



Australian War Memorial

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Part: 2

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AWM -54 |

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL
ACCESS STATUS

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WAR OF 1939-45

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A.H.Q.

Class. No. 1010/4/4

In. and [Part 2]

A.W.M. File 417/11/17

53
15-11-45

Statement by —:

NX12595 Lieutenant-Colonel - G.D.W. Anderson.

On this Twentythird day of January One thousand nine hundred and forty-seven Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of "Fernhill", Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows :-

I was a member of the Australian Military Forces in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12595, rank Lt-Col, and Unit 2/19 Bn.

- (a) Q. Was Col. Anderson in any of the following Burma Prisoner of War Camps: 95 Km, 105 Km, 122 Km, 131 Km, 14 Km, 26 Km, and particularly 80 Km (Aparon)?
- A. Yes I was in all these Camps, 14 Km, 26 Km, 95, Km, 105 Km, 122 Km, 80 Km, 131 Km.
- (b) Q. Was Sgt Shimojo on the Japanese Staff of any of these Camps, if so, outline his duties.
- A. Yes, Sgt Shimojo was on the Japanese Staff in all these Camps, either as assistant camp commander, or in the absence of his officer, acting camp commander. Included in his duties was the discipline of POW's, detailing of working parties, and control of junior Japanese staff. Most of the Liasion work between myself and the I.J.A. was done through Sgt Shimojo during this period.
- (c) Q. Was he responsible for the beatings or ill treatment of any Prisoners of War in these Camps?
- A. During this period I do not recall Sgt Shimojo ever personally striking a POW, but he failed to sufficiently restrain his Korean guards from so doing in spite of numerous protests.
- (d) Q. Did he force sick Prisoners of War to work?
- A. I recall at 80 Km (Aparon) Sgt Shimojo going through a parade of PW's marked by our Doctor as N.D., and detailing men for work, but I believe he was carrying out his orders. During the whole of the period April 1943 to December 1943 the peak period of the Railway construction sick PW's were forced out to work in the camps mentioned in Answer (a)

Charles Groves Wright Anderson *Sgt Shimojo* *[Signature]*

(e) Q. What was SHIMOJO's general attitude towards prisoners of war?

A. Sgt SHIMOJO was always courteous to me personally, and although extremely strict in his camp discipline always allowed me to voice and write strongly worded ~~as~~ protests for forwarding to higher authority. I feel that he could have done more to restrain his Korean guards for unnecessary brutality and save the lives of PW's by more consideration and care in the movements that Williams force and Anderson's force (No.1 Mobile Camp) in the gruelling task that we were subjected to in laying the line from Burma to the junction with the rail gangs from Siam. I do know that Sgt SHIMOJO was extremely severe to Williams force when they were separated from my force for a short time, and that he personally forced out many sick to work. He had a personal animosity towards Lt-Col Williams.

(f) Q. Has Col. Anderson any recollection of Lt-Col Williams being rescued by Sgt SHIMOJO when a Korean guard threatened his life in October 1943? If so, please outline the circumstances.

A. I recall an incident in which Lt-Col Williams fell foul of a Korean guard, and the situation was very tense and threatening, I recall that as a result of my representations to Sgt SHIMOJO he took action and stopped the incident. He was camp commander at the time, and had just arrived at the new camp. The Korean guards were allowed too much licence, vide my answer to question (e)


(g) Q. Is Col Anderson able to testify as to the good character of SHIMOJO?

A. Sgt SHIMOJO had rather a grandiose complex, a strict disciplinarian. I formed the opinion he was a good soldier. I do not think he had any personal animosity to POW's except the last six months of the war in the Officers' Camp. His discipline amounted to extreme ~~harshness~~ ^{harshness} creating almost a reign of terror. This was the only period I ever saw him strike a POW (only Officers). He was always courteous to me, and my interpreter Capt. Drower and my staff, but I feel that Sgt SHIMOJO is a man that would carry out his orders, and how far the strictures I mention in this Affidavit were in the execution of those orders I cannot say.

SWORN by the abovenamed Deponent)
Charles Groves Wright Anderson)
at YOUNG on the Twentythird day)
of January One thousand nine)
hundred and forty-seven.)



BEFORE ME



A Justice of the Peace.

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Charles Groves Wright Anderson

W. J. ...

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Blair

Post Blair

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Blair

SWORN by the abovesaid Deponent)
Charles Groves Wright Anderson)
at YOUNG on the Twentythird day)
of January One thousand nine)
hundred and forty-seven.)

Chas. G. Wright Anderson

BEFORE ME

W. H. Stoughton, Jr.

A Justice of the Peace.

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To be copied

SECRET
E.Gp/Int/Q. 4579

Done 10/4/81
1046

FORM 'Q'

File C5/25

WAR CRIMES

Information supplied by ex-Prisoners of War

81

Number Nx 12595 Name ANDERSON
(In Block Letters)

Rank Lieut Colonel Initials C. G. W.

Unit/Ship 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.

Home Address "Fernhill" Growther - N.S.W.

Date and place of Capture Singapore 15 Feb. '42.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY

1. You are requested to set out, in accordance with the directions below, such knowledge as you may have on the subject of War Crimes. By doing so you may be the means of establishing the identity of persons who have committed offences against Prisoners of War and others, and the particulars you are able to give may be an important contribution towards their subsequent trial and punishment.

Therefore it is important that you should give your detailed information with the greatest possible care and accuracy in the columns provided overleaf.

2. War Crimes can be divided into two classes of offence :-

(a) Criminal Acts in Transit or in Camp.

Examples are :- shooting and killing without justification, shooting and killing on the false pretence that the prisoner was escaping, assault with violence causing death, and other forms of murder or manslaughter; shooting, wounding with bayonet, beating, torture, unjustified violence, and other forms of ill-treatment causing the infliction of grievous bodily harm; theft of money and goods.

Under this head give in the columns overleaf the most exact information you have as to any such case. State, if you can, the names of those who committed the offence, as well as the names of any other enemy personnel such as Camp Commandant, Superior Officers or N. C. O's, who may in some degree be responsible. If possible, give also the names and full particulars of any other witnesses of the offence.

(b) Violations of the Geneva Convention and of the rules of warfare, whether in Transit or in Camp.

Examples are :- unjustified imprisonment; insufficient food, water and clothing; lack of medical attention; bad treatment in hospitals; unhealthy conditions in Camp; employment on work having direct connection with the operations of the war, or on unhealthy or dangerous work; being detained in an area exposed to the fire of the fighting zone; being used as a screen, and such cases as attacks on hospitals or hospital ships, and on merchant ships without making provision for survivors; interrogation by third degree or other forcible methods.

Under this head, give brief particulars, with places and dates in the columns provided overleaf.

3. The above examples are only given as a general guide, and if you have knowledge of different kinds of war crimes committed (not necessarily against P's/W only) you are requested to give similar particulars of them.

Date, Camp or Place	Particulars of the Criminal Act or Violation	Names where known, description, rank, appointment, unit, etc., of enemy personnel concerned and any other detail to fix their identity	Names of other witnesses
<p>June 13 - 1945 Mt. White Camp Burma</p>	<p>This officer was camp commandant, Mt. White Camp Burma. The camp was located on a large hillside. He was seen to have been in the camp since the large number of prisoners, though his negligence in large number of prisoners were left unwatched by guards although many reports were made, the commandant failed to investigate the matter. He had no adequate supplies and the prisoners had no medical facilities.</p>	<p>Lieut. Matsuzaki, member of J.A.P.C.W. Battalion Thailand camp Chayachit & Prasit, his transferred to 3rd Battalion</p>	<p>W. Col. Anderson 419 Bn A.I. Capt. W. K. Brown Capt. J. A. L. Shaw A.I.</p>

C. G. Anderson

RECEIVED
 10 JUN 1945

Date, Camp or Place	Particulars of the Criminal Act or Violation	Names where known, description, rank, appointment, unit, etc., of enemy personnel concerned and any other detail to fix their identity	Names of other witnesses

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"BULL" CS9

CS19
SECRET
E.Gp/Int/Q..... 108

Australian

FORM 'Q'
WAR CRIMES

Information supplied by ex-Prisoners of War

Number Nx 12595 Name ANDERSON
(In Block Letters)

Rank Lieut Colonel Initials L. G. W.

Unit/Ship 2/19 Bn. A.I.F.

Home Address "Munhill" Snowden - N.S.W.

Date and place of Capture Singapore 15 Feb '42

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(b) *Violations of the Geneva Convention and of the rules of warfare, whether in Transit or in Camp.*

Examples are:—unjustified imprisonment; insufficient food, water and clothing; lack of medical attention; bad treatment in hospitals; unhealthy conditions in Camp; employment on work having direct connection with the operations of the war, or on unhealthy or dangerous work; being detained in an area exposed to the fire of the fighting zone; being used as a screen, and such cases as attacks on hospitals or hospital ships, and on merchant ships without making provision for survivors; interrogation by third degree or other forcible methods.

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<p>June 13 - Dec 13 No. 1 Mobile Camp Bismarck</p>	<p>Probably the worst hospital to receive ground wounded by J.P.A. P.O. at all times. No day passed unless some unfortunate P.O. was wounded by the enemy. The hospital was a real unbalanced place. The Bull. Not to be compared with any other hospital.</p>	<p>Korean Guard ARAI. Gun soldier. Major 13 Branch, one time returned to 1st Col. Nagasaki at Bismarck, Bismarck Branch. He was the same man who was the "The Bull". Not to be compared with any other "The Bull".</p>	<p>1st Col. Anderson 694 Capt. W. H. L. Hower</p>

[Handwritten signature]

ARMY OFFICER

1st Lt. HOWER

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On this ~~thirtieth~~ ^{Second} day of ~~August~~ ^{September} One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of "Fernhill", Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows :-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12595, rank Lt-Col, and Unit 2/19 Bn.

- (a) Q. What was the attitude of Lt-Col Nagatomo who was the commander of the 3rd Branch POW camp in Siam towards the POWs in general?
 - A. Lt-Col Y.Nagatomo was one of the very few Japanese senior officers who received petitions from POWs with a modicum of courtesy. I formed the opinion that though not openly hostile towards POWs he should have been able to improve conditions for POWs. Many of the petitions, requests, and suggestions made by Senior POW Officers for the betterment and treatment of POWs were within the framework of his administration without the necessity of his reference to higher authority, and his failure to implement these can only be attributable to indifference or neglect.
- (b) Q. Did he inspect the different work camps once or several times each month with Brig.A.I.Varley, Lt-Col T.Hamilton, and Maj.C.F.Hauzenberg?
 - A. Yes, he visited some camps at irregular intervals of one month or six weeks accompanied by Brig.A.I.Varley, Lt-Col Hamilton, and Maj.Hauzenberg.
- (c) Q. Did he give orders to Brig.Varley to present a report on the inspection at each time?
 - A. Yes, as far as I can recollect Brig.Varley told me he submitted a report after visits.
- (d) Q. If so, what was the reason that he took Brig.Varley on his inspection trips, and made Brigadier present written report each time?
 - A. I cannot give any reason, as I personally could not trace any benefit to the Mobile Camp I commanded due to his visits. On one occasion Brig.Varley told me that he believed Lt-Col Nagatomo had requested that my camp be rested from the arduous task of line laying, and had been refused by the Railway Engineers Unit.

Walter Wood G.P.

Chas Anderson

- (e) Q. Did he give any limitations POWs on presenting protests, complaints or petitions or heard them willingly?
- A. As far as I am aware he made no limitations. If they went through Brig. Varley, the Brigadier told me that he always got a hearing, but I submitted many petitions through his subordinate camp commanders that came to nothing.
- (f) Q. How did he treat those complaints, protests and petitions when they were presented to him? Did he give answers or explanations to them each time?
- A. To my personal knowledge only a few of the many complaints were rectified. See my answer to Question (a)
- (g) Q. Did he make any endeavour to improve the treatment of POWs?
- A. If he made any endeavours they were of no avail as conditions deteriorated progressively until the line was built, and a large proportion of POWs were moved to Siam.
- (h) Q. If so, what did he do?
- A. See my previous answer.
- (i) Q. What was the result of his efforts to bring about a n improvement of the treatment of POWs?
- A. Lt-Col Nagatomo commanded 3 Branch from about Aug. 1942 to Dec. 1943, the period of the greatest casualties, and for the last 7 months the worst treatment of our POWs, and from memory our heaviest death roll being in the last three months of his command.
- (j) Q. If these did not bear any fruit, what would be the reasons for such?
- A. The reasons I feel are due to failure of his own administration and probably his orders from higher authority.
- (k) Q. Where did he get the medical supplies for the POWs, and could he get any supplies enough for the POWs from any source outside?
- A. I don't know, but sufficient representations were made to him regarding shortage and requirements.
- (l) Q. Did he have sufficient supplies of food and clothes within his power, or had he to obtain such supplies from outside?
- A. Same answer as for (k)
- (m) Q. Did he ever beat any POW himself or give orders to beat POWs?
- A. I have never heard of a single instance.
- (n) Q. Did he give orders prohibiting to beat POWs and sending sick POWs to work?
- A. I believe he issued orders that POWs were NOT to be beaten, or sick sent to work.
- (o) Q. Was he earnest in his duty?
- A. I suppose by Japanese standards he was.
- (p) Q. Was the POWs afraid of him?
- A. I don't think POWs had any particular fear of Lt-Col Nagatomo.

Walter Wood J.P.

Walter Wood

(q) Q. Were the Japanese and Korean guards afraid to have the matters within the camp reported to Lt-Col Nagatomo?

A. Yes, but for a POW to report a Japanese or Korean was no easy matter, and one took a grave risk when reporting an officer or N.C.O.

(r) Q. Did he have any idea of ill treating POWs?

A. It would be impossible for Lt-Col Nagatomo not to be aware of the shocking ill treatment of POWs under his administration.

(s) Q. What was the good qualities of his character (in comparison to that of Maj. Mizutani?)

A. I only met Maj. Mizutani on two brief occasions, and most of my knowledge of him is by hearsay. The only good qualities of Lt-Col Nagatomo was that he was more courteous to POWs than other Japanese officers.

(t) Q. Was Lieut. Matsuzaki who was the commander of the First Mobile Camp of the Third Branch, suffering from piles, and difficulties in walking? And did he not stay in hospital for a long period on account of the operation on the same?

A. I was not aware that Lt Matsuzaki suffered from piles. He was away for a time, but I made innumerable complaints and protests to Lt Matsuzaki in the strongest terms personally and in writing about ill-treatment, bashings, overwork, working of sick, with no results.

(u) Q. And during his absence from the camp, did not Sgt. Shimojo, assistant commander take charge for Matsuzaki?

A. Sgt Shimojo commanded in Lt Matsuzaki's absence.

(v) Q. Had the 1st Mobile Camp to move very frequently that the POWs of the camp were specially tired out?

A. Yes. But with the minimum of thought and consideration, unnecessary and callous hardships could have been eliminated. All orders for moves from camp to camp were marked by indifference to human suffering and criminal negligence.

WMA
SWORN by the abovenamed Deponent)
Charles Groves Wright Anderson)
at CROWTHER on the ~~thirty-first~~)
day of ~~August~~ ^{September})
one thousand nine)
hundred and forty-six.)

BEFORE ME

Martin Wood
J.P.

A Justice of the Peace.

On this *second* day of *September* one thousand nine hundred and forty-six, Charles Groves Wright Anderson of Fernhill, Crowther in the state of New South Wales, grazier, makes oath, says as follows:-

1. AS NX12595 Lt-Col. C.G.W. Anderson of 2/19 Bn I. was taken PW at Singapore on 15 Feb 1942. Later I was moved to 18 Kolo Camp.

MMWA
tried to escape
MMWA

2. *Elkenny* I recall an incident of the 26th Dec 1942. At about 9 in the ~~afternoon~~ I was told that QX13768 Sgt. O'Donnell had ~~suffered~~ *injury in an accident*. I was taken out to the scene of the happening. I saw a wound, high up in the chest slightly on left side in front. The exit to the wound was in the back lower down on the right side, a very large hole of exit. The shot was fired from a height, from a bank about 8' high. The bullet entered the body from the front. The position of the bullet entering the front indicated that Sgt. O'Donnell was not making an attempt to escape, the undergrowth was very heavy so it must have been fired from a very close range as the jungle was very thick. ~~That~~ O'Donnell apparently dropped immediately there was no disturbance on the ground where he fell, indicating that there was no movement, meaning that the shot killed the man instantly. There were still more bullet wounds, one in the jaw after death which came out on the back of the base of the skull shattering brain matter over the ground. The second wound entered under the chin and came out near the top of the skull also shattering brain matter over the surrounding grounds. There were powder marks on the wounds where the bullets penetrated, indicating they had been fired at very close range. In the immediate vicinity of the exits of wounds there were clear indications of brain matter and blood on the ground which showed that the body had not moved. The first wound in my opinion caused instant death, the other two were fired after death. The ground was fairly moist and it was very simple to read the signs of what took place.

MMWA

SWORN by the abovenamed deponent, Charles Groves Wright Anderson, at Sydney, this *26th* day of *September* One thousand nine hundred and forty-six.

BEFORE ME. *Walter Wood J.*
A Justice of the Peace

Chas. Anderson





AUSTRALIAN WAR CRIMES

BOARD OF INQUIRY

CHARLES GROVES WRIGHT ANDERSON, sworn and examined:

I am NX12595 Lt Col Charles Groves Wright Anderson, G.C. 2/19 Aust Inf Bn.

I became a prisoner of war at Singapore on 15 February 1942

During the fighting prior to the fall of Singapore I did not witness anything in the nature of a war crime or atrocity. I did however, hear of the massacre of wounded at Parit Sulong.

We were fighting at Bakri and Parit Sulong between 18 January and 22 January, and I had Intelligence reports that the Japanese unit we were fighting was the Japanese First Guards Division. I have no knowledge from my own observations or inquiries as to the Japanese unit we were fighting.

I and the troops under my command were surrounded. We suffered severe casualties and it became necessary to withdraw. It was impossible to get the severely wounded away. We had to leave them there. They were dispersed in trucks and huts within the Parit Sulong perimeter. At one stage we were being heavily shelled there.

I remained at that position on for about half an hour after the last of my troops had withdrawn. The withdrawal took place over a period of about 25 minutes and companies were moving out at five-minute intervals. The last company, I believe, was timed to withdraw at half past 9. That company moved out at that time and I remained there with five other officers for some time. At that stage the battle had died down. We were not returning Japanese fire. Artillery fire had ceased. The Japanese were doing some firing at our troops who were withdrawing, but there was no fire from our side.

The Japanese must have seen the withdrawal of our troops. Up to the time I left the position the Japanese had not overrun the position. I left there between 100 and 200 white wounded and about 150 Indian wounded. I have not seen a man of those whom I knew were left there. I have since heard that the Japanese came in and massacred those wounded. I heard that from Capt Lloyd Cahill, my regimental M.O., but he did not witness it. The only official survivor to my knowledge is Lieut Hackney.

There is no question to my mind that the Japanese were aware of the withdrawal, because all the heavy artillery had been hard hit and were content to let us go. All the wounded we could not take were left in the ambulances, of which we had two. Some were in Army trucks; others were in huts.

I eventually made my way to Singapore with my troops and ultimately I went with "A" Force to Burma. The Force was under the command of Brigadier Varley and I was his second-in-command. The Force was divided into three groups - three battalions - one of which disembarked at Victoria Point, one at Mergui and the Headquarters at Tavoy. The party which landed at Victoria Point was under Major Green, 2/4 Machine Gun Battalion. Lt Col Ramsey, 2/18 Battalion, was in command of the group which landed at Mergui and I was at Tavoy with Brigadier Varley.

The force moved in four ships, of which we occupied two. There were 2,000 on the Toyashi Maru and 1,000 on the Celebes Maru. Conditions were frightfully overcrowded. The men were down in the holds. On the Toyashi Maru we got two small helpings of rice a day and a tin of meat and vegetables - one - man tins - had to be divided between each 60 men. We were 14 days on that ship.

The crowded conditions, lack of drugs etc. led to a severe outbreak of dysentery, which later caused about 20 deaths in Tavoy and a few deaths at the other two points of disembarkation. There were no deaths on the voyage. Those deaths at Tavoy were undoubtedly due to the conditions on the ships.

We left on 14 May 1942 and arrived at Tavoy 14 days later on 28 May 1942.

Two or three days after our arrival, despite warnings to other ranks, eight men of 4 Anti-Tank Regiment escaped. Escape was very easy. However, they had no plans and no arms and were quickly recaptured. Brig Varley heard that they had been tried and eight graves were dug. We made very strong protests to Lieut Schina, the Company Commander controlling prisoners-of-war, but with no result. Brig Varley took very aggressive action with him and he decided not to take full responsibility and went to see Maj Itai with Brig Varley who directed that the men be executed.

Although the men were tried in a sort of way, they were not represented; we had no talk with them and were refused admission to see them. Padre Bashford asked permission to see the men before they were executed but this, too, was denied.

