee—H.R. 5195.

smoking AVF specifically. The proposition of a cigarette smoking AVF was a particularly grim reality that made their task all the more daunting. Once legislators parsed fact from fiction in terms of the baseline health care requirement for military beneficiaries, reality emerged: this was a large, growing, and expensive pool that was guaranteed access to a great variety of services and benefits both on- and off-post.⁵⁴

Additionally, many were aware the typical smoke-and-mirror games involving slick accounting schemes and bureaucratic efficiencies would not work in this case. The 1978 Finneran Study had informed them the administration of CHAMPUS was as good as it would ever be; there simply were no administrative fixes, fat-trimming exercises, or operational maneuvers that could stop the bleeding or yield substantial cost savings. If the CHAMPUS program was expensive, it was due to a glaring reality: the growth in throughput and eligible beneficiaries had outpaced Congressional efforts to keep up with demand.⁵⁵

As a result, Congress was faced with a bleak proposition: if the health care bill of the AVF and the retiree force of the mid 1980s appeared unsustainable, how much more so would they be in the mid-1990s when the first wave of the AVF started to retire? Even more daunting, they had to consider the fact that if nothing changed, at minimum 52 percent of these future Army retirees would be smokers who spent the majority of their career smoking cigarettes subsidized by Congress, sold in bulk at half-price or less on

⁵⁴ Stanley and Blair, *Challenges in Military Health Care*, 4. A monumental military health care bubble was emerging: in 1980, 2.9 million veterans were over 65; by 1990 that pool had grown to 7.2 million.

⁵⁵ Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, 88.

post, or given to them free of charge in ration packs or at military hospitals.⁵⁶ If this beneficiary pool created a \$525 million cost overrun during the mid-1980s, how would the overrun look in the mid-1990s when a massive group of chain smoking military retirees entered the CHAMPUS system? Leon Panetta saw this conundrum when he said in 1979 that the retiree population was outgrowing the capabilities of the military health care system.⁵⁷ Panetta was soon joined by a cabal of fiscal conservatives concerned about spiraling costs, and more specifically, a host of costs associated with the problem of a smoking, soon retiring AVF.

⁵⁶ *The Senate Congressional Record*, August 6, 1986, at S10529, accessed January 28, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eld92b00>. See statements by Senator Bingham in Senate Congressional Record. In 1985, 57.3 percent of all enlisted forces smoked. 52 percent of the Active Duty Army smoked. Bingham was alarmed about DoD reported smoking statistics, adding that smoking cost taxpayers 210 million dollars in additional health care costs in 1984 and contributed to poor physical fitness. Senators opposed to subsidizing cigarettes were most alarmed by the fact that 52 percent of the Army smoked while only 29 percent in society.

⁵⁷ *Military Health Care Delivery System: Hearings on H.R. 5195 (H.R. 5235) Before the Military Compensation Committee*, 337.

CHAPTER IX

CAP, JOE, AND THE JESSE HELMS CREW GO TO WAR

If Rome was not built in a day, neither was the soldier-cigarette bond that produced the AVF starters and chain smokers of such great concern for Carter-Reagan Era legislators and defense appropriators. The entrenchment of the soldier and the cigarette occurred over six decades within a military-industrial-political culture that nursed the manly, rugged, financially lucrative, and politically expedient connection between soldiering and smoking. The cigarette enterprise's extended battle to keep Americans, and by extension soldier-starters, hinged to smoking and the federal bureaucracy's efforts to unhinge these bonds eventually came into direct conflict. What had started as low-level wrangling grew into small scale skirmishes and further escalated: by the mid-1970s, the battle over cigarettes in America ballooned to full-scale war.

Like all wars, the cigarette wars had battle lines, strategic plans, and battlefield commanders. The battlefield was the Beltway, the strategic plans were developed by lobbyists and politicians on both sides of the cigarette debate, and the great commanders were Casper "Cap" Weinberger, Jesse Helms, and Joe Califano. The story of these great captains of the cigarette war not only sets up a final discussion of the demise of the soldier-cigarette bond, it further exposes an American corporatocracy linking highly placed government and industrial officials with powerful special interests.

When Casper Weinberger stood for nomination as Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in 1981, he was a veteran infantryman, a cost-cutting budgeter, a seasoned bureaucrat, a big business "ladle," and a powerful corporate lawyer all in one.¹ All his

¹ Edward M. "Ted" Kennedy and Casper W. Weinberger, "Political Debate," (*C-SPAN* video, March 14, 1986), 1:03:38, accessed December 31, 2014, www.c-spanvideo.org/program/PoliticalDebate. In

varied experiences informed his leadership of the DoD and the way he approached the problems associated with chain smoking soldiers during the 1980s. Weinberger considered himself a soldier's soldier. Four decades before he assumed the helm at DoD, Weinberger had finished Harvard Law School and promptly enlisted in the Army as an infantryman. Later in life, he commented: "The infantry was, in my mind, the most honorable way to serve, a sentiment which I suppose came particularly from my mother's New England heritage and the ethic that only the most difficult, disagreeable path was morally right and that anything enjoyable must be wrong."²

Weinberger was proud that he knew the life of the grunt, how to look after the men under his charge, and that he had served in his generation's great war. Once when listening to President Reagan quote from a WWI infantryman's journal during a speech, Weinberger said that he "knew again that kinship I always felt for the infantry and the pride I had served in it so long ago."³ He knew the distinction of being an infantryman; however, he also knew the hardships associated with the infantryman's troglodyte existence. Reporting to Camp Roberts, California, for basic training during WWII, he, along with a group of college and graduate degree recruits, were given their first military assignment: "digging sewers under the main parade ground." Weinberger commented that in the mud, muck, and ditches of Camp Roberts, he first learned how vital morale was to the enlisted man, commenting he "got a good idea of what is important to enlisted

a widely publicized debate between Ted Kennedy and Cap on March 14, 1986, Senator Kennedy gave Cap the moniker *Cap the Ladle*: "Are arms buildup and arms control compatible . . . A trillion dollars spent but nothing done in arms control. We've heard of the welfare cheat and now we have the procurement cheat . . . Cap the Knife has become Cap the Ladle."

² Casper W. Weinberger, *In the Arena: A Memoir of the 20th Century*, with Gretchen Roberts (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2001), 55.

³ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 7.

men and their morale,” knowledge he felt proved “invaluable when I became Secretary of Defense.”⁴ As SECDEF, he would find out how important cigarettes were to the morale of the force and the enterprise’s bottom line.

Weinberger’s life as an infantryman was a valuable and rewarding experience, but not his life’s work. Instead, he lived a life of service in high-placed positions in and out of government—not digging slit trenches, directing enfilading fire, or performing the monotonous duties of an Army staff officer. Though not in the trench, whether serving at the state, federal, or corporate level, Weinberger was always in the arena. After cutting his teeth as a lawyer and serving as California’s state finance and budget director, Weinberger saw his first federal posting when elevated as the Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1969. According to President Nixon, he wanted Weinberger “to clean [the FTC] up.”⁵ When appointed, newspapers reported the “FTC was buffeted and embattled when President Nixon appointed California’s aggressive and knowledgeable Cap Weinberger to take charge and straighten things out.”⁶ What needed cleaning, and why did the FTC feel “buffeted” by Cap’s arrival? As Weinberger soon discovered, the cigarette enterprise had much to say about these questions.

At the FTC, Weinberger spent much of his time in direct confrontation with the enterprise. He found that the “heavy criticism the agency was receiving” was to a great

⁴ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 56, 69–77. Weinberger went on to serve in combat in the jungles of New Guinea. He was later assigned to MacArthur’s staff in Australia where he was promoted to the rank of Captain and served in the Combined Operational Intelligence Center. After moving forward to the Philippines with MacArthur, Weinberger was given the choice of going home or serving with his boss in the Japanese Occupation Force. With a father who had recently died and a child recently born, Weinberger chose to avail himself of the opportunity to go home.

⁵ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 171.

⁶ “FTC Carries On,” September 14, 1970 Newspaper Clipping, November-December 1968, Newspaper Clipping File, Box 926, Weinberger Collection.

degree generated from the propagandists and pundits associated with the cigarette enterprise. The industry was livid over the FTC's cigarette warning labels and interference with Americans' smoking behaviors.⁷ FTC interference started in 1964 in response to the Surgeon General's Warning, and continued through 1969 with Congressional and FTC mandated restrictions on cigarette advertising, as well as mandatory labeling regulations.⁸ Subsequently, the enterprise proved extremely interested in and committed to getting the federal government *out* of the smoking regulation business.

To some extent, the developing cigarette controversy in the Beltway and the immense power of the enterprise took Weinberger by surprise. Leaving California, he commented, "Reporters' questions in Sacramento showed genuine interest in government and in establishing facts about a policy." However, by the time he entered Washington, DC, he found the questions changed. Questions about general policy turned to "questions . . . designed to elicit controversy" and were questions "particularly interested in my views on smoking and tobacco policy."⁹ Many on both sides of the smoking issue were interested in his views on cigarettes and health. During Senate Commerce Committee confirmation hearings, Weinberger was consistently grilled about his position on cigarettes. One particular Senator came right to the point, asking Weinberger whether or

⁷ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 171.

⁸ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 186. The industry was feeling the heat from a string of successive victories by anti-smoking groups in the Beltway: The Surgeon General's Warning of 1964, the Cigarette Advertising Bill of 1965, the Truth in Labeling Act of 1966 were all enacted, and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1970 was in conference when Weinberger took his position at FTC.

⁹ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 174.

not he would “strive diligently to protect the American people against hazards of cigarette smoking.” Weinberger responded:

Yes Senator . . . once it is established that there are, for example, health hazards involved in cigarette smoking . . . it seems to me entirely appropriate that a label that states that be included, as it is at the present time . . . this is again a simple matter of basically truth in labeling and truth in advertising. This is the way I feel about it.¹⁰

With this statement, Weinberger made one of his earliest official statements regarding his position on smoking in America. His statement was and should be interpreted as exposing his core belief that smoking was a habit requiring regulation, to some degree or another, by the federal government. Considering his controversial stance on smoking, it was not surprising for Weinberger to discover that some in the media “appeared to be quite gleeful when I said I did not smoke.”¹¹ The press knew there was a Beltway bonanza of juicy news in the making when a California-based, non-smoking, bourgeoisie moderate ran up against the conservative, Southern-based *good ol’ boy* tobacco coalition. Given time and enough baiting questions, the stories would practically write themselves.

Thus, when Cap Weinberger took the reins at the FTC, he became the chief target of a force relentless in its efforts to undermine the regulatory power of the federal apparatus in relation to cigarette smoking. The FTC was established in 1914 as the “capstone of over thirty years of progressive government” during a period which saw the enactment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890 and the emergence of Progressive Era

¹⁰ *Senate Commerce Committee Hearing on the Nomination of Caspar W. Weinberger to Be a Member of the Federal Trade Commission*, November 18, 1969, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rnx10a00/pdf>. In the line of questioning from Senator Moss, Weinberger further included that he would not be averse to the “printing of the tar and nicotine content on the outside of the package by order of the FTC.”

¹¹ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 174.

lightning rod Teddy Roosevelt in 1901.¹² The enterprise had largely avoided the meddling hand of the FTC during the Commission's first 50 years; this string of success came to an end after the 1964 Surgeon General's Warning. When the industry and others interested in rolling back the power of the FTC fought back, they quickly noted the FTC was historically a waste dump of lawyers, "the little old lady of Pennsylvania Avenue."¹³ When Weinberger took over in 1969, the FTC had over 400 lawyers on its payroll who litigated a mere 23 cases the previous year. The cigarette enterprise used the perception of waste and unwarranted *brass nanny* meddling as a rallying cry against Weinberger's FTC. For the next two decades, Weinberger was destined to develop intimate familiarity with this *brass nanny* rallying cry during subsequent postings at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and DoD.

To some degree however, Weinberger sympathized with those critical of the FTC. As a veteran budget cutter from California, where he was instrumental in pushing through Governor Reagan's austerity measures, he felt that the FTC budget was a bit bloated. He recalled, "I fully agreed that our budget was much too big and should be cut." He added that this confused many of the Beltway insiders and "caused quite a stir . . . Congress had never had anyone ask for a budget reduction."¹⁴ Weinberger trimming budgets and asking

¹² Robert Howard Wieland, "Direct Responsibility: Casper Weinberger and the Reagan Defense Buildup" (dissertation, The University of Southern Mississippi, 2013), ch. 2, p. 8.

¹³ Wieland, "Direct Responsibility: Casper Weinberger and the Reagan Defense Buildup," ch. 2, p. 8.

¹⁴ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 184–185.

for spending reductions would prove incredibly ironic for a man who, as SECDEF, drove defense spending to a stratosphere many had never fathomed.¹⁵

Further, he felt some of the FTC programs were slightly intrusive or badly botched. For example, he lamented the Commission had spent “about seven years to determine whether Listerine really freshened your breath and whether the advertising was truthful.” Additionally, he poked fun at the FTC directed label “*do not wash* on one side, and *do not dry clean* on the other.”¹⁶ However, austere budgets, good breath, and silly garment labels were one thing; smoking dangers and lung cancer were another. Throughout his time at the FTC and other postings leading to his appointment as SECDEF, Weinberger consistently believed the public required warning about potentially dangerous, unhealthy behaviors so “they could make more informed decisions.”¹⁷

As an executive in the federal government, Weinberger strove to place cigarette production and consumption under the all-seeing eye of big government. Particularly striking about Weinberger’s odyssey into anti-smoking zealotry was his determination to

¹⁵ Wieland, “Direct Responsibility: Casper Weinberger and the Reagan Defense Buildup,” ch. 2, p. 18; Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 218. Weinberger’s history of budget smashing and cost cutting presented an irony that several on his HEW confirmation panel were unable to overlook. One particularly exasperated Senator asked Weinberger the frank question, “How can a budget cutter support the 250 programs and 110,000 employees of the HEW?” Weinberger became hated on the Hill and on the street during this period as he continued to impound funds the same way he had at OMB with Nixon’s blessing. As HEW Chief, he was quick to sequester money he felt Congress had misappropriated or wasted. Great Society liberals were angry, and their constituents were, as well. When Cap left the Hill to become a recipient of the big government ladle as a Bechtel Corp Executive, and then later as a profligate spender at DoD, he came to be labeled a zig-zag and a flip-flop. Whether he would be a flip-flop or not on the issue of soldiers’ smoking behavior when he became SECDEF remained to be seen. Weinberger was eventually confirmed as HEW by a 61–10 vote, with the 10 *nay* voices coming from Democrats unhappy with his penchant for impounding. The two *nay* votes he’d get during his SECDEF confirmation hearing six years later would be cast for different reasons.

¹⁶ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 185.

¹⁷ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 186.

make it an overtly personal odyssey. Regarding the personal nature of this foray,

Weinberger commented:

I personally was convinced of the need to protect the public from the perils of smoking, but my opinion had been formed long before and was based on much less erudite reasoning. When I was four years old, I had found a half-smoked, still burning cigar on the street near our home in San Francisco, and naturally I tried to smoke it as I had seen others do. I still remember how ill it made me, and I never touched tobacco again. More important, I felt the dangers of smoking were an important consumer issue.¹⁸

Stridently opposed to the enterprise, he took the rather controversial stance that the FTC should implement and orchestrate all forms of cigarette warning, including advertising and media, and not just recently approved FTC package labels.¹⁹ He wanted to substantially strengthen warnings on cigarette packs and advertisements to include, ironically, a *frank statement* warning consumers about what he felt were scientifically proven dangers inherent in smoking.²⁰ He also wanted to address the dangers of secondhand smoke, an issue that was just beginning to rear its head in the 1970s.²¹

¹⁸ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 187–188.

¹⁹ The Federal Trade Commission, *Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966*, 15 U.S.C. §1333 (1966), accessed January 29, 2015, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/chapter-36>. In 1966, the FTC passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act; it has been amended several times since. There have been various warning labels prescribed over the years. Originally, there were four: “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy” or “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health” or “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight” or “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide.” However, today there are nine rotating labels: “WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive,” “WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children,” “WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease,” “WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer,” “WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease,” “WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby,” “WARNING: Smoking can kill you,” “WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers,” and “WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health.”

²⁰ Federal Trade Commission, *Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966*, accessed January 28, 2015, <http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-cigarette-labeling-advertising-act-1966>. According to the FTC webpage, since 1966, the FTC has enacted the following consumer protection measures regarding tobacco: “The Cigarette Act, as amended by the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1986 and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act . . . requires manufacturers, packagers, and importers of cigarettes to place one of four statutorily-prescribed health-related warnings on cigarette packages and in advertisements, on a rotating basis. Under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control, as of October 2012 one of nine statutorily-prescribed health-related warning labels must

Regarding these aggressive anti-smoking policies, Weinberger reasoned the enterprise and associated advertisers had comfortably survived the tranche of labeling requirements and advertising restrictions that came into effect in the 1960s. As a man who would grow comfortable navigating the waters between industry and government, board and bureaucracy, Weinberger felt cigarette production should continue as a very profitable private venture, albeit with some responsible government oversight. However, he personally hoped “many American people survive too, thanks to the dangers of smoking” which the federal government had endeavored to make clear to them. These comments and policy positions were infuriating to an enterprise increasingly alarmed by the maverick anti-smoking bureaucrat from the West Coast.²²

After a stint at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) where he again angered Beltway bureaucrats with his penchant for impounding appropriated funds and trimming budgets to unsustainable levels, President Nixon elevated Weinberger to the

be used, on a rotating basis approved by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. The Cigarette Act prohibits any advertising of cigarettes on radio and television. While the Act does not expressly provide for FTC enforcement, the FTC may bring enforcement actions under Section 5 of the FTC Act against unfair or deceptive acts or practices that would also constitute violations of the Cigarette Act.”

²¹ Peter Schrag, “The Anti-smoking Crusade Burns Out,” *The Inquiry* (April 2, 1979): 7, accessed January 2, 2015, <http://unzmag.org/Pub/Inquiry-1979apr02-00004>. In a scathing article espousing the libertarian viewpoint on secondhand smoke, journalist Schrag uses Senator Marlow Cook’s playbook through imagery and terms associated with nuclear warfare/deterrence (Cook used the Vietnam War) to sarcastically dismantle the anti-smoking zealots: “If one begins with real nukes and real fallout, then tobacco smoke is one of the penultimate forms in the descent of pollution from its metaphorical heights. Where real fallout is (or was) remote, complex and, in most instances, subject to expert obfuscation, other people’s tobacco smoke finally makes environmentalism into Everyman’s crusade. No need for the team from OSHA or the inspectors from EPA: one sign explaining the local smoking ordinance in the restaurant or supermarket and every Pecksniff’s nostrils work overtime like so many little Geiger counters. No team of nuclear maniacs testing a bomb in the desert ever encountered such hostility as is aimed at the patron palming a butt in the wrong part of a segregated eatery.”

²² Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 187.

helm of the HEW.²³ From a position with moderate impact on smoking and cigarette policies at FTC, at HEW Weinberger was placed in the center of the ring. As Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Weinberger would directly influence everything from the funding of smoking-related health research, to anti-smoking education initiatives, to a myriad of health and welfare issues as they pertained to an American population that included millions of dedicated cigarette smokers.

Consistent with his time at FTC, at HEW Weinberger went out of his way to highlight his personal aversion to cigarette smoking and the importance of federal intervention. In a radio interview given during this period, when asked about his desire to ban high-tar cigarettes, Weinberger responded:

Well, it is a personal suggestion and recommendation that I have made to the Congress [regarding] the effects of smoking on the nonsmoker who breathes in the smoke . . . We have found . . . that this is a very major public health hazard and that it has a high toll in illness and premature deaths, and it's totally needless and it's preventable. And we suggested that the—I did—suggested that the Congress should regulate the levels of the tar and nicotine and these hazardous ingredients that are in cigarettes.²⁴

When asked if he felt this demand for a ban on high-tar cigarettes would lead to an across-the-board ban on the manufacture of cigarettes in America, Weinberger responded that he did not “think that there’s any suggestion of that at this point . . .”²⁵ Words are important, and the fact that Weinberger had consistently supported a ban on high-tar cigarettes and was against a total ban of cigarettes, but only “at this point,” were not

²³ Wieland, “Direct Responsibility: Casper Weinberger and the Reagan Defense Buildup,” ch. 2, p. 14. Weinberger went along with Nixon’s vetoes and impoundment measures targeted at controlling spending. Impoundment was a *Nixonian* tactic of withholding appropriated funds that created “a number of enemies on Capitol Hill.” One of these was powerful tobacco Senator from North Carolina Sam Ervin who sparred with Weinberger on occasion, “bemoaning executive abuses” and abuse of power. The “impoundment controversy was just the first of many clashes Weinberger fought with Congress” . . . and one of the first he would fight with the tobacco delegation.

²⁴ Casper Weinberger, “Weinberger on Smoking,” interview by Radio TV Reports, *News and Information Service*, WRC Radio (NBC Network), July 30, 1975, accessed December 31, 2014, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dia09a00>.

²⁵ Weinberger, “Weinberger on Smoking,” 2.

words missed by powerful forces in the cigarette enterprise. Indeed they were interpreted as an existential threat to the entire American cigarette enterprise.

Jesse Helms to the breech!

As tensions mounted between pro and anti-cigarette factions in and out of government, it was only a matter of time before the key elements of the enterprise's strategy to make war on anti-smoking zealots appeared on the floors of Congress.²⁶ As previously demonstrated, this strategy was tethered to a program of denial, deflection, smokers' rights, and doubt. As an end state, the enterprise's grand plan was oriented on three mutually supporting outcomes. First, it would position the industry to degrade the federal government's ability to legislate against smoking. Second, the plan would allow the industry to attract new smokers—many of whom were soldiers, and nearly all voters. Third, it would aid in the retention of committed, experienced smokers (also voters) by giving them a measure of confidence in their choice to continue enjoying cigarettes. Influential tobacco state politicians were deeply involved in executing plans associated with these outcomes. They stood to benefit economically if government efforts to regulate cigarette smoking were obstructed, and politically if they were seen as guarding smoker-voter rights.

However before Jesse Helms entered the breech to join the enterprise's battle against anti-smoking zealotry, Senator Marlow W. Cook laid a strong foundation, masterfully employing enterprise strategies in the halls of Congress. Cook was a senator from Kentucky and a vociferous defender of tobacco land America. He was also a distinguished military veteran who entered the United States Navy at 17 and served in the

²⁶ Congressmen were more than willing to incorporate the previously discussed Roper Proposal strategies into their speeches and legislative programs. However, they left the tenets of the Bates Memo, with its focus on youth smoking, to secret meetings at cigarette industry giants like PM and RJR.

submarine fleet during WWII. After graduating from the University of Louisville Law School in 1950, Cook practiced law and worked his way up through the Kentucky State House of Representatives, eventually winning election to the US Senate as a Republican in 1968.²⁷ On February 7, 1973, Cook stepped to the podium on the Senate floor and waged a verbal war against the anti-smoking elements who, in his opinion, were invading the halls of Congress and the many corridors of the federal government.²⁸ By this date, Weinberger had already accrued his anti-smoking *bona fides* during his posts at FTC and OMB and had made anti-smoking waves during his confirmation hearings for his new posting at HEW. The occasion for Cook's tirade was the sixth annual release of HEW's report alerting Congress to the health risks associated with smoking. Cook's timing was not by chance; he wanted to welcome the incoming HEW secretary with a penchant for meddling in America's smoking habits with a shot across the bow.