I was waiting at the headquarters of the armed guard when a party moved past me into the area where the execution was to take place. The men to be executed were taken to the scene in trucks. On arrival, they were blindfolded, their hands were tied behind them, and they were taken into the position where they were to be executed, opposite the graves. Two shots were then fired into each of them at very close range. Brig Varley was present at the execution, and so was Padre Bashford. As far as possible, the execution was decently carried out; the men were killed instantly. The senior of the men executed was W.O. Quittendon. The story of the execution was told me by Brig Varley immediately after it had occurred. If there had been any representation of the men at their trial, I should have heard about it. Maj. Itai is the man whom I hold responsible for the execution and it was his name that was given to men as being the man who ordered the shooting. These executions took place in the first week of June 1942 and were the only ones I know of which took place in Tavoy.

I subsequently proceeded with Brig Varley to Thambazait, where Brig Varley became the Allied Commander of No 3 Branch on the Thailand-Burma railway. We were joined by a party of Dutch and another party of Americans. There were several executions of Dutch and three Australians there. One of these Australians was Bell, who escaped with Capt Mull, was badly wounded in the escape and brought back and executed. Padre Bashford interviewed him before he died. Another of the Australians executed was Whittaker of the AASC. About eight or nine Dutch were also executed, but I do not know their names. I was not in Thambazait at the time; they took place after I had gone away. None of these executions was witnessed.

I then took a party of men, known as Anderson Force, on the Burma-Thailand railway and remained in command of that party from September 1942 until January 1944. At one stage early in 1943, I amalgamated with Williams Force and we then became known as the No 1 Mobile Camp.

In the early days while we were close to supplies, food was poor but not bad. Drugs were very, very scarce, and as the war grew on, conditions worsened. Tasks were increased after early 1943 and pressure to get men out to work was increased. The process by which the Japanese controlled these working camps was that the actual administration of the prisoners was done by the prisoners themselves. They kept all records of pay, sick reports, etc. The recommendations of the doctors were at first respected but afterwards, when more labour was required, the Japanese demanded more men for work and, as figures of fit men became

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We would not let our sick men get on the parades. If more men were demanded than it was practicable to send out on the question of fitness, the least-sick were paraded, and the Japs selected from those men for work. Of course, the very bad, obviously bad, cases were changed to the men less sick sub rosa.

My Force at this time was actually a line-laying party on the Burma side, and laid the line from about 26 kilos down to about the 153 kilo mark, where the line met the parties from the other side. The food got very bad. It was very indifferent - vitaminosis was very prevalent. Pellagra showed itself very badly. We made repeated appeals for more drugs and more food more proteins. There was meat in the country: it was brought up on the hoof; there was no reason at all why better conditions could not have been provided.

From May 1943 the tide of war was rather going against the Japs and the general conditions there were worse, particularly from interference by planes to their shipping lines. It became to the Japs more and more imperative that the Burma-Thailand railway line should be completed - it was a life-line to them and they more or less considered it was an honour to die on the glorious task. Conditions became very bad. Wastage of labour through lack of food, disease, callous indifference, and sheer stupidity, was rising, and accounted for at least one-third of the casualties we had.

The Japs had no method of saving labour, no planning which would have saved hours of work. It was just coolie labour to them. They were not responsible as to life or death it just didn't matter to them.

Conditions under which they worked the men were very grim. To give an instance: In one camp of about 1,000 men, 300 men had to work some times up to 14 hours a day under the most appalling conditions - in rain, in great filth, with insufficient accommodation for rest; and they would be bare-footed and had practically no clothes. Next day they would have to work again, another stretch of 13 or 14 hours. I have known men work 40 hours in a stretch. As we were constructing the railway, there would be about 10 kilos between the different camps; when we had got halfway, we would have to go to the next camp and retrace our steps, instead of proceeding onwards. The simple thing would have been to take the line to the next camp, where the sick and gear would be carried, but no, the Japs decided we all would have to go back to the starting point, and then take the gear and the sick, with sick men carrying sick, right forward again. We would be carrying 10 per cent of our sick. Allegedly fit men had to carry those men and continue the work on the line.

Squalor in the camps was indescribable. We would have to move away dying Burmese coolies with cholera and smallpox. The huts were filthy hovels. Rain fell incessantly, and conditions were terrible.

At Aparang, the 30 kilo camp, was a hospital belonging to No 5 Group, which was again operating at 100 kilos. We were not under No 5 Group at that time. We arrived there and found the men there in jungle huts, underfed, without medicine, with ulcers, and in very weak condition. Some men had their legs with the bones showing, from the ulcers. My medical officers - there was no Australian M O there - provided what help they could; we gave them some extra food. But it was most difficult to interfere with other Groups and it was only by stealth that we could help our other men. We did it without the Japs knowing. Commander Epstein, a USA Naval doctor, was there, and was replaced by a Dutch halfcaste Doctor.

and men had been left behind there - their camp had moved on and they had been left behind as a base camp for 5 Group - the Japs policy was to abandon the sick and feed the healthy.

Dealing with the Thailand POW organization branches 3, 4 and 5 there were roughly 8,000 old Australians in the three branches, and the deaths totalled 1,564, on the line, and the total included a few deaths from bombing. These three Branches and these figures do not include F or H Force. They are Australian figures.

Roughly there were about 50,000 white prisoners (Australian, American, Dutch and British) in the Thailand camps; in March 1945 from Jap reports the deaths amounted to 8,200; but probably 8,500 would be closer the mark. That figure still excludes F and H Forces.

I put the bulk of those deaths down to in the early days dysentery, the greatest killer at that stage, due to unsuitable food and insufficient drugs; after that it was malaria.

From my own knowledge of the position, those deaths in the most part would have been avoidable if the Japs had supplied us with drugs, proper food, and much needed rest from work. The Japs controlled the genuine supplies of the world and made insufficient issued.

I took BRIGADIER Varley's place as Allied Commander of No 3 Branch.

One Commander of the Jap camps was Major General SASA.

He inspected the Burma side in about April or May 1943. One hospital at 30 kilos was closed down - there were not sufficient hospitals as it was, but he told Nagatomo that there were too many sick and that if there were less hospitals there would be less sick. He made his inspection from a truck. Brigadier Varley was in the back of the truck. Repeated requests were made for an interview with SASA, but these were all refused; and Sasa asked for no opinions. He is a trained soldier - such a man who must have observed in every camp the shocking state - the conditions and the food - the men were living under, and made no improvement or ordered no inquiry.

I double-crossed my same commander and put out all our eating utensils and food baskets which were in a simply shocking condition, in a conspicuous place. This must have been obvious to General Sasa. He would not allow any interview. We did everything to catch his eye and no man of military experience could fail to see so much that was wrong. He did not inspect a man. Only the senior officers were paraded. Brigadier Varley came up from base to the various camps. I was not 2 i/c at that stage. Sasa a military commander, failed to do anything to alleviate the position. He ordered the closing of the 30th Hospital camp, which was absolutely vital to us. Instead of improving things he made them worse. He must have seen it. He lessened the number of sick by lessening the hospitals; that is the Japanese method of lessening the sick.

Following him was Col Nakamura, called "Handlebars" because of his very big moustache. He issued a letter in which he said he took charge of the last stages. His main view was look after your health; that it was a great honour to assist the Japanese in building this railway. He was a very useless incompetent gentleman who did absolutely nothing for us. He as a soldier. The civilian counts nowhere in Japan at all. No alleviation took place due to him.

1 Col Sugawara followed him. His headquarters were at Kanburi then Bangkok, as with others. Kanburi was a town in Thailand about 90 miles northwest of Bangkok. Sugawara continued the same policy as the previous people. Tarekan was the camp where 3 Group came to after the withdrawal from Burma in March 1944. It was alongside the war memorial the Japanese erected to the dead on the Thai railway. There were two bridges there -- one concrete and steel and the other a wooden bridge. The camp was absolutely alongside it and on the boundaries of the camp was a Japanese Ack Ack Battery of medium ack ack guns. The bridges were subject to bombing several times. The first bombing caused us 18 killed 34 wounded. I was not camp commander 2 group at the time. I had as a matter of fact very strong influence in that camp because it was an old camp I was at, and Col Williamson No 2 commander and I worked in very harmoniously. Col Williamson saw Sugawara and requested that the camp be moved to Chungkai, for miles away from the military objective, and also advised him that we had insufficient trench protection for the strength of the camp. He refused to listen to any petitions and told us we must take the chances. Col Ishii saw fit to move his HQ immediately to Chungkai; with one day of bombing he and his senior staff left us and moved to Chungkai. Next month the strength of the camp increased from 3,000 to 5,400 at a peak period. Actually, accommodation on the very low Japanese standards could only carry 3,500 men. It was quite impossible to put these men in other camps. I have no hesitation in saying it was a deliberate attempt of the Japanese to expose the prisoners to casualties from the air. That is a definite accusation. Sugawara intended the men to be killed there. There was no possible reason why the men should have been taken there. People coming back from the jungle could have gone to Chungkai just as easily as to us. He has sufficient men to protect the objective if that was his purpose. The deduction is that by increasing the number of men and still not allowing further trenches to be dug for protection the desire was to kill the prisoners with their own bombs. I think you will get a similar opinion from practically any officer in that camp. Sugawara was the commander at that stage. He was the Thailand Group Commander. The branch commander was Col Ishii. All he did was to get out. He had two or three camps. Chungkai was his camp too. Tarekan was bombed and machine gunned seven or eight times. Latterly, the bombing was very good, early it was not so good. The total bombing casualties in the Prisoner of War camp was I think 200 killed. That included Tambisart Camp. At Nompinok 100 were killed in one day. Subordinate to these commands were the branch commanders. At No 3 was Lt Col Nagatomo who had a great deal of association with Brigadier Vesley and myself. There succeeded Col Nagatomo, Lt Col Ishii, previously commander at No 4 and subsequently at No 2 branch. Subsequently at Nukompaton was Capt Mizdani, who was subsequently a Major on the Commander's staff at Bangkok. He was known as "Wing the Merciless". He is regarded as one of the worst; in fact, I would put him down as the worst. I had no close association with him. He is the man who would be responsible for the camp of abandoned sick at Apalong. Of a group of young Americans, national coordinators, which was divided into two parties, one party came under Col Nagatomo in 3 Branch and the other party under Capt Mizdani at 5 Branch. The former had 5 per cent casualties and the latter over 23 per cent.

In my opinion Capt Mizdani would be to a large extent responsible for the higher death rate. His policy must be responsible for that.

The commander of No 2 Branch was Lt Col Yamagita. He subsequently became the commander of Nukompaton Hospital. He is referred to in Colonel Coates' evidence as Yamagita. The Camp Commanders with Anderson Force and No 1 Mobile Force were Lieut Matsuki and Lieut Waike. I regard both of these as being responsible for the deaths of men.

I wish to mention a Korean known as "Dillinger". Some time either in November or December 1942 a working party was operating on the line close to 18 Kilo Camp. A guard named Taimoto, alias "Dillinger", left the working party in the afternoon with Sgt O'Donnell, 2/30 Pz Regt. About four o'clock in the afternoon three shots were heard. Shortly afterwards Taimoto came back into camp and appeared fairly excited. An immediate roll call was ordered. By that time all the working party were back in camp. They were working on contract work and had finished early. Roll call was ordered and we checked one man missing, the man being O'Donnell. We reported that he had left the working party with Taimoto.

There was obvious excitement amongst the Japanese. About half past 5 Lieut Yamada, the Camp Commander at 35 Kilo Camp came into our camp. He sent for me and he told me that one man had escaped and asked me if I knew anything about it. I said that nobody had escaped. At 9 o'clock that night I was taken off with the interpreter, Capt W Drower, and an armed party into the bush, about a kilometer south west of the camp, and there found the body of Sgt O'Donnell lying in some heavy undergrowth. Lieut Yamada told me that he had been shot trying to escape. The body was nearly cold.

I got Yamada's torch and examined the body and found three wounds. One went through the higher part of the chest, the bullet emerging low down in the back. The bullet had hit a bone and turned. The point of exit at the back was a very big wound. The other two wounds were through the lower part of the jaw and out through the top of the head. On both exits were signs of brains and blood on the grass. The inference was that the first wound dropped the boy and the other wounds were caused by subsequent shooting. I pointed this out to Yamada, pointing out that the first wound was obvious and, as the shot entered from the front, Sgt O'Donnell could not have been escaping. I do not know the motive for that murder, but Taimoto was in the habit of going round a few native huts that were dotted about the bush and stealing chickens and bananas and so on. He took O'Donnell with him to carry the stuff back. I rather think that he was running along chasing chickens and suddenly missed O'Donnell. He then suddenly came upon him face to face and shot him. That was one reason we put it down to: that the boy could not keep up in bare feet and Taimoto got excited and killed him. The only other inference was that it was just a desire to kill on Taimoto's part.

I told Yamada that I had searched the boy's gear when I heard he was missing and he had a tin of bully beef and a tin of milk there, and pointed out that, if he was trying to escape, he would not leave his boots and his clothes behind.

Yamada, incidentally, was a very decent Japanese officer and the only one we had any respect for. I believe the Japanese instituted inquiries and we heard that "Dillinger" had been badly beaten by the Japanese, but he appeared

in our camps later on. After the Japanese surrender they paid off most of their Koreans and told them to go. We found "Dillinger" in Bangkok. He was arrested and put in our camp lockup and handed over to the Commission that was handling war crimes. We heard that he committed suicide. He was under arrest at the time.

At the end of 1943 we were brought back into Thailand and conditions were not so bad. They were not good, but there was sufficient food. An occasional jungle party was sent out

In April 1945 some 1,000 men were turned out of Nakompton Base Hospital and sent out to a place called Prachwab Kiriken to build a road, which went to Mergui. They were operating under shocking conditions and the death rate increased from two per day in the last week of July to 5.7 per day in the first fortnight of August. Out of a thousand men 250 died during that short period from April to August.

and 250 of the survivors would not have survived another week.

Fifteen of them died after release. They were worked to death and were not properly fed and worked under shocking conditions.

A full report of this has been put in. I think the Australian deaths in that party numbered about 30 to 35. The party was comprised mainly of Dutch and British. The total Australian strength in that party was about 120 men. That is only a guess, but it is very close to the mark. The proportion of deaths among the Australians was a little less than the proportion of the others.

Major J Stringer, 2/5 Battalion, went down to investigate the position on 3 September 1945. The information I have just given you comes from his reports. The full account of that has been handed in to the R A P W I at Bangkok.

Early after the capitulation we heard of this party and we got on to Sugasawa. We sent down Capt Mizudani to make a report on it. He sent in a rather stiff report which was anti-Japanese, giving a fair, clear indication of what took place.

In a paragraph headed "Responsibility", he named Major General Watari (?), Commander Japanese 33 Division, as the principal person responsible. From him the responsibility went down to two major-generals who commanded mixed brigades. One was Sató. It then went down to four colonels. He left it at that, but he added a rider to the effect that the Major General commanding the Division was actually at Kanburi at the time. That incident was more or less than anything that happened on the line. There were no officers except three or four British Doctors.

At Sungkri, 131 Mile, near Neki, Private Derkin of 2/2 Pioneers, was killed on 14 August 1945. We did not get information of this until about 23 or 25 August 1945. Dispositions were then taken of all men who came from that camp who knew the case and these were handed in to the War Crimes Commission at Bangkok. From hearsay, I know that the unit engaged in digging defence positions at Neki were forcing sick men out to work. Derkin had a high temperature at the time and was probably delirious, and he left the working party and was in the bush for three or four days. He was recovered and brought back into the camp and was then tied to a tree for 14 days. A grave was then dug and he was bayoneted and buried.

In 1944, Nagatoma left Kanburi, as far as I know, in chains and I was told in July 1945 by Capt Kagawa, Commander of No 7 Branch, that Nagatoma had died from a disease. I can only infer that he had stolen funds. He was always polite and listened very carefully to our requests but the pressure on the sick and lack of supplies of food still went on. This could have been due to corrupt practices on his party. I hold the view that the prisoners of war were on coolie rations but that the Branch Commanders had funds to supplement these rations. Our rations came from the Railway Engineers and meat was bought by Nagatoma and supplied through the prisoners of war administration. In February 1944 there was a big inquiry. Ishi was Commander of No 3 Group then in Burma and suddenly he dashed back to Moulmein and sent large quantities of meat to our camp. This took three days to come by train to Moulmein and arrived eventually in a

chooking condition as no arrangements had been made to preserve it. The anxiety which he showed to try and produce meat rapidly to us indicated that there had been a big inquiry. Then he improved his methods and brought us salted beef. Then, suddenly, all beef rations stopped. The only interpretation I can give is that as he suddenly produced meat, he had the funds, which then supported the theory that Nagatomo was buying meat from his funds; so that if the rations were below the scale it might be an indication that the money went into his own pocket.

With regard to railway engineers guilty of crimes, the Japanese would be unable to conceal two young Lieutenants who were actually engaged on the laying of the line from Burma. These were two Japanese lieutenants actually engaged in controlling the laying of the line and they were responsible for the shocking conditions and hours of work that No. 1 Mobile Camp suffered. These two men can be located because they were in charge of the line-laying. I have no indication as to who the Japanese regimental commander was except that I think he was called Ryashi, as the work was done under the control of the Ryashi Butai. One of the Japanese lieutenants was Sato.

It was an instruction of the Japanese that we had to have a night watchman at either end of our huts to be responsible for anybody leaving the hut for private purposes and, in case of escape, these watchmen would be held responsible. In about the last quarter of 1943, at 2 o'clock in the morning, Sgt. Lynch was the night watchman at my end of the hut. He had gone to call his relief down a very dark passage, and just as he left, one of the worst guards on the line arrived. He was Arai, alias "The Stormtrooper". He called for the missing watchman. He did not wait. Lynch then came back and I called out to him to call after Arai and tell him that he had been changing guards and had returned. Lynch followed him up the hill a little and called out to him but received no reply. Lynch's relief returned and took over and Lynch retired. Three minutes later "Storm Trooper" came back and saw Sgt. Smith of the 2/15 Fld Bde. He demanded to know where he was. Smith explained to him that we were changing, and in the meantime I got up and interfered and told Bull that the men were changing and pointed to the time by the clock. He went into a furious rage and took the two men, Lynch and Smith, to the guard house. I suspected that he intended to lash them up and I collected the interpreter, Capt. Drower, and we went over to give a hand.

Bull started beating the two men and I interposed; he rushed at me and eventually laid me out with a stick of bamboo- he knocked me out for about a minute and then he knocked out the interpreter for several minutes. He then realised that he had gone too far; after lecturing us for about an hour, he went away.

Lynch died within three weeks. He was badly beaten up that night. The actual cause of death was cerebral malaria. I suppose it was rather a savage beating and certainly must have had a weakening effect on his resistance. Bull used a bamboo stick on Lynch. At the time, Lynch was not fit in any way. I fear that that beating lowered his resistance, but to what extent is a matter for surmise.

This is the eleventh and last sheet of the evidence of Charles Groves Wright Anderson taken and sworn before me at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 26th day of November 1945.
C.G.W. Anderson (Deponent) Chairman Australian Board of Inquiry into War Crimes.

This and the preceding 7 pages comprise a certified true copy of the duplicate of the original statement by Charles Groves Wright Anderson.

Singapore..... Apr 46

1 Aust War crimes Sec (SEAC)

AUSTRALIAN WAR CRIMES

BOARD OF INQUIRY

CHARLES GROVES WRIGHT ANDERSON, sworn and examined:

I am NX12595 Lt Col Charles Groves Wright Anderson, C.O. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.

I became a prisoner of war at Singapore on 15 February 1942.

During the fighting prior to the fall of Singapore I did not witness anything in the nature of a war crime or atrocity. I did however, hear of the massacre of wounded at Parit Sulong.

We were fighting at Bakri and Parit Sulong between 18 January and 23 January, and I had intelligence reports that the Japanese unit we were fighting was the Japanese First Guards Division. I have no knowledge from my own observations or inquiries as to the Japanese unit we were fighting.

I and the troops under my command were surrounded. We suffered severe casualties and it became necessary to withdraw. It was impossible to get the severely wounded away. We had to leave them there. They were dispersed in trucks and huts within the Parit Sulong perimeter. At one stage we were being heavily shelled there.

I remained at that position on for about half an hour after the last of my troops had withdrawn. The withdrawal took place over a period of about 25 minutes and companies were moving out at five-minute intervals. The last company, I believe, was timed to withdraw at half past 9. That company moved out at that time and I remained there with five other officers for some time. At that stage the battle had died down. We were not returning Japanese fire. Artillery fire had ceased. The Japanese were doing some firing at our troops who were withdrawing, but there was no fire from our side.

The Japanese must have seen the withdrawal of our troops. Up to the time I left the position the Japanese had not overrun the position. I left there between 100 and 200 white wounded and about 150 Indian wounded. I have not seen a man of those whom I knew were left there. I have since heard that the Japanese came in and massacred those wounded. I heard that from Capt Lloyd Cahill, my regimental M.O., but he did not witness it. The only official survivor to my knowledge is Lieut Mackney.

There is no question to my mind that the Japanese were aware of the withdrawal, because all the heavy artillery had been hard hit and were content to let us go. All the wounded we could not take were left in the ambulances, of which we had two. Some were in Army trucks; others were in huts.