In a speech replete with martial overtones, Cook began by lamenting that the nation had recently extracted itself from an unpopular and costly insurgent war in Southeast Asia, only to find the homeland under attack by elements of the federal government. This "winter offensive" against the fifty million American citizens who chose to smoke was, in Cook's estimation, preceded by a "bombardment" campaign masquerading itself as "scientific data." Cook claimed the propaganda and deception

²⁷ Office of Art and Archives/Office of the Historian, "Marlow W. Cook," *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*, accessed November 15, 2013, <http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=c000721>.

²⁸ Ward Sinclair, "Cook's Not Saying, But He Acts Like a Candidate," *Louisville Times*, May 16, 1973. This was a particularly aggressive speech from the Senate floor; however it did not garner much attention in the newspapers. One journalist mentioned it in an article where he speculated whether or not Cook would run again for Senate in 1974. The *Louisville Times* reported on Cook's popularity as one of the staunchest allies of the state's large tobacco farmer population. The writer referred back to this fiery speech Cook made in February 1973 where he launched an "unusual personal attack" on Dr. Daniel Horn, the government's chief anti-smoking scientist. In what appeared to be an unwarranted attack, Cook doubted Horn's qualifications which the author said were "highly regarded in the scientific community."

strategies of the Viet Cong were leveraged by the US government in a program to employ false data and unsupported accusations aimed at social engineering and mind control. While real soldiers fought in jungles and rice paddies, federal bureaucrats, like Weinberger, were “entrenched in the dark nooks and crannies of the federal establishment” cranking out propaganda in their ongoing war against the cigarette industry. Cook labeled the anti-smoking elements of the HEW office as “closed-minded crusaders” plotting a sneak attack against smoking in a disgusting war against the American tobacco farmer. Cook concluded his emotional speech in support of the cigarette industry and smokers’ rights with a quote from a recent Supreme Court ruling: “Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”²⁹

Cook’s oration displayed nearly every aspect of the enterprise’s Roper strategy. He brilliantly combined the plan’s key tenets as he invoked language regarding rights, freedom, federal cronyism, questionable scientific data, and patriotic fervor. Cook ended with a warning to Cap Weinberger: rein in the “smoke fighters” and entrenched government bureaucrats at the HEW.³⁰ He demanded that Weinberger instead steer the Department toward fair and objective reporting about the supposed health risks associated with smoking. Weinberger took office less than a week later on February 12, 1973; however, only time would tell if the new HEW Secretary, and future Defense Secretary, was listening.

²⁹ 93 Cong. Rec. S1-5 (daily ed. February 7, 1973) (statement of Sen. M.W. Cook), accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/orr2aa00/pdf>. The provenance of this quote comes from Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis’ 1928 dissenting opinion as found in *Olmstead v. US*, 277 US 438.

³⁰ 93 Cong. Rec. S2 (daily ed. February 7, 1973) (statement of Sen. M.W. Cook).

If Weinberger was not listening to Cook, a newly elected senator from North Carolina was determined to make sure Weinberger paid attention to him. Senator Jesse Helms appeared in full armor on the Beltway battlefield in 1973. Helms soon thereafter responded in force at various and sundry times over the next two decades to any threat to the cigarette enterprise. HEW Secretary Weinberger, with his prolonged, zealous, and in Helm's eyes, malicious actions against the cigarette enterprise, was made a key target of Helm's counterassault. Hailing from North Carolina, Helms was the first Republican Senator from that state since the end of Reconstruction. He gained popularity among North Carolina's grassroots tobacco community as a radio personality and conservative editorialist on the Tobacco Radio Network, a conglomeration of AM and FM stations that served as the conservative voice of rural Carolina.

To say Helms was a staunch supporter of the cigarette enterprise is an understatement; he was at once foot soldier, field commander, and grand strategist. In short, Helms was the cigarette industry's best friend in Congress and Weinberger's worst enemy.³¹ Both Helms and Weinberger, and the interest groups they represented, were soon engaged in a high-visibility war. Despite the tradition that freshmen Senators were

³¹ Peter Benson, *Tobacco Capitalism: Growers, Migrant Workers, and the Changing Face of a Global Industry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 110–111. Tobacco politicians like Helms rarely refer to their support of “cigarettes” or “the cigarette industry”—they generally refer to these in terms of the agricultural product “tobacco.” Farmers are “growers,” cigarettes are “tobacco,” and the cigarette industry is known as the “tobacco industry.” Benson argues that this is deliberately done to distance farmers, lobbyists, politicians, and industry officials as far as possible away from the cigarette, focusing instead on agriculture, tobacco, farmer-growers, community, gold leaf, tobacco family, tobacco economy, jobs, and sales tax generation—not on cigarettes. They refer to the attack on “tobacco” and never refer to it as attack on “cigarettes.” When discussing the industry’s “pride in tobacco” campaign, with its logo of the clinched fist grasping a leaf of tobacco, Benson argues that “the campaign was an effective way to connect with growers . . . organiz[ing] growers into . . . a fictive kinship. It was a vehicle for smuggling a strategic politics of public health and industry loyalty into what seemed simply to be . . . pride and heritage. Use of the word tobacco played a key role. The campaign did not advocate pride in cigarette manufacturing . . . the logo’s nondescript leaf clenched by a hand . . . clinging to something that is agricultural in nature . . . something good, a tradition, not a deadly product.” If Helms or industry representatives used the word “cigarette” at all, it was usually connected to freedom of choice.

to be seen and not heard, Helms had quickly joined the fight. Helms lasted only eight days under this restrictive tradition before he rose to make an impassioned speech in defense of tobacco price supports.³² By 1975, he had grown in confidence and was a regular on the Senate floor exuberantly defending enterprise interests. If Cook welcomed Weinberger to his post at HEW in 1973, Helms delivered Weinberger a parting shot when Cap left office in August 1975 to return to the corporate arena. Similar to Cook, Helms took to the Senate floor on the occasion of the HEW's annual release of their report to Congress on the dangers of cigarette smoking. In a report "financed by taxpayers," Helms declared Casper Weinberger had "done it again," exposing the rest of the world to his annual "tizzy" over smoking and providing Congress with unproven, debatable "science" regarding the supposed dangers of cigarette smoking.

Though much of Helms' vitriol and rhetoric tracked closely with the key points of the Roper Proposal, the conservative tobacco state politician tended not to concern himself with status quo. Helms wanted to take the discourse to an entirely new level. Rather than continuing with his own words as Cook had done, Helms chose to insert the words of Tobacco Institute President, close personal friend, and former North Carolina Congressman Horace Kornegay into the official Senate transcript. If Cook's words were a subtle yet stern warning against government interference in the cigarette industry, Kornegay's speech, defiantly placed by Helms in the official Senate transcript, was an outright battle cry.

The words Helms co-opted were originally spoken by Kornegay at the annual Tobacco Growers Convention in Wilmington, North Carolina, two months earlier on

³² Jesse Helms, *Here's Where I Stand: a Memoir* (New York: Random House Press, 2005), Forward and 50.

June 16, 1975. He conjured up military terms and rhetoric long associated with the Civil War's Lost Cause and Dunning Schools of interpretation.³³ He also skillfully capitalized on the fact that he was speaking at the Blockade Runner Hotel to a crowd of Southern sympathizers. Seizing the emotion of the moment, and the regionally divided political environment in America at that time, Kornegay raged against the anti-cigarette forces amassed in opposition to the industry:

As a son of North Carolina, and a soldier in what can properly be called "The Twenty-Year War of Anti-Tobacco Aggression," I feel it is especially fitting to speak to you tonight . . . for it is no exaggeration to say that our industry is under siege . . . we are sustaining a blockade by an enemy bound and determined to cut the right of the American people who smoke . . . we are determined to break that blockade . . . [and] express the pursuit of happiness through the simple pleasure of smoking tobacco.³⁴

In referencing the "Twenty Year War," Kornegay dated the tobacco war to the release of Ernst Wynder's definitive 1950 study forcefully linking cigarette smoking with lung cancer. By referring to the "War of Anti-Tobacco Aggression," he alluded to the controversial name for the Civil War more familiar to his audience: The War of Northern Aggression. By evoking this aggression imagery, Kornegay expressed the sentiments of many tobacco growers and smokers across the nation, and certainly the South: smoking was under attack by fanatic, anti-smoking abolitionists.

Bruce Schulman, historian of the "rise of the Sun Belt and the reddening of America," describes how, during the 1970s, the South, as well as the Southwest, arose and became a formidable region in Republican Party politics—a party that was fast

³³ The Lost Cause and Dunning School's of Civil War and New South interpretation, led by historians like U.B. Phillips and William Dunning, argued that the white South was acting in the tradition of Jeffersonian Liberalism when they attempted to throw off the yoke of Northern aggression. They were the victim of the Civil War and the injustices of Reconstruction. According to their interpretations, Northern cronies, represented by Republican abolitionists, carpetbaggers, and Southern scalawags, were the real villains. They argued the redeemed, New South was a good South . . . as long as it could resist Federal intervention and wicked Northern cronyism.

³⁴ 94 Cong. Rec. S15020 (August 1, 1975) (statement of Sen. Helms), accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qsu84f00>.

becoming the home of white, former Democrats. No longer the sleepy, backwards South, politicians and party bosses were forced to look to the Sun Belt if they wanted to gain electoral office in the Executive Branch. This paradigm shift formed the heart of Nixon's Southern Strategy and was instrumental in returning the Republicans to office in 1972. When Kornegay made this speech pitting Southern "Rednecks" against DC "abolitionists," his defiance was not fringe or seen as a voice in the wilderness. Indeed, as Schulman argues, it was to the contrary: "by the mid-1970s . . . a number of Northern leaders awoke to this alliance between government action and Sunbelt boosterism and began worrying about increasing Southern power in national affairs. Their fears were well founded."³⁵ In the end, as inflammatory and divisive as Kornegay's words were, he knew he was speaking from a position of power, fueled by the will of the people represented by those in his audience.

Kornegay adhered to the key aspects of the Roper doubt strategy and discussed the environmental factors that cause poor health. He argued these factors were much more likely to cause lung cancer than cigarette smoke. He suggested Americans could not be tricked anymore into blaming cigarettes for poor lung health over more plausible causes like coal dust, asbestos, chemicals, air pollution, genetics, and even certain dietary habits. He postulated smoking was an easy target for (Yankee) industrialists who wanted to divert attention from the real causes of illness. This line of argumentation was soaked in the Dunning School approach to the New South, an interpretation that placed the South's problems squarely in the lap of evil, money-grubbing Northern industrialists. Kornegay cited supposed government reports showing that death and disease were higher

³⁵ Bruce Schulman, *The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo Press, 2001), 102–117.

in industrial counties, as opposed to suburban counties void of pollution generating factories. He reasoned that an average person with “eyes, and ears, and brains” could easily determine it was not tobacco smoke causing illness. Referring to the simmering debate over secondhand smoke, Kornegay opined that areas drawing their drinking water from polluted rivers and life-sustaining oxygen from air contaminated by auto emissions knew better than to blame their health problems on “someone smoking in a restaurant.”³⁶

In this speech, Kornegay introduced yet another aspect of the tobacco industry defense strategy: taxes. Cigarette industry apologists had long argued the benefits of tobacco and cigarette sales as a lucrative tax source for federal and state governments. In the same vein, they also railed against federal government waste represented by what they saw as excessive kowtowing to the anti-cigarette lobby. Government at all levels took in over \$5.7 billion in tobacco-related tax revenue in 1975 alone. This fact by itself supported the industry’s assertion that it was a lavish contributor to the federal purse.³⁷

³⁶ 94 Cong. Rec. S15021 (August 1, 1975) (statement of Sen. Helms), accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qsu84f00>. The industry deplores the term “secondhand smoke,” instead preferring the term “environmental smoke.”

³⁷ Stephanie Saul, “Government Gets Hooked on Tobacco Tax Billions,” *New York Times* (August 31, 2008), accessed November 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/weekinreview/31saul.html?_r=0; Lorillard, “Cigarette Taxes Collected at Various Levels of Government,” internal budgeting document, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fdr61e00>; Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 49–55. In an investigative report by Saul, she describes how “in 2007, states collected more than \$19 billion in cigarette taxes . . . The federal government, meantime, collects nearly \$7 billion annually in cigarette excise taxes.” Additionally Saul describes how cities benefit from tobacco tax, with American municipalities collecting upwards of \$600 million a year. In addition to taxes, the government also collects money from the cigarette industry master settlement . . . “the cigarette industry is paying states nearly \$250 billion over 25 years. Under the agreement, those payments to states will continue flowing even beyond 25 years as long as the tobacco industry is healthy. But the payments would phase out as cigarette company profits decline and would ultimately disappear if people stop smoking.” For these reasons, Saul argues, “the government has become a financial stakeholder in smoking . . . even as public health officials warn people about its deadly consequences. Smoking declines as cigarette taxes increase, but a core group of smokers hang on to the habit.” Also, see Proctor’s chapter entitled, “Taxation: The Second Addiction” for a discussion on cigarette taxation as an addictive source of Federal and State income.

Additionally, Kornegay took a swipe at federal government waste with his accusation that American's hard-earned tax dollars were funding what he considered phony research and exorbitant anti-smoking conventions. He chastised the HEW for its sponsorship of the American Cancer Society and other anti-smoking agencies. At taxpayer expense, Kornegay accused these phony organizations of convening at various cushy locations to discuss the elimination of every American's right to enjoy a good cigarette. A prime example was the World Conference on Smoking and Health, which had recently gathered at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. Kornegay lamented that anti-smoking zealots from all over the world were bankrolled by the American taxpayers in this extravagant conference. His agenda was quite clear: if the government could not be trusted with tax dollars, how could it be trusted to provide accurate, objective scientific data regarding the dangers of smoking?

However in the interest of full disclosure, Kornegay failed to mention the \$23 million a year the federal government provided in tobacco crop subsidies and price supports during this period.³⁸ Nor did he mention the \$400 million a year the industry spent on advertising, as opposed to the \$1 million the HEW budgeted for direct anti-cigarette promotions. The \$23 million price support figure is particularly ironic considering the budget for the HEW Office on Smoking Health was exactly \$23 million as well.³⁹ In a story rife with paradoxes, this is one of many: the government was paying

³⁸ Ernest B. Furguson, *Hard Right: The Rise of Jesse Helms* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1986), 154.

³⁹ Chris Connell, "Califano to consider tax to cut cigarette smoking," *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, (January 12, 1978), 7A; Rodney Ford, "No Smoking Day," radio transcript, WAVE Radio, Louisville, Kentucky, January 20, 1978, accessed January 28, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nah33f00>. Popular tobacco country on-air radio show host Rodney Ford was quick to point out this irony as well. On air, he pointed out the absurdity that the government spends millions to guarantee a certain price for tobacco, and then wants to "spend another \$23 million a year encouraging people to not use tobacco . . .

tobacco farmers \$23 million to support prices with one hand and then paying various HEW sponsored groups \$23 million to stop Americans from smoking with the other.⁴⁰

Helms and Kornegay's opponents viewed the price support program, a hallmark of FDR's New Deal legislative agenda, as an even greater example of irresponsible federal spending. The issues of price supports and federal government largess in the form of massive federal farm bill legislation were constant problems for Helms. They allowed his opponents and anti-smoking groups to paint him as a walking, flame-throwing contradiction. On one hand, Helms was one of the most vocal and determined opponents of the federal food stamp program. However, as a Senator from North Carolina and the Chairman of the Agriculture Committee, Helms was one of the most determined and vocal proponents of the tobacco support program. Many of his critics felt crop supports were nothing more than food stamps for tobacco farmers in the form of millions in cash payments. His position on federal price supports for tobacco also flew in the face of his staunch belief that "government should stay out of relations between the private

now you figure that out."

⁴⁰ Norman Whitley, "Speaking of Welfare," *The Inquiry* (Nov. 27, 1978; quoted from the *Los Angeles Times*, Oct. 13, 1978), 1, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://unzmag.org/Pub/Inquiry-1978nov27:3>; Richard R. Miller, "Nonmeddling," *The Inquiry* (June 11, 1979), 6, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://unzmag.org/Pub/Inquiry-1979jun11-00003:8>. Tobacco farmer Norman Whitley, who farmed eight acres of leaf in North Carolina, described this irony the best with his comment that he had no love for people who wanted to ban smoking, and that he hoped "people will keep smoking . . . I guess if they don't I'll get in the welfare line." The journal went on to describe what tobacco farmers feared the most: "that no-smoking drives will . . . goad Congress into killing the government's 40-year-old tobacco price support program." The incongruity is clear: a farmer trading one form of government assistance for another based on Americans' smoking preferences. Further exposing the paradoxes inherent in America's corporatocracy, in an interesting exchange between a Tobacco Institute Executive (Richard R. Miller), who was applauding the Libertarian stance against tobacco regulation (and marijuana and seat belts and . . .), and the Cato Institute's editorial staff, the editors responded that they were "happy to join the Tobacco Institute in the ranks of those opposed to government meddling. But please let us know, Mr. Miller, when the institute's lobbyists will appear before Congress to denounce subsidies for tobacco growers. We want to be there to see it with our own eyes."

entrepreneur and the free market.” Additionally, his tobacco policies were at odds with his position on government waste and the need for conservative fiscal policies.⁴¹

In James C. Cobb’s classic work on Southern identity, *The Most Southern Place on Earth*, he paints a clear picture of this paradox. Cobb describes the irony of Southern planter inconsistency: they register “objections to ‘wasteful’ and ‘unnecessary’ antipoverty efforts” and then eagerly accept “huge federal subsidy checks.” Cobb excoriates Mississippi’s Congressman Whitten, who would play a significant role in the struggle over cigarette subsidies in the 1980s while he was Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. Cobb points out how Whitten bristled at the food stamp program, arguing that “when you start giving people something for nothing . . . I wonder if you don’t destroy character more than you might improve nutrition.” However, Cobb also notes that Whitten “expressed no such concerns . . . about the effects of government farm payments on the character of their already well-heeled recipients.” Cobb reserves the final word on this Southern “paradoxical phenomenon” to Walker Percy, who said that over the span of thirty years, “planters who were going broke on ten cent cotton

⁴¹ Furguson, *Hard Right*, 154–158; “Califano and Smoking,” *Kokomo Tribune*, January 23, 1978, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/nnhd0045>; Michael T. Craig, “Response to Editor of *Kokomo Tribune*,” March 3, 1978, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/gzc10g00>. A *Kokomo Tribune* article from January 1978 describes Califano’s aggressive policies against the cigarette industry and expansion of programs and money to fund anti-smoking education; it criticizes the government for funding anti-smoking on one hand, while at the same time providing millions in tobacco subsidies to prop up tobacco farmers. This is just one of many stories emphasizing the contradictory behavior of the Federal Government: increasing funds for anti-smoking campaigns while at same time subsidizing cigarette sales in commissaries PXs on military bases. This issue of price supports, allotments, and subsidies is a complex issue; there are no black and white answers, only shades. Some parts of the farm bill program are simply guaranteed loans; others are cash advances that are repaid by farmers with interest after he brings his product to market; and others involve checks sent to farmers to induce them *not* to place land under the plow. These programs range from good business practice to sophisticated price manipulation schemes to ag-welfare-largesse. To make things even more complicated, Califano said that if these programs were not in place, the price of cigarettes would be even cheaper than they were, encouraging even more people to smoke, “I do not believe that anyone smokes or doesn’t smoke or decides to begin or continue or stops smoking because of the tobacco subsidy...I think if we didn’t have the subsidy...the price (of cigarettes) would go down.”

voted for Roosevelt, took federal money, got rich, lived to hate Kennedy and Johnson and vote for Goldwater—while still taking federal money.”⁴²

In reality, Weinberger, Helms, Whitten, and a majority of the characters associated with the story of the soldier and the cigarette are paradoxical figures representing the warp and woof of a modern federal corporatocracy which attempts to weave together various, oft opposing interests. Weinberger first exemplified this with his pernicious budget slashing on one hand, only to become a legendary ladle for the defense and international construction industry on the other. Jesse Helms fell right in line with his tirades against government assistance on one hand, and his dogged support of tobacco price supports and allotments on the other. Both present a classic case study in contradiction. In *Smoking and Politics*, Fritschler and Hoefer explain the often “perfidious” behavior of Helms and other tobacco state politicians:

The beneficiaries of the multibillion-dollar tobacco industry work hard to discourage reductions in the tobacco regulatory programs which benefit the industry, while arguing forcefully against big government and government intervention in the economy. The only possible explanation for this perfidious behavior was offered by Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina). Reacting to proposals to eliminate the tobacco program . . . the Senator said, “In North Carolina, tobacco isn’t a commodity, it’s a religion.”⁴³

⁴² James C. Cobb, *The Most Southern Place on Earth : the Mississippi Delta and the Roots of Regional Identity* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1992), 261; and Badger, *Prosperity Road*, 219-220. Cobb uses “longtime beneficiary of governmental generosity” Roy Flowers, a planter in Coahoma County, Mississippi, as the personification of this paradoxical behavior. Flowers presented himself as a self-made man, but forgot to reference the \$210,000 a year he was receiving in federal farm subsidies. Badger also points out the stark irony of the well healed “town farmers.” Quoting from a North Carolina farmer he interviewed, Badger recalls this farmer’s story: “tobacco’s all right if you’re one of these town farmers and they give you a big allotment . . . yes sir, tobacco is all right if you got a big allotment and tenants to do the work. That’s dandy and sugar candy. You git up slow and take your hot bath and have a nigger fan you at breakfast. Then your chofer [sic] drives you up to Raleigh and you git up in a big meetin’ . . . and say ‘Something has got to be done for us farmers. We labor and sweat and we’re growin’ the crop that pays more taxes to Uncle Sam than any in the world. We want justice’ . . . and Farmer Smith comes home and complains at supper about the tenderloin’s tough. His belly’s so big he can’t hardly get to the table. He’s a farmer alright, but I’d like to see you catch him suckering.’”

⁴³ A. Lee Fritschler and James M. Hoefer, *Smoking and Politics: Policy Making and the Federal Bureaucracy* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1983), 9.

Historian Joseph Ellis, in his biography of Thomas Jefferson, the hero of classic liberals like Helms and Kornegay, notes contradictory behavior was something the great Jefferson bequeathed to his nation. Ellis concludes his biography by stating Jefferson was “America’s Everyman” and that his great gift to America was “an American political culture . . . based on the capacity to rest comfortably with contradictions.”⁴⁴ However, as Kornegay concluded his speech, he called upon Jefferson’s memory as an agrarian populist and ardent defender of the “pursuits of happiness” as opposed to Jefferson’s apparent penchant for contradiction. He closed with the standard patriotic plea that surely jolted the farmers to their feet:

All these scarce government funds to blend foreign zealotry with the domestic variety in a frantic effort to destroy the product that saved the Jamestown colony . . . that financed the war that freed us from the British Empire . . . and without which there may have been no reason to have a Bicentennial, much less celebrate one.⁴⁵

These strong words contained an interesting Populist reinterpretation of American history. In essence, Kornegay and Helms argue that America would not exist as a free nation if it was not for agrarian interests and hardworking tobacco farmers. Americans are not wrong to appreciate the place of agriculture in the nation’s history; well into the twentieth century America was still a rural, agricultural nation. However, Kornegay was on shaky grounds with such straight line, ahistoric logic. These accusations and apparent contradictions aside, Helms was more than happy to insert Kornegay’s speech into the official Senate Record in order to reinforce his position regarding the cigarette enterprise. Their rhetoric forcefully asserted the enterprise argument that federal meddling in an

⁴⁴ Joseph J. Ellis, *American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 5 and 301.

⁴⁵ 94 Cong. Rec. S15021 (August 1, 1975) (statement of Sen. Helms), accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/qsu84f00>.

American pastime that generated billions of dollars in tax receipts and sustained thousands of farm families, industry jobs, and subsidiary commerce, was not in the best interest of the American people.

When Helms yielded his time on the Senate floor that day, August 1, 1975, he hoped his words traveled further than the wood-paneled halls of Congress.⁴⁶ He wanted the entire federal government to notice he was speaking on behalf of millions of American smokers, of whom large portions were American military personnel. By the mid-1970s, 54 million Americans were still avid cigarette smokers who generated the industry \$14 billion a year in profits.⁴⁷ The vast majority of all soldiers then in uniform were smokers. The industry was still several years from reaching its nadir in terms of production and sales. Helms and tobaccoland politicians represented a politically active constituency of smokers that included soldiers, retirees, veterans, and tobaccoland farmers who would play a major role in the smoking debate. Armed with the power represented in these, the sublime smokers, and the cash-happy cigarette industry, Helms

⁴⁶ L.H. Fountain, “Statement by Congressman L. H. Fountain,” July 31, 1975, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/action/document/page?tid=czz82f00>. Helms’ firebrand speech against Weinberger had also been preceded by Congressman Lawrence H. Fountain, a colleague from the North Carolina delegation. Fountain had represented North Carolina’s Second Congressional District since 1953, and he said of Weinberger, “HEW Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s recommendation to the Congress to regulate tobacco represents the last stand of lame duck cabinet member to once again impose his own views on the American people. It’s old news, not new.” Further, Fountain stated that Weinberger’s views had been quickly dismissed before by the Administration “as representing Secretary Weinberger’s views and not the Administration’s.” Further, Fountain added that Weinberger’s views represented by his latest statements were just “one more in a series of one-sided reviews of the literature, which over-emphasize smoking and under emphasize other actual and potential health hazards in our society . . . It’s my firm belief that the American people and the Congress deserve a more credible basis for policy decisions than reliance on a document prepared by the anti-smoking propaganda arm of HEW.” Ironically, Congressman Fountain’s statement itself, similar to those he accuses, was more than likely prepared by the pro-smoking propaganda arm of the Tobacco Institute.

⁴⁷ Connell, “Califano to consider tax to cut cigarette smoking,” 3A.

had risen to defend freedom of choice, personal responsibility, freedom of commerce, and their Jeffersonian rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”⁴⁸

However, Weinberger seemed to have rained on Helm’s parade. Did Weinberger not have the last laugh? His last official act at HEW, and his parting shot against Helms, was, after all, the issuance of the annual report that Helms was so incensed about in the first place. Yet on the other hand, Weinberger may not have had the last laugh after all. Before Weinberger had even finished his post-Beltway vacation, Helms and the enterprise displayed their power over and access to the very top echelons of the federal government. When President Ford discovered Weinberger’s anti-smoking swan song, he quickly jotted a personal note to Helms regarding the personal nature of Weinberger’s comments:

As you know, Secretary Weinberger sent to Congress the 1975 Annual Report on the Health Consequences of Smoking which recommended legislation to provide authority to set maximum permissible levels of hazardous ingredients in cigarettes. As the Secretary has indicated, the views expressed in the transmittal letter are *his own*. They are not intended to represent the

⁴⁸ Brandt, *Cigarette Century*, 5–6; and Badger, *Prosperity Road*, 33, 39, and 58. This theme of smoking as a personal choice made by responsible adults had been around for decades. It was a tactic used by the tobacco enterprise as far back as the 1950s to “thwart tobacco regulation.” Once a minimal level of regulation was introduced in 1966 with the FTC warning on every cigarette package, the industry reinforced this argument by positing that alas, adults were fully apprised of the risk—now let the individual make their choice free of government meddling. During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s the industry included images of military service, patriotism, and the American volunteer serviceman, and his access to cigarettes, in this social engineering scheme in ways much more focused than ever before. This imagery matched well with the traditional philosophies behind American *laissez faire* consumerism and the “deeply traditional American cultural norm that held individuals uniquely responsible for their health.” The message was simple: smoking, along with all American’s personal freedoms, was a choice guaranteed by Constitutional principles and underpinned by America’s servicemen at home and abroad. Additionally, Badger, ironically, points out that many of these same farmers, who benefited from allotment checks, price support, and crop control and bristled at federal infringement on smokers’ individual liberties, had grandfathers that bristled at compulsory crop control and allotment schemes that were seen as an “unacceptable” infringement on “individual liberties.” Many of these old farmers became ardent New Deal farmers when this “unacceptable” infringement was pasted over with federal rent checks and consistent good prices for their leaves. Badger also points out how this shift in grower’s attitudes during the New Deal was essentially the death knell of the classic Jeffersonian ideal of rural agri-liberalism: “The details of the [AAA] did not bother the growers, as long as the *government* succeeded in raising leaf prices.” Badger also quotes from a contemporary new paper source: “How the government does it” and “by what agreement with the buyers, the growers do not care.”

Administration's views on federal regulation of cigarettes. The Administration has not proposed legislation on this subject.⁴⁹

With these words, President Ford essentially threw Secretary Weinberger, and the entire anti-smoking establishment, under the bus and reset the clock back to the status quo situation that had welcomed Weinberger to the HEW in 1973.⁵⁰ The letter also displayed another stark reality: a first-term Senator with only two years' experience commands much respect when he is backed by the powerful, enormously wealthy cigarette enterprise. When Weinberger did finish his vacation, he reported to San Francisco where he had been lavishly recruited as legal counsel and Vice President of Bechtel Corporation. He was more than happy to leave behind Helms and the imbroglio that saw Nixon fall and Ford ascend. If he only knew the future, he might not have written off the vexatious Helms or the problems of the Republican Party so quickly.

Weinberger was subsequently replaced at HEW by President Ford's man, Forrest David Matthews. When Ford lost the election to Jimmy Carter in 1976, Carter called on long time Democratic operative and LBJ Great Society man Joseph Califano to serve as the new HEW chief. Califano, like Weinberger, was a seasoned bureaucrat with extensive experience in Beltway politics, big business, and high-powered DC legal firms, who also

⁴⁹ President Gerald Ford, letter to Senator Helms, August 17, 1975, accessed December 31, 2014, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/gqkg0145>.

⁵⁰ *The Cancer Letter*, 1, no. 33 (Aug 15, 1975): 1, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/fqkg0145>. Again, showing the complex nature of these issues and the delicacy with which politicians walk when considering the power of big business, as well as the needs of their voting constituency, Ford, at the same time wrote to Helms distancing himself from Weinberger, remained silent in certain circles about the HEW's smoking report. And silence, in this case, was interpreted as tacit approval—despite his private letter to Helms stating the exact opposite. In the August 15, 1975, issue of *The Cancer Letter*, released just two days before Ford penned his letter to Helms, the journal reported: "PRESIDENT FORD astounded some members of the National Cancer Advisory Board when he passed on to Congress the Board's recommendation for federal control of high tar and nicotine cigarettes. After the Board had responded to the President's request for scientific evidence of the harmful effects of cigarettes, there was nothing but silence from the White House. NCAB members felt the President did not want to stir up tobacco-state opposition and would let the matter die. But the Administration's annual report to Congress on smoking and health [Weinberger's HEW Report] asked for legislation to regulate tar and nicotine content of cigarette."

had an anti-smoking pedigree. Like Weinberger, he quickly came under the wrath of Helms. However, as opposed to Weinberger, Califano had been an avid smoker for most of his adult life. Like many before and after, Califano was challenged to set aside his many connections with big business and his personal vices as he pursued his public duties at HEW.

When Joseph Califano was sworn in as the twelfth Secretary of the HEW in January 1977, he brought with him extensive experience as a Democratic Party operative, federal executive, Defense Department insider, and Beltway lawyer. Helms and the Southern Conservatives had grave concerns about his liberal policies and what they felt was a dangerous fascination with social welfare; after all, he was the architect and executor of LBJ's Great Society. However, even more disconcerting to them was Califano's comfort with the anti-smoking agenda and his apparent desire to expand federal regulatory powers. If his smoking habit and background as a big-business Beltway lawyer (a vice and an occupation many in the enterprise were personally familiar with) made some cautiously optimistic, by the middle of his stay at HEW the enterprise had abandoned any veiled optimism, instead digging in for another round of trench warfare.

In Califano, an anti-enterprise HEW chief with extensive connections in big business and big money who was himself struggling to quit smoking, one finds yet another paradoxical character in the tale of the soldier and the cigarette. Like Weinberger, Califano was a Harvard Law School graduate that donned the uniform immediately after graduation. He was exempted from the Korean War due to his status as a student but was eligible for the draft in 1955. Like many young American men in this predicament, he

chose to control his own destiny and signed up for Navy Officer Candidate School (OCS). After a May graduation from Harvard, he took and passed the New York State Bar exam on July 1, was married on July 4, and left for Navy Officers Candidate School on July 11, 1955. For a man of Califano's energy and drive, this was all in a week's work. Offering evidence of his future talent as a litigator, his most notable experience during his time in uniform was suing the Navy. Using hair splitting legal maneuvering, Califano received credit for his time in law school as part of his military service. He was subsequently granted remedy through a step in rank and an award of \$1,700. It is ironic that Califano, one who would make a career out of either serving as a federal bureaucrat or as a lawyer representing clients who thrived on federal largesse, started his professional career by bringing suit against the federal government.⁵¹

After honorably separating from the service, Califano eventually joined Secretary Robert McNamara's *Whiz Kids* at the Pentagon. His most notable achievement in McNamara's inner circle was his work to secure legal support to justify McNamara's program of expanding DoD powers over the armed services.⁵² After success in the highest levels of the Pentagon bureaucracy, his talents were recognized and rewarded when he was hand-picked by President Johnson as his Domestic Policy Advisor. Essentially, Califano became Johnson's Great Society ramrod. Not only was he tasked with crafting social welfare legislation, he had to find ways to ensure said legislation passed in Congress.⁵³

⁵¹ Joseph A. Califano, Jr., *Inside a Public and Private Life* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 53–56.

⁵² Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 89.

⁵³ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 153–154. The Great Society was a term used to describe a set of domestic programs launched by President Johnson from 1964 to 1965. Johnson's Great

It was in this capacity that Califano first came in contact with tobacco land politicians, the power of the enterprise, and the electoral and political perils of any anti-smoking agenda. During the 1966 midterm elections, President Johnson was furious that key Southern states had reacted to his Great Society anti-segregation and shared-wealth programs by electing anti-administration Republicans.⁵⁴ He subsequently called a meeting of Southern governors at his ranch in Texas. When recalling this meeting, Califano said Johnson was extremely aggravated that these men thought they could come into his ranch fomenting rhetoric laced with “Niggah! Niggah! Niggah!” especially considering the pork-barrel politics Johnson had leveraged to prop up the solid South.⁵⁵

Society goal was to eliminate poverty and racial injustice. Spending associated with the Great Society addressed education, medical care, urban problems, and transportation. Great Society social welfare programs were subsequently promoted by Johnson and fellow Democrats in Congress in the 1960s and years following. In comparison, Johnson’s Great Society resembled Roosevelt’s New Deal in terms of scope and sweep.

⁵⁴ Kent B. Germany, “Lyndon B. Johnson and Civil Rights: Introduction to the Digital Edition,” (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 2010), accessed January 29, 2015, <http://presidentialrecordings.rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/essays?series=CivilRights#fnref3>. Though President Johnson may have been furious, he should not have been surprised. After all, it was Johnson who declared on the evening after signing the sweeping Civil Rights Legislation that he had “delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come.”

⁵⁵ Ira Katznelson, *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time* (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013), 149–151, 191, 426–427, 471, 475. Katznelson tells the story of Administrations from FDR to Truman to Eisenhower being forced to make deals with the South in order to pass the monumental legislative initiatives of the twentieth century. Be it the New Deal, the NSC-68 military buildup, or the push for the Great Society, deals had to be cut with the powerful, solid South. These included pork-barrel political maneuverings such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, Defense Boom Dixie, and Gun Belt infrastructure. Katznelson comments the segregated South was the “core of the New Deal” and the engine that sustained it. Further, he argues the South always saw a dark cloud on the horizon, and that cloud was the threat to regional autonomy and segregation. Katznelson harkens to Hofstadter, who said this threat pushed the South to bolt to the Conservative Republicans on votes that would disperse this cloud and ensure the South’s peculiar autonomy. If they held off the cloud by joining Republicans with floor votes before 1964, they voted with their feet after that momentous year. Johnson grew up in this era, when the South was the most “pivotal bloc.” It was this bloc that turned against his Great Society and eventually united behind Helms, tobacco, red-state Republicanism, and the Southern Strategy from the mid-1970s on. Johnson would be long gone when Califano was forced to deal with this new Southern bloc again over the cigarette issue.

He felt these men and their constituents had turned their back on him, which in effect is exactly what they had done.⁵⁶

In an attempt to focus the President on his domestic policy agenda for the coming legislative season, Califano, possibly underestimating the immense power of the enterprise, suggested that the President confront the Southern caucus and speak to them about FTC cigarette labeling initiatives. As it turns out, this was the last thing Johnson wanted to do considering the situation. Califano reasoned that in response to the 1964 Surgeon General's report on smoking, the President should focus on labeling as a key domestic policy initiative during the second half of his term. He expected the President would see the wisdom of a labeling regimen as Johnson had suffered a near fatal heart attack and was forced to quit smoking under doctor's orders in 1955, a feat Califano himself struggled to achieve. Johnson, aware of Califano's four-pack-a-day habit, told him that he would send his bill to Congress when Califano quit. Johnson knew Califano could never quit, especially considering the pressure he was under as his domestic policy advisor, so he was comfortable making such a wager.

In a frankness for which Johnson is legendary, he also told Califano that he'd rather have his "pecker cut off" than completely quit smoking, adding that he would resume smoking the day he left the White House.⁵⁷ This (resuming smoking) was a promise he fulfilled aboard Air Force One on January 20, 1969, on his way to retirement

⁵⁶ Johnson was one of only three Southern senators who had refused to sign the Southern Manifesto back in 1956, and now he rammed through the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As Johnson had predicted when he signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this was indeed the beginning of the end of the solid Democratic South, a situation that tobacco and Republicans like Helms would leverage to their advantage for years to come.

⁵⁷ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 168.

at his Texas ranch.⁵⁸ Personal addictions aside, Johnson quickly dispatched with Califano's anti-smoking policy agenda and reoriented him on the true issue at hand. Johnson said these "Niggah" shouting governors of the South proved once again the administration was "at war with the old Confederacy over desegregation," and since he was determined to move aggressively on civil rights, "he would not further alienate Senators and Representatives from states like Virginia, North Carolina, and Kentucky" with anti-smoking rhetoric or policies. Further, and most telling, Johnson did not want to risk "driving all the tobacco money to the side of the segregationists and against civil rights."

The power of the enterprise and tobacco money, as already demonstrated, was a major factor for which politicians and anti-smoking activists would have to account throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Recognizing the nature of this ongoing battle, Johnson concluded that "the public battle against smoking was for another president and another day." Califano had "no idea that a decade later" it would become his battle.⁵⁹

However before Califano could go head to head with the enterprise under another president on another day, his career directed him down other paths. Similar to Weinberger, Califano moved freely in and out of federal service. After his time as

⁵⁸ Michael Beschloss, *Decisions that Shook the World*, vol. 1, 38:18-47, directed by Gerald Rafshoon (2004; Silver Spring, Maryland: Discovery Productions, 2004), DVD. According to historian Michael Beschloss as recounted in the television documentary *Decisions that Shook the World*, "On Inauguration Day (January 20, 1969), Johnson saw Nixon sworn in, then got on the plane to fly back to Texas. When the front door of the plane closed, Johnson pulled out a cigarette—his first cigarette he had smoked since his heart attack in 1955. One of his daughters pulled it out of his mouth and said, 'Daddy, what are you doing? You're going to kill yourself.' He took it back and said, 'I've now raised you girls. I've now been President. Now it's my time!'" He eventually died of a massive heart attack four years later after what one historian has called a "self-destructive spiral."

⁵⁹ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 168–169.

domestic policy advisor to Johnson, Califano was recruited to work for the powerful Washington law firm of Arnold and Porter. Unable to completely leave politics behind, Califano was happy when he was retained as the General Counsel to the Democratic National Committee. Further demonstrating that enterprise executives like Horace Kornegay and other former government appointed and elected officials were not the only ones that could represent powerful industrial interests (e.g., big tobacco), Califano as well became known for his talents in the realm of industrial-government relations, also known as lobbying. Califano said that despite his intentions to devote his time to litigating after leaving the federal government, he “soon learned that corporate clients were more interested in my ability to negotiate the treacherous rapids of Capitol Hill than in my largely untested courtroom talents.”⁶⁰

This pattern, right or wrong, is very often the way of the modern federal corporatocracy. Officials, whether Kornegay, Califano, or Weinberger, generally leave federal service for lucrative jobs utilizing their extensive contacts and perks to attract government business, or as in the case of the enterprise, thwart government oversight. Califano’s post-federal government career included, among other ventures, work for the large pharmaceutical firm Hoffman-La Roche in the highly profitable business of marketing anti-anxiety drugs, to work advising manufacturing interests including the Chrysler Corporation, to lobbying for the oil industry.⁶¹ These big-business endeavors

⁶⁰ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 201.

⁶¹ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 201; Nicholas Von Hoffman, “Smokey Joe Califano: The Political Hustler as Imperial Secretary,” *Inquiry Magazine* (July 9 & 23, 1979), 16, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/action/document/page?tid=pej73b00>. Commenting on the profitable nature of his work with Hoffman-La Roche, Califano said, “millions of Americans, especially women . . . began taking these presumably safe tranquilizers to combat stress of daily life . . . Hoffmann-La Roche reaped enormous profits” . . . and paid enormous legal fees to secure them as well! In a particularly scathing article written for the Cato Institute’s libertarian journal *The Inquiry*, journalist Nicholas Von

and the work he performed for industry giants required strong inside rapport with key government oversight agencies and congressional appropriators—rapport Califano had and rapport many were willing to pay for.

However, the grittiness of lobbying for big business and the plutocratic nature of such endeavors soon began to wear on Califano. Though he was lavishly compensated and “enjoy[ed] the excitement and rewards of being a Washington lawyer . . . prowling the corridors of power,” he said the “pressures to use skills honed in public service to lobby for private interests—and the need to bend my personal views to a large partnership” combined to encourage a return to federal service.⁶² That opportunity soon came when Democrats took back the office of President and newly-elected Jimmy Carter nominated Califano as his Secretary of the HEW. It had been almost exactly ten years to the day since Johnson had predicted that the cigarette fight was for *another president and another day*. The President was Carter, the ramrod was Califano, and the day had indeed arrived.

The *Washington Post* was quick to point out that Califano “will now have to run programs that he had much to do with creating when he was President Lyndon Johnson’s top man for domestic affairs.”⁶³ As it was during his time with Johnson a decade earlier, the programs and issues involving federal regulation of the cigarette enterprise continued

Hoffman wrote a piece critical of Califano’s lucrative connections with the energy sector while Califano was a powerful Beltway lawyer after leaving the Johnson Administration. “His most successful coup as a cut-deal cutter was in 1975 when he played Pal Joey to an informal consortium of oil companies and, by steering a small change in the law through Congress, was able to net his guys a profits of \$164 million in the four months this legal racket was allowed to run before it was shut down.” Von Hoffman quoted a Democratic Senate staffer saying that Califano’s work for the oil consortium was “the most outrageous case of taking money out of one man’s pocket and putting it in another’s that I ever heard of.”

⁶² Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 215.

⁶³ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 327.

as contentious and hotly debated aspects of Califano's time at HEW where smoking policy and other health issues were foremost on his slate. If there was irony in Califano's mandate to implement many of the programs he had created a decade earlier, the enterprise was alas denied the irony of an active chain smoking HEW chief. What it acquired was a recovering chain smoker.

After years of dealing with stress in and out of federal service through a vociferous habit of nicotine relief, Califano had finally quit smoking just one year prior to his installation at HEW. On October 27, 1975, upon the request of his 11-year-old son who wanted him to quit as a birthday present, Califano had smoked his last cigarette.⁶⁴ Though he said he didn't think much about kicking the habit at the time, if he thought he had seen the last of the cigarette, either personally or professionally, he found he was greatly mistaken. The cigarette issue would come to define his time as HEW Chief. If Califano was Johnson's Great Society ramrod, he became known to the enterprise as Carter's Great Smoke-Out ramrod. Yet it remained to be seen if Carter, who hailed from the tobacco and peanut country in the plains of Georgia, and Califano, with his background in corporate capitalism, could hold fast against the powerful cigarette enterprise.