I eventually made my way to Singapore with my troops and ultimately I went with "A" Force to Burma. The Force was under the command of Brigadier Varley and I was his second-in-command. The Force was divided into three groups - three battalions - one of which disembarked at Victoria Point, one at Mergui and the Headquarters at Tavoy. The party which landed at Victoria Point was under Major Green, 2/4 Machine Gun Battalion. Lt Col Ramsey, 2/18 Battalion, was in command of the group which landed at Mergui and I was at Tavoy with Brigadier Varley.

The force moved in four ships, of which we occupied two. There were 2,000 on the Toyashi Maru and 1,000 on the Celebes Maru. Conditions were frightfully overcrowded. The men were down in the holds. On the Toyashi Maru we got two small helpings of rice a day and a tin of meat and vegetables - one - man tins - had to be divided between each 60 men. We were 14 days on that ship.

The crowded conditions, lack of drugs etc. led to a severe outbreak of dysentery, which later caused about 20 deaths in Tavoy and a few deaths at the other two points of disembarkation. There were no deaths on the voyage. Those deaths at Tavoy were undoubtedly due to the conditions on the ships.

We left on 14 May 1942 and arrived at Tavoy 14 days later on 28 May 1942.

Two or three days after our arrival, despite warnings to other ranks, eight men of 4 Anti-Tank Regiment escaped. Escape was very easy. However, they had no plans and no arms and were quickly recaptured. Brig Varley heard that they had been tried and eight graves were dug. We made very strong protests to Lieut Schina, the Company Commander controlling prisoners-of-war, but with no result. Brig Varley took very aggressive action with him and he decided not to take full responsibility and went to see Maj Itani with Brig Varley who directed that the men be executed.

Although the men were tried in a sort of way, they were not represented; we had no talk with them and were refused admission to see them. Padre Bashford asked permission to see the men before they were executed but this, too, was denied.

I was waiting at the headquarters of the armed guard when a party moved past me into the area where the execution was to take place. The men to be executed were taken to the scene in trucks. On arrival, they were blindfolded, their hands were tied behind them, and they were taken into the position where they were to be executed, opposite the graves. Two shots were then fired into each of them at very close range. Brig Varley was present at the execution, and so was Padre Bashford. As far as possible, the execution was decently carried out; the men were killed instantly. The senior of the men executed was W.O. Quittendon. The story of the execution was told me by Brig Varley immediately after it had occurred. If there had been any representation of the men at their trial, I should have heard about it. Maj. Itani is the man whom I hold responsible for the execution and it was his name that was given to men as being the man who ordered the shooting. These executions took place in the first week of June 1942 and were the only ones I know of which took place in Tavoy.

I subsequently proceeded with Brig Varley to Thambazait, where Brig Varley became the Allied Commander of No 3 Branch on the Thailand-Burma railway. We were joined by a party of Dutch and another party of Americans. There were several executions of Dutch and three Australians there. One of these Australians was Bell, who escaped with Capt Hull, was badly wounded in the escape and brought back and executed. Padre Bashford interviewed him before he died. Another of the Australians executed was Whittaker of the AASC. About eight or nine Dutch were also executed, but I do not know their names. I was not in Thambazait at the time; they took place after I had gone away. None of these executions was witnessed.

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inadequate, they paraded all the sick men and forced some of them out to work.

We would not let our sick men get on the parades. If more men were demanded than it was practicable to send out on the question of fitness, the least-sick were paraded, and the Japs selected from these men for work. Of course, the very bad, obviously bad, cases were changed to the men less sick sub rosa.

My Force at this time was actually a line-laying party on the Burma side, and laid the line from about 26 kilos down to about the 153 kilo mark, where the line met the parties from the other side. The food got very bad. It was very indifferent - vitaminosis was very prevalent. Pellagra showed itself very badly. We made repeated appeals for more drugs and more food more proteins. There was meat in the country; it was brought up on the hoof; there was no reason at all why better conditions could not have been provided.

From May 1943 the tide of war was rather going against the Japs and the general conditions there were worse, particularly from interference by planes to their shipping lines. It became to the Japs more and more imperative that the Burma-Thailand railway line should be completed - it was a life-line to them and they more or less considered it was an honour to die on the glorious task. Conditions became very bad. Wastage of labour through lack of food, diseases, callous indifference, and sheer stupidity, was rising, and accounted for at least one-third of the casualties we had.

The Japs had no method of saving labour, no planning which would have saved hours of work. It was just coolie labour to them. They were not responsible as to life or death it just didn't matter to them.

Conditions under which they worked the men were very grim. To give an instance: In one camp of about 1,000 men, 300 men had to work some times up to 14 hours a day under the most appalling conditions - in rain, in great filth, with insufficient accommodation for rest; and they would be bare-footed and had practically no clothes. Next day they would have to work again, another stretch of 13 or 14 hours. I have known men work 40 hours in a stretch. As we were constructing the railway, there would be about 10 kilos between the different camps; when we had got halfway, we would have to go to the next camp and retrace our steps, instead of proceeding onwards. The simple thing would have been to take the line to the next camp, where the sick and gear would be carried, but no, the Japs decided we all would have to go back to the starting point, and then take the gear and the sick, with sick men carrying sick, right forward again. We would be carrying 10 per cent of our sick. Allegedly fit men had to carry those men and continue the work on the line.

Squalor in the camps was indescribable. We would have to move away dying Burmese coolies with cholera and smallpox. The huts were filthy hovels. Rain fell incessantly, and conditions were terrible.

At Apárong, the 80 kilo camp, was a hospital belonging to No 5 Group, which was again operating at 100 kilos. We were not under No 5 Group at that time. We arrived there and found the men there in jungle huts, underfed, without medicines, with ulcers, and in very weak condition. Some men had their legs with the bones showing, from the ulcers. My medical officers - there was no Australian M O there - provided what help they could; we gave them some extra food. But it was most difficult to interfere with other Groups and it was only by stealth that we could help our other men. We did it without the Japs knowing. Commander Epstein, a USA Naval doctor, was there, and was replaced by a Dutch halfcaste Doctor.

The men had been left behind there - their camp had moved on and they had been left behind as a base camp for S Group - the Japs' policy was to abandon the sick and feed the healthy.

Dealing with the Thailand POW organisation branches 3, 4 and 5 there were roughly 8,000 of us Australians in the three branches, and the deaths totalled 1,564, on the line, and the total included a few deaths from bombing. These three branches and these figures do not include F or G force. They are Australian figures.

Roughly there were about 50,000 white prisoners (Australian, American, Dutch and British) in the Thailand camps; in March 1945 from Jap reports the deaths amounted to 8,200; but probably 8,500 would be closer the mark. That figure still excludes F and G Forces.

I put the bulk of those deaths down to in the early days dysentery, the greatest killer at that stage, due to unsuitable food and insufficient drugs; after that it was malaria.

From my own knowledge of the position, those deaths in the most part would have been avoidable if the Japs had supplied us with drugs, proper food, and much needed rest from work. The Japs controlled the genuine supplies of the world and made insufficient use of them.

I took BRIGADIER Varley's place as Allied Commander of No 3 Branch.

One Commander of the Jap camps was Major General SASA.

He inspected the Burma side in about April or May 1945. One hospital at 30 kilos was closed down - there were not sufficient hospitals as it was, but he told Nagatomo that there were too many sick and that if there were less hospitals there would be less sick. He made his inspection from a truck. Brigadier Varley was in the back of the truck. Reported requests were made for an interview with SASA, but these were all refused, and SASA asked for no opinions. He is a trained soldier - such a man who must have observed in every camp the shocking state - the conditions and the food - the men were living under, and made no improvement or ordered no inquiry.

I double-crossed my camp commander and put out all our eating utensils and food baskets which were in a simply shocking condition, in a conspicuous place. This must have been obvious to General Sasa. He would not allow any interview. We did everything to catch his eye and no man of military experience could fail to see so much that was wrong. He did not inspect a man. Only the senior officers were ostracised. Brigadier Varley came up from base to the various camps. I was not 2 1/2 at that stage. Sasa a military commander, failed to do anything to alleviate the position. He ordered the closing of the 30th hospital camp, which was absolutely vital to us. Instead of improving things he made them worse. He must have seen it. He lessened the number of sick by lessening the hospitals; that is the Japanese method of lessening the sick.

Following him was Col Kokamura, called "Handlebars" because of his very big moustache. He issued a letter in which he said he took charge of the last stages. His main view was look after your health; that it was a great honour to assist the Japanese in building this railway. He was a very useless incompetent gentleman who did absolutely nothing for us. He was as a soldier. The civilian counts nowhere in Japan at all. No alleviation took place due to him.

Col Sugawara followed him. His HQ headquarters were at Kanburi then Bangkok, as with others. Kanburi was a town in Thailand about 90 miles northwest of Bangkok. Sugawara continued the same policy as the previous people. Tamakan was the camp where 3 Group came to after the withdrawal from Burma in March 1944. It was alongside the war memorial the Japanese erected to the dead on the Thai railway. There were two bridges there -- one concrete and steel and the other a wooden bridge. The camp was absolutely alongside it and on the boundaries of the camp was a Japanese Artillery Battery of medium ack ack guns. The bridges were subject to bombing several times. The first bombing caused us 18 killed 34 wounded. I was not camp commander 2 group at the time. I had as a matter of fact very strong influence in that camp because it was an old camp I was at, and Col Williamson No 2 commander and I worked in very harmoniously. Col Williamson saw Sugawara and requested that the camp be moved to Chungkai, for miles away from the military objective, and also advised him that we had insufficient trench protection for the strength of the camp. He refused to listen to any petitions and told us we must take the chances. Col Ishii saw fit to move his HQ immediately to Chungkai; with one day of bombing he and his senior staff left us and moved to Chungkai. Next month the strength of the camp increased from 3,000 to 5,400 at a peak period. Actually, accommodation on the very low Japanese standards could only carry 3,500 men. It was quite impossible to put these men in other camps. I have no hesitation in saying it was a deliberate attempt of the Japanese to expose the prisoners to casualties from the air. That is a definite accusation. Sugawara intended the men to be killed there. There was no possible reason why the men should have been taken there. People coming back from the jungle could have gone to Chungkai just as easily as to us. He has sufficient men to protect the objective if that was his purpose. The deduction is that by increasing the number of men and still not allowing further trenches to be dug for protection the desire was to kill the prisoners with their own bombs. I think you will get a similar opinion from practically any officer in that camp. Sugawara was the commander at that stage. He was the Thailand Group Commander. The branch commander was Col Ishii. All he did was to get out. He had two or three camps. Chungkai was his camp too. Tamakan was bombed and machine gunned seven or eight times. Latterly, the bombing was very good, early it was not so good. The total bombing casualties in the Prisoner of war camp was I think 200 killed. That included Tamakan Camp. At Hompladuk 100 were killed in one day. Subordinate to these commanders were the branch commanders. At No 3 was Lt Col Nagatomo who had a great deal of association with Brigadier Varley and myself. There succeeded Col Nagatomo, Lt Col Ishii, previously commander at No 4 and subsequently at No 3 branch. Subsequently at Nakomaton was Capt Mizdani, who was subsequently a Major on the Commander's staff at Bangkok. He was known as "King the Merciless". He is regarded as one of the worst; in fact, I would put him down as the worst. I had no close association with him. He is the man who would be responsible for the camp of abandoned sick at Apilong. Of a group of young Americans, national Guardsmen, which was divided into two parties, one party came under Col Nagatomo in 3 Branch and the other party under Capt Mizdani at 5 Branch. The former had 5 per cent casualties and the latter over 23 per cent.

In my opinion Capt Mizdani would be to a large extent responsible for the higher death rate. His policy must be responsible for that.

The commander of No 2 Branch was Lt Col Yamagida. He subsequently became the commander of Nakomaton Hospital. He is referred to in Colonel Coates evidence as Yamagita. The Camp Commanders with Anderson Force and No 1 Mobile Force were Lieut Matsuki and Lieut Saito. I regard both of these as being responsible for the deaths of men.

I wish to mention a Korean known as "Dillinger". Some time either in November or December 1943 a working party was operating on the line close to 18 Kilo Camp. A guard named Taimoto, alias "Dillinger", left the working party in the afternoon with Sgt O'Donnell, 2/10 Fd Regt. About four o'clock in the afternoon three shots were heard. Shortly afterwards Taimoto came back into camp and appeared fairly excited. An immediate roll call was ordered. By that time all the working party were back in camp. They were working on contract work and had finished early. Roll call was ordered and we checked one man missing, the man being O'Donnell. We reported that he had left the working party with Taimoto.

There was obvious excitement among the Japanese. About half past 5 Lieut Yamada, the Camp Commander at 35 Kilo Camp came into our camp. He sent for me and he told me that one man had escaped and asked me if I knew anything about it. I said that nobody had escaped. At 9 o'clock that night I was taken off with the interpreter, Capt W Drower, and an armed party into the bush, about a kilometer south west of the camp, and there found the body of Sgt O'Donnell lying in some heavy undergrowth. Lieut Yamada told me that he had been shot trying to escape. The body was nearly cold.

I got Yamada's torch and examined the body and found three wounds. One went through the higher part of the chest, the bullet emerging low down in the back. The bullet had hit a bone and turned. The point of exit at the back was a very big wound. The other two wounds were through the lower part of the jaw and out through the top of the head. On both exits were signs of brains and blood on the grass. The inference was that the first wound dropped the boy and the other wounds were caused by subsequent shooting. I pointed this out to Yamada, pointing out that the first wound was obvious and, as the shot entered from the front, Sgt O'Donnell could not have been escaping. I do not know the motive for that murder, but Taimoto was in the habit of going round a few native huts that were dotted about the bush and stealing chickens and bananas and so on. He took O'Donnell with him to carry the stuff back. I rather think that he was running along chasing chickens and suddenly missed O'Donnell. He then suddenly came upon him face to face and shot him. That was one reason we put it down to: that the boy could not keep up in bare feet and Taimoto got excited and killed him. The only other inference was that it was just a desire to kill on Taimoto's part.

I told Yamada that I had searched the boy's gear when I heard he was missing and he had a tin of bully beef and a tin of milk there, and pointed out that, if he was trying to escape, he would not leave his boots and his clothes behind.

Yamada, incidentally, was a very decent Japanese officer and the only one we had any respect for. I believe the Japanese instituted inquiries and we heard that "Dillinger" had been badly beaten by the Japanese, but he appeared

in our camps later on. After the Japanese surrender they paid off most of their Koreans and told them to go. We found "Dillinger" in Bangkok. He was arrested and put in our camp lockup and handed over to the Commission that was handling war crimes. We heard that he committed suicide. He was under arrest at the time.

At the end of 1943 we were brought back into Thailand and conditions were not so bad. They were not good, but there was sufficient food. An occasional jungle party was sent out

In April 1945 some 1,000 men were turned out of Nakompton Base Hospital and sent out to a place called Prachuab Kirikan to build a road, which went to Mergui. They were operating under shocking conditions and the death rate increased from two per day in the last week of July to 5.7 per day in the first fortnight of August. Out of a thousand men 250 died during that short period from April to August.

and 250 of the survivors would not have survived another week. Fifteen of them died after release. They were worked to death and were not properly fed and worked under shocking conditions. A full report of that has been put in. I think the Australian deaths in that party numbered about 30 to 35. The party was comprised mainly of Dutch and British. The total Australian strength in that party was about 120 men. That is only a guess, but it is very close to the mark. The proportion of deaths among the Australians was a little less than the proportion of the others.

Major J Stringer, 2/25 Battalion, went down to investigate the position in September 1945. The information I have just given really comes from his reports. The full account of that has been handed in to the R A P W I at Bangkok.

Early after the capitulation we heard of this party and we got on to Sugasawa. He sent down Capt Mizudani to make a report on it. He sent in a rather stiff report which was anti-Japanese, giving a fair, clear indication of what took place.

In a paragraph headed "Responsibility", he named Major General Watari (?), Commander Japanese 33 Division, as the principal person responsible. From him the responsibility went down to two major-generals who commanded mixed brigades. One was Satō. It then went down to four colonels. He left it at that, but he added a rider to the effect that the Major General commanding the Division was actually at Kanburi at the time. That incident was more grim than anything that happened on the line. There were no officers except three or four British Doctors.

At Sunghri, 131 Kilo, near Niek, Private Derkin of 2/2 Pioneers, was killed on 14 August 1945. We did not get information of this until about 23 or 25 August 1945. Dispositions were then taken of all men who came from that camp who knew the case and these were handed in to the War Crimes Commission at Bangkok. From hearsay, I know that the unit engaged in digging defence positions at Niek were forcing sick men out to work. Derkin had a high temperature at the time and was probably delirious, and he left the working party and was in the bush for three or four days. He was recovered and brought back into the camp and was then tied to a tree for 14 days. A grave was then dug and he was bayoneted and buried.

In 1944, Nagatoma left Kanburi, as far as I know, in chains and I was told in July 1945 by Capt Naguchi, Commander of No 7 Branch, that Nagatoma had died from a disease. I can only infer that he had stolen funds. He was always polite and listened very carefully to our requests but the pressure on the sick and lack of supplies of food still went on. This could have been due to corrupt practices on his party. I hold the view that the prisoners of war were on coolie rations but that the Branch Commanders had funds to supplement these rations. Our rations came from the Railway Engineers and meat was bought by Nagatoma and supplied through the prisoner of war administration. In February 1944 there was a big inquiry. Ishi was Commander of No 3 Group then in Burma and suddenly he dashed back to Moulmein and sent large quantities of meat to our camp. This took three days to come by train to Moulmein and arrived eventually in a

chocking condition as no arrangements had been made to preserve it. The anxiety which he showed to try and produce meat rapidly to us indicated that there had been a big inquiry. Then he improved his methods and brought us salted beef. Then, suddenly, all beef rations stopped. The only interpretation I can give is that as he suddenly produced meat, he had the funds, which then supported the theory that Nagatoma was buying meat from his funds; so that if the rations were below the scale it might be an indication that the money went into his own pocket.

With regard to railway engineers guilty of crimes, the Japanese would be unable to conceal two young Lieutenants who were actually engaged on the laying of the line from Burma. These were two Japanese lieutenants actually engaged in controlling the laying of the line and they were responsible for the shocking conditions and hours of work that No. 1 Mobile Camp suffered. These two men can be located because they were in charge of the line-laying. I have no indication as to who the Japanese regimental commander was except that I think he was called Ryashi, as the work was done under the control of the Ryashi Butai. One of the Japanese Lieutenants was Sato.

It was an instruction of the Japanese that we had to have a night watchman at either end of our huts to be responsible for anybody leaving the hut for private purposes and, in case of escape, these watchmen would be held responsible. In about the last quarter of 1943, at 2 o'clock in the morning, Sgt. Lynch was the night watchman at my end of the hut. He had gone to call his relief down a very dark passage, and just as he left, one of the worst guards on the line arrived. He was Arai, alias "The Stormtrooper". He called for the missing watchman. He did not wait. Lynch then came back and I called out to him to call after Arai and tell him that he had been changing guards and had returned. Lynch followed him up the hill a little and called out to him but received no reply. Lynch's relief returned and took over and Lynch retired. Three minutes later "Storm Trooper" came back and saw Sgt. Smith of the 2/15 Fld Regt. He demanded to know where he was. Smith explained to him that we were changing, and in the meantime I got up and interfered and told Bull that the men were changing and pointed to the time by the clock. He went into a furious rage and took the two men, Lynch and Smith, to the guard house. I suspected that he intended to wash them up and I collected the interpreter, Capt. Drower, and we went over to give a hand.

Bull started beating the two men and I interposed; he rushed at me and eventually laid me out with a stick of bamboo- he knocked me out for about a minute and then he knocked out the interpreter for several minutes. He then realised that he had gone too far; after lecturing us for about an hour, he went away.

Lynch died within three weeks. He was badly beaten up that night. The actual cause of death was cerebral malaria. I suppose it was rather a savage beating and certainly must have had a weakening effect on his resistance. Bull used a bamboo stick on Lynch. At the time, Lynch was not fit in any way. I fear that that beating lowered his resistance, but to what extent is a matter for surmise.

This is the eleventh and last sheet of the evidence of Charles Groves Wright Anderson taken and sworn before me at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 26th day of November 1945.
C.G.W. Anderson (Deponent) Chairman Australian Board
of Inquiry into War Crimes.

This and the preceding 7 pages comprise a certified true copy of the duplicate of the original statement by Charles Groves Wright Anderson.

Singapore..... Apr 46

1 Aust War crimes Sec (SEAC)

On this Twentyseventh day of March One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows :-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX.12595, rank Lt-Col, and Unit 2/19 Bn.

I have made full reports of various war crimes of which I have knowledge to Justice Sir William Webb, and have been interrogated by him.

The particular instance of Lt Naito's ill treatment of Capt W.M. Drower, British Army, was not raised as to my certain knowledge this was fully dealt with in Siam.

At your request I now submit the following details :-

I was camp commander of No.1. Mobile Camp operating in Burma from March 1943 onwards.

At 26 KM Camp (KUNWITWAY) about April 1943 when Lt Naito on the staff of THAILAND PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS, was my Japanese camp commander.