Califano did not waste any time in going after the enterprise once installed at HEW. Based on HEW survey data which revealed "virtually every addicted adult smoker first lit up and was hooked as a teen, well before reaching the age of twenty-one, and that most had tried to quit in the last year," Califano announced his multi-million dollar anti-

⁶⁴ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 354.

cigarette campaign in January 1978.⁶⁵ He even initiated plans to install an additional tax on cigarettes to encourage smokers to stop smoking, a practice that became the standard in many states. He enraged Helms and the enterprise by calling cigarettes “America’s most important public health enemy” and “public health enemy No. 1.” Helms responded by calling Califano and his smoking program “absurd.” He described Califano as a “bureaucratic monster” and called for him to resign.⁶⁶

Helms’ war against Califano was by no means a small affair. He was joined by a host of Congressional colleagues, grassroots tobacco and constituents, cigarette state legislatures, and enterprise executives. RJR Chief Executive Officer William D. Hobbs compared Califano to an out-of-control carnival ringmaster playing to the emotions of those in the cheap bleacher seats—the media in this case.⁶⁷ Thousands of Southerners affixed “Califano is dangerous for your health” bumper stickers to their vehicles. The Kentucky State Legislature called for Califano’s impeachment. Leveraging the discourse of the Iranian crisis, a situation that would eventually lead to the Iran hostage crisis, the enterprise dubbed Califano “Ayatollah Califano.” One journalist even dubbed him “Smokey Joe Califano: The Political Hustler as Imperial Secretary.”⁶⁸

On the electoral front, the enterprise warned Carter that he could not win any tobacco states in 1980 if he did not control his HEW chief; embarrassing the South on

⁶⁵ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 355–356.

⁶⁶ William A. Link, *Righteous Warrior: Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 173–174, 219.

⁶⁷ Associated Press, “RJR Chief fuming at Califano,” *Raleigh News & Observer*, June 30, 1979 accessed January 1, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/action/document/page?tid=pej73b00>.

⁶⁸ Hoffman, “Smokey Joe Califano,” 14–17, accessed January 1, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/action/document/page?tid=pej73b00>.

racial issues was one thing, crushing its cigarette economy was another. In one of the more dramatic episodes of this story, powerful Massachusetts Congressman and Speaker of the House Tip O’Neal warned Califano that if he did not back down, the industry was “capable of hiring a hit man to kill” him. Besides Califano’s life being in danger, the ambitious Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy also pointed out what the enterprise already knew—Califano’s anti-smoking campaign was going to destroy Carter’s chances for reelection.⁶⁹

Carter eventually caved. Under pressure from Southerners, Conservatives, tobaccoland politicians, and voters unhappy with the ailing Carter Administration, Carter relieved Califano of his duties at HEW in July 1979. The entire event was quickly passed off by Carter aides and staffers as the proverbial “someone had to go” scenario, and not much more was said. Califano felt that in respect to his anti-smoking campaign, he was muzzled by Carter’s “politically driven staffers . . . who tried to stop [him] from acting.” With this in mind, Califano speculated that he had brought his firing upon himself because of his stance on issues like smoking—issues that did not sit well with the tobaccoland powers that had put Carter in office. Though he could not substantiate it at the time, Califano was sure that his speaking out on issues like his anti-smoking campaign ensured he would not be around for “the final 18 months of [Carter’s] term.”⁷⁰ However, years later Carter had the final say on the whole affair. The next time Califano

⁶⁹ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 355–356. Califano later commented that O’Neal’s dramatic warnings proved not far off the mark. Carter was defeated in a landslide to Reagan in 1980, and after the saga of the Jeffrey Wigand whistle-blowing scandal was revealed in 1996, as portrayed in the movie *The Insider*, Americans discovered the depths to which some in the enterprise were willing to go to guard the golden goose.

⁷⁰ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 369.

saw Carter over a decade later at a dinner gala, Carter pulled Califano aside, shook his hand, and said “Joe, about smoking. You were right and I was wrong.”⁷¹

Califano left his job at HEW with a profound and tragic appreciation of “the growing power of special interests” and a thorough understanding of “how locked into special interests the Democratic congressmen and Democratic Party were.” He further said he was “disturbed by the power of special interests, especially those with big political bucks . . . who exact undue control over congressional committees and subcommittees.”⁷² Chief among these was the cigarette enterprise, a special interest that would play an even more direct role in the soldier-cigarette debate in the following decade as it struggled against DoD and Congressional efforts to curb smoking among the enterprise’s most loyal source for starters.

Jesse Helms was the face of the cigarette juggernaut. After just six years in Congress, Helms had made a blistering impression. Senator Alan Cranston from California said Helms’s war against anti-smoking federal bureaucrats during this period was so vitriolic that there was a “meanness in the Senate now that I don’t think has been seen since the days of Joe McCarthy.”⁷³ If Red Scare communism was the issue fueling McCarthy’s great terror, the debate over cigarettes and federal oversight were the issues fueling Helms’s.

At this point, the Weinberger-Califano-Helms cigarette war spilled over into the 1980s. The battle had become a back-and-forth affair; both sides had taken ground and

⁷¹ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 368, 370.

⁷² Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 371.

⁷³ Link, *Righteous Warrior*, 174; Furguson, *Hard Right*, 128, 156; Connell, “Califano to consider tax to cut cigarette smoking,” 3A.

then lost it, retreating back to their respective trench lines. Weinberger had made waves at the FTC and the HEW, and then had retreated and left in disgust. Califano came to power and implemented the most aggressive federal anti-smoking program to date, only to be fired in disgrace by a president weary of the electoral power of the tobacco land and the enterprise. It seemed Helms held the field as the decade of the 70s ended. However, Weinberger and Califano would soon return to the field of battle, and the soldier-cigarette relationship, mounting health care costs, and the cost of a chain-smoking AVF would finally motivate powerful anti-smoking fiscal conservatives and concerned DoD officials to action.

CHAPTER X

THE CIGARETTE SNOWBALL

If Leon Panetta and other fiscally conservative legislators were concerned about skyrocketing health care costs in America, a great source of that concern stemmed from the smoking habits of the 1980s era active duty and retired military forces. After multiple panels, Congressional investigators and military health care teams published their results and the facts became quite clear: the mixture of soldiering, smoking, and subsidized cigarettes were not policy positions, nor habits, conducive to the health of the soldier or the defense medical budget. Congress had bought and paid for an AVF. To ensure its success, soldiers required higher pay and increased benefits in an effort to motivate them to career-length service. The majority of soldiers, dependents, and retirees were smokers and together created a tobacco-stained health care snowball growing to epic proportions. Yet a solution remained unclear for this massive unfunded liability. However, by the mid-1980s, a powerful anti-smoking lobby emerged. As much as the enterprise said about smoking and freedom, this resurgent anti-smoking lobby matched it at every turn. And when it did, this lobby had much to declare regarding the solution to the fiscal liabilities inherent in a career-oriented volunteer force hooked on smoking cheap, government-subsidized cigarettes.

The year 1980 was the apex of American cigarette consumption. In that year alone, Americans consumed a record-breaking 632 billion cigarettes.¹ The men and women in uniform were doing their part to contribute to this smoking record. In terms of demographics, the data is revealing. Researchers reported that during this period, 52.2 percent of uniformed personnel under age 20 smoked compared to 21.2 percent of high

¹ Proctor, *Golden Holocaust*, 57.

school seniors.² In the Army, 63 percent of non-commissioned officers smoked, and 57 percent of junior enlisted soldiers were avid smokers.³ The polling data proved out the veracity of the old cultural symbol: soldiers were, and continued as, Marlboro Men, and women now, in green.

The number of cigarettes soldiers bought at subsidized prices in the early 1980s matched this level of smoking found in the demographic polling data. In 1982 uniformed service personnel, retirees, and dependents purchased “127 million cartons of cigarettes costing \$572 million from military commissaries, post exchanges, and clubs.”⁴ Not including cartons purchased off-base, these figures equate to 25.4 billion cigarettes purchased in the singular year 1982 on military installations and presumably smoked. Comprising ten percent of all purchases at military commissaries and exchanges, these consumption levels represented a significant sales figure for the military resale system. In addition to sales volume, these purchases also denote a noteworthy investment of discretionary income by service members and retirees. With such a substantial investment, these soldier-smokers were understandably attracted to the boon of on-base cigarette purchases. In addition to the convenience, the government subsidies allowed them to save as much as 76 percent off per carton when compared to off-base prices.⁵

² Walter Pincus, “Pentagon Doctor Seeks to Reduce Cigarette Sales,” *The Washington Post*, January 5, 1986, A1 and A16; James Savarese & Associates, “Economic Impact: Proposal to Raise Cigarette Prices in Military Commissaries,” May 5, 1986, 7, accessed January 10, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/cff22d00/pdf>.

³ Larry Carney and Jim Tice, “Army Broadens Ban on Smoking July 7,” *The Army Times*, June, 23, 1986, 10, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dkc36b00>.

⁴ Pincus, “Pentagon Doctor Seeks to Reduce Cigarette Sales,” A1 and A16.

⁵ A.M. Joseph, M. Muggli, K.C. Pearson, and H. Lando, “The cigarette manufacturers’ efforts to promote tobacco to the US military” *Military Medicine* (Oct. 2005), 877.

However, to fully grasp the high number of soldier-smokers for whom the government was responsible for health care during this period, one must also account for the number of military retirees who smoked. Given those in the retirement system in the 1980s entered military service during the 1950s and 60s when a majority of adult males in America smoked, finding that these retirees smoked was unsurprising. A team of researchers conducting surveys at VA clinics reported at the Denver, Colorado, clinic the smoking rate among veterans in 1986 was 64 percent. Their research also showed that smoking prevalence among inpatient veterans was twice that of the American population as a whole.⁶

Another similar study of the VA clinic in New Orleans from 1974 to 1978 found that 70 percent of veteran inpatients were smokers. The results of one 26-year study found that smoking-related malignant lung cancers were the most common malignancy among veterans during the period after 1970. This mountain of data allowed the researchers to conclude the “high prevalence of smoking among veterans places a large disease burden on the VA health system.”⁷ The majority of these smokers were on fixed incomes, and they enjoyed cheap cigarettes available through the military resale system. In reality they relied on these subsidized cigarettes as a function of monthly budget planning and allocation of their scarce resources.⁸

⁶ McKinney et al., “Comparing Smoking Behavior of Veterans and Nonveterans,” 211–213; Rick Maze and Sharon Young, “Commissary Sales of Tobacco May End,” *Army Times*, March 3, 1986, 1, 8, and 20, Tobacco Online Archives T105800304.

⁷ McKinney et al., “Comparing Smoking Behavior of Veterans and Nonveterans,” 211–213.

⁸ Interestingly, government began smoking cessation and education programs in 1978, then initiated cessation plans in the Army in 1986, but waited until 1998 to start rolling out programs to deny certain health benefits to retirees suffering from smoking related illness. Presumably by 1998, they had a full 20-year career at minimum with ample access to smoking education and quit programs but chose to continue regardless. Retirees in 1986 were a sunk cost; 1998 retirees were a different story. Additionally,

All of these statistics, whether quantity of cigarettes purchased through the military resale system or percentages of active and retired members who were avid smokers, only have meaning when connected to *costs*. In this case, the old adage proves correct: money talks. In 1985, the Coalition on Smoking or Health made it clear to Congress their position that “smoking prevalence data and reports from medical personnel indicate that the costs [of soldier-smokers] are substantial.”⁹ Indeed it was hard for anyone to miss their message regarding smoking, soldiering, and health—they announced their campaign from Capitol Hill with 1984 American League MVP and future Baseball Hall of Fame member Cal Ripken as their guest speaker!

When the DoD eventually released the *Report on Smoking and Health in the Military* in 1986, the financial impact of Americans’ consumption of cigarettes on health care costs were described as much more than just substantial. The report estimated the financial impact of smoking-related diseases in America was \$20.3 billion in 1975 and \$42.2 billion in 1980. The report also cited data showing smokers cost employers between \$400 and \$800 in “excess cost” when compared to non-smoking employees, and that these same smokers had “33 percent to 45 percent excess absenteeism compared to their nonsmoking counterparts.”¹⁰

the tobacco archives are filled with letters from these veteran, retired smokers claiming the right and necessity of cheap access to cigarettes during this period.

⁹ Coalition on Smoking or Health, “Coalition on Smoking or Health Announces Its Public Policy Agenda for 1985,” news release, January 9, 1985, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.ucsf.edu/tid/csw75d00/pdf>.

¹⁰ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), “Department of Defense Report on Smoking and Health in the Military,” March 1986, 10–11, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00>.

The facts and data presented in this report made their way into speeches presented in Congress from legislators angry over the high costs associated with military smokers. Though the report estimated the bill for military smoking was \$209.9 million, a number that had already made its way to the floor of Congress, an *Army Times* writer reported that one doctor saw the figure as much higher: closer to \$2 billion in 1984 alone! If this number was correct, then it represented a substantial part of the overall \$7.5 billion defense medical budget in 1985. This same reporter also relayed that the VA estimated it paid \$180 million a year to 42,000 veterans with smoking-related illness.¹¹

This expensive, smoke-filled room was the venue Casper Weinberger and Joe Califano chose for their reappearance in the cigarette war. With careers spanning three decades, Weinberger and Califano proved they were comfortable challenging the cigarette enterprise, as well as moving in and out of various bureaucratic assignments in defense, health and welfare, budgeting, and domestic policy.¹² They also spent considerable time in powerful firms representing everything from oil barons to mega military-industrial contractors to powerful pharmaceuticals. From their first days as public servants, both were outspoken in their criticism of and activism against cigarette smoking. Their powerful blend of executive experience in the federal government as well as their skills as cunning litigators, corporate counselors, and anti-smoking activists,

¹¹ Maze and Young, “Commissary Sales of Tobacco May End,” 1, 8; Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, “Department of Defense Report on Smoking and Health in the Military,” 10–11.

¹² Jane Weinberger, *As Ever: A Selection of letters from the voluminous correspondence of Jane Weinberger 1970-1990* (Ellsworth, Maine: Windswept House Publishers, 1991), 49. Jane Weinberger described Cap Weinberger’s career as a game akin to musical chairs. After the Nixon landslide victory in 1972, she gave a frank description of the Belt Way bounce: “We have survived the election . . . Everyone has been told to have his resignation on the president’s desk by the next morning . . . Cabinet members are being invited to morning or afternoon sessions at Camp David . . . they are taken by helicopter. The joke . . . is that if the floor boards are loose on the return trip you are being offered the opportunity to jump before you are dumped, into the Potomac, no doubt.”

made them formidable foes for powerful tobacco land boosters like Jesse Helms, Congressman Dan Daniel from Virginia, and a host of other tobacco state politicians.

In the early 1980s, Weinberger and Califano emerged as the de facto faces of the federal government's efforts to curb smoking in America. They were soon joined by a group of anti-smoking executives and elected officials including Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and United States Senators including Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), David Boren (D-Oklahoma), and Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico).¹³ Together, these captains of the cigarette war, along with a throng of characters from the DoD and other federal agencies, were an interesting mix of corporate-bureaucrats, capitalists, lobbyists, government executives, and legislators locked in a struggle over the most successful, highly-engineered consumer product ever. Within the framework of modern economic arrangements, these groups blended issues of conscience, commerce, and personal freedom, with the needs of big business, taxpayers, industry, and the military-industrial complex. It was within this framework that the soldier and cigarette bond met its final demise in 1986.

In retrospect, however, the demise in 1986 can be traced back to two seemingly random events in 1981. In 1981, both Weinberger and Califano, in a strange twist of fate, found themselves back in a familiar place: the forefront of the cigarette war. Weinberger returned to federal service as Reagan's Secretary of Defense, and Califano, having left government work, emerged in Lee Iacocca's Chrysler boardroom. When they entered their respective posts in the war room and the boardroom, these two powerful bureaucrats struggled to hold fast against a cigarette enterprise which had grown to hate them.

¹³ Stevens was particularly noteworthy in this group. Upon leaving office in 2009, he was and is the longest serving Republican Senator in US history.

Weinberger's Senate confirmation as candidate for Secretary of Defense in January 1981 and Califano's interview and appointment to Iacocca's Chrysler board as chief health care expert in June 1981 together were key events in the unfolding saga. Their actions at these posts proved instrumental in guiding the government's case for decreasing, if not eliminating, smoking rates among soldiers, and once again, placed them on a trajectory for conflict with the cigarette enterprise.

SECDEF Confirmation Hearings

Students of United States diplomatic and political history will readily recall the strange events of Weinberger's 1981 Senate confirmation hearing. President Reagan recently won a national election in a landslide against Democratic opponent Jimmy Carter. The Reagan Revolution was in full swing, and the Republicans were recipients of a clear mandate: bring America back! With this groundswell of support and a powerful mandate, President-elect Reagan began forming a cabinet. For Secretary of Defense, he nominated his old California friend and fellow conservative Republican Casper Weinberger. As stated, Cap was a seasoned executive with extensive experience in Belt Way bureaucraties, big business, and budgeting. He appeared the right man for the job, and nearly all agreed, except two Senators from the tobacco state of North Carolina.

When Weinberger came before the Senate for full confirmation, many were struck by the fact he only received two nay votes in his 97-2 confirmation, and these were from conservative members of his own party: North Carolina Senators Jesse Helms and John Porter East. In the aftermath, Helms's and East's rationale (which Weinberger believed) was that he "would not sufficiently pursue a hard line against the USSR and would not

spend enough on defense.”¹⁴ However, considering Weinberger’s high profile history with the tobacco enterprise, these statements require closer scrutiny.

Regarding Weinberger’s rejection by the entire North Carolina Senate delegation, several points are in order. As Weinberger stood for confirmation, he had a proven track record as one simultaneously committed to national defense, reducing cigarette consumption in America, and controlling exploding health care costs. First, and most relevant to his confirmation as Secretary of Defense, he had a strong, proven, verifiable reputation supporting national defense and defense spending going back to OMB days. At a speech he made to the conservative American Enterprise Institute as budget director under Nixon in October 1972, he said, “if our defense budget is inadequate, nothing else will be of much moment, and we will only know when it is too late.”¹⁵ In this speech, he also said:

The sad fact is that there are still many points of contention between nations of the world. Many governments, including particularly the Soviet Union and China, maintain large and increasingly effective forces which they have shown a willingness to use when the occasion suits. For the foreseeable future, I do not anticipate the world situation or human nature changing so radically that we could plan on substantially reduced force structure.¹⁶

It was abundantly clear at this early phase in Weinberger’s career that he was noticeably committed to the idea of a robust investment of national treasure to national defense.

¹⁴ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 272.

¹⁵ Casper Weinberger, Murray L. Weidenbaum, and Gene R. La Rocque, *The Defense Budget: A Town Hall Meeting on Nation Security Policy*, (Washington: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy and Research, 1972), 4, 5, and 19. In his speech, Weinberger also made several other pro-defense statements. Regarding defense cuts, he said cutting the “defense budget first and later adopt a foreign policy to suit is illogical, to phrase it in the most polite terms possible.” Regarding his sober acceptance of the expenses of the AVF, he said that “paying reasonable salaries, has been an apparent increase in the defense budget. Approximately \$10 billion in appropriations are required annually because the adjustments, even though we gain no more defense strength, as such, for this additional outlay.”

¹⁶ Weinberger, Weidenbaum, and La Rocque, *The Defense Budget*, 11.

Regarding the cost of funding a volunteer Army, his personal experience as budget director made him more than adequately aware of the fact the AVF was exceedingly expensive, yet absolutely required. Regarding the expense of the AVF, he was faced with the conundrum of overcoming inflation while simultaneously increasing military wages to meet the needs of the volunteer Army. The calculus he was forced to apply ended up consuming the entire peace dividend from the Vietnam War drawdown.¹⁷ With so much spent on combating inflation and dramatic expansion of military benefits, it was only a matter of time, and only logical according to many, that post-war budgets would see some reductions in certain defense programs and new weapon systems. However as a whole, defense spending expanded after a major war for the first time in American history.¹⁸

Further, regarding the expense of the AVF, Weinberger recalls that he was opposed to going back to the draft, and that “the crucial element in this recovery of strength was our people . . . our most urgent task would be to address the needs of our uniformed men and women and to improve morale, thereby strengthening the volunteer system, which was failing badly.” He was also practical and realized that many elected officials, including Jesse Helms, would recoil when confronted with the levels of spending required to field a strong national defense capable of deterring the Soviet Union in 1981. Weinberger said, “dealing with Congress was, unfortunately, often contentious—especially because having a credible deterrent and the capability of

¹⁷ Wieland, “Direct Responsibility,” ch. 2, p. 17.

¹⁸ Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt*, 176–178. From Chapter 6 on the AVF, remember that the large military budgets associated with the “hollow force” of the early-to-mid-1970s were unique in American history because, for the first time ever, “military spending increased at the conclusion of a major war.” This was a fiscal feat that left many bewildered; the AVF was turning out to be an “immensely expensive proposition,” and mounting costs were still on the horizon—as seen in this chapter.

defending American interests around the world is expensive, and military spending in a democracy is never popular.”¹⁹

If Helms and East were casting their votes against Weinberger because they thought he would be a miserly, weak spendthrift in regard to the Soviet Union and its brand of communism, it proved one of the most incorrect assertions in modern American history. A boon to the military-industrial complex, Weinberger was famous for his declaration that cost would not be a consideration in his plans for a defense build-up. He saw cost aversion as akin to a form of moral weakness. To be an effective military commander or planner under his leadership, Weinberger required dispatching with both thrift and timidity. He felt fears over cost or sticker shock would corrupt the “military judgment of the effectiveness of the armed forces,” according to Weinberger scholar Robert Howard Wieland.²⁰

With this budget-busting determinism, Weinberger subsequently presided over the most prolific peacetime military build-up in American history.²¹ From the very start, budget planning for FY 82 involved dramatic increases in spending. Outgoing Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had already expanded defense spending for 1982 by \$26.4 billion during his last five days in office. Weinberger then requested an additional \$32.6 billion on top of Brown’s submission. Ultimately, Weinberger requested and received a colossal \$237.3 billion defense budget for 1982, with only a billion cut away by a cost-

¹⁹ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 301.

²⁰ Wieland, “Direct Responsibility,” ch. 3, p. 1.

²¹ Wieland, “Direct Responsibility,” ch. 3, p. 2.

conscious Congress. By 1985 the defense budget had exploded to a figure incredible for its time: \$297 billion.²²

Weinberger, in another story rife with irony, was himself faced with a Congress that eventually proved happy to engage in his old budget trick: impounding of appropriated funds. Some on Capitol Hill balked at what they felt was an egregious price tag to bring America back. These fiscal conservatives came under the ire of Weinberger and other defense hawks. The *Washington Post* was swift to cover this paradoxical story, noting how Weinberger the impounder from OMB days played the hypocrite by telling a Congress determined to cut off the spigot to “forget about the overall ceiling and pump out the money the Pentagon wants.” He was lampooned by the post for urging them to “ignore the ceiling and avoid any reductions in Reagan’s defense hike.”²³ This had no effect on Weinberger, and during his first five years at the helm of the Pentagon’s unprecedented military build-up, he presided over a 12 percent increase in military budgets that translated to an astounding \$1.46 trillion in defense spending. David Stockman, Reagan’s OMB director and Weinberger’s successor by a decade, commented

²² Wieland, “Direct Responsibility,” ch. 3, p. 5; National Priorities Project, “How Military Spending Has Changed Since 9/11,” accessed January 29, 2015, <https://www.nationalpriorities.org/campaigns/how-military-spending-has-changed>; Center for American Progress, “A Users Guide to the Fiscal Year 2015 Defense Budget,” accessed January 29, 2015, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/04/24/88516/a-users-guide-to-the-fiscal-year-2015-defense-budget>; Daniels, *The Man of Independence*, 216-217. The words “cost conscious” are used sarcastically. Two decades later, in the years after 9/11, Pentagon defense budgets made Weinberger’s look minuscule. During this period, the DoD budget topped out at nearly \$800 billion, with the 2015 DoD budget coming in at just under \$500 billion. This figure is also ironic considering the fact that when Harry Truman had formed his Truman Committee to investigate waste in 1941, he did so in response to his alarm over Congress’s approval of a *national* debt load of \$65 billion dollars (this figure is not adjusted for inflation of course). What seemed as a herculean national sum then is only a minor portion of defense spending today. All these figures, and indeed this entire cigarette story, are just a by-line of a much larger twentieth century story: the growth of federal government.

²³ David S. Broder, “Weinberger Then and Now,” *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1983, First Section, Op Ed., A23.

that these numbers left the military-industrial complex “squealing with delight.”²⁴ If the complex was squealing with delight, the cigarette enterprise would soon howl in pain as a result of Weinberger’s forthcoming measures to staunch the smoke ‘em if you’ve got ‘em culture in the military.

Thus, here lay the real reason why Senators Helms and East cast their lone, dissenting votes against Casper Weinberger. It was not for any real or perceived fear that Weinberger would be a miser-like weakling on Communism. Their dissenting votes were informed by their tortured awareness of his background in opposition to the cigarette enterprise. Further, they knew he would be an activist for the anti-smoking agenda, committed to controlling spiraling military health care costs, and a proponent of preventative health care measures. These were all policy positions the enterprise knew threatened its continued existence, much less profitability. Marlow Cook had given HEW Secretary Weinberger the opening shot in 1973, with Helms delivering what he thought was the *coup de grâce* in 1975. However, Weinberger was before them once again. To the two hardcore tobacco men from North Carolina, a shot across the bow seemed an appropriate way to welcome their old foe back to the cigarette war.

Califano Arrives in a Chrysler

After his abrupt firing as Carter’s HEW chief, largely as a result of his controversial opposition to the cigarette enterprise, Califano was once again a hot commodity and he quickly offered his services to corporate America. Before long, one of this period’s most bold corporate executives called: Lido Anthony Iacocca. Lee Iacocca was a career man at Ford, known for leading the rollout of the ever-popular Mustang line of cars. Over a career spanning 32 years, he worked his way to the top of the company

²⁴ Wieland, “Direct Responsibility,” ch. 3, p. 10.

and had arrived as President of the Ford Motor Company in 1978. However, ironically, nearly a year to the day before Califano was fired by Carter, Iacocca was fired by Henry Ford II, on July 13, 1978, after years of infighting with the obstinate patriarch of the Ford family.²⁵ Ford's reasons for firing Iacocca were just as murky as Carter's for firing Califano. The only explanation Ford gave was that "sometimes you just don't like someone."²⁶ Within a year, Iacocca was snapped up by the ailing, nearly bankrupt Chrysler Corporation, who named him their president in 1979.

As soon as Iacocca took over, he faced seemingly insurmountable problems involving debt, pathetic sales informed by equally pathetic automobile products, and daunting labor problems. In Iacocca's eyes, all were dangerous, and failure in any one area would lead to the end of the Chrysler Corporation. Regarding the third problem, labor, Iacocca identified skyrocketing health care costs as an issue that would drive Chrysler to insolvency if not contained. He described the health care situation in his company, and in America, as a "mess" for which he and other industry executives were responsible.²⁷ He lamented that auto industry executives were getting "killed" because of the dreadful mistake of promising "cradle to grave" medical and fringe benefits.²⁸

According to Iacocca, Blue Cross and Blue Shield was "billing us more than our suppliers of steel and rubber." Further, "Chrysler, Ford, and GM were paying \$3 billion a year just for hospital, medical, surgical, and dental, plus all pharmaceutical bills." Iacocca

²⁵ Iacocca was fired on July 13, 1978, and Califano was fired on July 19, 1979.

²⁶ Lee Iacocca, *Iacocca: An Autobiography*, with William Novak (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), 127.

²⁷ Iacocca, *Iacocca*, 236.

²⁸ Iacocca, *Iacocca*, 304.

explained that at Chrysler, these benefits cost the company “\$600 million or about \$600 per car” for a grand total of about “\$1 million a day.” When Chrysler was finally able to secure a bailout from the government totaling \$1.5 billion, the first of its kind in American history, Iacocca had to immediately allocate cash to pay off a massive benefits backlog that included \$311 million to Prudential and Aetna for pensions, and \$50 million to Blue Cross and Blue Shield to cover overdue health care premiums and medical bills.²⁹

Similar to the military medical benefits package that had grown steadily from an obscure line in a 1884 Congressional appropriations bill to the all-encompassing active duty-retiree-dependent stem-to-stern benefit Congress was struggling to fund at that very moment, Iacocca described Chrysler’s health care benefit package as a creeping monster: “Like every other benefit that management provides to labor, the medical plans began modestly. But over the years we’ve gone from paying no medical bills to the point where the company now pays for everything you can think of: dermatology, psychiatry, orthodontics—even eyeglasses.³⁰ Not only was health care costing Chrysler more than half-a-billion dollars a year, Iacocca was exasperated that over \$200 million of Chrysler’s payments to its suppliers were going to “cover their [the suppliers’] employees’ health insurance premiums.”³¹

²⁹ Iacocca, *Iacocca*, 306; Maynard M. Gordon, *The Iacocca Management Technique* (New York: Dodd, Meade, and Co., 1985), 103–104. The shrewd economic reasoning Iacocca provided the Carter Administration for his bailout scheme is interesting considering other topics previously discussed like the New Deal, consumption economy theory, “Modern Economic Arrangements,” and the expansion of the federal government. Iacocca reasoned that his company was, to use a modern term, too big to fail. By his calculus, if Chrysler failed it would cost the government \$1.5 billion in welfare, \$500 million in lost tax revenue from 110,000 out-of-work auto employees, 19,000 unemployed suppliers, and 4,000 unemployed auto dealers.

³⁰ Iacocca, *Iacocca*, 307.

³¹ Iacocca, *Iacocca*, 307–308.

With these problems in mind, in 1981 Iacocca called on former HEW Secretary Joe Califano. When Iacocca was fired by Henry Ford II, Califano reached out to encourage him that the firing may be “one of the best things that ever happened to you.”³² When Carter fired Califano, Iacocca reached out to him and returned the favor, telling him that “you told me that being fired by Henry Ford could turn out to be one of the best things that ever happened to me. Well, let me tell you this. Getting fired by this guy Carter is the best thing that ever happened to you.”³³

Califano was a known expert in matters involving labor, health care, and government relations, and Iacocca was determined to have him on the new Chrysler board. While Weinberger was struggling through his confirmation hearings and his first months at Defense, Califano slipped away to a lunch meeting with Iacocca in his Waldorf Towers suite on March 23, 1981. Iacocca informed Califano he was recruiting him to help the company address their skyrocketing health care costs. Califano said of the meeting that Iacocca was “aghast at Chrysler’s health care costs” and that he was struggling to pay back the \$1.5 billion debt load the company had taken from Carter to keep them afloat. While at HEW, Califano commented that he worked tirelessly to “alert American businesses to the dangers of rising health care costs,” but his admonitions were nothing more than “twigs snapping in an abandoned forest.” At this lunch meeting, he soon found out that “the [snapping] noise was deafening to Iacocca.”³⁴

³² Iacocca, *Iacocca*, 442.

³³ Iacocca, *Iacocca*, 442.

³⁴ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 443–445.

During their discussions, Iacocca told Califano that his Great Society policies, along with United Auto Workers President Doug Fraser's aggressive union demands, had both done more than anyone or anything to create the health care benefits mess that was driving Chrysler to bankruptcy. Now, in an unprecedented move that raised eyebrows in and out of the auto industry, Iacocca, in a stroke of genius, invited the fox into the henhouse. He offered both Califano and Fraser an opportunity to join the Chrysler Board. Both accepted, and Califano was soon hard at work trying to solve Chrysler's health care conundrum, and Fraser took on the not-so-popular job of convincing union labor to live with reduced benefits.

As Califano assumed his duties at Chrysler headquarters in Detroit, he too was just as shocked as Iacocca to find that the company was "paying more for health care than for steel."³⁵ Like the DoD officials, Congressional investigators, and other research scientists who looked into skyrocketing military health care costs in the late 1970s, Califano also found that a major portion of Chrysler's health care woes were attributable to cigarette-thumping employees and retirees. After studying the problem in depth, Califano determined that health care costs for Chrysler employees and retirees who smoked were on average "75 percent higher than for non-smokers."³⁶ In addition to other health care related cost-cutting measures, Califano immediately took the unprecedented act of launching a corporation-wide anti-smoking and smoking cessation campaign. It was one of the largest companywide smoke-outs in American history. However, Califano was soon topped in sheer size and audacity when Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and

³⁵ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 443–445.

³⁶ Califano, *Inside a Public and Private Life*, 443–445.

Secretary of Defense Weinberger subsequently shook the cigarette enterprise to its core with their anti-cigarette vision. Califano attempted to stamp out smoking at one of the Big Three auto makers; Koop and Weinberger had a much bigger prize in mind: the entire nation and its uniformed, retired, and dependent military members.³⁷

Koop's Campaign: SFA2000

Before looking at Weinberger's unprecedented measures to curb smoking in the military, a key event in 1984 requires discussion, as it substantially influenced his DoD health care policies. That event was a speech given by Reagan's Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, at a gathering of the American Lung Association in Miami, Florida, in May 1984. Koop used this occasion to launch his 1984 anti-smoking crusade. Koop's crusade speech against smoking was the strongest statement a federal government official ever made against cigarette smoking in American history.

The anti-cigarette movement experienced fits and starts ever since Dr. Luther Terry, Koop's predecessor by two decades, had published the nation's first definitive statement on the dangers of smoking back in 1964. If there were any starts, they were hastily stopped by fits from the enterprise and its powerful Congressional allies. However, health care policies regarding cigarettes and cigarette smoke, and the national

³⁷ Joseph Califano, *America's Healthcare Revolution: Who Lives? Who Dies? Who Pays?* (New York: Random House, 1986), 4, 13, 21, 25, 190. After spending nearly 20 years at the forefront of America's healthcare issues, in 1986 Califano published a book capturing his thoughts this experience. Of America's healthcare snowball, Califano calls it "colossus," "costly," and "mercenary." Regarding the cost of retiree healthcare, Califano pointed out that in 1982, Chrysler was paying healthcare bills for 107,000 non-workers (retirees and workman's comp. cases) versus 61,000 active workers actually making cars. If no action was taken on administration of Chrysler's healthcare program, payment fraud, and preventative healthcare measures (i.e. smoking cessation), Califano estimated that Chrysler's healthcare costs would exceed a billion dollars a year in a decade. Unsurprisingly, cigarettes and smoking issues play a prominent part in Califano's healthcare *magnum opus*. He was quick to point out that all the smoking related healthcare costs that he reported to the board, and subsequent premium hikes for smokers, drove Chrysler executives to quit smoking. Finally, Califano points out how his anti-smoking, cost-saving campaign at Chrysler was a positive example of how a "society-wide effort [was] required" to control runaway, "unnecessary sick care costs."

will to accept them, were changing. At the same time, leaders like Weinberger, Koop, and Califano were emerging as executives committed to preventative health care at the corporate and federal level, and they assumed highly influential positions both in and out of government during this period. With such polices and leaders in place, the industry had hard work to do if it was to continue thriving in America.

Even before his speech, Koop had already been marked by the industry after his first official act as Surgeon General: issuing the 1982 Surgeon General's *Report on Smoking and Health*. After Califano was ousted from the Carter Administration, Helms and the cigarette enterprise held command of the field, and they were cautiously optimistic, especially considering the record number of cigarettes smoked in 1980. However with Koop's 1982 report, the most authoritative statement to date on the links between smoking and cancer of the lung, oral cavity, larynx, esophagus, stomach, bladder, pancreas, and kidneys, the pendulum began to swing.

Later in 1982, Koop made more waves when he testified before Congress he was strongly in favor of continuing and even strengthening a series of rotating labels warning against the specific dangers of smoking. With this background, it seemed fitting for Koop to choose the year 1984 as the occasion to announce his major smoking news. Koop had specifically chosen 1984, the twentieth anniversary of US Surgeon General Luther L. Terry's *Report on Smoking and Health*, as the appropriate time to make a major announcement regarding the future of cigarette smoking in America.³⁸

In his May 1984 speech, Koop announced his new campaign entitled *SFA2000*. The campaign's goal was a smoke-free American society by the year 2000. In addition to

³⁸ National Library of Medicine, "Tobacco, Second-Hand Smoke, and the Campaign for a Smoke-Free America," The C. Everett Koop Papers, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/QQ/p-nid/85>.

a challenge to end smoking in America, Koop also advanced a host of other supporting objectives. He was critical of the industry's expenditure of \$4,000 on advertising for every one the government spent on warnings. He called for more resources dedicated to anti-smoking messages. He called for a ban on all tobacco advertising. He called for all physicians to demand their patients stop smoking, and for *all* children to insist their parents stop. He challenged all the youth of America and the YMCA (ironically) to mobilize against smoking. Like Califano at Chrysler, he also called for all employers to encourage employees to stop smoking and to give them access to the resources to do so.

Moreover, in a call that directly affected subsequent DoD and Congressional actions to curb smoking in the military and contain smoking-related health care costs, Koop also demanded that all military bases cease providing low-cost, subsidized cigarettes to soldiers. And he called for all military hospitals and VA clinics to provide doctors and programs to help soldiers and veterans quit smoking. Regarding soldier-smokers, he said "I don't care what war you fought in—Vietnam or Spanish-American—if you smoke, you should stop and you'll be better for it."³⁹

Additionally, similar to the efforts of Califano at the Chrysler Corporation, he related cigarette smoking to the dramatic increase in health care expenditures in America:

The increasing cost for a pack of cigarettes has certainly had an effect on cigarette consumption. But also of great significance is the realization among consumers, insurers, and employers that cigarette smoking adds greatly to the health care costs of the individual and the nation. The effects of cigarette smoking are all too often manifested in long hospital stays and extended outpatient care for a variety of chronic problems that could have been avoided.⁴⁰

³⁹ C. Everett Koop, M.D., "Julia M. Jones Memorial Lecture," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Lung Association (May 20, 1984), 18, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hyv36e00>.

⁴⁰ Koop, "Julia M. Jones Memorial Lecture," 6–7.

Seeking to add to his cost argument, Koop quoted from a speech President Reagan previously made to the Health Insurance Association of America when Reagan offered a similar economic and financial justification for curbing smoking in America, “The illness resulting from smoking is costly both to the smoker and his or her boss. A helping hand to assist employees to break the habit might be a wise investment.”⁴¹

For Koop, this was an all or nothing campaign; he was serious in his desire to end smoking in America. He chose to end his speech, which largely focused on the health hazards of smoking, with a plea to see cigarette smoking in America as a national economic issue:

There is much for you and me to do. Let us do it together and make a smoke-free society by the year 2000 a reality that will eliminate a tremendous number of deaths . . . a great deal of suffering and disability . . . and an economic burden we can no longer bear.⁴²

These words from America’s top doctor regarding the expense of smoking, both physically and monetarily, became guiding principles for government appropriators, fiscally conservative congressmen, and DoD bean counters in the days, months, and years to come as they sought ways to reduce massive unfunded liabilities pertaining to the military health care system.

When Koop finished his speech, he fundamentally changed the nature and scope of the cigarette war. Possibly learning from Califano’s experience in the Carter Administration, Koop was afraid that his *SFA2000* message might meet opposition from his superiors in the Reagan Administration, so he discussed the speech’s contents with only a handful of trusted advisors. Few, if any, had any idea that Koop was about to deliver such an aggressive anti-smoking message, that if effective, would banish the very

⁴¹ Koop, “Julia M. Jones Memorial Lecture,” 20–21.

⁴² Koop, “Julia M. Jones Memorial Lecture,” 21–22.

lucrative American cigarette enterprise to the ash tray of history.⁴³ When news of his *SFA2000* initiative was made public it was, to say the least, a bombshell. Horace Kornegay, who had moved from President of the Tobacco Institute to Chairman, was particularly furious when he read news of the speech and Koop's escalation of the cigarette war. In a speech delivered just eleven days after Koop's bombshell, Chairman Kornegay, as he had a decade prior when Weinberger had released the HEW's annual report on smoking in America in 1975, provided the enterprise response to the *SFA2000* Campaign. If he was aiming to match Koop's audacity with his own brand of shocking rhetoric, Kornegay succeeded beyond imagination.

Kornegay to the Breech

The occasion for Kornegay's retaliatory speech was a gathering of the Burley Auction Warehouse Association in Ashville, North Carolina, on May 31, 1984, less than two weeks after Koop's *SFA2000* speech. Offering apologies that Dr. Koop was unable to sojourn among them that night, Kornegay offered a response to Koop's plan to extinguish smoking in America. Connecting the dots between Califano's federal anti-smoking campaigns of the late 1970s, which had now become his corporate anti-smoking campaign at Chrysler, Kornegay commented that Koop had "out Califanoed-Califano" and that he had taken over Califano's position as "National Antismoking Ayatollah Number One."⁴⁴

⁴³ National Library of Medicine, "Tobacco, Second-Hand Smoke, and the Campaign for a Smoke-Free America," The C. Everett Koop Papers, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/Narrative/QQ/p-nid/85>.

⁴⁴ Horace Kornegay, "Remarks of Horace Kornegay: Burley Tobacco Warehouse Association," May 31, 1984, 1–2, accessed January 15, 1984, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ixs82f00>.

After placing Califano in proper conversation with Koop, the enterprise's previous enemy number one, Kornegay, in a move to make Koop the new target, took the rhetoric to a place almost awkward to recount. Referring to Koop's efforts to enlist children in the nation's anti-smoking agenda, Kornegay compared Koop's *SFA2000* plan to Hitler's Nazi Youth and the Chinese Red Guard. In a particularly vitriolic and unfortunate portion of his speech, Kornegay rhetorically asked whether or not Koop planned on a "final solution for the recalcitrant ones who refuse to obey your order to quit." He wondered if cigarette smoking hold-outs would have to go into "exile" or face "deportation" or banishment to "concentration camps" or the cold fate of execution by "death squads?"⁴⁵ Lobbying for a highly lucrative industry was one thing; comparing anti-smoking campaigns to the Holocaust and the extermination of the Jews was another. To make matters worse, later in the speech, Kornegay audaciously accused Koop of being "susceptible to a virus that causes antismoking agitation and violent rhetoric."⁴⁶ The cigarette war surely took a dark turn.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Kornegay, "Remarks of Horace Kornegay," 3.

⁴⁶ Kornegay, "Remarks of Horace Kornegay," 5.

⁴⁷ Badger, *Prosperity Road*, 86-87, 96, 156, 186. Considering Kornegay's vociferous rant against federal manipulation of cigarette consumption and his position on tobacco price supports, it is ironic that one of his predecessors, North Carolina Senator Josiah Bailey, used similar harsh discourse to voice his *rejection* of federal agriculture allotments and government involvement in agricultural production! During the New Deal, Bailey was noted for saying that such schemes ran "counter to every principle of American liberty." He further described crop control as "half-baked communistic control of agriculture." From the Senate floor, Bailey voiced that the issue of crop control was not an issue of price stabilization but rather a "question of human liberty." He said New Deal crop and allotment legislation made it clear this was a struggle to determine if America was still grounded as a "republic" or ruled as a "tyranny." He asked whether America was "going to be a free republic or regimented socialistic communism" with Ag Secretary Wallace the "Commissar of Agriculture." Later, when these federal crop control and allotment measures proved to be a resounding success, Bailey was quick to point out that it was not due to anything FDR liberals had done; farmers had been "miraculously delivered" by an act of God. In private correspondence, Bailey said the success of crop control and price parity had "nothing whatever" to do with the increase in the price of tobacco resulting from federal programs to reduce production. He reasoned that "if we could raise prices by legislation, then it is a strange thing that for two thousand years the civilized world failed to do such a thing." It was not legislation in his eyes, it was Divine intervention! Another North Carolina

Leaving such emotional, irrational rhetoric for analysis of another sort, Kornegay next chose to match Koop's policy discussion of smoking and health care economics with his own counter-assertion that the cigarette enterprise added \$59 billion to America's gross national product. With such massive impact on America's economy as a substantial contributor to the nation's bottom line, the enterprise was able to command considerable political influence on Capitol Hill. However, in what amounted to tortured logic, Kornegay opined that while cigarettes had contributed such vast treasure to America's coffers, Koop and Califano's programs had drained taxpayers of billions of dollars. Of course President Reagan and a host of military and civilian researchers already made the argument that smoking-related health care costs were indeed a substantial portion of the wasted expenditures to which Kornegay referred.

Kornegay continued his speech with a litany of other accusations. He argued that smoking was not the threat to millions of Americans. It was actually Dr. Koop who was the real hazard, "representing a grave threat to millions of Americans."⁴⁸ He described discrimination against smokers as a situation akin to the Civil Rights struggle, commenting: "It is unfair that at this time in our country's history when we have broken down the barriers that divide people on the basis of race, creed, color and gender, we are letting zealots erect new barriers to divide people on the basis of whether or not they

political figure of this period, S. H. Hobbs, Sr., expressed his opposition to federal regulation of tobacco production calling its supporters "Bolshevik," "undemocratic," and "un-American." He added that in regards to such federal meddling that "a Hoovercart looks better . . . than the dead carcass of personal liberty" and that "if I perish to death I don't want a government man coming to tell me what to do and what not to do." Ironically, the issues of patriotism, faith, freedom, and liberty were co-opted at various times throughout this saga, by those for and against crop control, as well as those opposed to government meddling in Americans' smoking behavior. Later Hobbs, similar to Kornegay, Hobbs would take the rhetoric one step further, calling federal crop control and allotment a "Hitler or Staling form of government."

⁴⁸ Kornegay, "Remarks of Horace Kornegay," 5.

smoke.⁴⁹ He persisted with the Civil Rights accusations, calling Koop's agenda "anti-smoking apartheid," and arguing that cigarette smokers are mercilessly "relegated to the back of planes, trains, and buses" and are "segregated in factories, offices and public places" and "refused employment."⁵⁰ This strategy of relating the smoking issue to other emotional issues such as the Civil Rights Movement, South African apartheid, the holocaust, veteran's benefits, soldiers, patriotism, and the Constitution, as previously discussed, became an industry mainstay for the remainder of the cigarette war.