Captain W.M.Drower British Army was my interpreter. At the time he was suffering from a very severe tropical ulcer on his ankle, and our camp Doctor, Captain R.Richards, A.A.M.C. ordered that Captain Drower must rest, or his leg would be endangered. Captain Drower was sent for by Lt NAITO for interpreting duty, and a message was sent back that Captain Drower was ordered off duty by a medical officer. Shortly afterwards an agitated Japanese camp clerk approached me with the duty work sheets submitted by my office, and asked me to alter the duty cypher in respect of Captain Drower's name, to a no duty cypher. This I refused to do as the report had been submitted. For the guidance of the court daily work returns were submitted by the POW camp office separately for PW officers and other ranks. The PW other ranks were accurately prepared, as these sheets were the basis of their pay, but as officers were paid irrespective of work (supervisory) these officers records were usually shown as duty. Without my knowledge the Japanese clerk induced one of my orderly room sergeants to make the alteration.

Shortly afterwards I was sent for by Lt Naito, and he produced the officers work sheet, and asked me whether I thought an alteration had been made opposite Captain Drower's name for that day.

It had obviously been altered, and I had no alternative but to admit it.

Wright Anderson

Wright Anderson

My Orderly Room Sergeant (SGT L.CROWE) had told me of the alteration on my way to the office. Naito asked me whether it had been altered on my instructions, and I told him I accepted full responsibility for my office. We were working without an interpreter. Captain Richards Medical Officer was sent for by Lt Naito, and he was told that in conjunction with me he was concealing the fact that Captain Drower had contracted smallpox, and we were both stood up in front of the Japanese commanders office for two hours, and were both lightly struck by a Korean private.

There was a virulent case of smallpox of a British soldier of my force in this camp, and he was isolated in the little attap hut, size about 10 ft by 7 ft in the corner of the camp.

Lt Naito sent two armed guards to produce Captain Drower, and on his arrival Lt Naito accused him of concealing the fact that he had small pox, and then personally took Captain Drower with the escort to the isolation hut. I watched what was apparently a discussion outside the hut, and saw Captain Drower go in. I was fully aware that the hut contained a virulent smallpox case in its most infective stage. Captain Drower was held there for a week or longer. I sent a message to him and received advice about him subrosa through the British medical orderly (Pte Fitzgerald?) attending to patient. This medical orderly had told me that Lt Naito had forced Captain Drower in spite of his protests in to the close confinement of the isolation hut.

Captain Drower was held there till I was able to make representations at the base camp to the Japanese branch commander Lt-Col NAGATOMO, as a result of which Captain Drower was returned to base, isolated for a time, and then sent back to my camp.

Lt Naito was not seen for a month after this incident, and from Korean guards who lived in terror of Lt Naito, I was told that Lt Naito had been sent to MOULMEIN Japanese hospital.

Capt Drower at the time of his confinement was only allowed the clothes he had on him. The remainder of his gear was ordered to be burnt by Lt Naito. It was set on fire, but after Lt Naito's back was turned a few things were salvaged by a friendly Korean.

Captain Drower told me that Lt Naito had warned him that he would be bayoneted if he refused to enter the isolation hut. I have no doubt in my mind that Lt Naito was fully aware that Captain Drower had not contracted smallpox, but it was an oriental method of evening his refusal of duty.

SWORN by the abovenamed deponent
Charles Groves Wright Anderson
at YOUNG on the Twentyseventh
day of March One thousand nine
hundred and forty-six.

BEFORE ME

Charles Groves Wright Anderson
A Justice of the Peace.

Charles Groves Wright Anderson

B *Naito* *294*
Conrad
Lines - 8 copies

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SWORN by the abovenamed deponent
Charles Groves Wright Anderson
at YOUNG on the Twentyseventh
day of March One thousand nine
hundred and forty-six.

BEFORE ME


A Justice of the Peace.



8284

c5/9.

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six, Charles Groves Wright Anderson of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows:-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12595, rank Lt.Col., and Unit 2/19 Bn.

ARAI Shokei (Jungle Jim Stormtrooper), a Korean Guard attached to the Camp Staff of No. 1 Mobile Camp which I commanded between April 1943 and December 1943. He was also known as "The Bull" previous to joining No. 1 Mobile Camp. He was Lt.Col. NAGOTOMO'S Batman. This Korean was, in my opinion, the most brutal guard that I ever came in contact with. He created a reign of terror wherever he was. An extremely strong man with a very powerful voice; nothing was safe from his savage attentions, he had innumerable brutal bashinges credited against him. I witnessed him striking dying men carried on stretchers at 70 K.M. Camp Burma (MEZALI). I was knocked unconscious by him at 2 a.m. at NIKKE CAMP 131 K.M. Burma about October 1943 when trying to intervene in the interests of Sgt. J. Lynch, 2/15 Fd Regt. A.I.F. and Sgt. Hill - or Smith - of the same Unit, whom he was savagely assaulting for a completely trumped up charge of failure of duty on night picquet. Sgt. J. Lynch, a Sydney Barrister-at-Law, died within three weeks. He was a sick man at the time of the assault and the assault was undoubtedly a contributory cause. I made numerous complaints against this conduct but most of the Japanese Staff were themselves frightened of ARAI. I can best describe him as an evil inhuman monster. I had continual dealings with this man and except for the one incident I have mentioned against myself, I personally had no other trouble with him. I know that he was severely punished for striking me, but in our subsequent relations he showed no malice. I mention this in order that whilst making these charges I have no feelings of personal animus against him.

SWORN by the abovenamed deponent
Charles Groves Wright Anderson
at YOUNG on the Twenty-ninth day
of May One thousand nine hundred
and forty-six.

BEFORE ME



A Justice of the Peace.

8285

C 5/31

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows :-

I was a member of the Australian Military Forces in the Malayan campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX.12595, rank Lt-Col, and Unit 2/19 Bn.

KANEATSU, known as "Boofhead" a Korean Guard who was mainly employed as cook for the Japanese Guards was responsible for many bashings of P.O.W's in No.1 Mobile Camp, between April 1943 - Dec. 1943.

I can testify to seeing him strike at least 30 P.O.W's at various times.

SWORN by the abovenamed deponent (
 Charles Groves Wright Anderson (
 at YOUNG on the Twentyninth (
 day of May One thousand nine (
 hundred and forty-six. (



BEFORE ME

Walter Wood J.P.
A Justice of the Peace.

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows:-


I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12595, rank Lt-Col., and Unit 2/19 Bn.

HAYASHI (The Maggot) a Korean Guard, was a member of the Japanese Camp Staff of No. 1 Mobile Camp which I commanded between April 1943 and December, 1943. I do not recall him in connection with the murder of L/Sgt. Whitfield. I can testify that he was a very brutal guard and was responsible for bashing and beating my prisoners. One of his favourite methods was kicking either the shins or pri ites of his victims. I have seen him striking many P.O.W. and recall a particularly vicious assault on a dangerously sick man at NIKKE 131 KM Burma. Shin kicking was a particularly vicious practice when a very high proportion of P.O.W. suffered from Tropical Ulcers, either aggravating existing ulcers or starting new ones. Tropical Ulcers under conditions suffered by P.O.W. on the Burma-Thai Railway was an extremely dangerous condition.

SWORN by the abovenamed Deponent }
Charles Groves Wright Anderson }
at YOUNG on the Twenty-ninth day }
of May One thousand nine hundred }
and forty-six. }



BEFORE ME



A Justice of the Peace.

8286

C7/6

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of Crother, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows:-


I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12595, rank Lt-Col., and Unit 2/19 Bn.

HAYASHI (The Maggot) a Korean Guard, was a member of the Japanese Camp Staff of No. 1 Mobile Camp which I commanded between April 1943 and December, 1943. I do not recall him in connection with the murder of L/Sgt. Whitfield. I can testify that he was a very brutal guard and was responsible for bashing and beating my prisoners. One of his favourite methods was kicking either the shins or privates of his victims. I have seen him striking many P.O.W. and recall a particularly vicious assault on a dangerously sick man at NIKKE 131 KM Burma. Shin kicking was a particularly vicious practice when a very high proportion of P.O.W. suffered from Tropical Ulcers, either aggravating existing ulcers or starting new ones. Tropical Ulcers under conditions suffered by P.O.W. on the Burma-Thai Railway was an extremely dangerous condition.

SWORN by the abovenamed Deponent)
Charles Groves Wright Anderson)
at YOUNG on the Twenty-ninth day)
of May One thousand nine hundred)
and forty-six.)



BEFORE ME



A Justice of the Peace.

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Crazier, makes oath and says as follows:-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12596, rank L.-Col., and Unit 2/19 Bn.

NAKAGAWA (FRANKENSTEIN) A Korean Guard, was a member of the Japanese Camp Staff of No. 1 Mobile Camp which I commanded between April, 1943 and December, 1943. He was one of the most brutal guards we had, and I have witnessed innumerable beatings and assaults by this man, and I can say with confidence that he struck more P.O.Ws than any other guard that I had any contact with. He was also known as the "Black Cook" or "Concerto". He had a Salute Complex.

SWORN by the abovenamed deponent)
 Charles Groves Wright Anderson)
 at YOUNG on the Twenty-ninth day)
 of May One thousand nine hundred)
 and forty-six.)

BEFORE ME

Malcolm Wood J.P.

A Justice of the Peace.

Charles Groves Wright Anderson

8287

C7/6

On this Twantyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows:-


I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12595, rank L.-Col., and Unit 2/19 Bn.

NAKAGAWA (FRANKENSTEIN) A Korean Guard, was a member of the Japanese Camp Staff of No. 1 Mobile Camp which I commanded between April, 1943 and December, 1943. He was one of the most brutal guards we had, and I have witnessed innumerable bashings and assaults by this man, and I can say with confidence that he struck more P.O.Ws than any other guard that I had any contact with. He was also known as the "Black Cook" or "Concerto". He had a Salute Complex.

SWORN by the abovenamed deponent
Charles Groves Wright Anderson
at YOUNG on the Twenty-ninth day
of May One thousand nine hundred
and forty-six.)



BEFORE ME



A Justice of the Peace.

8313

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson of Crowthor, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows:-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NXL2595, rank Lt-Col., and Unit 2/19 Bn.

MORIMOTO (Greenpants) a Korean Guard was the Works Clerk of No. 1. Mobile Camp which I commanded between April, 1943 and December, 1943. His task was the checking of P.O.Ws for work parade. He took a sadistic delight in hounding out sick prisoners to work. My Administrative Staff and I regarded him as the greatest obstacle we had to overcome in trying to reduce the numbers of our working parties, and I testify without hesitation that it was due to his inhuman efforts that many sick P.O.W were forced out to work and to their death. Although not responsible for as many bashings as other guards, I witnessed him assaulting Sapper Shaw 2/12 Fd. Coy. A.I.F. at NIKKE 131 K.M. Camp Burma. The assault was the most brutal and savage one that I had ever witnessed; he used a heavy billet of wood, striking Shaw all over the body with powerful blows about thirty times. Sapper Shaw was an exceptionally strong man which probably saved him from either permanent injury or death.

SWORN by the abovenamed deponent)
Charles Groves Wright Anderson)
at YOUNG on the Twenty-ninth day)
of May Onethousand nine hundred)
and forty-six.)

Charles Groves Wright Anderson

BEFORE ME

Walter Wood J.P.
A Justice of the Peace.

On this Twentythird day of January One thousand nine hundred and forty-seven Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of "Fernhill", Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grenier, makes oath and says as follows :-

I was a member of the Australian Military Forces in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being MX12595, rank Lt-Col, and Unit 2/19 Bn.

- (a) Q. Was Col. Anderson in any of the following Burma Prisoner of War Camps: 95 Km, 105 Km, 122 Km, 131 Km, 14 Km, 26 Km, and particularly 80 Km (Aparon)?
- A. Yes I was in all these Camps, 14 Km, 26 Km, 95, Km, 105 Km, 122 Km, 80 Km, 131 Km.
- (b) Q. Was Sgt Shimojo on the Japanese Staff of any of these Camps, if so, outline his duties.
- A. Yes, Sgt Shimojo was on the Japanese Staff in all these Camps, either as assistant camp commander, or in the absence of his officer, acting camp commander. Included in his duties was the discipline of POW's, detailing of working parties, and control of junior Japanese staff. Most of the Liaison work between myself and the I.J.A. was done through Sgt Shimojo during this period.
- (c) Q. Was he responsible for the beatings or ill treatment of any Prisoners of War in these Camps?
- A. During this period I do not recall Sgt Shimojo ever personally striking a POW, but he failed to sufficiently restrain his Korean guards from so doing in spite of numerous protests.
- (d) Q. Did he force sick Prisoners of War to work?
- A. I recall at 80 Km (Aparon) Sgt Shimojo going through a parade of PW's marked by our Doctor as H.D., and detailing men for work, but I believe he was carrying out his orders. During the whole of the period April 1943 to December 1943 the peak period of the Railway construction sick PW's were forced out to work in the camps mentioned in Answer (c)

W. Stough *Ch. G. W. Anderson* *Ch. G. W. Anderson*

(e) Q. What was SHIMOJO's general attitude towards prisoners of war?

A. Sgt SHIMOJO was always courteous to me personally, and although extremely strict in his camp discipline always allowed me to voice and write strongly worded ^{and} protests for forwarding to higher authority. I feel that he could have done more to restrain his Korean guards for unnecessary brutality and save the lives of PW's by more consideration and care in the movements that Williams force and Anderson's force (No. 1 Mobile Camp) in the grueling task that we were subjected to in laying the line from Burma to the junction with the rail gangs from Siam. I do know that Sgt SHIMOJO was extremely severe to Williams force when they were separated from my force for a short time, and that he personally forced out many sick to work. He had a personal animosity towards Lt-Col Williams.

(f) Q. Has Col. Anderson any recollection of Lt-Col Williams being rescued by Sgt SHIMOJO when a Korean guard threatened his life in October 1943? If so, please outline the circumstances.

A. I recall an incident in which Lt-Col Williams fell foul of a Korean guard, and the situation was very tense and threatening, I recall that as a result of my representations to Sgt SHIMOJO he took action and stopped the incident. He was camp commander at the time, and had just arrived at the new camp. The Korean guards were allowed too much licence, vide my answer to question (e)

(g) Q. Is Col Anderson able to testify as to the good character of SHIMOJO?

A. Sgt SHIMOJO had rather a grandiose complex, a strict disciplinarian. I formed the opinion he was a good soldier. I do not think he had any personal animosity to POW's except the last six months of the war in the Officers' Camp. His discipline amounted to extreme ~~harshness~~ creating almost a reign of terror. This was the only period I ever saw him strike a POW (only Officers). He was always courteous to me, and my interpreter Capt. Drower and my staff, but I feel that Sgt SHIMOJO is a man that would carry out his orders, and how far the strictures I mention in this Affidavit were in the execution of those orders I cannot say.

SWORN by the abovesaid Deponent
Charles Groves Wright Anderson
at YOUNG on the Twentythird day
of January One thousand nine
hundred and forty-seven.

BEFORE ME

W. Stoughton
A Justice of the Peace.

17/9

WJH

Second *Sept 17/9*

On this ~~thirtieth~~ ^{first} day of August One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of "Fernhill", Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows :-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12595, rank Lt-Col, and Unit 2/19 Bn.

- (a) Q. What was the attitude of Lt-Col Nagatomo who was the commander of the 3rd Branch POW camp in Siam towards the POWs in general?
- A. Lt-Col Y. Nagatomo was one of the very few Japanese senior officers who received petitions from POWs with a modicum of courtesy. I formed the opinion that though not openly hostile towards POWs he should have been able to improve conditions for POWs. Many of the petitions, requests, and suggestions made by Senior POW Officers for the betterment and treatment of POWs were within the framework of his administration without the necessity of his reference to higher authority, and his failure to implement these can only be attributable to indifference or neglect.
- (b) Q. Did he inspect the different work camps once or several times each month with Brig.A.I.Varley, Lt-Col T.Hamilton, and Maj.C.F.Hausenberg?
- A. Yes, he visited some camps at irregular intervals of one month or six weeks accompanied by Brig.A.I.Varley, Lt-Col Hamilton, and Maj.Hausenberg.
- (c) Q. Did he give orders to Brig.Varley to present a report on the inspection at each time?
- A. Yes, as far as I can recollect Brig.Varley told me he submitted a report after visits.
- (d) Q. If so, what was the reason that he took Brig.Varley on his inspection trips, and made Brigadier present written report each time?
- A. I cannot give any reason, as I personally could not trace any benefit to the Mobile Camp I commanded due to his visits. On one occasion Brig.Varley told me that he believed Lt-Col Nagatomo had requested that my camp be rested from the arduous task of line laying, and had been refused by the Railway Engineers Unit.

Walter Wood

Ch. G. W. Anderson

- (e) Q. Did he give any limitations POWs on presenting protests, complaints or petitions or heard them willingly?
- A. As far as I am aware he made no limitations. If they went through Brig. Varley, the Brigadier told me that he always got a hearing, but I submitted many petitions through his subordinate camp commanders that came to nothing.
- (f) Q. How did he treat those complaints, protests and petitions when they were presented to him? Did he give answers or explanations to them each time?
- A. To my personal knowledge only a few of the many complaints were rectified. See my answer to Question (a)
- (g) Q. Did he make any endeavour to improve the treatment of POWs?
- A. If he made any endeavours they were of no avail as conditions deteriorated progressively until the line was built, and a large proportion of POWs were moved to Siam.
- (h) Q. If so, what did he do?
- A. See my previous answer.
- (i) Q. What was the result of his efforts to bring about a n improvement of the treatment of POWs?
- A. Lt-Col Nagatomo commanded 3 Branch from about Aug. 1942 to Dec. 1943, the period of the greatest casualties, and for the last 7 months the worst treatment of our POWs, and from memory our heaviest death roll being in the last three months of his command.
- (j) Q. If these did not bear any fruit, what would be the reasons for such?
- A. The reasons I feel are due to failure of his own administration and probably his orders from higher authority.
- (k) Q. Where did he get the medical supplies for the POWs, and could he get any supplies enough for the POWs from any source outside?
- A. I don't know, but sufficient representations were made to him regarding shortage and requirements.
- (l) Q. Did he have sufficient supplies of food and clothes within his power, or had he to obtain such supplies from outside?
- A. Same answer as for (k)
- (m) Q. Did he ever beat any POW himself or give orders to beat POWs?
- A. I have never heard of a single instance.
- (n) Q. Did he give orders prohibiting to beat POWs and sending sick POWs to work?
- A. I believe he issued orders that POWs were NOT to be beaten, or sick sent to work.
- (o) Q. Was he earnest in his duty?
- A. I suppose by Japanese standards he was.
- (p) Q. Was the POWs afraid of him?
- A. I don't think POWs had any particular fear of Lt-Col Nagatomo.

Walter Wood
J.T.

W. Wood

(q) Q. Were the Japanese and Korean guards afraid to have the matters within the camp reported to Lt-Col Nagatomo?

A. Yes, but for a POW to report a Japanese or Korean was no easy matter, and one took a grave risk when reporting an officer or N.C.O.

(r) Q. Did he have any idea of ill treating POWs?

A. It would be impossible for Lt-Col Nagatomo not to be aware of the shocking ill treatment of POWs under his administration.

(s) Q. What was the good qualities of his character (in comparison to that of Maj. Mizutani?)

A. I only met Maj. Mizutani on two brief occasions, and most of my knowledge of him is by hearsay. The only good qualities of Lt-Col Nagatomo was that he was more courteous to POWs than other Japanese officers.

(t) Q. Was Lieut. Matsuzaki who was the commander of the First Mobile Camp of the Third Branch, suffering from piles, and difficulties in walking? And did he not stay in hospital for a long period on account of the operation on the same?

A. I was not aware that Lt Matsuzaki suffered from piles. He was away for a time, but I made innumerable complaints and protests to Lt Matsuzaki in the strongest terms personally and in writing about ill-treatment, lashings, overwork, working of sick, with no results.

(u) Q. And during his absence from the camp, did not Sgt. Shimojo, assistant commander take charge for Matsuzaki?

A. Sgt Shimojo commanded in Lt Matsuzaki's absence.

(v) Q. Had the 1st Mobile Camp to move very frequently that the POWs of the camp were specially tired out?

A. Yes. But with the minimum of thought and consideration, unnecessary and callous hardships could have been eliminated. All orders for moves from camp to camp were marked by indifference to human suffering and criminal negligence.

SWORN by the abovenamed Deponent)
Charles Groves Wright Anderson)
at GROETHE on the ~~Twenty~~ first)
day of August One thousand nine)
hundred and forty-six.)

Wright Anderson

Wright Anderson

BEFORE ME

Walter Wood
W. Wood

A Justice of the Peace.

was at Savoy with Brigadier Varley.

The force moved in four ships, of which we occupied two. There were 2,000 on the Toyashi Maru and 1,000 on the Celebes Maru. Conditions were frightfully overcrowded. The men were down in the holds. On the Toyashi Maru we got two small helpings of rice a day and a tin of meat and vegetable - one-man tins - had to be divided between each 60 men. We were 14 days on that ship. The crowded conditions, lack of drugs etc. led to a severe outbreak of dysentery, which later caused about 20 deaths in Savoy and a few deaths at the other two points of disembarkation. There were no deaths on the voyage. Those deaths at Savoy were undoubtedly due to the conditions on the ships.

This is the second sheet of the evidence of Charles Groves Wright ANDERSON taken and sworn before me at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 8th day of November, 1945.

.....
Chairman, Australian Board of
Inquiry into War Crimes.

.....
Department

was at Tavy with evidence...

The larvae moved in four miles, of which he
accounted two. There were 2,000 on the ground near
and 1,000 on the ground near. Conditions were
favorably overcast. The sun was out in the
middle. On the ground there was not too much
of rice and a tin of meat and vegetables - one
man line - had to be divided between each of us.
We were in days on this trip. The ground conditions
lack of grain etc. led to a severe outbreak of
which later caused about 20 deaths in Tavy and a few
deaths at the other two points of observation.
There were no deaths on the voyage. These deaths at
Tavy were undoubtedly due to the conditions on the
trip.

This is the second sheet of the evidence of
Charles Groves Wright ANDERSON taken and sworn before
me at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this
28th day of November, 1945.

.....
Charles Groves Wright Anderson
Deponent

.....
Chairman, Australian Board of
Inquiry into War Crimes.

We left on 14 May 1942 and arrived at Tavoy 14 days later, on 28 May 1942.

Two or three days after our arrival, despite warnings to other ranks, eight men of 4 Anti-Tank Regiment escaped. Escape was very easy. However, they had no plans and no arms and were quickly recaptured. Brig. Varley heard that they had been tried and eight graves were dug. We made very strong protests to Lieut. Schina, the Company Commander controlling prisoners-of-war, but with no result. Brig. Varley took very aggressive action with him but he was a very strong character and decided not to take full responsibility and went to see Maj. Itsui, who directed that the men be executed. *with Varley*

Although the men were tried in a sort of way, they were not represented; we had no talk with them and were refused admission to see them. Padre Bashford asked permission to see the men before they were executed but this, too, was denied.

I was waiting at the headquarters of the armed guard when a party moved past me into the area where the execution was to take place. The men to be executed were taken to the scene in trucks. On arrival, they were blindfolded, their hands were tied behind them, and they were taken into the position where they were to be executed, opposite the graves. Two shots were then fired into each of them at very close range. Brig. Varley was present at the execution, and so was Padre Bashford. As far as possible, the execution was decently carried out; the men were killed instantly. The senior of the men executed was W.O. Quittendon. The story of the execution was told me by Brig. Varley immediately after it had occurred. If there had been any representation of the men at their trial, I should have heard about it. Maj. Itsui is the man whom I hold responsible for the execution and it was his name that was given to me as being the man who had ordered the shooting. These executions took place in the first week of June 1942 and were the only ones I know of which took place in Tavoy.

I subsequently proceeded with Brig. Varley to Thambazait, where Brig. Varley became the Allied Commander of No. 3 Branch on the Thailand-Burma railway. We were joined by a party of Dutch and another party of Americans. There were several executions of Dutch and three Australians there. One of these Australians was Bell, who escaped with Capt. Mull, was badly wounded in the escape and brought back and executed. Padre Bashford interviewed him before he died. Another of the Australians executed was Whittaker, of the A.A.S.C. About eight or nine Dutch were also executed, but I do not know their names. I was not in Thambazait at the time; they took place after I had gone away. None of these executions was witnessed.

I then took a party of men, known as Anderson Force, on the Burma-Thailand railway and remained in command of that party from September 1942 until January 1944. At one stage early in 1943, I amalgamated with Williams Force and we then became known as the No. 1 Mobile Camp.

In the early days while we were close to supplies, food was poor but not bad. Drugs were very, very scarce, and as the war grew on, conditions worsened. Tasks were increased after early 1943 and pressure to get men out to work was increased. The process by which the Japanese controlled these working camps was that the actual administration of the prisoners was done by the prisoners themselves. They kept all records of pay, sick reports, etc. The recommendations of the doctors were at first respected but afterwards, when more labour was required, the Japanese demanded more men for work and, as figures of fit men became inadequate, they paraded all the sick men and forced some of them out to work.

We left on 14 May 1942 and arrived at Tavoy 14 days later.

on 28 May 1942.

Two or three days after our arrival, despite warnings to other ranks, eight men of 4 Anti-Tank Regiment escaped. Escape was very easy. However, they had no plans and no arms and were quickly recaptured. Brig. Varley heard that they had been tried and eight graves were dug. We made very strong protests to Lieut. Schinn, the Company Commander controlling prisoners-of-war, but with no result. Brig. Varley took very aggressive action with him but he was a very strong character and decided not to take full responsibility and went to see Maj. Lewis, who directed that the men be executed.

Although the men were tried in a sort of way, they were not represented; we had no talk with them and were refused admission to see them. Padre Bashford asked permission to see the men before they were executed but this, too, was denied.

I was waiting at the headquarters of the armed guard when a party moved past me into the area where the execution was to take place. The men to be executed were taken to the scene in trucks. On arrival, they were blindfolded, their hands were tied behind them, and they were taken into the position where they were to be executed, opposite the graves. Two shots were then fired into each of them at very close range. Brig. Varley was present at the execution, and so was Padre Bashford. As far as possible, the execution was decently carried out; the men were killed instantly. The senior of the men executed was W.O. Giltendon. The story of the execution was told me by Brig. Varley immediately after it had occurred. If there had been any other witnesses, they would have been held responsible for the execution and I would have been held responsible for the man who had ordered the execution. These executions took place in the last week of June 1942 and were the only ones I know of which took place in Tavoy.

[Handwritten note:] This is the only case of a party of 8 men being executed in the Tavoy area. The party consisted of 8 men, 4 of whom were British and 4 were Australian. They were all killed on 14 June 1942.

I subsequently proceeded with the party to Imphal, where Brig. Varley became the commander of No. 8 Branch. The party consisted of 8 men, 4 of whom were British and 4 were Australian. They were all killed on 14 June 1942. One of these Australians was Bell, who escaped with Capt. Hill, was badly wounded in the escape and brought back and executed. Padre Bashford interviewed him before he died. Another of the Australians executed was Wiltaker, of the A.A.C. About eight or nine Dutch were also executed, but I do not know their names. I was not in Imphal at the time; they took place after I had gone away. None of these executions was witnessed.

I then took a party of men, known as Anderson force, on the Burma-Thailand railway and remained in command of that party from September 1942 until January 1944. At one stage early in 1943, I amalgamated with Williams force and we then became known as the No. 1 Mobile Camp.

In the early days while we were close to supplies, food was poor but not bad. Drugs were very, very scarce, and as the war grew on, conditions worsened. Tasks were increased after early 1943 and pressure to get men out to work was increased. The process by which the Japanese controlled these working camps was that with the actual administration of the prisoners was done by the prisoners themselves. They kept all records of pay, sick reports, etc. The recommendations of the doctors were at first respected but afterwards, when more labour was required, the Japanese demanded more men for work and, as figures of fit men became inadequate, they paraded all the sick men and forced some of them out to work.

We would not let our sick men get on the parades. If more men were demanded than it was practicable to send out on the question of fitness, the least-sick were paraded, and the Japs selected from those men for work. Ofcourse, the very bad, obviously bad, cases were changed to the men less sick sub rosa.

My Force at this time was a ctually a line-laying party on the Burma side, and laid the line from about 30 miles down to about the 155 kilo mark, where the line met the parties from the other side. The food got very bad. It was very indifferent - vitaminosis was very prevalent. Pellagra showed itself very badly. We made repeated appeals for more drugs and more food, more proteins. There was meat in the country; it was brought up on the hoof; there was no reason at all why better conditions could not have been provided.

From May 1943 the tide of war was rather going against the Japs and the general conditions there were worse, particularly from interference by planes to their shipping lines. It became to the Japs more and more imperative that the Burma-Thailand railway line should be completed - it was a lifeline to them, and they more or less considered it was an honour to die on "the glorious task". Conditions became very bad. Wastage of labour through lack of food, diseases, callous indifference, and sheer stupidity, was rising, and accounted for at least one-third of the casualties we had.

The Japs had no method of saving labour, no planning which would have saved hours of work. It was just coolie labour to them. They were not responsible as to life or death - it just didn't matter to them.

Conditions under which they worked the men were very grim. To give an instance: In one camp of about 1,000 men, 300 men had to work some times up to 14 hours a day under the most appalling conditions - in rain, in great filth, with most insufficient accommodation for rest; and they would be bare-footed and had practically no clothes. Next day they would have to work again, another stretch of 15 or 14 hours. I have known men work 40 hours in a stretch. As we were constructing the railway, there would be about 10 miles between the different camps; when we had got halfway, we would have to go to the next camp and retrace our steps, instead of proceeding onwards. The simple thing would have been to take the line to the next camp, where the sick and gear would be carried; but no, the Japs decided we all would have to go back to the starting point, and then take the gear and the sick, with sick men carrying sick, right forward again. We would be carrying 10 per cent of our sick. Allegedly fit men had to carry these men and continue the work on the line.

Squalor in the camps was indemonstrable. We would have to move away dying Burmese coolies with cholera and smallpox. The huts were filthy hovels. Rain fell incessantly, and conditions were terrible.

At Apayong, the 80 kilo camp, was a hospital belonging to No. 5 Group, which was again operating at 100 miles. We were not under No. 5 Group at that time. We arrived there and found the men there in jungle huts, underfed, without medicines, with ulcers, and in very weak condition. Some men had their legs with the bones showing, from the ulcers. My medical officers - there was no Australian M.O. there - provided what help they could; we gave them some extra food. But it was most difficult to interfere with other Groups and it was only by stealth that we could help our other men. We did it without the Japs knowing. Commander Epstein, a USA Naval doctor, was there, and was replaced by a Dutch half-caste doctor.

We would not let our side get on the ground. It was very dark then it was necessary to look out on the ground to find out where the other side was. The lights were very dim, and the fog was very thick. The fog was very thick, and the lights were very dim. The fog was very thick, and the lights were very dim.

By force of this side was a specially a line-drawing party on the line. The line was about 20 miles long. The line was about 20 miles long. The line was about 20 miles long. The line was about 20 miles long.

This is the name of the witness who testified at this trial. The name of the witness who testified at this trial. The name of the witness who testified at this trial.

[Handwritten signature]

Deposant Chairman, Australian Board of Inquiry into War Crimes. The name of the witness who testified at this trial. The name of the witness who testified at this trial.

Conditions under which they worked the war was very hard. The conditions under which they worked the war was very hard. The conditions under which they worked the war was very hard. The conditions under which they worked the war was very hard.

Special in the camp was indispensable. The special in the camp was indispensable. The special in the camp was indispensable. The special in the camp was indispensable.

At Sydney, the 80th line camp was a hospital belonging to the 8th Group, which was being operated at 100 miles. The 80th line camp was a hospital belonging to the 8th Group, which was being operated at 100 miles. The 80th line camp was a hospital belonging to the 8th Group, which was being operated at 100 miles.

The men had been left behind there - their camp had moved on and they had been left behind as a base camp for 3 Group - the Japs policy was to abandon the sick and feed the ~~mill~~ healthy.

Dealing with the Thailand POW organisation branches 3, 4 and 5, there were roughly 8,000 odd Australians in the three branches, and the deaths totalled 1,564, on the line, and the total includes a few deaths from bombing. Those three Branches and those figures do not include F or H force. They are Australian figures.

Roughly there were about 50,000 white prisoners (Australian, American, Dutch and British) in the Thailand camps; in March 1945 from Jap reports the deaths amounted to 8,200; but probably 8,500 would be closer the mark. That figure still excludes F and H Forces.

I put the bulk of those deaths down to in the early days dysentery, the greatest killer at that stage, due to unsuitable food and insufficient drugs; after that it was malaria.

From my own knowledge of the position, those deaths in the most part would have been avoidable if the Japs had supplied us with drugs, proper food, and much needed rest from work. The Japs controlled the quinine supplies of the world and made insufficient issued.

I took BRIGADIER Varley's place as Allied commander of No. 3 Branch.

One Commander of the Jap camps was Major General SASA.

He inspected the Burma side in about April or May 1943. One hospital at 30 kilos was closed down - there were not sufficient hospitals as it was, but he told Nagatamo that there were too many sick and that if there were less hospitals there would be less sick. He made his inspection from a truck. Brigadier Varley was in the back of the truck. Repeated requests were made for an interview with SASA, but these were all refused; and Sasas asked for no opinions. He is a trained soldier - such a man who must have observed in every camp the shocking state - the conditions and the food - the men were living under, and made no improvement or ordered no inquiry.

The man had been left behind there - their camp had moved on and they had been left behind as a base camp for 5 Group - the Japanese policy was to abandon the sick and lead the rest healthy.

Leading with the Thailand POW organization branches 2, 4 and 5, there were roughly 8,000 odd Australians in the three branches, and the deaths totaled 1,500 on the line, and the total includes a few deaths from bombing. Those three branches and those figures do not include 7 or 8 forces. They are Australian figures.

Roughly there were about 30,000 white prisoners (Australian, American, Dutch and British) in the Thailand camp; in March 1945 from the reports the deaths amounted to 8,500; but probably 8,000 would be closer the mark. That figure still excludes 7 and 8 forces.

I put the bulk of those deaths down to in the early days of the war, the greatest killer at that stage, due to inadequate food and insufficient drugs; after that it

This is the fifth sheet of the evidence of Lt-Col Charles Groves Wright ANDERSON taken and sworn before me at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 26th day of November, 1945.

I took BRIGADIER VARISEY's evidence as a witness and commander of No. 3 Branch.

Deponent

Chairman, Australian Board of Inquiry into War Crimes.

He inspected the Burma side in about April or May 1943. One hospital at 30 miles was closed down - there were not sufficient hospitals as it was, but he told me that there were too many sick and that if there were less hospitals there would be less sick. He made his inspection from a truck. Brigadier Varisey was in the back of the truck. Repeated requests were made for an interview with BRIGADIER VARISEY and he was asked for no opinion. BRIGADIER VARISEY was a trained soldier - such a man who must have observed in every camp the shocking state - the conditions and the food - the men were living under, and made no improvement or ordered no inquiry.

I double-crossed my camp commander and put out all our eating utensils and food baskets which were in a simply shocking condition. It was impossible not to see that. The guards are very well treated there. This must have been obvious to General Sasa. He would not allow any interview. We did everything to catch his eye and no man of military experience could fail to see wrong. He did not inspect a man. Only the senior officers were paraded. Brigadier Varley came up from base of the various camps. I was not 2 I/c at that stage. As a military commander, he failed to do anything to alleviate the position. He ordered the closing of the 30th Hospital Camp, which was absolutely vital to us. Instead of improving things he made them worse. He must have seen it. He lessened the number of sick by lessening the hospitals; that is the Japanese method of lessening the sick.

Following him was Col. Nakamura, called "Handlebars" because of his very big moustache. He issued a letter in which he said he took charge of the last stages. His main view was look after your health; that it was a great honour to assist the Japanese in building this railway. He was a very useless incompetent gentleman who did absolutely nothing for us. He was a soldier. The civilian counts nowhere in Japan at all. No alleviation took place due to him.

Col. Sugasa wa followed him. His headquarters were at Samburi then Bangkok, as with others. Samburi was a British town in Thailand about 90 miles northwest of Bangkok. Sugasa wa continued the same policy as the previous people. He was wholly implicated. Tamakan was the camp where 3 Group came to after the withdrawal from Burma in March, 1944. It was alongside the war memorial the Japanese erected to the dead on the Thai railway. There were two bridges there -- one concrete and steel and the other a wooden bridge. The camp was absolutely alongside it and on the boundaries of the camp was a Japanese Ack Ack Battery of medium ack ack gunners. The bridges were subject to bombing several times. The first bombing caused us 18 killed 34 wounded. I was camp commander 2 group at the time. I had as a matter of fact very strong influence in that camp because it was an old camp I was at, and Col. Williamson and I worked in very harmoniously. Col. Williamson saw Sugasawa and requested that the camp be moved to Chungkai, four miles away from the military objective, and also advised him that we had insufficient trench protection for the strength of the camp. He refused to listen to any petitions and told us we must take the chances. Col. Ishii saw fit to move his HQ immediately to Chungkai; with one day of bombing he and his senior staff left us and moved to Chungkai. Next month the strength of the camp moved from 3,000 to 5400 at a peak period. Actually, accommodation on the very low Japanese standards could only carry 3,500 men. It was quite possible to put these men in other camps. I have no hesitation in saying it was a deliberate attempt of the Japanese to expose the prisoners to casualties from the air. That is a definite accusation. Sugasawa intended the men to be killed there. There was no possible reason why the men should have been taken there. People coming back from the jungle could have gone to Chungkai just as easily as to us. He has sufficient men to protect the objective. The deduction is that by increasing the number of men and still not allowing further trenches to be dug for protection the desire was to kill the prisoners with their own bombs. I think you will get a similar opinion from practically any officer in that camp. Sugasawa was the commander at that stage. He was the Thailand Group Commander. The branch commander was Col. Ishii. All he did was to get out. He had two or three camps. Chungkai was his camp too. That camp was bombed and machine gunned seven or eight times. Latterly, the bombing was very good; early it was not so good. The total bombing casualties in the Prisoner-of-war camp was I think 2x00 200 killed. That included Tambizart Camp. At Nompladuk 100 were killed in one day. Subordinate to these commanders were the branch commanders. At No. 3 was Lt.-Col. Nagatomo who had a great deal of association with Brigadier Varley and myself. There succeeded Col. Nagatomo, Lt.-Col. Ishii, previously commander at No. 4

and

subsequently at No. 2 branch. Subsequently at Nakompaton was Capt. Mizdani, who was subsequently a Major on the Commander's staff at Bangkok. He was known as "King the Merciless". He is regarded as one of the worst; in fact, I would put him down as the worst. I had no close association with him. He is the man who would be responsible for the camp of abandoned sick at Ap along. Of a group of young Americans, National Guardsmen, which was divided into two parties, one party came under Col. Nagatomo in 3 Branch and the other party under Capt. Mizdani at 5 branch. The former had 5 per cent casualties and the latter over 23 per cent.

This is the seventh
of Lt.-Col. Anderson taken and sworn before me at
Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 28th
day of November, 1945.

.....
Chairman, Australian Board of
Inquiry into War Crimes.

.....
Proprietor

unusually at 10.30 hours. Subsequently at 11.00 hours
Capt. Richard, who was subsequently a Major in the
Royal Australian Air Force, was seen on the
airfield at 11.00 hours. He was seen as "King the
airfield". I would not put it down as
a fact. I had no close association with him. It is
not possible to be responsible for the camp of
detainees. It is a group of young Americans, and
detainees, which was divided into two parties, one party
under Capt. Richard and the other party under
Capt. Richard at 10.30 hours. The former had 5 per cent
and the latter over 25 per cent.

This is the seventh sheet of the evidence
of Lt.-Col. Anderson taken and sworn before me at
Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 26th
day of November, 1945.


.....
Deponent

.....
Chairman, Australian Board of
Inquiry into War Crimes.

In my opinion Capt Mindani would be to a large extent responsible for the higher death rate. His policy must be responsible for that.

The Commander of No. 2 Branch was Lt-Col Yamagida. He subsequently became the commander of Makempaten Hospital. He is referred to in Colonel Coates evidence as Yamagita. The Camp Commanders with Anderson Force and No. 1 Mobile Force were Lieut Matsuzaki and Lieut Naito. I regard both of these as being responsible for the deaths of the men.

I wish to mention a Korean known as "Dillinger". Some time either in November or December 1942 a working party was operating on the line close to 18 kilo camp. A guard named Taimoto, alias "Dillinger", left the working party in the afternoon with Sgt O'Donnell, 2/10 Pd Regt. About four o'clock in the afternoon three shots were heard. Shortly afterwards Taimoto came back into camp and appeared fairly excited. An immediate roll call was ordered. By that time all the working party were back in camp. They were working on contract work and had finished early. Roll call was ordered and we checked one man missing, the man being Sgt O'Donnell. We reported that he had left the working party with Taimoto.

There was obvious excitement among the Japanese. About half past 5 Lieut Yamada, the Camp Commander at 35 Kilo Camp, came into our camp. He sent for me and he told me that one man had escaped and asked me if I knew anything about it. I said that nobody had escaped. At 9 o'clock that night I was taken off with the interpreter, Capt W. Crower, and an armed party into the bush, about a kilometer southwest of the camp, and there found the body of Sgt O'Donnell lying in some heavy undergrowth. Lieut Yamada told me that he had seen the body trying to escape. The body was nearly cold.