And it became the mainstay for the remainder of his speech that night. After registering these arguments against Koop's great smoke-out, mostly based in rhetoric and unfounded emotion, Kornegay ended his speech by cunningly co-opting a sensitive Veterans' issue. Seeking to connect smoking with rights and freedoms won on foreign fields of battle, Kornegay recalled:

On Memorial Day, they buried the unknown soldier of the Vietnam War in Arlington National Cemetery. He joins his fellow unknowns of WWI, WWII, and the Korean War. Of this unknown Vietnam War serviceman, the President said, 'An American hero has returned home. God bless him. We may not know of this man's life, but we know of his character. We may not know his name, but we know his courage. He is the heart, the soul and the spirit of America.' And my question to the Surgeon General is this: Dr. Koop, what if he were a smoker? Would he be less a hero, would he have less character, less courage, be less of an American? I think we all know the right answer . . . but I would like to hear Dr. Koop's answer.⁵¹

With that, the trench lines were dug even deeper. The great captains of the cigarette war had once again marshaled onto the field and were engaged in a struggle over the future of smoking and smoking policy in America. Some of the names, like Weinberger, Califano, Helms, and Kornegay, were familiar. Others, like Koop and Iacocca, were relatively new to the high-stakes cigarette war, and additional names would

⁴⁹ Kornegay, "Remarks of Horace Kornegay," 6.

⁵⁰ Kornegay, "Remarks of Horace Kornegay," 7, 9.

⁵¹ Kornegay, "Remarks of Horace Kornegay," 10.

soon join the ranks. Moreover in 1985, all these captains, as well as those new to the struggle, would become either directly or indirectly involved in the soldier-cigarette saga either through legislative action, policy formulation, or the appropriations process. The smoke had barely settled from the most recent skirmish of the war—the Koop-Kornegay exchange—when Casper Weinberger fired the next shot: a shot aimed at unhinging the soldier and the cigarette once and for all.

1985: The Year of Transition

By 1985, Congress's ability to stomach such massive deficit-funded defense spending was about to end.⁵² The Weinberger defense era budgets were enormous. However these budgets, at least in theory, were underpinned by Reagan's economic growth. With an economy that had expanded by one-third during his first term, a portion of this increase reaped the tax treasure that was earmarked to fund Weinberger's military expansion.⁵³ Whereas FDR and LBJ had dreamed of an American corporate welfare capitalism that funded social welfare programs and full-employment machinations, Reagan invested in a form of war-welfare capitalism which materialized as the largest peacetime expansion of the military in American history.⁵⁴

⁵² Wieland, "Direct Responsibility," ch. 3, p. 13. The Cold War cost America \$13 trillion from 1947–1989. During the period between 1981 and 1989, the Pentagon's budget doubled from \$158 billion to \$304 billion a year.

⁵³ Wieland, "Direct Responsibility," ch. 3, p. 13.

⁵⁴ Wieland, "Direct Responsibility," ch. 3, p. 22; Casper W. Weinberger, *Public Statements of Secretary of Defense Weinberger* (Washington, D.C: National Printing Office, 1983), 34. A portion of Weinberger's defense shovel was also rooted in a form of Keynesian economics no different than FDR's or LBJ's policies. In reality, they should all be lumped under the term "modern economic arrangements." The Keynesian nature of Weinberger's policies became clear during Senate hearings regarding the FY84 defense budget when Weinberger said, "reductions are not safe for the security of the United States and for every billion dollars cut in defense spending, 35,000 jobs are lost." Informed by his belief in social-welfare Keynesianism, Senator Pete Domenici countered Weinberger's connecting full-employment to the health of the military-industrial complex by asking him "about the \$135 billion cuts in entitlements, do they represent a loss in jobs as well?" Another Senator accused Weinberger of "mortgaging our future" with

Historian of the twentieth century James Patterson described this as the *paradox* associated with *National Security Council Report-68* (NSC 68). A top-secret paper prepared for the Truman Administration in 1950, the document set forth an aggressive policy of a greatly expanded military-industrial complex, among other things. Patterson argues that the NSC 68 military-economic-policy consortium also envisioned more than just communist containment. This uniquely American consortium grandly expected a situation where an equally expanded American economy, along with the high-tech weapon systems churned out by this military-industrial complex, would fund both military *and* social welfare expansion *and* provide security *without* massive tax burdens on American citizens.⁵⁵

However, by 1985, according to a powerful group of fiscal conservatives, Patterson's NSC-68 bank account was nearly dry. Weary of a slumping economy, five decades of unprecedented federal spending, and doubtful that America could continue such drunken forays into war and welfare capitalism, fiscally conservative Congressmen fought back.⁵⁶ The Senate soon passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Deficit Control Act of 1985, which bit into the largest budget deficit in US history.⁵⁷ This

deceptive budgetary allocations and threat assessments, assessments that the military-industrial complex supported with delight. As previously pointed out, in Weinberger, one side of the complex was happy (military-industrial) while another was furious (the cigarette enterprise).

⁵⁵ James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States: 1945-1974* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 177.

⁵⁶ Wieland, "Direct Responsibility," ch. 3, p. 20. Reagan's spend spree honeymoon ran into a wall almost immediately. As is the pattern of the American electorate, after ousting a liberal by electing a conservative, they then ousted conservative legislators in favor of liberals: "the 1982 Congressional elections showed some blowback to all this Defense build-up and pork barrel spending ... and Reagan lost 25 seats in Congress."

⁵⁷ Wieland, "Direct Responsibility," ch. 3, p. 23-24.

momentous legislation was a form of sequestration-oversight for reining in government spending of which defense was the most profligate.

Most significant to the soldier-cigarette discussion, in this Gramm-Rudman spirit of austerity, some in Congress chose to *directly* focus their gaze on the costs arising from funding health care for military members, dependents, and retirees who were burning through more than 26 billion government-subsidized cigarettes a year.⁵⁸ At long last, the soldier and the cigarette, a mainstay since WWI, finally came under the microscopic gaze of congressional appropriators, fiscal activists, and DoD programmers struggling to understand how soldiers, cigarettes, freedom, patriotism, and cradle-to-grave health care benefits should continue as a *single* policy issue. Soldiers, freedom, and patriotism would survive this fight; the cigarette would not. Further, unconditional cradle-to-grave health care benefits, to this point an industry and military standard, was never the same again.

⁵⁸ Maj. Gen. Dan Burkett USAF (Ret), “After the ALA and AFCOMS Meetings, Thoughts on ‘Mental Paralysis’ of Gramm-Rudman... Standardization (And Cigarettes) in Commissaries.” *Military Market* April 1986, 56–57, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00>. In a journal article by commissary-exchange insider Burkett, he clearly links the Gramm-Rudman austerity measures to military smoking and cigarette subsidies on military bases, “It appears that the commissaries will soon get the opportunity to experience operating at reduced funding in this case with less non-appropriated funds (surcharge money).”

CHAPTER XI

THE END OF THE SOLDIER AND THE CIGARETTE:

SFA2000 INVADES THE DOD

When Surgeon General C. Everett Koop announced his audacious plan to drastically reduce smoking in America, he did so with a supreme confidence in timing. Just four years before his momentous 1984 *SFA2000* declaration, Americans had smoked a record number of cigarettes. What gave him the confidence to believe in his timing? Could the nation go from 620 billion to zero in just two decades? If the plan was a bit of a stretch, his confidence was found at the intersection of twenty years of science linking the physical costs of cigarette smoking and more recent articulation of the mountainous fiscal costs. Yet, to make such a declaration was one thing, to enact policy measures and legislation to bring it about was another.

If Koop was to achieve his *SFA2000* objectives, he required help from anti-smoking's most powerful and consistently anti-cigarette government executive: Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Jesse Helms had sensed imminent doom when he and his protégé John Porter East had cast their votes against the anti-smoking California bureaucrat. Possibly, he saw the writing on the wall when the cigarette lobby pressured Carter to pull the plug on Califano. However, Califano's firing and these two votes against Weinberger, in retrospect, were minor skirmishes in the cigarette war. What loomed on the horizon was a showdown threatening to end the enterprise's decades' long, deeply acculturated, state-supported access to their most faithful customers. To Califano's campaign at Chrysler and Koop's crusade at the Capitol, Weinberger now added his own front: a dislodging attack at Defense.

The Resolution Heard ‘Round the Pentagon

The end started as a minor continuing resolution issued by Congress as the members were hurrying to finish business so they could leave for their homes to enjoy Christmas recess. On December 19, 1985, they headed out to what would become one of the coldest winters in modern memory.¹ However the continuing resolution they left behind would spark a flame that would grow to a full-scale fire for the enterprise by the time the winter of 1986 drew to a close. In order to grasp the importance of this resolution, one must go back a few months to October 1985.

On October 24, Senators Ted Stevens (R-AK) and David Boren (D-OK) exchanged letters with each other confirming their plans to introduce an amendment to the FY86 Defense appropriation that would call for an increase to the price of cigarettes on military posts so that they at least matched the prevailing per-pack cost off-post. In essence, they called for the end of military cigarette subsidies. They reasoned the precedent was already in place stemming from the VA’s 1978 decision, followed by the DoD’s 1982 guidance, that on-post alcohol prices be adjusted to reflect the off-post cost. In a personal letter to Stevens, Boren summed up his determination to end military cigarette subsidies saying, “Ted, I know you agree with me that there is no reason for the federal government to encourage or subsidize the detrimental smoking habit” anymore.²

The Stevens-Boren cigarette pricing amendment passed through the Defense Appropriation Subcommittee on October 29, and then sailed through the full committee.

¹ Kevin Ambrose, “Inauguration Weather: Record Cold for Reagan,” *The Washington Post*, July 13, 2009, accessed January 15, 2015, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitalweathergang/2009/01/reagans_1985_inauguration_cold.html.

² David Boren, memo to Ted Stevens, October 24, 1985, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu.tid/dbt52e00/pdf>.

By early November, their legislation appeared on the Senate floor as a resolution to amend the FY86 defense appropriation to remove cigarette subsidies and increase cigarette prices on all military installations. Now on the floor for all to see, the amendment was quickly assailed by the enterprise, first from the inside, and then from the outside. On the inside, Senator John Warner from Virginia dashed off a memo to Stevens warning him that, though he understood Steven's noble purpose was to end subsidized smoking, this is not how it would be perceived by the troops. He warned that they would see it as "yet another attempt to reduce the overall military compensation system." Further, he warned Stevens that he was tampering with "the most successful aspect of DoD operations—people," and that the only losers in Steven's scheme were the good folks who put the uniform on every day.³ With these words, Warner instantly moved the conversation to a place it had already been, and would stay for years to come: from one focused on fiscal and physical liabilities to one re-focused on rights, patriotism, benefits, promises, compensation, and veteran's issues.

On the outside, the issue was quickly picked up by enterprise lobbyists like Amy Millman who reported the emergence of the amendment to her industry client Phillip Morris. Though Millman was alarmed at the amendment, she was not worried because her contacts informed her that "the DoD is solidly in our corner as are the veterans groups" and that both had "promised to lobby against this amendment." Further, she reported that groups friendly to tobacco were "carrying with them a paper which was prepared by the Tobacco Institute and the DoD," and that both organizations (TI and DoD) were acting in concert with each other on this issue. Finally, she uncovered the

³ John Warner, memo to Ted Stevens, November 4, 1985, accessed January 8, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/jap35d00/pdf>.

chief proponent of the anti-smoking agenda inside the DoD policy-making apparatus as Dr. William Mayer, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, and labeled him as a “friend” of Dr. Koop.⁴

In her summation of the amendment event, Millman highlights two key factors that would become crucial in the months ahead: enterprise interference strategy and the irony of the TI and DoD working together to formulate military smoking policy. As it turns out, the situation was much more complex than meets the eye. The TI was interacting with certain inside elements at DoD and taking advantage of an internal breakdown at the Pentagon over smoking, cigarette policy, and cigarette subsidies.

In what may be shocking to any unfamiliar with the way politics and getting things done in the federal bureaucracy works, the main detractor of the Stevens-Boren legislation, other than the tobacco state politicians, appeared as none other than *Casper Weinberger*. How is it that Weinberger, who was such a thorn in the side of enterprise officials for so many years, appeared to come out as their ally in this initial fight? The old adage says that politics makes strange bedfellows; in this case, Weinberger’s desire for incremental change drove his choice of beds. He knew that the anti-cigarette moment had come, but he was also aware it would never be the slam dunk Koop had envisioned.

Weinberger anticipated the enterprise would drive the discussion straight to the emotional, divisive issues like soldiers’ rights and benefits, and if he was to achieve any level of meaningful change to the smoking culture in the military, he had to do it in measured, incremental steps. As events unfolded over the next several months, it became clear that his strategy was to make changes in-house at DoD first through policy

⁴ Amy Millman, memo to Phillip Morris Co., November 1, 1985, accessed January 31, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ebt52e00/pdf>.

implementation, and that these policies had to be in place before any outside measures like forced price increases should be attempted, if at all. Among organizational behavior parlance, this is described as a process of socializing change rather than legislating change.

With this incremental strategy in mind, Weinberger quickly sent off a note to Senator Mark Hatfield who was Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee. In this letter, Weinberger, the old infantryman, essentially repeats Warren's fears that the price increases might be perceived incorrectly by his soldiers, and asks the Senator to hold off on any price reductions or decreased appropriations. Considering Weinberger's remonstration, and the enterprise's swift interference, there was almost no chance that the amendment would move forward in the Senate, and it was tabled. Rather than kill the amendment completely, Stevens met Weinberger in the middle and requested a study on the impacts of the use and sale of tobacco within the military; this was a request that proved pivotal. This tabled amendment eventually made its way through the legislative process and emerged as *Continuing Resolution 4657*, which was the document drafted by those legislators anxious to leave town on December 19, 1985. This resolution, and the study it requested, was the proverbial spark that lit the fire, or in this case, burned the cigarette.⁵

A Tent Divided

As Congress headed off for a cold winter break, in the bowels of the Pentagon the policy wonks were still hard at work. In late December, they were given this study directive from Senator Stevens demanding data regarding the impacts of the use and sale

⁵ Casper Weinberger, memo Mark O. Hatfield, November 5, 1985, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/uhe44c00/pdf>; Casper Weinberger, memo to Jamie L. Whitten, March 10, 1986, accessed January 14, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00>.

of cigarettes in the military. The visible hand of bureaucracy had determined that within the Pentagon, two offices would handle health care policy: the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OSD/HA), led by the aforementioned Dr. William Mayer, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel (OSD/MPP), led by newcomer Chapman B. Cox. Within OSD/MPP, the civilian leader, Cox, had a military deputy, Lieutenant General Edmund Chavarrie. Mayer, Cox, and Chavarrie played prominent roles during the drama that unfolded within the Pentagon during 1986 over cigarette pricing and cigarette subsidies.⁶

When the staffs at OSD/HA and OSD/MPP began work on the Stevens Resolution, an internal riff quickly became apparent within the Pentagon regarding the cigarette issue. On one side were Mayer and Cox, who staunchly supported aggressive measures to reduce smoking in the military, including cessation programs, price increases, banning cigarette sales in commissaries, and caving to pressures to end cigarette subsidies. On the other side was General Chavarrie who aggressively supported the enterprise's position.⁷ It appears that Chavarrie was the insider that lobbyist Millman spoke of when she said, "the DoD is solidly in our corner."⁸ Chavarrie played the part of

⁶ Maze and Young, "Commissary Sales of Tobacco May End," 1, 8; Pete Sparber, memo to Ed Battison, January 12, 1987, and attached cigarette news articles, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fxo38b00>. A note on the Sparber-Battison document: the memo is merely a cover letter for a package of cigarette related articles; the article that is pertinent to the Mayer-Cox-Chavarrie issue is contained therein. It is from an issue of *Military Market News*, and the article is titled "Cigarettes: DoD's Decision," which refers to issues pertinent to understanding the winter of 1985–1986.

⁷ Maze and Young, "Commissary Sales of Tobacco May End," 1, 8. Note that at least one uniformed member among these groups stood aggressively opposed to Chavarrie and the enterprise. Newly appointed USAF Surgeon General Lt Gen Murphy A. Chesney (he arrived about the same time as Cox). Chesney commented he believed cigarette sales in the post-exchange "killed more (people) in Vietnam than Agent Orange."

⁸ Amy Millman, memo to Phillip Morris Co., November 1, 1985, accessed January 31, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ebt52e00/pdf>.

enterprise juggernaut in this policy struggle, consistently sticking to the position that any adjustment to the price or availability of cigarettes would be perceived as an attack on soldiers' rights and freedoms.

In this way, the discourse on cigarette subsidies quickly became a discussion about commissary rights as opposed to cigarette subsidies or health issues, harkening back to the healthcare benefits discourse. The plan to remove the cigarette subsidy was touted as yet another example of a breach in trust and an infringement on an important part of the overall compensation package: commissary benefits.⁹ In the point papers Millman delivered to DoD, the enterprise highlighted this commissary benefit and the fact that Congress, not the DoD, managed appropriations in this area. DoD was advised to quickly wash their hands of the issue regarding pricing and subsidies and let the legislators (and lobbyists) handle those issues. In this way the enterprise hoped to wrench control of smoking policy out of the hands of the DoD anti-smoking cabal, and back into the hands of Congressional appropriators, many of whom were enterprise supporters from tobacco states.

As events unfolded, this commissary argument, and therefore the soldier-cigarette issue, increasingly fell under the purview of the powerful House Armed Services Committee (HASC) which was disproportionately represented by a number of tobacco state representatives. Specifically, the Chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee and

⁹ This is where the discourse on eroding health benefits (from Chapter 9), oddly, meets the discourse on eroding commissary (i.e., smoking) benefits. Both issues were co-opted by the industry to support their real position—access to the lucrative military market. The co-opting of these issues served to take the spotlight away from what was an important policy debate regarding responsible stewardship of Americans' tax dollars. This is where traditional conservative issues (rights and freedom of choice) meet traditional *modern* liberal issues (social welfare) in an ironic heap of intrigue, paradox, and simple manipulation. *Modern* and *classic* liberalism must be differentiated, as anyone versant in the topic would be quick to note that classic liberalism and modern conservatism are so similar, they are ironically almost indistinguishable.

Chairman of the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Subcommittee Dan Daniel exerted considerable influence over the soldier-cigarette issue. Daniel was a former soldier and tobacco farmer and was then a Congressman from Virginia. As a cigarette booster alongside Helms, he went out of his way to ensure that soldiers who desired smokes would not come under what he termed the “brass nanny” supervision of the anti-cigarette zealots in Congress or at DoD.¹⁰

As these DoD officials worked to hammer out a unified response to Steven’s inquiry, they struggled to develop a smoking policy that accounted for their boss’s (Weinberger’s) desire for compromise, and their own instincts as a staff ranging from support of cessation to insistence upon adhering to the enterprise’s freedom position. At one point, discussions were terse. One source said that Chavarrie refused to go along with his superior Cox’s insistence that the military revise manpower recommendations to the SECDEF regarding cigarette policy. In a back-and-forth bureaucratic battle within the cigarette war, Cox was said to have rejected several policy drafts that did not include his desire to shift DoD’s position on cigarette pricing and subsidies. This led to a tense environment in the OSD/MPP office and a situation “bordering on insubordination” as Chavarrie refused to provide a position paper that incorporated Cox’s recommendations.¹¹ When the policy guidance was released in March 1986, and followed up by official DoD regulations, it became obvious whose position appeared to have won.

However, the March 1986 release of the DoD guidance was still in the distant future, and the struggle under the DoD tent continued. The enterprise soon discovered the

¹⁰ Samuel D. Chilcote Jr., memo to the Members of the TI Executive Committee, January 13, 1986, 2, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zgq85e00/pdf>.

¹¹ Pete Sparber, memo to Ed Battison, January 12, 1987, and attached cigarette news articles, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fxo38b00>.

internal disagreement at DoD; chiefly the Mayer-Cox plan to persuade Weinberger to go against the advice of his military staff (i.e. Chavarrie). When Congressman Stephen Neal of North Carolina found out about the struggle, and rumors that Weinberger was considering tampering with the cigarette benefit, he was quick to pen a response to the SECDEF.

Neal's message to Weinberger was succinct: of course soldiers smoke! After trying to shift the attention to alcohol, which Neal claimed had a much more detrimental effect on soldiers than cigarettes, Neal's main line of argument focused on the historic link between soldiers and smoking. He wanted Weinberger to understand that "in times of war, tobacco has been a tremendous morale booster," and his actions infringed upon this special relationship. He informed Weinberger, the old infantryman, that soldiers' military training was incomplete if they did not know how to "police the area and field strip cigarette butts." Not only does this argument speak to the pervasiveness of smoking among the troops, it uncovers the level of acculturation that the cigarette had gone through among the ranks as it had essentially become synonymous with "field stripping" a rifle—one cannot be done without the other.¹²

Neal went on to exclaim that a 50 percent smoking rate was "astonishingly low" considering what it must have been 20 years ago. After all, are not soldiers just doing what they are supposed to do, "enjoy[ing] simple pleasures in situations and settings that are not always pleasurable?" When chain smokers from the 1950s and 60s hit the CHAMPUS system in the 1980s, many were not so quick to laugh off the whole affair as another case of soldiers will be soldiers. In an amazing piece of frankness, Neal ends his

¹² Steve Neal, letter to Casper Weinberger, March 4, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/map35d00>.

note with a concession that his argument was not grounded in health and wellness, or even data for that matter, but in the morale of the force. Regarding the morale issue, Neal closes:

I do not think, either, that the historic and traditional link between the services and tobacco can be ignored. In times of war, tobacco has been a tremendous morale booster to the soldier, and a source of great pleasure and satisfaction. Armies ceased fire to trade it during the Civil War (a most civil thing to do). In WWII, the soldier often extracted the cigarettes from a K-Ration packet and threw the ration away. In every war, cigarettes are a currency and are bartered for all sorts of booty.¹³

Though not as sentimental as Neal, and surely not quick to point out his rejection of science and data, TI President Sam Chilcote said much about the issue as well. In a memo to the TI executive board, Chilcote referred to the Mayer-Cox action during the Christmas recess as a “lightning strike” timed to take effect while all the enterprise’s Congressional friends were safely away on Christmas recess. On this point Chilcote was emphatic: if Mayer and Cox were able to end cut-rate cigarette sales in the military as a health measure, this would form the proverbial slippery slope upon which all would slide into Koop’s sea of complete cessation.

Regarding the Mayer-Cox end run, Chilcote felt the enterprise was in a position of strength since Weinberger had already made previous statements in the autumn against the aggressive Mayer-Cox policy position. He pointed out that “should [Weinberger] cave in to the anti-smoking forces in the Pentagon . . . [he] would be in the embarrassing position of doing a complete reversal on a position he has previously taken in writing.”¹⁴ Chilcote was confident that the enterprise appeared to have Weinberger wedged in a corner. Weinberger was giving no indication that he was caving on his previous

¹³ Steve Neal, letter to Casper Weinberger, March 4, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/map35d00>.