I got Yamada's torch and examined the body and found three wounds. One went through the higher part of the chest, the bullet emerging down in the back. The bullet had hit a bone and turned. The point of exit at the back was a very big wound. The other two wounds were through the lower part of the jaw and through the top of the head. On both sides were signs of brains and blood. The inference was that the first wound dropped the boy and the other wounds were caused by subsequent shooting. I pointed this out to Yamada, pointing out that the first wound was obvious and, as the shot entered from the front, pointed out that the boy could not have been escaping. I do not know the motive for that murder, but Taimoto was in the habit of going round a few native huts that were dotted about the bush and stealing chickens and bananas and so on. He took O'Donnell with him to carry the stuff back. I rather think that he was running along chasing chickens and suddenly missed O'Donnell. He then suddenly came upon him face to face and shot him. That was one reason we put it down to: that the boy could not keep up in bare feet and Taimoto got excited and killed him. The only other inference was that it was just a desire to kill on Taimoto's part.

I told Yamada that I had searched the boy's gear when I heard he was missing and he had a tin of bully beef and a tin of milk there, and pointed out that, if he was trying to escape, he would not leave his boots and his cloths behind. Yamada, incidentally, was a very excellent Japanese officer and the only one we had any respect for. I believe the Japanese instituted inquiries and we heard that "Dillinger" had been badly beaten by the Japanese, but he appeared in our camps later on. After the Japanese surrender they paid off most of their Koreans and told them to go. We found "Dillinger" in Bangkok. He was arrested and put in

our own looking and looking over to the Commission that was
handling the evidence. I heard that he committed suicide.
He was under arrest at the time.

At the end of 1945 we were preparing back into
Korea and conditions were not so good. There were not 5000
but there were well over 7000. In occasional jungle parties
we went out in April 1945 more than 1000 men were killed
at Khabarovsk Base Hospital and sent out to a place called
Tremont's Mission to build a road, which was to be built.
We were operating under shocking conditions and the death rate
increased from two per day in the last week of July to 5-7 per
day in the first fortnight of August. But one thousand men died
during that short period from July to August and 500 of the
survivors would not have survived another week. Wilson of the
died after release. They were worked to death and were not
properly fed and worked under shocking conditions. A full report
of that has been put in. I think the Australian decision is
that party numbered about 30 to 35. The party was equipped
mainly of lunch and bedding. The local Australian wireless
in that party was about 100 men. That is only a guess, but
it is very close to the mark. The proportion of deaths among
the Australians was a little less than the proportion of the
others.

Major J. G. ...
I have just given you a copy of the report. The full
account of that has been handed in to the ... of ...
Early after the capitulation we heard of this party and we got
on to ... he sent in a report with which was anti-
Japan, giving a fair, clear indication of what took place.
In a paragraph headed "Responsibility" he named Major ...
person responsible. ... was his responsibility and down
to two major ... who committed these ...
... it then went down to ... He left it as that
but he added a rider to the effect that the Major-General
command of the division was ... at the time
... there were no other ... or less ...

This is the 9th sheet of the evidence of
Charles Groves Wright Anderson taken and
sworn before me at Sydney in the State of
New South Wales this 26th day of November, 1945.

Charles Groves Wright Anderson

C. G. W. Anderson

Deponent

Chairman, Australian Board of
Inquiry into War Crimes

At Sungkri, 131 Kilo, near Niski, Private Derkin, of 2/2 Pioneers, was killed on 14 August 1945. We did not get information of this until about 23 or 25 August 1945. Dispositions were then taken of all men who came from that camp who knew the case and these were handed in to the War Crimes Commission at Bangkok. From hearsay, I know that the unit engaged in digging defence positions at Niski were forcing sick men out to work. Derkin had a high temperature at the time and was probably delirious, and he left the working party and was in the bush for three or four days. He was recovered and brought back into the camp and was then tied to a tree for 14 days. A grave was then dug and he was bayoneted and buried.

In 1944, Nagatoma left Kanburi, as far as I know, in chains and as I was told in July 1945 by Capt. Naguchi, Commander of No. 7 Branch, that Nagatoma had died from a disease. I can only infer that he had stolen funds. He was always polite and listened very carefully to our requests but the pressure on the sick and lack of supplies of food still went on. This could have been due to corrupt practices on his part. I hold the view that the prisoners-of-war were on coolie rations but that the Branch Commanders had funds to supplement these rations. Our rations came from the Railway Engineers and meat was bought by Nagatoma and supplied through the prisoner-of-war administration. In February 1944 there was a big inquiry. Ishi was Commander of No. 3 Group then in Burma and suddenly he dashed back to Moulmein and sent large quantities of meat to our camp. This took three days to come by train to Moulmein and arrived eventually in a shocking condition as no arrangements had been made to preserve it. The anxiety which he showed to try and produce meat rapidly to us indicated that there had been a big inquiry. Then he improved his methods and brought us salted beef. Then, suddenly, all beef rations stopped. The only interpretation I can give is that as he suddenly produced meat, he had the funds, which then supported the theory that Nagatoma was buying meat from his funds; so that if the rations were below the scale it might be an indication that the money went into his own pocket.

The Japanese were unable to conceal two young Lieutenants who were actually engaged on the laying of the line from Burma. These were two Japanese lieutenants actually engaged in controlling the laying of the line and they were responsible for the shocking conditions and hours of work that No. 1 Mobile Camp suffered. These two men can be located because they were in charge of the line-laying. I have no indication as to who the Japanese regimental commander was except that I think he was called Hyashi, as the work was done under the control of the Hyashi Butai. One of the Japanese lieutenants was Sato.

It was an instruction of the Japanese that we had to have a night watchman at either end of our huts to be responsible for anybody leaving the hut for private purposes and, in case of escape, those watchmen would be held responsible. In about the last quarter of 1943, at 2 o'clock in the morning, Sgt. Lynch was the night watchman at my end of the hut. He had gone to call his relief down a very dark passage, and just as he left, one of the worst guards on the line arrived. He was Arai, alias "The Stormtrooper". He did not wait but immediately awakened the officers. Lynch then came back and I called out to him to call after Arai and tell him that he had been changing guards and had returned. Lynch followed him up the hill a little and called out to him but received no reply.

AS GUNFIRE, 121 Miles, Private Parkin, of 8th
Flowers, was killed on 14 August 1945. He did not get information
of this until about 22 or 23 August 1945. Dispositions were then
taken of all men who came from that camp who knew the case and
there were handed in to the War Crimes Commission at Bangkok.
From memory, I know that the unit engaged in fighting Japanese
positions at Miki were leaving sick men out to work. Parkin
had a high temperature at the time and was probably delirious,
and he felt the working party and was in the bush for three or
four days. He was recovered and brought back into the camp and
was then laid to rest for 14 days. A grave was then dug and
he was buried and buried.

In 1944, Nagatani left Kanburi, as far as I know, in chains
and he was told in July 1945 by Capt. Nagatani, Commander of
No. 7 Branch, that Nagatani had died from a disease. I can only
infer that he had died of malaria. He was always polite and listened
very carefully to our requests but the pressure on the sick and
lack of supplies of food still went on. This could have been due
to corrupt practices on his part. I hold the view that the
prisoners-of-war were on coiled rations but that the Branch
Commanders had funds to supplement these rations. Our rations
came from the Railway Engineers and were bought by Nagatani
and supplied through the prisoner-of-war administration. In
February 1944 there was a big industry. I had been Commander of
No. 3 Group then in Burma and suddenly he dashed back to Moulmein
and sent large quantities of meat to our camp. This took three
days to come by train to Moulmein and arrived eventually in a
shocking condition as no arrangements had been made to preserve
it. The anxiety which he showed to try and produce meat rapidly
to us indicated that there had been a big industry. Then he
improved his methods and brought us salted beef. Then, suddenly,
all beef rations stopped. The only interpretation I can give
is that as he suddenly produced meat, he had the funds, which
then disappeared, to buy the meat. This is the tenth sheet of the evidence of

Mr. Charles Wright taken and sworn before me in the State of New South
Wales this 26th day of November, 1945.

The Japanese were unable to control two young lieutenants
who were actually engaged on the laying of the line from Burma.
There were two Japanese lieutenants actually engaged in controlling
the laying of the line and they were responsible for the shocking
conditions and hours of work that the British Camp suffered.
These two men can be located because they were in charge of the
line-laying. I have no indication as to the Japanese
names of these two men except that one was called Hara.
The Japanese lieutenant was late.

It was an indication of the Japanese that we had to have
a night watchman at either end of our hut to be responsible for
anybody leaving the hut for private purposes and, in case of escape,
those watchmen would be held responsible. In about the last
quarter of 1945, at 3 o'clock in the morning, Sgt. Lynch was the
night watchman at my end of the hut. He had gone to call his
rifle down a very dark passage, and just as he left, one of the
watch guards on the line arrived. He was Arzi, alias "The
Stormtrooper". He did not wait but immediately awakened the
officers. Lynch then came back and I called out to him to call
after Arzi and tell him that he had been changing guards and had
returned. Lynch followed him up the hill a little and called out
to him but received no reply.

Lynch's relief returned and took over and Lynch retired. Three minutes later "Storm Trooper" Bull came back and immediately saw Sgt. Smith of the 2/15 Fld Regt. He demanded to know where he was. Smith explained to him that we were changing, and in the meantime I got up and interfered and told Bull that the men were changing and pointed to the time by the clock. He went into a furious rage and took the two men, Lynch and Smith, to the guard house. I suspected that he intended to bash them up and I collected the interpreter, Capt. Dreward, and we went over to give a hand.

Bull started beating the two men and I interposed; he rushed at me and eventually laid me out with a stick of bamboo -- he knocked me out for about a minute and then he knocked out the interpreter for several minutes. He then realized that he had gone too far; after lecturing us for about an hour, he went away.

Lynch died within three weeks. He was badly beaten up that night. The actual cause of death was cerebral malaria. I suppose it was rather a savage beating and certainly must have had a weakening effect on his resistance. Bull used a bamboo stick on Lynch. At the time, Lynch was not fit in any way. I fear that that beating lowered his resistance -- but to what extent is a matter for surmise.

~~I certify that the above evidence is true and correct~~

.....

This is the 11th and last sheet of the evidence of Charles Groves Wright Anders on taken and sworn before me at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 26th day of November, 1945.

Charles Groves Wright Anders
.....
Deponent

.....
Chairman, Australian Board of Inquiry into War Crimes.

3

AUSTRALIAN WAR CRIMES

BOARD OF INQUIRY

CHARLES GROVES WRIGHT ANDERSON, sworn and examined:

I am NX12595 Lt-Col Charles Groves Wright Anderson,
C.O. 2/19 Aust Inf Bn.

I became a prisoner of war at Singapore on 15
February 1942.

During the fighting prior to the fall of Singapore
I did not witness anything in the nature of a war crime or
atrocities. I did, however, hear of the massacre of wounded
at Parit Sulong.

We were fighting at Bakri and Parit Sulong between
18 January and 22 January, and I had Intelligence reports
that the Japanese unit we were fighting was the Japanese
First Guards Division. I have no knowledge from my own
observations or inquiries as to the Japanese unit we were
fighting.

I and the troops under my command were surrounded.
We suffered severe casualties and it became necessary to
withdraw. It was impossible to get the severely wounded
away. We had to leave them there. There were dispersed
in trucks and huts within the Parit Sulong perimeter.
At one stage we were being heavily shelled there.

I remained at that position for about half an hour
after the last of my troops had withdrawn. The withdrawal
took place over a period of about 25 minutes and companies
were moving out at five-minute intervals. The last company,
I believe, was timed to withdraw at half past nine. That
company moved out at that time and I remained there with five
other officers for some time. At that stage the battle had
died down. We were not returning Japanese fire. Artillery
fire had ceased. The Japanese were doing some firing at
our troops who were withdrawing, but there was no fire from
our side.

The Japanese must have seen the withdrawal of our
troops. Up to the time I left the position the Japanese
had not overrun the position. I left there between 100 and
200 white wounded and about 150 Indian wounded. I have
not seen a man of those whom I knew were left there. I
have since heard that the Japanese came in and massacred
those wounded. I heard that from Capt Lloyd Cahill, my
regimental M.O., but he did not witness it. The only
official survivor to my knowledge is Lieut Hackney.

There is no question to my mind that the Japanese
were aware of the withdrawal, because all the heavy artillery
fire had ceased and the impression I formed was that they
had been hard hit and were content to let us go. All the
wounded who could be moved were taken away. I think we
got out about 140. Some of the wounded we could not take
were left in ambulances, of which we had two. Some were in
Army trucks, others were in huts.

I eventually made my way to Singapore with my troops
and ultimately I went with "A" Force to Burma. The Force
was under the command of Brigadier Varley and I was his
second-in-command. The Force was divided into three groups -
three battalions - one of which disembarked at Victoria
Point, one at Mergui and the Headquarters at Tavoy. The
party which landed at Victoria point was under Major Green,
2/4 Machine Gun Battalion. Lt-Col Ramsey, 2/18 Battalion,
was in command of the group which landed at Mergui and I

was at Tavoy with Brigadier Varley.

The force moved in four ships, of which we occupied two. There were 2,000 on the Toyashi Maru and 1,000 on the Celebes Maru. Conditions were frightfully overcrowded. The men were down in the holds. On the Toyashi Maru we got two small helpings of rice a day and a tin of meat and vegetable - one-man tins - had to be divided between each 60 men. We were 14 days on that ship. The crowded conditions, lack of drugs etc. led to a severe outbreak of dysentery, which later caused about 20 deaths in Tavoy and a few deaths at the other two points of disembarkation. There were no deaths on the voyage. Those deaths at Tavoy were undoubtedly due to the conditions on the ships.

We left on 14 May 1942 and arrived at Tavoy 14 days later on 28 May 1942.

Two or three days after our arrival, despite warnings to other ranks, eight men of 4 Anti-Tank Regiment escaped. Escape was very easy. However, they had no plans and no arms and were quickly recaptured. Brig. Varley heard that they had been tried and eight graves were dug. We made very strong protests to Lieut. Schina, the Company Commander controlling prisoner-of-war, but with no result. Brig. Varley took very aggressive action with him, and he decided not to take full responsibility and went to see Maj. Itsui with Brig Varley, who directed that the men be executed.

Although the men were tried in a sort of way, they were not represented; we had no talk with them and were refused admission to see them. Padre Bashford asked permission to see the men before they were executed but this, too, was denied.

I was waiting at the headquarters of the armed guard when a party moved past me into the area where the execution was to take place. The men to be executed were taken to the scene in trucks. On arrival, they were blindfolded, their hands were tied behind them, and they were taken into the position where they were to be executed, opposite the graves. Two shots were then fired into each of them at very close range. Brig. Varley was present at the execution, and so was Padre Bashford. As far as possible, the execution was decently carried out; the men were killed instantly. The senior of the men executed was W.O. QUITTENDON. The story of the execution was told me by Brig. Varley immediately after it had occurred. If there had been any representation of the men at their trial, I should have heard about it. Maj Itsui is the man whom I hold responsible for the execution and it was his name that was given to me as being the man who had ordered the shooting. These executions took place in the first week of June 1942 and were the only ones I know of which took place in Tavoy.

I subsequently proceeded with Brig. Varley to Thambazait, where Brig. Varley became the Allied Commander of No. 3 Branch on the Thailand-Burma railway. We were joined by a party of Dutch and another party of Americans. There were several executions of Dutch and Three Australians there. One of these Australians was Bell, who escaped with Capt. Mull, was badly wounded in the escape and brought back and executed. Padre Bashford interviewed him before he died. Another of the Australians executed was Whittaker, of the A.A.S.C. About eight Australians executed was Whittaker, of the A.A.S.C. About eight or nine Dutch were also executed, but I do not know their names. I was not in Thambazait at the time; They took place after I had gone away. None of these executions was witnessed.

I then took a party of men, known as Anderson Force, on the Burma-Thailand railway and remained in command of that party from September 1942 until January 1944. At one stage early in 1943, I amalgamated with Williams Force and we then became known as the No. 1 Mobile Camp.

In the early days while we were close to supplies, food was poor but not bad. Drugs were very, very scarce, and as the war grew on, conditions worsened. Tasks were increased after early 1943 and pressure to get men out to work was increased. The process by which the Japanese controlled these working camps was that the actual administration of the prisoners was done by the prisoners themselves. They kept all records of pay, sick reports, etc. The recommendations of the doctors were at first respected but afterwards, when more labour was required, the Japanese demanded more men for work and, as figures of fit men became inadequate, they paraded all the sick men and forced some of them out to work.

We would not let our sick men get on the parades. If more men were demanded than it was practicable to send out on the question of fitness, the least-sick were paraded, and the Japs selected from those men for work. Of course, the very bad, obviously bad, cases were changed to the men less sick sub rosa.

My Force at this time was actually a line-laying party on the Burma side, and laid the line from about 26 kilos down to about the 155 kilo mark, where the line met the parties from the other side. The food got very bad. It was very indifferent - vitaminosis was very prevalent. Pellagra showed itself very badly. We made repeated appeals for more drugs and more food, more proteins. There was meat in the country; it was brought up on the hoof; there was no reason at all why better conditions could not have been provided.

From May 1943 the tide of war was rather going against the Japs and the general conditions there were worse, particularly from interference by planes to their shipping lines. It became to the Japs more and more imperative that the Burma-Thailand railway line should be completed - it was a lifeline to them, and they more or less considered it was an honour to die on "the glorious task". Conditions became very bad. Wastage of labour through lack of food, diseases, callous indifference, and sheer stupidity, was rising, and accounted for at least one-third of the casualties we had.

The Japs had no method of saving labour, no planning which would have saved hours of work. It was just coolie labour to them. They were not responsible as to life or death - it just didn't matter to them.

Conditions under which they worked the men were very grim. To give an instance: In one camp of about 1,000 men, 30 men had to work some times up to 14 hours a day under the most appalling conditions - in rain, in great filth, with insufficient accommodation for rest; and they would be bare-footed and had practically no clothes.. Next day they would have to work again, another stretch of 13 or 14 hours. I have known men work 40 hours in a stretch. As we were constructing the railway, there would be about 10 kilos between the different camps; when we had got halfway, we ~~would have to go to the next camp, where the sick and gear would be carried; but no, the Japs decided we all would have to go back to the starting point, and then take the gear and the sick, with sick men carrying sick, right forward again. We would be carrying 10 per cent of our sick, allegedly fit men had to carry those men and continue the work on the line.~~

Squalor in the camps was indescribable. We would have to move away dying Burmese coolies with cholera and smallpox, The huts were filthy hovels. Rain fell incessantly, and conditions were terrible.

At aparong, the 80 kilo camp, was a hospital belonging to No. 5 Group, which was again operating at 100 kilos. We were not under No. 5 Group at that time. We arrived there and found the men there in jungle huts, underfed, without medicines, with ulcers, and in very weak condition. Some men had their legs with the bones showing, from the ulcers. Some men medical officers - there was no Australia M.O. there - provided what help they could; we gave them some extra food. But it was most difficult to interfere with other Groups and it was only by stealth that we could help our other men. We did it without the Japs knowing. Commander Epstein, a USA Naval doctor, was there, and was replaced by a Dutch halfcaste doctor.

The men had been left behind there - their camp had moved on and they had been left behind as a base camp for 5 Group - the Japs policy was to abandon the sick and feed the healthy.

Dealing the Thailand P.O.W. organisation branches 3, 4 and 5, there were roughly 8,000 odd Australians in the three branches, and the deaths totalled 1,564, on the line, and the total includes a few deaths from bombing. Those three Branches and those figures do not include F or H Force. They are Australian figures.

Roughly there were about 50,000 white prisoners (Australians American, Dutch and British) in the Thailand camps; in March 1945 from Jap reports the deaths amounted to 8,200; but probably 8,500 would be closer the mark. That figure still excludes F and H Forces.

I put the bulk of those deaths down to in the early days dysentery, the greatest killer at that stage, due to unsuitable food and insufficient drugs; after that it was malaria.

From my own knowledge of the position, those deaths in the most part would have been avoidable if the Japs had supplied us with drugs, proper food, and much need rest from work. The Japs controlled the quinine supplies of the world and made insufficient issued.

I took Brigadier Varley's place as Allied commander of No. 3 Branch.

One Commander of the Jap camps was Major General SASA.

He inspected the Burma side in about April or May 1943. One hospital at 30 kilos was closed down - there were not sufficient hospitals as it was, but he told Nagatamo there were too many sick and that if there were less hospitals there would be less sick. He made his inspection from a truck. Brigadier Varley was in the back of the truck. Repeated requests were made for an interview with SASA, but these were all refused; and Sasa asked for no opinions. He is a trained soldier - such a man who must have observed in every camp the shocking state - the conditions and the food - the men were living under, and made no improvement or ordered no inquiry.

I double-crossed my camp commander and put out all our eating utensils and food baskets which were in a simply shocking condition, in a conspicuous place. This must have been obvious to General Sasa. He would not allow any interview. We did everything to catch his eye and no man of military experience could fail to see wrong. He did not inspect a man. Only the senior officers were paraded. Brigadier Varley came up from base to the various camps. I was not 2 1/c at that stage. Sasa as a military commander, failed to do anything to alleviate the position. He ordered the closing of the 30th Camp Hospital, which was absolutely vital to us. Instead of improving things he made them worse. He must have seen it. He lessened the number of sick by lessening the hospitals; that is the Japanese method of lessening the sick.

Following him was Col. Nokamura, called "Handlebars" because of his very big moustache. He issued a letter in which he said he took charge of the last stages. His main view was look after you health; that it was a great honour to assist the Japanese in building this railway. He was a very useless incompetent gentleman who did absolutely nothing for us. He was a soldier. The civilian counts nowhere in Japan at all. No alleviation took place due to him.

Col. Sugasa followed him. His headquarters were at Kamburi then Bangkok, as with others. Kamburi was a town in Thailand about 90 miles northwest of Bangkok. Sugasawa continued the same policy as the previous people. Tamakan was the camp where 3 Group came to after the withdrawal from Burma in March, 1944. It was alongside the war memorial the Japanese erected to the dead on the Thai railway. There were two bridges there - one concrete and steel and the other a wooden bridge. The camp was absolutely alongside it and on the boundaries of that camp was a Japanese Ack Ack Battery of medium ack ack gunners. The bridges were subject to bombing several times. The first bombing caused us 18 killed 34 wounded. I was not camp commander 2 group at the time. I had as a matter of fact very strong influence in that camp because it was an old camp I was at, and Col. Williamson, No 2 Commander, and I worked in very harmoniously. Col Williamson saw X Sugasawa and requested that the camp be moved to Chungkai, four miles away from the military objective, and also advise him that we had insufficient trench protection for the strength of the camp. He refused to listen to any petitions and told us we must take the chances. Col. Ishii saw fit to move his HQ immediately to Chungkai; with one day of bombing he and his senior staff left us and moved to Chungkai. Next month the strength of the camp increased from 3,000 to 5,400 at a peak period. Actually, accommodation on the very low Japanese standards could only carry 3,500 men. It was quite possible to put these men in other camps. I have no hesitation in saying it was a deliberate attempt of the Japanese to expose the prisoners to casualties from the air. That is a definite accusation. Sugasawa intended the men to be killed there. There was no possible reason why the men should have been taken there. There was no possible reason why the men should have been taken there. People coming back from the jungle could have gone to Chungkai just as easily as to us. He has sufficient men to protect the objective if that was his purpose. The deduction is that by increasing the number of men and still not allowing further trenches to be dug for protection the desire was to kill the prisoners with their own bombs. I think you will get a similar opinion from practically any officer in that camp. Sugasawa was the commander at that stage. He was the Thailand Group Commander. The branch commander was Col. Ishii. All he did was to get out. He had two or three camps. Chungkai was his camp too. Tamakan was bombed and machine gunned seven or eight times. Latterly, the bombing was very good; early it was not so good. The total bombing casualties in the prisoner-of-war camp was I think 200 killed. That included Tambizart Camp. At Nompladuk 100 were killed in one day. Subordinate to these commanders were the branch commanders. At No. 3 was Lt-Col. Negatomo who had a great deal of association with Brigadier Varley and myself. There succeeded Col. Negatomo, Lt-Col. Ishii, previously commander at No. 4 and

subsequently at No. 2 Branch. Subsequently at Nakompaton was Capt. Mizdani, who was subsequently a Major on the Commander's staff at Bangkok. He was known as "Ming the Merciless". He is regarded as one of the worst; in fact, I would put him down as the worst. I had no close association with him. He is the man who would be responsible for the camp of abandoned sick at Apalong. Of a group of young Americans, national Guardsmen, which was divided into two parties, one party came under Col. Nagatomo in 3 Branch and the other party under Capt. Mizdani at 5 branch. The former had 5 per cent casualties and the latter over 23 per cent.

In my opinion Capt Mizdani would be to a large extent responsible for the higher death rate. His policy must be responsible for that.

The Commander of No. Branch was Lt-Col Yamagida. He subsequently became the commander of Nakompton Hospital. He is referred to in Colonel Coates evidence ~~xxxxxxxMablixxxxx~~ as Yamagita. The Camp Commanders with Anderson Force and No. 1 Mobile Force were Lieut Matsaki and Lieut Naito. I regard both of these as being responsible for the deaths of men.

I wish to mention a Korean known as "Dillinger". Some time either in November or December 1942 a working party was operating on the line close to 18 Kilo Camp. A guard named Taimoto, alias "Dillinger", left the working party in the afternoon with Sgt O'Donnell, 2/10 Fd Regt. About four o'clock in the afternoon three shots were heard. Shortly afterwards Taimoto came back into camp and appeared fairly excited. An immediate roll call was ordered. By that time all the working party were back in camp. They were working on contract work and had finished early. Roll call was ordered and we checked one man missing, the man being sgt O'Donnell. We reported that he had left the working party with Taimoto.

There was obvious excitement among the Japanese. About half past 5 Lieut Yamada, the Camp Commander at 35 Kilo Camp, came into our camp. He sent for me and he told me that one man had escaped and asked me if I knew anything about it. I said that nobody had escaped. at 9 o'clock that night I was taken off with the interpreter, Capt W Drower, and an armed party into the bush, about a kilometer southwest of the camp, and there found the body of Sgt O'Donnell lying in some heavy undergrowth. Lieut Yamada told me that he had been shot trying to escape. The body was nearly cold.

I got Yamada's torch and examined the body and found three wounds. One went through the higher part of the chest, the bullet emerging low down in the back. The bullet had hit a bone and turned. The point of exit at the back was a very big wound. The other two wounds were through the lower part of the jaw and out through the top of the head. On both exits were signs of brains and blood on the grass. The inference was that the first wound dropped the boy and the other wounds were caused by subsequent shooting. I pointed this out to Yamada, pointing out that the first wound was obvious and, as the shot entered from the front, he could not have been escaping, I do not know the motive for the murder, but Taimoto was in the habit of going round a few native huts that were dotted about the bush and stealing chickens and bananas and so on. He took O'Donnell with him to carry the stuff back. I rather think that he was running along chasing chickens and suddenly missed O'Donnell. He then suddenly came upon him face to face and shot him. That was one reason we put it down to: that the boy could not keep up in bare feet and Taimoto got excited and killed him. The only other inference was that it was just a desire to kill on Taimoto's part.

I told Yamada that I had searched the boy's gear when I heard he was missing and he had a tin of bully beef and a tin of milk there, and pointed out that, if he was trying to escape, he would not leave his boots and his clothes behind. Yamada, incidentally, was a very decent Japanese officer and the only one we had any respect for. I believe the Japanese instituted inquiries and we heard the "Dillinger" had been badly beaten by the Japanese, but he appeared in our camps later on. After the Japanese surrender they paid off most of their Koreans and told them to go. We found "Dillinger" in Bangkok. He was arrested and put in

our camp lockup and handed over to the Commission that was handling war crimes. We heard that he committed suicide. he was under arrest at the time.

At the end of 1943 we were brought back into Thailand and conditions were not so bad. They were not good, but there was sufficient food. An occasional jungle party was sent out. In April 1945 some 1000 men were turned out of Nakompaton Base Hospital and sent out to a place called Prachuab Kirikan to build a road, which went to Mergui. They were operating under shocking conditions and the death rate increased from two per day in the last week of July to 5.7 per day in the first fortnight of August. Out of a thousand men 250 died during that short period from April 1 to August and 250 of the survivors would not have survived another week. Fifteen of them died after release. They were worked to death and were not properly fed and worked under shocking conditions. A full report of that has been put in. I think the Australian deaths in that party numbered about 30 to 35. The party was comprised mainly of Dutch and British. The total Australian strength in that party was about 120 men. That is only a guess, but it is very close to the mark. The proportion of deaths among the Australians was a little less than the proportion for the others.

Major J Stringer, 2/26 Battalion, went down to investigate the position in September 1945. The information I have just given really comes from his reports. The full account of that has been handed in to the R.A.P.W.I. at Bangkok. Early after the capitulation we heard of this party and we got on to Sugawara. He sent down Capt Mizudani to make a report on it. He sent in a rather stiff report which was anti-Japanese, giving a fair, clear indication of what took place. In a paragraph headed "responsibility", he named Major-General Matari (?), Commander Japanese 33 Division, as the principal person responsible. From him the responsibility went down to two major-generals who commanded mixed brigades. One was Sato. It then went down to four colonels. He left it at that, but he added a rider to the effect that the Major-General commanding the Division was actually at Kanburi at the time. That incident was more grim than anything that happened on the line. There were no officers except three or four British doctors.

At Sungkri, 131 Kilo, near Niaki, Private Derkin, of 2/2 Pioneers, was killed on 14 August 1945. We did not get information of this until about 23 or 25 August 1945. Dispositions were then taken of all men who came from that camp who knew the case and these were handed in to the War Crimes Commission at Bangkok. From hearsay, I know that the unit engaged in digging defence positions at Niaki were forcing sick men out to work. Darkin had a high temperature at the time and was probably delirious, and he left the working party and was in the bush for three or four days. He was recovered and brought back into the camp and was then tied to a tree for 14 days. A grave was then dug and he was bayoneted and buried.

In 1944, Nagatoma left Kanburi, as far as I know, in chains and I was told in July 1945 by Capt Naguchi, Commander of No. 7 Branch, that Nagatoma had died from a disease. I can only infer that he had stolen funds. He was always polite and listened very carefully to our requests but the pressure on the sick and lack of supplies of food still went on. This could have been due to corrupt practices on his part. I hold the view that the prisoners-of-war were on coolie rations but that the Branch Commanders had funds to supplement these rations. Our rations came from the Railway Engineers and meat was bought by Nagatoma and supplied through the prisoner-of-war administration. In February 1944 there was a big inquiry. Ishi was Commander of No. 3 Group in Burma and suddenly he dashed back to Moulmein and sent large quantities of meat to our camp. This took three days to come by train to Moulmein and arrived eventually in a shocking condition as no arrangements had been made to preserve it. The anxiety which he showed to try and produce meat rapidly to us indicated that there had been a big inquiry. The he improved his methods and brought us salted beef. Then, suddenly, all beef rations stopped. The only interpretation I can give is that as he suddenly produced meat, he had the funds, which then supported the theory that Nagatoma was buying meat from his funds; so that if the rations were below the scale it might be an indication that the money went into his own pocket. With regard to Railway Engineers guilty of crimes, the Japanese were unable to conceal two young Lieutenants who were actually engaged on the laying of the line from Burma. These were two Japanese lieutenants actually engaged in controlling the laying of the line and they were responsible for the shocking conditions and hours of work that No. 1 Mobile Camp suffered. These two men can be located because they were in charge of the line-laying. I have no indication as to who the Japanese regimental commander was except that I think he was called Hyashi, as the work was done under the control of the Hyashi Butai. One of the Japanese lieutenants was Sato.

It was an instruction of the Japanese that we had to have a night watchman at either end of our huts to be responsible for anybody leaving the hut for private purposes and, in case of escape, those watchmen would be held responsible. In about that last quarter of 1945, at 2 o'clock in the morning, Sgt. Lynch was the night watchman at my end of the hut. He had gone to call his relief down a very dark passage, and just he left, one of the worst guards on the line arrived. He was Arai, alias "The Stormtrooper". He did not wait. Lynch then came back and I called out to him to call after Arai and tell him that he had been changing guards and had returned. Lynch followed him up the hill a little and called out to him but received no reply.

Lynch's relief returned and took over and Lynch retired. Three minutes later "Storm Trooper" came back and saw Sgt Smith of the 2/15 Fld Regt. He demanded to know where he was. Smith explained to him that we were changing, and in the meantime I got up and interferred and told Bull that the men were changing and pointed to the time by the clock. He went into a furious rage and took the two men, Lynch and Smith, to the guard house. I suspected that he intended to bash them up and I collected the interpreter, Capt Drower, and we went over to give a hand.

Bull started beating the two men and I interposed; he rushed at me and eventually laid me out with a stick of bamboo - he knocked me out for about a minute and then he knocked out the interpreter for several minutes. He then realised that he had gone too far; after lecturing us for about an hour, he went away.

Lynch died within three weeks. He was badly beaten up that night. The actual cause of death was cerebral malaria. I suppose it was rather a savage beating and certainly must have had a weakening effect on his resistance. Bull used a bamboo stick on Lynch. At the time, Lynch was not fit in any way. I fear that that beating lowered his resistance - but to what extent is a matter for surmise.

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AUSTRALIAN WAR CRIMES

BOARD OF INQUIRY

CHARLES GROVES WRIGHT ANDERSON, sworn and examined:

I am NX12595 Lt-Col Charles Groves Wright Anderson,
C.O. 2/18 Aust Inf Bn.

I became a prisoner of war at Singapore on 15
February 1942.

During the fighting prior to the fall of Singapore
I did not witness anything in the nature of a war crime or
atrocities. I did, however, hear of the massacre of wounded
at Parit Sulong.

We were fighting at Bakri and Parit Sulong between
18 January and 22 January, and I had Intelligence reports
that the Japanese unit we were fighting was the Japanese
First Guards Division. I have no knowledge from my own
observations or inquiries as to the Japanese unit we were
fighting.

I and the troops under my command were surrounded.
We suffered severe casualties and it became necessary to
withdraw. It was impossible to get the severely wounded
away. We had to leave them there. There were dispersed
in trucks and huts within the Parit Sulong perimeter.
At one stage we were being heavily shelled there.

I remained at that position for about half an hour
after the last of my troops had withdrawn. The withdrawal
took place over a period of about 25 minutes and companies
were moving out at five-minute intervals. The last company,
I believe, was timed to withdraw at half past nine. That
company moved out at that time and I remained there with five
other officers for some time. At that stage the battle had
died down. We were not returning Japanese fire. Artillery
fire had ceased. The Japanese were doing some firing at
our troops who were withdrawing, but there was no fire from
our side.

The Japanese must have seen the withdrawal of our
troops. Up to the time I left the position the Japanese
had not overrun the position. I left there between 100 and
200 white wounded and about 150 Indian wounded. I have
not seen a man of those whom I knew were left there. I
have since heard that the Japanese came in and massacred
those wounded. I heard that from Capt Lloyd Cahill, my
regimental M.O., but he did not witness it. The only
official survivor to my knowledge is Lieut Mackney.

There is no question to my mind that the Japanese
were aware of the withdrawal, because all the heavy artillery
fire had ceased and the impression I formed was that they
had been hard hit and were content to let us go. All the
wounded who could be moved were taken away. I think we
got out about 140. Some of the wounded we could not take
were left in ambulances, of which we had two. Some were in
Army trucks, others were in huts.

I eventually made my way to Singapore with my troops
and ultimately I went with "A" Force to Burma. The Force
was under the command of Brigadier Varley and I was his
second-in-command. The Force was divided into three groups -
three battalions - one of which disembarked at Victoria
Point, one at Mergui and the Headquarters at Tavoy. The
party which landed at Victoria point was under Major Green,
2/ Machine Gun Battalion. Lt-Col Ramsey, 2/18 Battalion,
was in command of the group which landed at Mergui and I

was at Tavoy with Brigadier Varley.

The force moved in four ships, of which we occupied two. There were 2,000 on the Toyashi Maru and 1,000 on the Celebes Maru. Conditions were frightfully overcrowded. The men were down in the holds. On the Toyashi Maru we got two small helpings of rice a day and a tin of meat and vegetable - one-man tins - had to be divided between each 60 men. We were 14 days on that ship. The crowded conditions, lack of drugs etc. led to a severe outbreak of dysentery, which later caused about 20 deaths in Tavoy and a few deaths at the other two points of disembarkation. There were no deaths on the voyage. Those deaths at Tavoy were undoubtedly due to the conditions on the ships.

We left on 14 May 1942 and arrived at Tavoy 14 days later on 28 May 1942.

Two or three days after our arrival, despite warnings to other ranks, eight men of 4 Anti-Tank Regiment escaped. Escape was very easy. However, they had no plans and no arms and were quickly recaptured. Brig. Varley heard that they had been tried and eight graves were dug. We made very strong protests to Lieut. Schine, the Company Commander controlling prisoner-of-war, but with no result. Brig. Varley took very aggressive action with him, and he decided not to take full responsibility and went to see Maj. Itsui with Brig. Varley, who directed that the men be executed.

Although the men were tried in a sort of way, they were not represented; we had no talk with them and were refused admission to see them. Padre Bashford asked permission to see the men before they were executed but this, too, was denied.

I was waiting at the headquarters of the armed guard when a party moved past me into the area where the execution was to take place. The men to be executed were taken to the scene in trucks. On arrival, they were blindfolded, their hands were tied behind them, and they were taken into the position where they were to be executed, opposite the graves. Two shots were then fired into each of them at very close range. Brig. Varley was present at the execution, and so was Padre Bashford. As far as possible, the execution was decently carried out; the men were killed instantly. The senior of the men executed was W.O. QUITTENDON. The story of the execution was told me by Brig. Varley immediately after it had occurred. If there had been any representation of the men at their trial, I should have heard about it. Maj. Itsui is the man whom I hold responsible for the execution and it was his name that was given to me as being the man who had ordered the shooting. These executions took place in the first week of June 1942 and were the only ones I know of which took place in Tavoy.

I subsequently proceeded with Brig. Varley to Thanbassit, where Brig. Varley became the Allied Commander of No. 3 Branch on the Thailand-Burma railway. We were joined by a party of Dutch and another party of Americans. There were several executions of Dutch and Three Australians there. One of these Australians was Bell, who escaped with Capt. Hall, was badly wounded in the escape and brought back and executed. Padre Bashford interviewed him before he died. Another of the Australians executed was Whitaker, of the A.A.S.C. About eight Australians executed was Whittaker, of the A.A.S.C. About eight or nine Dutch were also executed, but I do not know their names. I was not in Thanbassit at the time; they took place after I had gone away. None of these executions was witnessed.

I then took a party of men, known as Anderson Force, on the Burma-Thailand railway and remained in command of that party from September 1942 until January 1944. At one stage early in 1943, I amalgamated with Williams Force and we then became known as the No. 1 Mobile Camp.

In the early days while we were close to supplies, food was poor but not bad. Drugs were very, very scarce, and as the war grew on, conditions worsened. Tasks were increased after early 1943 and pressure to get men out to work was increased. The process by which the Japanese controlled these working camps was that the actual administration of the prisoners was done by the prisoners themselves. They kept all records of pay, sick reports, etc. The recommendations of the doctors were at first respected but afterwards, when more labour was required, the Japanese demanded more men for work and, as figures of fit men became inadequate, they paraded all the sick men and forced some of them out to work.

We would not let our sick men get on the parades. If more men were demanded than it was practicable to send out on the question of fitness, the least-sick were paraded, and the Japs selected from those men for work. Of course, the very bad, obviously bad, cases were changed to the men less sick sub rosa.

My Force at this time was actually a line-laying party on the Burma side, and laid the line from about 28 miles down to about the 155 mile mark, where the line met the parties from the other side. The food got very bad. It was very indifferent - vitaminosis was very prevalent. Pellagra showed itself very badly. We made repeated appeals for more drugs and more food, more proteins. There was meat in the country; it was brought up on the hoof; there was no reason at all why better conditions could not have been provided.

From May 1945 the tide of war was rather going against the Japs and the general conditions there were worse, particularly from interference by planes to their shipping lines. It became to the Japs more and more imperative that the Burma-Thailand railway line should be completed - it was a lifeline to them, and they more or less considered it was an honour to die on "the glorious task". Conditions became very bad. Wastage of labour through lack of food, diseases, callous indifference, and sheer stupidity, was rising, and accounted for at least one-third of the casualties we had.

The Japs had no method of saving labour, no planning which would have saved hours of work. It was just coolie labour to them. They were not responsible as to life or death - it just didn't matter to them.

Conditions under which they worked the men were very grim. To give an instance: In one camp of about 1,000 men, 30 men had to work some times up to 14 hours a day under the most appalling conditions - in rain, in great filth, with insufficient accommodation for rest; and they would be bare-footed and had practically no clothes. Next day they would have to work again, another stretch of 13 or 14 hours. I have known men work 40 hours in a stretch. As we were constructing the railway, there would be about 10 miles between the different camps; when we had got halfway, we would have to go to the next camp, where the sick and gear would be carried; but no, the Japs decided we all would have to go back to the starting point, and then take the gear and the sick, with sick men carrying sick, right forward again. We would be carrying 10 per cent of our sick, ribbgedly fit men had to carry those men and continue the work on the line.

Squalor in the camps was indescribable. We would have to move away dying Burmese coolies with cholera and smallpox. The huts were filthy hovels. Rain fell incessantly, and conditions were terrible.

At Aungmye, the 80 mile camp, was a hospital belonging to No. 5 Group, which was again operating at 100 miles. We were not under No. 5 Group at that time. We arrived there and found the men there in jungle huts, underfed, without medicines, with ulcers, and in very weak condition. Some men had their legs with the bones showing, from the ulcers. Some men medical officers - there was no Australia M.O. there - provided what help they could; we gave them some extra food. But it was most difficult to interfere with other Groups and it was only by stealth that we could help our other men. We did it without the Japs knowing. Commander Epstein, a USA Naval doctor, was there, and was replaced by a Dutch halfcaste doctor.

The men had been left behind there - their camp had moved on and they had been left behind as a base camp for 3 Group - the Japs policy was to abandon the sick and feed the healthy.

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From my own knowledge of the position, those deaths in the most part would have been avoidable if the Japs had supplied us with drugs, proper food, and much need rest from work. The Japs controlled the quinine supplies of the world and made insufficient issued.