¹⁴ Samuel D. Chilcote Jr., memo to the Members of the TI Executive Committee, January 13, 1986, 2, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zgq85e00/pdf>.

commitment not to adjust prices or subsidies; he remained true to his plan to allow for internal DoD processes to work. As events unfolded, Weinberger appeared as one committed to changing the smoking culture in the military. However, he wanted to do it cautiously and incrementally—too cautious and incremental for some. With the tabling of the Stevens Amendment in December, the fizzling of the Mayer-Cox strike in January, the interference from General Chavarrie throughout, and Weinberger’s apparent desire to settle with a weak compromise, the enterprise was positive it had weathered yet another storm.

As the Pentagon staffers continued to work on developing a cigarette policy, General Chavarrie was invited to speak at a Commissary Round Table meeting in San Antonio, Texas, on February 13, 1986. Commissary stake holders were considerably alarmed over the cigarette pricing issue and how it would affect both commissary sales and commissary foot traffic, issues linked to one another. They were concerned that as cigarettes were the main draw at commissaries, no cigarettes would mean substantially less shoppers. If soldiers were not attracted by cut-rate cigarettes, not only would they lose the cigarette sales volume, they would forfeit the rest of the purchases these soldiers would have made as well. However, a PM representative who was at the roundtable discussion was pleased to report that it appeared the enterprise had a strong advocate at DoD in General Chavarrie. He described Chavarrie as squarely on the side of the industry and its position that cigarette prices remain free of nanny-state interference. Their fears were further alleviated when Chavarrie reported that despite Dr. Mayer’s efforts, the issue was and remained an issue of “service personnel rights and freedom of choice.”¹⁵

¹⁵ Ted Costas, Phillip Morris interoffice correspondence to George Powell, “ALA Midwest Commissary Round Table,” February 13, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015,

The enterprise was not the only group to pick up on the internal struggle at DoD over smoking policy. Before long, the issue had come to the attention of anti-smoking Senators who supported Stevens and Boren in their struggle to amend DoD funding to exclude cigarette subsidies and curb tobacco sales on military installations. In a February memo from a select group of anti-smoking Senators addressed to Weinberger, the issues of smoker's rights, commissary benefits, and quality of life were prominent:

Raising the price of cigarettes would not take away a smoker's right to smoke. Nor would this provision deny a benefit to the military community, unless lung cancer and heart disease are benefits. We find the argument that raising tobacco prices would endanger the commissary system specious, for there must be better ways to keep commissaries open . . . Health promotion and disease prevention programs in the Department of Defense have the potential to improve the quality of life for hundreds of thousands of service members and their families. We strongly support the health initiatives already undertaken by the Department and encourage you to affirm and expand these initiatives by promptly issuing the health promotion directive, including the tobacco price increase provision. You have an historic opportunity to reverse the traditional role which the military services have played in promoting smoking in our society. We hope you will seize it.¹⁶

This was a straight-forward, clear statement from a powerful group of anti-cigarette Senators urging Weinberger to listen to his subordinates' advice (Mayer and Cox) and take historic action on the soldier-cigarette issue *now*. They were frustrated that Weinberger seemed intent to compromise and delay issuance of the DoD health promotion directive his staffers labored over—even if under a tent divided. The Senators, as well as the enterprise, would have to wait another month to find out Weinberger's decision.

The DoD Report on Smoking and DoD 1010.10

<http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fct52e00/pdf>. This PM representative reported, “tobacco companies dominated the issues discussed” at this meeting.

¹⁶ John Chafee, et al., memo to Casper Weinberger, February 5, 1986, accessed January 31, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nmj78b00>. The anti-smoking Senators who signed this document are: John Chafee (R-RI), Richard Lugar (R-IN), Mark Hatfield (R-OR), John Heinz (R-PA), Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), David Boren (D-OK), William Proxmire (D-WI), and Edward Kennedy (D-MA).

The DoD issued its extensive *Department of Defense Report on Smoking and Health in the Military* on March 10, 1986, followed the next day by the *Department of Defense Health Promotion Directive 1010.10*. These two documents represent a major step in the history of the soldier and the cigarette. Initially, it appeared the enterprise had won this latest round of the cigarette war. However, the documents require close scrutiny in order to understand who the winners and losers were and what the documents meant to the future of smoking in the military.

The first document, the *DoD Report on Smoking*, consisted of Weinberger's response to the December 19, 1985, continuing resolution that included a request for the DoD to provide a study on the pervasiveness and effects of the military smoking culture. Weinberger acknowledged that the report:

concludes that smoking rates are high for active duty personnel, that smoking is a major health hazard, that increasing the price of cigarettes could result in an 8 to 10 percent reduction in consumption, but that a formalized and structured anti-smoking campaign with no increase in prices would also result in significant reduced consumption.¹⁷

In this sentence, Weinberger is acknowledging that, behind the scenes, his policy staff at DoD is at loggerheads on the issue. In general terms, one side wanted to stop funding the smoking habit by slashing subsidies and price breaks; the other wanted to hold the line on commissary benefits and simply afford soldiers educational opportunities and then let them make their own choice. In reality, the Chavarrie side wanted the enterprise standard—status quo—and provided the reasoning that the smoking rate in the military was on a four percent per year downward trend, thus the military was better served by

¹⁷ Casper Weinberger, memo to Jamie L. Whitten, March 10, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/nkvy0034>.

letting the soldier-cigarette bond fizzle out on its own without giving the perception they were cutting into benefits.

The 93 pages of reports, analysis, graphs, and appendices confirmed what was essentially already known: soldiers and retirees smoked copious amounts of cigarettes that were injurious to health and a huge burden on the military health care system and the defense medical budget. The study goes on to provide four options to address the smoking problem in the military. The first was to seek status quo—do nothing. The other two involved some version of price hikes, and the last option was to ban the sale of all tobacco in commissaries.

These basic options were followed by a conclusion that is a tortured piece of logic obviously written by a tent divided. It darts from one position to another, and then to no position at all; it is disjointed at best, preposterous at worst. At one point, the study says that price hikes would definitely work to achieve smoking reduction targets, and then casts off such hikes as a drastic infringement on soldiers' rights that would have profound effects on morale and retention. Then it maintains such price hikes will have only negligible impacts on soldier finances, to the tune of about \$100 a year on average. Next it backs completely away and places the military smoking problem squarely in the lap of the federal government: "Smoking is a behavior that has the appearance of being officially sanctioned by a number of policies including federal programs subsidizing the tobacco growing industry and the sale of low-cost cigarettes at military installations."¹⁸

¹⁸ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), "Department of Defense Report on Smoking and Health in the Military," March 1986, 24, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00>.

How could Weinberger's DoD staffers who authored this report extol low-cost cigarettes as a virtue, right, and indeed an important part of retention, and then reason that a price hike is a negligible inconvenience . . . that would work to reduce smoking? Finally, how could they place blame for the whole situation on federal cigarette subsidies when the report previously lauded such cut-rate cigarettes as vital to retention? The pretzel logic found in the conclusion of this report, and indeed the entire soldier-cigarette issue, is yet another symptom of a much greater theme in modern American history: the warp and woof of a modern corporatocracy which attempts to weave together various, oft opposing interests in the name of good business.

Thus in these bureaucratic trenches, where policy meets politics, one finds the modern economic arrangements that fuel American political-economy. Taxable transactions, in the government's eyes, fuel this arrangement. In these trenches, actors with varying motivations work tirelessly to create, or block, policies as informed by their constituencies. In this way, similar to a sausage grinder, the needs of big business, taxpayers, industry, and the military-industrial complex are ground together with the end product a mixed bag of industry-friendly incentives and taxpayer-friendly efficiencies.¹⁹ As with all such transactions, there are winners and losers, and there are inherent paradoxes. The art is to maximize the winning, minimize the losing, and, like Thomas Jefferson, develop the "capacity to rest comfortably with contradictions."²⁰

In Weinberger's report, he acknowledges the paradoxical warp and woof phenomenon as he explains his selected course of action to Congressman Jamie Whitten,

¹⁹ Lind, *Land of Promise*, 453.

²⁰ Ellis, *American Sphinx*, 5, 301.

Chairman of the Appropriations Committee. Weinberger concedes “the tobacco issue has presented the government (federal, state and local) with a *paradoxical situation* attempting to balance the *negative* health impacts against the *positive* economic impacts (Italics mine).”²¹ With the paradox duly registered, he further explains the nuances of the line he is forced to walk between inconsistency and expediency, stating:

There are some understandable inconsistencies in the Government directly or indirectly making available for purchase at lower prices than could be obtained elsewhere, products that we know are injurious to the individual’s health. Therefore, at the end of a period of time reasonable to measure the effectiveness of our aggressive anti-smoking campaign in decreasing use of tobacco by the troops, I will review our progress and consider whether it would be appropriate, in addition, to make changes in the present policies of tobacco sales in commissaries and post exchanges.²²

And finally, he informed Congress, the enterprise, and the soldiers that his chosen course of action was to “direct that an intense anti-smoking campaign be conducted at all levels of all Services and that it become a major responsibility of all commanders and

²¹ Office of the Asst. Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), “Department of Defense Report on Smoking and Health in the Military,” March 1986, 24, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00>; James C. Cobb, *The Most Southern Place on Earth : the Mississippi Delta and the Roots of Regional Identity* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1992), 260. Congressman Whitten was no stranger to the paradox of tobacco politics. A representative from Mississippi’s farming Delta who served in the House from 1941 to 1995, Whitten had engaged in paradoxical tobacco policy in 1962 when conservative Delta planters influenced the introduction of legislation to provide federal funding for a large tractor training program. The government would pay to train tractor drivers, who would in-turn provide the planters with safe, cheap, reliable tractor labor – yet with no possibility of increased wages or job mobility. It appeared to be a win for the planters, and another exploitation of poor black laborers. However, with Whitten leading the charge, the planters eventually killed the bill they had created because, in Whitten’s words, it would set a precarious precedent and was dangerous to the farm labor status quo because it would give the government a foothold “wedge into Labor Department supervision of wage rates and hours in agriculture, which could upset the local economy.” Whitten was a leader in the effort to remind Washington of its “absolute obligation to help agriculture achieve parity with other sectors of the economy,” so he would have been very familiar with Weinberger’s comments regarding the “positive economic impacts” of cigarettes, tobacco, and smoking.

²² Casper Weinberger, memo to Jamie L. Whitten, March 10, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/nkvy0034>.

commanding officers, up to and including the highest levels of each Service and the Department.²³"

In the end, Weinberger did not choose any of the options he was offered by the staff. Instead of status quo, price hikes, or ending cigarette sales, he chose an aggressive program of education, with a wait and see fallback option. This was essentially a hedging strategy that pursued compromise in the short term, yet opened the door to further action in the long term. Words are important, especially regarding crucial policy issues pertinent to the war room, the boardroom, and the American living room. It is important to note that Weinberger ordered an *intense* anti-smoking campaign as a *major* policy issue Services must pursue with utmost vigor at the *highest levels*. In essence, the Secretary of Defense ordered the Army Chief of Staff to make anti-smoking one of his *top policy issues*. Through a cascading set of ordered effects, some anticipated, others not, these were the words that eventually sounded the death knell of the smoking culture in the Army.

The very next day, March 11, 1986, Weinberger and the DoD released regulatory guidance to implement the policy options he had chosen based on (and in some ways not based on) the DoD's own report on smoking released the day before. *Health Promotions Directive 1010.10* was essentially just that—a directive to the Services to promote healthy lifestyles. Tobacco use was just one of many healthy lifestyle issues addressed in this directive. At first glance, it appears non-committal, offering little substance to the anti-smoking lobby. Using classic status quo language, for example, it asks military

²³ Casper Weinberger, memo to Jamie L. Whitten, March 10, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/nkvy0034>.

commanders to “coordinate and monitor” the “use of tobacco products *in* DoD occupied facilities.”²⁴

However, in the same section it tells commanders to coordinate and monitor just about everything else health related. It invites them to monitor and reduce stress, fat, hypertension, and to coordinate calisthenics programs. The regulation addresses smoking in general terms and waters down the smoking issue by lumping cigarettes in with other vague, ill-defined topics such as positive work environment and stress. Further diluting the issue, it calls for the formation of “coordinating committees” to monitor smoking policy and health. In most bureaucracies, “coordinating committees,” in reality, are formed to work hard to achieve status quo.²⁵

However, peering deeper into the document, there are parts of the guidance that directly address smoking as a separate, distinct issue. Yet these are attenuated as well, or even offer clear loopholes. The regulation does call for plans to address “smoking prevention and cessation,” only to admonish leaders not to, under any circumstance, coerce or pressure soldiers to actually enter smoking cessation programs. Leaders were to only provide information and education if they are asked. The soldier would have ample opportunity to ask for help with cessation at yearly physicals, dental exams, or feedback sessions.²⁶

²⁴ Department of Defense, *Directive 1010.10: Health Promotion*, March 11, 1986, 1–5, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/slkf0030>. For more on this issue of direct marketing to soldiers as well as the commissary issue in general, see Elizabeth A. Smith, Virginia S. Blackman, and Ruth E Malone, “Death at a discount: how the tobacco industry thwarted tobacco control policies in US military commissaries,” *Tobacco Control*, 16, no. 1 (February 2007): 38–46.

²⁵ Department of Defense, *Directive 1010.10*, 1–5.

²⁶ Department of Defense, *Directive 1010.10*, 1–5.

In terms of direct smoking policy and workspace management, the directive allowed smoking in buildings as long as it did not “impair non-smokers.” It also gave provisions to restrict smoking to designated areas outside buildings, yet at the same time allowed smoking inside if there were well ventilated areas that could accommodate smokers. It allowed for smoking in private offices, and encouraged supervisors, where space permitted, to allow for smokers to have their own work stations. Finally it encouraged supervisors and commanders to consider billeting smokers and non-smokers in ways that consider smoking preferences, and it banned cigarette companies from marketing directly to military personnel.²⁷

The reaction to Weinberger’s report and follow-on guidance ranged from cautious optimism from the enterprise to disgust from certain anti-smoking legislators. The enterprise initially saw the rather demure, weak sounding guidance as a victory. Tobacco Institute President Sam Chilcote said, “despite intense lobbying by the Coalition on Smoking or Health and the support of two key Pentagon officials (Mayer and Cox) . . . there will be no change in status quo” regarding the DoD cigarette policy.²⁸ Ironically, the TI was happy to join Weinberger and his military staff in blocking Congress’ attempt to erode soldier benefits even further. The TI attributed the entire *1010.10* fiasco to an internal power struggle among certain DoD staffers rather than an honest attempt to address health promotion in the military. In a statement provided to the *Washington Post*, a TI spokesman said, “What is going on is a Pentagon staff dispute, with the health affairs

²⁷ Department of Defense, *Directive 1010.10*, 1–5.

²⁸ Sam Chilcote, memo to Tobacco Institute Executive Committee, “Cigarette Sales in Commissaries,” March 11, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dir4fe007/pdf>.

people and other anti-smoking forces on one side and a number of other people looking at the broader issue of commissary rights.”²⁹

Enterprise booster Daniel swung into action as well, describing the whole cigarette affair as a knee jerk reaction by certain overzealous DoD officials (Mayer and Cox) who had made a carnival out of the whole affair. Later he would comment the *1010.10* matter not only threatened soldiers’ benefits, it threatened combat readiness. “Scientists agreed that in the stressful environment of war ‘the positive effects [of smoking] offset the negative.’”³⁰ Daniel does not say which scientists; although it is possible he is referring to the enterprise-backed St. Martins meeting where cigarette scientists gathered to find out why people smoked—to allow the industry to market more effectively.³¹

If the enterprise was cautiously optimistic, the more aggressive members of the anti-smoking lobby were seething. On Capitol Hill, Senator Bingaman was particularly disappointed in Weinberger’s weak *1010.10* guidance. In the *Congressional Record* for March 13, 1986, the Senator comments:

By omitting from this directive positive and substantive provisions which would have discounted the DoD subsidies for tobacco products sold on military installations, the Secretary missed a significant opportunity to improve the quality of life of those who serve in the armed forces . . . This directive guarantees that the DoD will continue to subsidize disease and premature death among its personnel and their families. Additional service members and their families will suffer from lung cancer, heart disease, and other smoking related maladies as a result of this directive. These individuals will seek medical care for their diseases in military hospitals and in VA medical centers.³²

²⁹ Walter Pincus, “Pentagon Doctor Seeks to Reduce Cigarette Sales,” *The Washington Post* (January 5, 1986), A16.

³⁰ Smith, Blackman, and Malone, “Death at a discount,” 41.

³¹ William L. Dunn Jr., ed., *Smoking Behavior: Motives and Incentives* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), 1–3. Reference Chapter 2 for discussion of this conference sponsored by the cigarette industry to find out why people smoke.

Bingaman further lamented, “the taxpayers are the biggest losers,” in Weinberger’s decision not to adjust prices or cut cigarette subsidies. He reiterated that he and other concerned Senators had urged the Secretary to take action on this matter, however he “has chosen not to do so.”³³ He accused Weinberger of caving to the enterprise he had spent most of his federal career fighting, saying that he believed Weinberger “would have liked to have included an end to the military tobacco subsidy in his directive” were it not for pressure from “supporters of the tobacco industry, both in Congress and in the administration” that are both “many and vocal” and have “persuaded the Secretary to put off any increase in tobacco prices.” Finally, he characterized the newly established DoD policy on cigarette smoking as found *1010.10* as “absurd” and “schizophrenic.”³⁴

Chilcote felt he summed up the whole episode best with his assessment that “We have won the battle, but not the war . . . the issue remains.”³⁵ Another lobbyist felt the battle was “far from being over.”³⁶ With such strong words against the enterprise

³² Armed Forces Marketing Council, memo, “Cigarette Pricing in the Military Retail System,” August 8, 1986, TI07791424, accessed January 18, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eld92b00>. A note on this source is appropriate. The document is a cover letter from a lobbyist relaying pertinent information from the Congressional transcript covering several key dates, one being March 13, 1986, on page S2693 and S2694 when Senator Bingaman rose to register his complaints against Weinberger. See Congressional Record pages S2693 and S2694 attached to this memo.

³³ Armed Forces Marketing Council, memo, “Cigarette Pricing in the Military Retail System,” August 8, 1986, TI07791424, accessed January 18, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eld92b00>. See Congressional Record pages S2693 and S2694 attached to this memo.

³⁴ Armed Forces Marketing Council, memo, “Cigarette Pricing in the Military Retail System,” August 8, 1986, TI07791424, accessed January 18, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eld92b00>. See Congressional Record pages S2693 and S2694 attached to this memo. One observer quipped the enterprise “got to Weinberger,” since he reversed his previous policy stance in a baffling decision. They characterized this reversal as a “slap in the face” to Mayer and other DoD officials charged with the health and readiness of the force.

³⁵ Sam Chilcote, memo to TI Executive Committee, “Cigarette Sales in Commissaries,” March 11, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dir4fe007/pdf>.

³⁶ Armed Forces Marketing Council, memo, “Cigarette Pricing in the Military Retail System,” August 8, 1986, TI07791424, accessed January 18, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eld92b00>. See

becoming a normal part Senate floor discussion, and debate often followed by strongly worded amendments and legislative proposals against the tobacco enterprise, how long could the enterprise stave off the onslaught? Chilcote did not realize at the time how correct he was in his other assessment that the enterprise had to “respond to the adverse findings in the report” in the very near future.³⁷ Notice that he emphasized the *report* and not the DoD *1010.10* guidance. In the end, the *report*, with the *1010.10* guidance playing only a secondary role, was the document that brought about the final unraveling of the enterprise’s tight grip on the soldier-cigarette bond.

The Army Executes the Dislodging Maneuver

Whether Weinberger recognized it or not may never be known, but his actions on March 10 and 11 set in motion a sequence of events that ensured the final demise of the soldier and the cigarette. After nearly a decade debating back and forth about the special soldier-cigarette relationship, the industry’s targeting of young soldiers, and the mounting costs of health care in America and a cigarette-smoking military, the Army shocked all involved with the release of their April 17, 1986, *US Army Tobacco Cessation Plan*.

The *1010.10* language was so weak it was open to interpretation in any number of ways by commanders responsible for implementation. However Weinberger’s report, with its guidance that “an intense anti-smoking campaign . . . become a major responsibility of all commanders . . . up to and including the highest levels of each

typed comments from lobbyist on page TI07791424.

³⁷ Sam Chilcote, memo to TI Executive Committee, “Cigarette Sales in Commissaries,” March 11, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/dir4fe007/pdf>.

Service,” proved almost binding.³⁸ Moreover, it was supported by nearly a hundred pages of evidence documenting the irrefutable dangers, both physically and fiscally, of soldier smokers, and these two elements, the binding order and the data, proved intensely problematic for an enterprise intent to keep Army soldiers smoking at the rate they had for decades.³⁹ For in the Army, an old adage governs all orders from higher commands: the subordinate commander can be *more restrictive*, but they cannot be less restrictive. In this case, the Army chose the former as opposed to the latter.

April 17, 1986, was the day the Army took matters into its own hands. Issuing its own supplement to the DoD 1010.10 directive, the Army’s *Tobacco Cessation Program*, in true Army fashion, was blunt, direct, and to the point. There was no mention of stress, calories, hypertension, workspace rights, or exercise programs. However the document had much to say about the vice of excessive cigarette smoking, a vice the Army now determined was neither conducive nor acceptable any longer in the military profession. Rather than establish committees or work groups, the Army established timelines, tasks, clear objectives, and offices of primary responsibility (OPR).

In cover letters that accompanied the Army’s guidance, the Army gave tobacco cessation the highest priority and the highest level of support, both of which were after all demanded by Weinberger in his DoD smoking report. Signed by the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the top brass stressed the fact that service in Army is a “profession unique in many respects,

³⁸ Casper Weinberger, memo to Jamie L. Whitten, March 10, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tid/nkvy0034>.

³⁹ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), “Department of Defense Report on Smoking and Health in the Military,” March 1986, 24, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kic36b00>.

requiring physical fitness and stamina to get the job done,” and that every member was charged with the responsibility to make the smoking cessation goal a reality. Lieutenant General Robert M. Elton, who was the OPR for the entire Army program, made the goal quite lucid, stating that the goal was “elimination of tobacco products usage in the Army.”⁴⁰ These were very strong words, especially considering the weak language in the DoD guidance.

In designing their cessation program, the Army took the tradition of assuming HHQ allowed more, rather than less restriction, to nearly its most extreme conclusion.⁴¹ The program included a set of milestones and OPRs, and a goal of meeting stated cessation objectives within five years. The overarching goal of the entire Army program was to achieve a level of smoking in the Army that, at minimum, matched the national goal of reducing smoking levels by 1990 to a point where only one in four Americans were still smoking. In order to flip digits and drop from the 52 to the 25 percent level, half the soldiers in the Army who smoked would have to quit smoking in the next four years. Moreover, at least half that entered the service during this time would have to quit as well, or not start. With plans to join the “Great American Smoke-out,” the Army’s “Great Army Smoke-out” was scheduled for November 1986.⁴²

⁴⁰ John O. Marsh Jr., and John A. Wichham Jr., “US Army Tobacco Cessation Program,” April 17, 1986, TIMN 371615, accessed January 31, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vyn40c00>; Robert M. Elton, letter, April 17, 1986, TIMN 371616, accessed January 31, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vyn40c00>.

⁴¹ The term “nearly” is used, because the *extreme* conclusion would have been to ban smoking in the Army effective immediately.

⁴² John O. Marsh Jr., and John A. Wichham Jr., “US Army Tobacco Cessation Program,” April 17, 1986, 4 and 7, accessed January 31, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vyn40c00>.

However the Army was not dragging its feet on this issue. Commanders were directed to boldly implement the Army smoking cessation plan by July 7, 1986, giving them just three months from the time the order was published to implement tobacco cessation. After this date, they were held accountable for their actions regarding the strong, clear guidance from the Army Chief of Staff. After outlining smoking and non-smoking space management issues in a similar manner to DoD *1010.10*, with the Army adding emphasis on secondhand smoke, the Army document takes it one step further and prescribes a punishment section for non-compliance. Punishment for violating the provisions of the Army cessation program included prosecution under the UCMJ, but not normally, unless the “smoking behavior clearly . . . involved either direct threat to safety or security, or evidences a willful disregard for the health and comfort of a non-smoker.”⁴³

With that, the official Army culture changed in an instant. From then on, if a soldier smoked a cigarette in a non-designated area and was asked to remove to a proper location, and if that soldier blew smoke in a hostile manner, they now had to prepare for UCMJ action and possible jail time. This is light years away from the smoke ‘em if you’ve got ‘em and field strip the area for butts culture that dominated the Army during the six previous decades. It would take years for the informal Army culture to change and even more years to officially end subsidized smokes for the soldiers and subsidized tobacco crops for the farmers. April 1986 was not the end of the state-sponsored

⁴³ John O. Marsh Jr., and John A. Wichham Jr., “US Army Tobacco Cessation Program,” April 17, 1986, Appendix “Controlling Smoking” TIMN 371625 and TIMN 371626, accessed January 18, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/vyn40c00>.

sanctioning of cigarette smoking in the Army; however it was the end of the Army's cultural sponsorship of the soldier and the cigarette.

When the Army ordered a change to the soldierly cult of smoking, obedience soon followed. To those in the enterprise who complained the Army's draconian policy on smoking was unenforceable and that it was "unimaginable the number of military policemen . . . required to enforce the regulation," one Congressional panel commented "when the Army wants to enforce anything, anything is enforceable."⁴⁴ In the end, when an organization such as the Army chooses to change the culture, either through issuing billions of cigarettes during WWI or snuffing cigarettes in 1986, the rest is simply history . . . and a matter of statistical accounting. To discover the veracity of this statement, simply review the numbers of cigarettes smoked by soldiers and Americans from 1918 to 1986 . . . and then light a cigarette at the Pentagon welcome center next time you visit.

⁴⁴ Irvin Molotsky, "Tobacco Trade Assails Army Smoking Curb," Special to the *New York Times* (June 13, 1986); C. Bergeson, memo "US Army Smoking Policy," June 13, 1986, accessed January 7, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/ymkk0087>. Regarding the Army's cessation plan and tough language regarding enforcement, the enterprise did not mix words as to the plan's potential to disrupt their strong positioning of cigarettes within the ranks. An RJR memo states the new Army policy "reverses the current practice of allowing smoking except where specifically prohibited; now the policy prohibits smoking except where specifically allowed. While the policy itself is sufficient cause for considerable alarm, the notion that the policy provides minimum standards and that local commanders can expand the policy is genuinely frightening. The newest sport at Army posts could be a contest to find out which commander can promulgate the most stringent anti-smoking regulations. I believe that the only way to reverse this policy is by political pressure. The Republican members from Tobaccoland must rise up in outrage about this policy."

CHAPTER XII

EPILOGUE

Casper Weinberger

A year after releasing DoD *1010.10* guidance, Weinberger decided to leave his post at Defense in order to properly care for his ailing wife. After nearly 40 years rotating as a federal and corporate executive and sparring with the cigarette enterprise, Weinberger bowed out of the cigarette war. Despite the criticism he received from anti-smoking Congressmen, and the laud he received from the enterprise over his weak *1010.10* guidance, it appears Weinberger had the last laugh after all. The guidance was so ambiguous, and was backed by such strong language in the DoD study that preceded it, that the door was left wide open for the Army to enact strong smoking cessation measures. The Army stepped through that door just one month after Weinberger's DoD report and follow-on guidance were released. This was a short lived victory for the enterprise in this case.

Though Weinberger left federal service, he did not leave the corporate service. In what can only be described as ironic, President Reagan appointed Weinberger to the National Economic Council, whose mission was to "look for ways to reduce the federal budget deficit," in 1988. The paradox of one of the federal government's most legendary spenders appointed to lead federal cost-cutting drills is an interesting selection to say the least. To credit Weinberger though, he stuck to his guns. His input to the committee was to slash taxes and spend even more on defense. He reasoned "substantial defense spending" was the best "social program" because it kept people alive and healthy (as opposed to nuked or invaded).

In another spate of irony, Weinberger, like Califano, was invited to the Waldorf-Astoria for a high-stakes power lunch in the fall of 1988. Instead of Iacocca telling Califano that he had authored much of the Chrysler health care problem and then inviting him to join his Chrysler board, this time it was billionaire Malcolm Forbes Sr., who had consistently criticized Weinberger in his magazine for Weinberger's budget-busting defense programs, inviting Weinberger to be *Forbes*'s new publisher. Weinberger was eventually named Chairman of Forbes.¹

Chapman B. Cox

Similar to Mayer, Cox left the Pentagon when Reagan left the White House and became the CEO of the USO and later the Senior Vice President of Lockheed Martin Information Management Systems.

Charles Bennett

As a debt-averse fiscal conservative, Bennett was a throwback to the Jeffersonian tradition in American political history. Bennett's 2003 obituary in the *Florida Times-Union* recounts his life of public service:

First and foremost, Bennett had integrity. In fact, a lot of people called him 'Mr. Clean'—a moniker that made him stand out during the scandal-plagued eras in which he served. He also tried his best to clean up Capitol Hill, sponsoring legislation that created the House Ethics Committee and serving as its first chairman. That didn't always endear him to his colleagues. The Almanac of American Politics 1980 reported, 'He opposes unofficial office accounts, outside income for members and congressional pay raises, which led one colleague to call him 'a bit too pious.' . . . Bennett made many personal sacrifices. He refused his paycheck during his early tenure on Capitol Hill, saying he had simple tastes, and often returned raises in later years. Excess campaign funds were donated to the National Park Service. Often, he would drive from Washington to Jacksonville, rather than flying, to save tax money . . . House records indicate he never missed a legislative roll call . . . When dealing with Bennett, it was difficult to become cynical about government . . . It was his legislation that put 'In God We Trust' on the nation's currency and coins, and he was always proud of that. Bennett personally triumphed over adversity, having contracted polio while overseas in the Army during WWII and spending his last 16 months of

¹ Weinberger, *In the Arena*, 377–380.

active duty in a hospital. Although slowed for the rest of his life, he didn't allow the affliction to ruin his career.²

Dan Daniels

After working hard to oppose limitations to soldiers' access to cigarettes during the 1984 to 1986 period, Daniels elevated his game in 1987. In order to prevent further DoD cigarette pricing activism, Daniels worked with the TI to quietly pass an obscure amendment that essentially forbade the DoD from adjusting cigarette prices or availability without the express consent of Congress. With strong tobacco state representation on the House Armed Services Committee, this measure worked for a time to halt efforts to end cigarette subsidies. Daniels also chose to directly take a stand against further activism by the Services. Falling in line with the Helms-Kornegay carnival of rhetoric, when Strategic Air Command's General John Chain instituted smoking restrictions even more aggressive than the Army 1986 cessation plan, Daniel was quick to fire back. In December 1987, Daniel sent Chain a letter where he accused him of using "fascist tactics." Daniel also bristled at Chain's apparent determination to:

impose the current fad of 'wellness' on this group of individuals who have volunteered to serve their country despite the fact that those who served before them managed to do so without excessive nannyism . . . it is frightening as we observe the 200th Anniversary of our Constitution that a denial of freedom by a branch of our Armed Services is permitted.³

With this statement, Daniel joined a host of tobaccoland politicians who became very comfortable applying industry strategy developed in the 1970s calling for a unification of

² "Charles E. Bennett: A Noble Life," *The Florida Times-Union*, September 9, 2003, accessed October 31, 2014, http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/090903/opi_13479868.shtml.

³ Dan Daniel, letter to John Chain, December 4, 1987, accessed January 31, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ctw88b00>. In fairness to Daniel, Chain's anti-smoking policy was rather intrusive. It required commanders to provide a monthly report with ranks and names of all smokers under their command, which sent the message, whether intended or not, that smoking cigarettes was not conducive to selection for advanced ranks at Strategic Air Command.

issues related to smokers' rights, freedom, patriotism, veterans' benefits, and Red State politics.

Dr. C. Everett Koop

After the Army issued their *Smoking Cessation Plan*, a plan that was much stronger than Weinberger's guidance, during Senate testimony Dr. Koop later referred to the Army's plan as "a courageous stand." Koop later released his "landmark" 1986 Surgeon General Report which was the first government report to link second hand smoke to lung cancer.⁴

Dr. William A. Mayer

Mayer left the Pentagon in 1989 when President Reagan left the White House.

Horace Kornegay

After two decades at the Tobacco Institute providing some of the most vociferous, memorable, and divisive quotes of the entire cigarette struggle, Kornegay retired as the TI's chairman in 1986, quietly quit smoking, and returned to private law practice.

Jeff Bingaman (D-OK)

Bingaman tried to introduce an amendment to the FY87 Defense Authorization Act, similar to the Stevens-Boren legislation the previous year. In a floor debate he argued "what sort of signal is sent to a service member . . . if on one hand he is told not to smoke and on the other hand, he is encouraged to smoke through DoD pricing." Further, he added that his amendment was not an erosion of benefits, unless "a lifetime of poor health and premature death be regarded as a benefit" or "unless lung cancer and heart

⁴ Irvin Molotsky, "Tobacco Trade Assails Army Smoking Curb," *New York Times*, June 13, 1986; Mark Schoifet, "C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General Who Took on Tobacco, Dies at 96," *Bloomberg* (February 25, 2013), accessed January 18, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-25/c-everett-koop-surgeon-general-who-took-on-tobacco-dies-at-96.html>.

disease are benefits.” Further, Bingaman advanced the idea that soldiers “should pay the same for these products as the civilian citizens of this country have to pay.” He further questioned the notion that soldier are recruited, retained, and motivated to serve based on cheap access to cigarettes.

Bingaman’s amendment was met with sharp objection from tobacco land politicians. Most notably, Senator Ford from Kentucky who said such tinkering with cigarette pricing and availability was “social engineering” that would force soldiers to buy *unhealthy*, unregulated cigarettes off-post. Ford accessed the recruitment and sustainment argument with his assertion that before soldiers “count the cost of service” they consider commissary benefits . . . “shopping and saving” are rights guaranteed to the uniformed service member. Senator Mitch McConnell from Kentucky joined in with his contention that soldiers might miss out on “high-quality American cigarettes” if such legislation was allowed to pass. With strong opposition registered from the powerful tobacco coalition, the Bingaman Amendment was tabled in similar fashion to the Boren-Stevens Amendment the previous year and additional studies on cigarette pricing were ordered.⁵

Jesse Helms

Helms was a powerful force in the Senate for 30 years. If he was anything, he was consistent. Be it tobacco, defense spending, or his scorn of welfare, Helms remained true to his conservative, North Carolina roots. In many ways, he is an archetype of the Jacksonian tradition in American politics: strong on defense, quick to a fight, fond of a

⁵ 99 Cong. Rec. S10529. August 5–6, 1986. Accessed January 28, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/eld92b00>.

hammer-and-nail foreign policy orientation, averse to free rides, and accepting of vice, to some degree or another.⁶

Joseph A. Califano

At the same time Weinberger released his *DoD 1010.10 Health Promotion* guidance in 1986, Califano published his book *America's Health Care Revolution: Who Lives? Who Dies? Who Pays?* In the end, Weinberger and Califano's 1986 releases were works of solidarity because both were oriented in preventative health care as physically and fiscally prudent. Further, both point out the dangers and costs of excessive cigarette smoking. In another irony, Califano cites RJR in his book as a prime exemplar of a company that was taking giant strides toward controlling health care costs. Reynolds was cited a leader in providing in-house medical and dental on site for their employees and emphasizing preventative health care in all areas but *one*. Of this one area, Califano commented, "Just think what RJR could achieve if they mounted a campaign to get its employees to quit smoking!"⁷

Lt Gen Edgar Chavarrie

General Chavarrie retired from the USAF in September 1986. The Tobacco Institute provided Chavarrie with a lavish retirement ceremony through their PR firm Flieshman-Hillard. Ironically, guests listed at this reception included Weinberger, Mayer, and Cox. Chavarrie later formed a lobbying firm with noted Congressional staffer and

⁶ For more on the Jacksonian tradition, see Walter Russell Meade, "The Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Diplomacy," *The National Interest* (Winter 1999/2000), 5–29.

⁷ Joseph Califano, *America's Health Care Revolution: Who Lives? Who Dies? Who Pays?* (New York: Random House, 1986), 32.

enterprise lobbyist Will Cofer, and he worked on the enterprise's Project Breakthrough Campaign, which was a formal effort to link smoking, soldiering, veterans, and freedom.⁸

Peyton March

March continued as the Army Chief of Staff until 1921 when he retired. He lived a long life and died in 1955, possibly never realizing the part he played in linking the soldier to the cigarette. Interestingly, March Air Force Base in California was not named for General Peyton March, but for his son, Peyton March Jr., who died in a plane crash while training for service with the Army Air Corps in WWI.

Sam Chilcote

Chilcote was president of the Tobacco Institute from 1981 to 1987. Once the Army cessation plan became a reality in July 1986, Chilcote drafted a plan of action involving a multi-front offensive for the enterprise to fight back. On the international front, he called the Army plan dangerous, as it would encourage foreign armies to implement smoking cessation. On the domestic, he suggested a focused effort to recruit scholars to write about the historic link between tobacco and national defense. On the science front, he suggested articles that express the importance of cigarettes to soldiers'

⁸ Paul Johnson, memo to Fred Panzer, "Chavarrie Reception," September 12, 1986, accessed January 8, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/jpjy0034>. Fred Panzer was the Vice President of the TI and the lead planner on the Chavarrie retirement party. See also Phillip Morris, "Plan of Action," December 1986, accessed January 18, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/qynn0122>; Karil L. Kochenderfer, memo to Rita Walters, September 30, 1986, accessed January 8, 2015, <http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/krhj0043>; T.C. Griscom, memo to R.C. Gaillard, "Project Breakthrough," March 24, 1994, accessed January 18, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ofz63d00>.

overall psychological health. However he does comment, “Actual science does not seem to me to be very important in this aspect of the overall tobacco issue.”⁹

Regarding the Congressional front, Chilcote suggested the enterprise leverage the fact that “Congressman of vast seniority (Mendel Rivers, Rayburn, Byrd, John McClellan, and two score more) dipped deeply in the barrel of pork to load their states with eternally flowing defense dollars. Most of the instillations happen to be where most tobacco is grown.”¹⁰ Therefore, he suggested an intense lobbying campaign to influence what he saw as pliable legislators bound to and wrapped up in the modern economic arrangements that form the heart of America’s modern political-economy.

Finally, on the soldier front, Chilcote suggested the enterprise retain a cartoonist to develop a stable of sketches to poke fun at the whole Army cessation campaign. He recommended slogans and quips such as, “The Soviet development of a new weapon—a parachute bomb which releases cartons of cigarettes behind the lines” or “Who ever heard of an army without tobacco?” or “The beer goes next” or “Toward a defenseless society by the year 2000” or “Disarmament at Geneva gets a new twist . . . two more ICBM’s (allowed) per 50,000 soldiers deprived of cigarettes.”¹¹ Chilcote remained President of the Tobacco Institute until 1997.

⁹ Sam Chilcote, memo to Martin R. Haley, “The Army Anti-Smoking Order,” July 11, 1986, TI10790543–TI10790549.

¹⁰ Chilcote, “The Army Anti-Smoking Order,” TI10790548.

¹¹ Chilcote, “The Army Anti-Smoking Order,” TI10790543–TI10790549; SourceWatch, “Samuel D. Chilcote Jr.,” accessed January 7, 2015, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Samuel_D._Chilcote,_Jr.

Tobacco Institute response to Army's 1986 smoking cessation guidance

The official TI response to the Army's smoking cessation directive and the DoD's flirting with cigarette price adjustments are found in sample statements from TI point papers developed in April and May 1986. One said:

The attitude which this will convey to the serviceman, the potential recruit, and the public is that "Army brass" in their infinite wisdom have decided that they are going to see to it that Army personnel do what they think is good for them, because the "brass" do not believe that Army personnel have the capability to make proper personal decisions on their own. It is obvious that this perception will have a significant adverse effect upon recruitment and retention and that it will adversely affect Army morale.¹²

The TI commissioned the marketing firm Savarese and Associates to present data linking the commissary and soldiers' rights issues in May 1986. This report argued that adjusting prices upwards is a "breach of contract" between the soldier and the conditions under which they enlisted and is essentially an "arbitrary pay cut." The reasoning stated that any "reduction of any element of the total compensation package represents a breach of this implicit contract."¹³

Further, the report argued there is a working class discrimination element to the cessation and price adjustment proposals. Savarese argued that blue collar laborers, enlisted soldiers, and low-income workers have high smoking prevalence both in and out of uniform. Joining the military is not an inducement to smoke; they already smoke. So if the Army increases the price of cigarettes, it is only punishing the blue collar backbone of the Army and the American workforce—the enlisted soldier and the blue collar worker.¹⁴

¹² Tobacco Institute, "Discussion Paper: Tobacco Cessation Program US Army," (Apr. 17, 1986), accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zrd40c00>.

¹³ James Savarese and Associates, Inc., "Economic Impact of Proposal to Raise Cigarette Prices in Military Commissaries" (April 1986) accessed February 1, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/isz76b00>.

¹⁴ Savarese and Associates, Inc., "Economic Impact of Proposal to Raise Cigarette Prices in Military Commissaries."

All these points regarding soldiers' smoking rights and the commissary benefit became a major element of the enterprise's strategy between 1986 and 2001 as it continued to fight cessation programs and the reduction in cigarette subsidies.

Tobaccoland's Congressional response to Army's smoking cessation guidance

In a letter to Weinberger's replacement Les Aspin, Walter B. Jones, Congressman from North Carolina and Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, commented on behalf of a group of concerned Congressmen, all from North Carolina, said:

We have serious concerns that the army's "game plan" exceeds the parameters established by the DoD directive (1010.10) and that the stated objective is not supported by conclusive scientific evidence. We are unaware of any conclusive study . . . which substantiates the Army's declaration that use of tobacco products impairs "critical military skills."¹⁵

The document further claims that Weinberger and the Army took their abrupt action without considering the long term impact on "recruitment, retention, and morale."

Finally, Jones described smoking cessation plans in the Army not as a "health initiative" but an attempt "to mandate certain personal habits of not only active duty personnel, but civilian employees, retirees, and their families." In essence, Jones called the Army's program social engineering, a bumper sticker slogan used extensively by the enterprise for the remainder of the twentieth century. The members of Congress who signed this remonstrance to Secretary Aspin include Charles O. Whitley (NC), W.G. "Bill" Hefner (NC), Stephen L. Neal (NC), Tim Valentine (NC), James T. Broyhill, William M. Hendon (NC), Howard Coble (NC), J. Alex McMillan (NC), and William M. Cobey, Jr. (NC).¹⁶

¹⁵ Walter Jones, memo to Les Aspin, July 11, 1986, accessed January 15, 2015, <http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/rbg36b00>.

¹⁶ Jones, memo to Les Aspin.

And finally . . . Military Smoking Rates post-1986

The 1986 Army Smoking Cessation program forever changed the military smoking culture; however it did not change the state sponsorship of cigarette subsidies for uniformed personnel. The enterprise was able to hold the line against several more attempts to amend defense appropriations bills throughout the 1990s to remove funding that supported cut-rate cigarettes in the military resale system. Nearly four decades after the 1964 Surgeon General's Report, fiscally conservative Congressmen were finally able to remove military cigarette subsidies in 2001.¹⁷

Since 1986, cigarette smoking among the ranks has slowly dwindled to the point where soldiers smoke at about the rate of civilians. If one goes on a military installation today, he or she would be hard pressed to find a single uniformed officer smoking a cigarette. If you find any smokers at all, they would likely only be a few diehard junior to mid-grade enlisted huddled around a tree or a can far from buildings.¹⁸ For example, on a recent trip to Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, the author observed a smoking area fifty meters from the main buildings of the Air University Campus over a several day period. The smoking gaggle over this period was comprised of a large group of foreign military officers who were chain smoking one after the other—no Americans anywhere.

On a personal note, the starker example of this tobacco-free cultural phenomenon that has invaded the military since 1986 came when I took my recent military physical.

¹⁷ Elizabeth A. Smith, Virginia S. Blackman, and Ruth E Malone, "Death at a discount: how the tobacco industry thwarted tobacco control policies in US military commissaries," *Tobacco Control*, 16, no. 1 (2007).

¹⁸ However, from personal experience, it must be noted that smoking rates among military officers and enlisted deployed to combat zones such as Iraq or Afghanistan increase dramatically. Whether *combat* in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Operation Iraqi Freedom, or Operation Enduring Freedom, or far-flung battle fields in-between, when it comes to the soldier and the cigarette (or pipe, or cigarillo, or cigar), some things never change.

Out of curiosity, I selected “yes” to the question, “have you smoked more than 20 cigarettes in your entire lifetime.” With my “yes” selection registered, all manner of chaos occurred as the questionnaire directed me to a host of other diagnostics, referrals, further tests, and cessation programs that I would have to step through in order to complete the exam. Then, with bravado that Jesse Helms and Dan Daniel surely would have labeled social engineering, the survey finished by asking, “When do you plan to quit smoking?”

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