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One Commander of the Jap camps was Major General SASA.

He inspected the Burma side in about April or May 1943. One hospital at 50 miles was closed down - there were not sufficient hospitals as it was, but he told Nagatano there were too many sick and that if there were less hospitals there would be less sick. He made his inspection from a truck. Brigadier Varley was in the back of the truck. Repeated requests were made for an interview with SASA, but these were all refused; and Sasa asked for no opinions. He is a trained soldier - such a man who must have observed in every camp the shocking state - the conditions and the food - the men were living under, and made no improvement or ordered no inquiry.

I double-crossed my camp commander and put out all our eating utensils and food baskets which were in a simply shocking condition, in a conspicuous place. This must have been obvious to General Sasa. He would not allow any interview. We did everything to catch his eye and no man of military experience could fail to see wrong. He did not inspect a man. Only the senior officers were paraded. Brigadier Varley came up from base to the various camps. I was not 2 1/2 at that stage. Sasa as a military commander, failed to do anything to alleviate the position. He ordered the closing of the 30th Camp Hospital, which was absolutely vital to us. Instead of improving things he made them worse. He must have seen it. He lessened the number of sick by lessening the hospitals; that is the Japanese method of lessening the sick.

Following him was Col. Kokamura, called "Handlebars" because of his very big mustache. He issued a letter in which he said he took charge of the last stages. His main view was look after you health; that it was a great honour to assist the Japanese in building this railway. He was a very useless incompetent gentleman who did absolutely nothing for us. He was a soldier. The civilian counts nowhere in Japan at all. No alleviation took place due to him.

Col. Sugawara followed him. His headquarters were at Tamburi then Bangkok, as with others. Tamburi was a town in Thailand about 90 miles northwest of Bangkok. Sugawara continued the same policy as the previous people. Tamburi was the camp where 3 Group came to after the withdrawal from Burma in March, 1944. It was alongside the war memorial the Japanese erected to the dead on the Thai railway. There were two bridges there - one concrete and steel and the other a wooden bridge. The camp was absolutely alongside it and on the boundaries of that camp was a Japanese 1st 1st Battery of medium ack ack gunners. The bridges were subject to bombing several times. The first bombing caused us 18 killed 34 wounded. I was not camp commander 2 group at the time. I had as a matter of fact very strong influence in that camp because it was an old camp I was at, and Col. Williamson, No 2 Commander, and I worked in very harmoniously. Col Williamson saw 3 Sugawara and requested that the camp be moved to Chungkai, four miles away from the military objective, and also advise him that we had insufficient trench protection for the strength of the camp. He refused to listen to any petitions and told us we must take the chance. Col. Ishii saw fit to move his HQ immediately to Chungkai; with one day of bombing he and his senior staff left us and moved to Chungkai. Next month the strength of the camp increased from 3,000 to 5,400 at a peak period. Actually, accommodation on the very low Japanese standards could only carry 3,500 men. It was quite possible to put these men in other camps. I have no hesitation in saying it was a deliberate attempt of the Japanese to expose the prisoners to casualties from the air. That is a definite accusation. Sugawara intended the men to be killed there. There was no possible reason why the men should have been taken there. There was no possible reason why the men should have been taken there. People coming back from the jungle could have gone to Chungkai just as easily as to us. He has sufficient men to protect the objective if that was his purpose. The deduction is that by increasing the number of men and still not allowing further trenches to be dug for protection the desire was to kill the prisoners with their own bombs. I think you will get a similar opinion from practically any officer in that camp. Sugawara was the commander at that stage. He was the Thailand Group Commander. The branch commander was Col. Ishii. All he did was to get out. He had two or three camps. Chungkai was his camp too. Tamburi was bombed and machine gunned seven or eight times. Latterly, the bombing was very good; early it was not so good. The total bombing casualties in the prisoner-of-war camp was I think 200 killed. That included Tambisart Camp. At Nampladuk 100 were killed in one day. Subordinate to these commanders were the branch commanders. At No. 3 was Lt-Col. Hagatomo who had a great deal of association with Brigadier Varley and myself. There succeeded Col. Hagatomo, Lt-Col. Ishii, previously commander at No. 4 and

subsequently at No. 2 Branch. Subsequently at Makumpaton was Capt. Mindani, who was subsequently a Major on the Commander's staff at Bangkok. He was known as "King the Merciless". He is regarded as one of the worst; in fact, I would put him down as the worst. I had no close association with him. He is the man who would be responsible for the camp of abandoned sick at Apalong. Of a group of young Americans, national Guardsmen, which was divided into two parties, one party came under Col. Negatomo in 3 Branch and the other party under Capt. Mindani at 3 branch. The former had 5 per cent casualties and the latter over 25 per cent.

In my opinion Capt Mizumi would be to a large extent responsible for the higher death rate. His policy must be responsible for that.

The Commander of No. Branch was Lt-Col Yamagida. He subsequently became the commander of Makumpeton Hospital. He is referred to in Colonel Coates evidence ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ as Yamagita. The Camp Commanders with Anderson Force and No. 1 Mobile Force were Lieut Matsuki and Lieut Haito. I regard both of these as being responsible for the deaths of men.

I wish to mention a Korean known as "Dillinger". Some time either in November or December 1942 a working party was operating on the line close to 18 Mile Camp. A guard named Taimoto, alias "Dillinger", left the working party in the afternoon with Sgt O'Donnell, S/IO PI Regt. About four o'clock in the afternoon three shots were heard. Shortly afterwards Taimoto came back into camp and appeared fairly excited. An immediate roll call was ordered. By that time all the working party were back in camp. They were working on contract work and had finished early. Roll call was ordered and we checked one man missing, the man being Sgt O'Donnell. We reported that he had left the working party with Taimoto.

There was obvious excitement among the Japanese. About half past 5 Lieut Yamada, the Camp Commander at 35 Mile Camp, came into our camp. He sent for me and he told me that one man had escaped and asked me if I knew anything about it. I said that nobody had escaped. At 9 o'clock that night I was taken off with the interpreter, Capt W Drower, and an armed party into the bush, about a kilometer southwest of the camp, and there found the body of Sgt O'Donnell lying in some heavy undergrowth. Lieut Yamada told me that he had been shot trying to escape. The body was nearly cold.

I got Yamada's torch and examined the body and found three wounds. One went through the higher part of the chest, the bullet emerging low down in the back. The bullet had hit a bone and turned. The point of exit at the back was a very big wound. The other two wounds were through the lower part of the jaw and out through the top of the head. On both exits were signs of brains and blood on the grass. The inference was that the first wound dropped the boy and the other wounds were caused by subsequent shooting. I pointed this out to Yamada, pointing out that the first wound was obvious and, as the shot entered from the front, he could not have been escaping. I do not know the motive for the murder, but Taimoto was in the habit of going round a few native huts that were dotted about the bush and stealing chickens and bananas and so on. He took O'Donnell with him to carry the stuff back. I rather think that he was running along chasing chickens and suddenly missed O'Donnell. He then suddenly came upon him face to face and shot him. That was one reason we put it down to: that the boy could not keep up in bare feet and Taimoto got excited and killed him. The only other inference was that it was just a desire to kill on Taimoto's part.

I told Yamada that I had searched the boy's gear when I heard he was missing and he had a tin of bully beef and a tin of milk there, and pointed out that, if he was trying to escape, he would not leave his boots and his clothes behind. Yamada, incidentally, was a very decent Japanese officer and the only one we had any respect for. I believe the Japanese instituted inquiries and we heard the "Dillinger" had been badly beaten by the Japanese, but he appeared in our camp later on. After the Japanese surrender they paid off most of their Koreans and told them to go. We found "Dillinger" in Bangkok. He was arrested and put in

our camp lookup and handed over to the Commission that was handling war crimes. We heard that he committed suicide. He was under arrest at the time.

At the end of 1945 we were brought back into Thailand and conditions were not so bad. They were not good, but there was sufficient food. An occasional jungle party was sent out. In April 1946 some 1000 men were turned out of Nakongpaton Base Hospital and sent out to a place called Prachinb Kiriham to build a road, which went to Mergui. They were operating under shocking conditions and the death rate increased from two per day in the last week of July to 5.7 per day in the first fortnight of August. Out of a thousand men 250 died during that short period from April 1 to August and 250 of the survivors would not have survived another week. Fifteen of them died after release. They were worked to death and were not properly fed and worked under shocking conditions. A full report of that has been put in. I think the Australian deaths in that party numbered about 30 to 35. The party was comprised mainly of Dutch and British. The total Australian strength in that party was about 120 men. That is only a guess, but it is very close to the mark. The proportion of deaths among the Australians was a little less than the proportion for the others.

Major J Stringer, 2/26 Battalion, went down to investigate the position in September 1945. The information I have just given really comes from his reports. The full account of that has been handed in to the R.A.P.W.I. at Bangkok. Early after the capitulation we heard of this party and we got on to Sugacawa. He sent down Capt Misudani to make a report on it. He sent in a rather stiff report which was anti-Japanese, giving a fair, clear indication of what took place. In a paragraph headed "responsibility", he named Major-General Natani (?), Commander Japanese 33 Division, as the principal person responsible. From him the responsibility went down to two major-generals who commanded mixed brigades. One was Sato. It then went down to four colonels. He left it at that, but he added a rider to the effect that the Major-General commanding the Division was actually at Kanhuri at the time. That incident was more grim than anything that happened on the line. There were no officers except three or four British doctors.

At Sangkri, 121 kilo, near Nishi, Private Derkin, of 2/8 Pioneers, was killed on 14 August 1945. We did not get information of this until about 23 or 25 August 1945. Dispositions were then taken of all men who came from that camp who knew the case and these were handed in to the War Crimes Commission at Bangkok. From hearsay, I know that the unit engaged in digging defence positions at Nishi were forcing sick men out to work. Derkin had a high temperature at the time and was probably dilerious, and he left the working party and was in the bush for three or four days. He was recovered and brought back into the camp and was then tied to a tree for 14 days. A grave was then dug and he was bayoneted and buried.

In 1944, Nagatoma left Kanburi, as far as I know, in chains and I was told in July 1945 by Capt Naguchi, Commander of No 7 Branch, that Nagatoma had died from a disease. I can only infer that he had stolen funds. He was always polite and listened very carefully to our requests but the pressure on the sick and lack of supplies of food still went on. This could have been due to corrupt practices on his part. I hold the view that the prisoners-of-war were on coolie rations but that the Branch Commanders had funds to supplement these rations. Our rations came from the Railway Engineers and meat was bought by Nagatoma and supplied through the prisoner-of-war administration. In February 1944 there was a big inquiry. Ishi was Commander of No. 3 Group in Burma and suddenly he dashed back to Moulmein and sent large quantities of meat to our camp. This took three days to come by train to Moulmein and arrived eventually in a shocking condition as no arrangements had been made to preserve it. The anxiety which he showed to try and produce meat rapidly to us indicated that there had been a big inquiry. The he improved his methods and brought us salted beef. The, suddenly, all beef rations stopped. The only interpretation I can give is that as he suddenly produced meat, he had the funds, which then supported the theory that Nagatoma was buying meat from his funds; so that if the rations were below the scale it might be an indication that the money went into his own pocket. With regard to Railway Engineers guilty of crimes, the Japanese were unable to conceal two young Lieutenants who were actually engaged on the laying of the line from Burma. These were two Japanese lieutenants actually engaged in controlling the laying of the line and they were responsible for the shocking conditions and hours of work that No. 1 Mobile Camp suffered. These two men can be located because they were in charge of the line-laying. I have no indication as to who the Japanese regimental commander was except that I think he was called Hyashi, as the work was done under the control of the Hyashi Butai. One of the Japanese lieutenants was Sato.

It was an instruction of the Japanese that we had to have a night watchman at either end of our huts to be responsible for anybody leaving the hut for private purposes and, in case of escape, those watchmen would be held responsible. In about that last quarter of 1944, at 2 o'clock in the morning, Sgt. Lynch was the night watchman at my end of the hut. He had gone to call his relief down a very dark passage, and just he left, one of the worst guards on the line arrived. He was Arai, alias "The Storetrooper". He did not wait. Lynch then came back and I called out to him to call after Arai and tell him that he had been changing guards and had returned. Lynch followed him up the hill a little and called out to him but received no reply.

Lynch's relief returned and took over and Lynch retired. Three minutes later "Storm Trooper" came back and saw Sgt Smith of the 2/15 P.I. Regt. He demanded to know where he was. Smith explained to him that we were changing, and in the meantime I got up and interferred and told Bull that the men were changing and pointed to the time by the clock. He went into a furious rage and took the two men, Lynch and Smith, to the guard house. I suspected that he intended to bash them up and I collected the interpreter, Capt Drower, and we went over to give a hand.

Bull started beating the two men and I interposed; he rushed at me and eventually laid me out with a stick of bamboo - he knocked me out for about a minute and then he knocked out the interpreter for several minutes. He then realized that he had gone too far; after lecturing us for about an hour, he went away.

Lynch died within three weeks. He was badly beaten up that night. The actual cause of death was cerebral malaria. I suppose it was rather a savage beating and certainly must have had a weakening effect on his resistance. Bull used a bamboo stick on Lynch. At the time, Lynch was not fit in any way. I fear that that beating lowered his resistance - but to what extent is a matter for surmise.

13

AUSTRALIAN WAR CRIMES
BOARD OF INQUIRY

CHARLES GROVES WRIGHT ANDERSON, sworn and examined:

I am HX12595 Lt-Col Charles Groves Wright Anderson, C.O. 2/19 Aust Inf Bn.

I became a prisoner of war at Singapore on 15 February 1942.

During the fighting prior to the fall of Singapore I did not witness anything in the nature of a war crime or atrocity. I did, however, hear of the massacre of wounded at Parit Sulong.

We were fighting at Bakri and Parit Sulong between 18 January and 22 January, and I had intelligence reports that the Japanese unit we were fighting was the Japanese First Guards Division. I have no knowledge from my own observations or inquiries as to the Japanese unit we were fighting.

I and the troops under my command were surrounded. We suffered severe casualties and it became necessary to withdraw. It was impossible to get the severely wounded away. We had to leave them there. They were dispersed in cracks and huts within the Parit Sulong perimeter. At one stage we were being heavily shelled there.

I remained at that position for about half an hour after the last of my troops had withdrawn. The withdrawal took place over a period of about 25 minutes and companies were moving out at five-minute intervals. The last company, I believe, was timed to withdraw at half past 9. That company moved out at that time and I remained there with five other officers for some time. At that stage the battle had died down. We were not returning Japanese fire. Artillery fire had ceased. The Japanese were doing some firing at our troops who were withdrawing, but there was no fire from our side.

The Japanese must have seen the withdrawal of our troops. Up to the time I left the position the Japanese had not overrun the position. I left there between 100 and 200 white-wounded and about 150 Indian wounded. I have not seen a man of those whom I knew were left there. I have since heard that the Japanese came in and massacred those wounded. I heard that from Capt Lloyd Cahill, my regimental M.O., but he did not witness it. The only official survivor to my knowledge is Lieut Mackney.

There is no question to my mind that the Japanese were aware of the withdrawal, because all the heavy artillery fire had ceased and the impression I formed was that they had been hard hit and were content to let us go. All the wounded who could be moved were taken away. I think we got out about 140. Some of the wounded we could not take were left in ambulances, of which we had two. Some were in Army trucks, others were in huts.

I eventually made my way to Singapore with my troops and ultimately I went with "A" Force to Burma. The Force was under the command of Brigadier Varley and I was his second-in-command. The Force was divided into three groups - three battalions - one of which disembarked at Victoria Point, one at Mergui and the Headquarters at Tavoy. The party which landed at Victoria Point was under Major Green, 2/4 Machine Gun Battalion. Lt-Col Ramsey, 2/18 Battalion, was in command of the group which landed at Mergui and I

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During the fighting prior to the fall of Singapore I did not witness anything in the nature of a war crime or atrocity. I did, however, hear of the treatment of wounded at various stages.

As the fighting continued and the Japanese forces advanced, I saw the Japanese treat the wounded in a very humane manner. I saw the Japanese take the wounded to the rear and treat them as best they could. I saw the Japanese take the wounded to the rear and treat them as best they could.

I saw the troops under my command were surrounded. We suffered severe casualties and it became necessary to withdraw. It was impossible to get the severely wounded away. We had to leave them there. They were dispersed.

This is the first sheet of the evidence of M18595 Lt-Col Charles Groves Wright ANDERSON taken and sworn before me at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 26th day of November, 1945.

I believe, was killed with my own hands. I believe, was killed with my own hands. I believe, was killed with my own hands. I believe, was killed with my own hands.

Charles Groves Wright

Deponent Chairman, Australian Board of Inquiry into War Crimes

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was at Tavoy with Brigadier Warley.

The force moved in four ships, of which we occupied two. There were 2,000 on the Toyashi Maru and 1,000 on the Celebes Maru. Conditions were frightfully overcrowded. The men were down in the holds. On the Toyashi Maru we got two small helpings of rice a day and a tin of meat and vegetable - one-man tins - had to be divided between each 60 men. We were 14 days on that ship. The crowded conditions, lack of drugs etc. led to a severe outbreak of dysentery, which later caused about 20 deaths in Tavoy and a few deaths at the other two points of disembarkation. There were no deaths on the voyage. Those deaths at Tavoy were undoubtedly due to the conditions on the ships.

This is the second sheet of the evidence of Charles Groves Wright ANDERSON taken and sworn before me at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 28th day of November, 1945.

.....
Chairman, Australian Board of
Inquiry into War Crimes.

.....
Deponent

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.....
Deponent

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Chairman, Australian Board of
Inquiry into War Crimes.

We left on 14 May 1942 and arrived at Tavoy 14 days later, on 28 May 1942.

Two or three days after our arrival, despite warnings to other ranks, eight men of 4 Anti-Tank Regiment escaped. Escape was very easy. However, they had no plans and no arms and were quickly recaptured. Brig. Varley heard that they had been tried and eight graves were dug. We made very strong protests to Lieut. Schina, the Company Commander controlling prisoners-of-war, but with no result. Brig. Varley took very aggressive action with him but ~~he was a very strong character and decided not to take full responsibility and went to see Maj. Itsui~~ ^{with Brig. Varley} who directed that the men be executed.

Although the men were tried in a sort of way, they were not represented; we had no talk with them and were refused admission to see them. Padre Bashford asked permission to see the men before they were executed but this, too, was denied.

I was waiting at the headquarters of the armed guard when a party moved past me into the area where the execution was to take place. The men to be executed were taken to the scene in trucks. On arrival, they were blindfolded, their hands were tied behind them, and they were taken into the position where they were to be executed, opposite the graves. Two shots were then fired into each of them at very close range. Brig. Varley was present at the execution, and so was Padre Bashford. As far as possible, the execution was decently carried out; the men were killed instantly. The senior of the men executed was W.O. Quittendon. The story of the execution was told me by Brig. Varley immediately after it had occurred. If there had been any representation of the men at their trial, I should have heard about it. Maj. Itsui is the man whom I hold responsible for the execution and it was his name that was given to me as being the man who had ordered the shooting. These executions took place in the first week of June 1942 and were the only ones I know of which took place in Tavoy.

I subsequently proceeded with Brig. Varley to Thambazait, where Brig. Varley became the Allied Commander of No. 3 Branch of the Thailand-Burma railway. We were joined by a party of Dutch and another party of Americans. There were several executions of Dutch and three Australians there. One of these Australians was Bell, who escaped with Capt. Mull, was badly wounded in the escape and brought back and executed. Padre Bashford interviewed him before he died. Another of the Australians executed was Whittaker, of the A.A.S.C. About eight or nine Dutch were also executed, but I do not know their names. I was not in Thambazait at the time; they took place after I had gone away. None of these executions was witnessed.

I then took a party of men, known as Anderson Force, on the Burma-Thailand railway and remained in command of that party from September 1942 until January 1944. At one stage early in 1943, I amalgamated with Williams Force and we then became known as the No. 1 Mobile Camp.

In the early days while we were close to supplies, food was poor but not bad. Drugs were very, very scarce, and as the war grew on, conditions worsened. Tasks were increased after early 1943 and pressure to get men out to work was increased. The process by which the Japanese controlled these working camps was that ~~with~~ the actual administration of the prisoners was done by the prisoners themselves. They kept all records of pay, sick reports, etc. The recommendations of the doctors were at first respected but afterwards, when more labour was required, the Japanese demanded more men for work and, as figures of fit men became inadequate, they paraded all the sick men and forced some of them out to work.

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This is the third sheet of the evidence of Lt-Col Charles Wright and his staff who were at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 26th day of November, 1945.

I subsequently proceeded to Tavy to see the men where Brig. Varley became the Allied Commanding Officer of the camp. The men were taken to the camp and three Australians were executed with Capt. Hill, who was badly wounded in the escape and brought back and executed. Padre Bashford interviewed him before he died. Another of the Australians executed was Wickett, of the A.A.C. About eight or nine Dutch were also executed, but I do not know their names. I was not in Tavy at the time; they took place after I had gone away. None of these executions was witnessed.

Chairman, Australian Board of Inquiry into War Crimes.

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We would not let our sick men get on the parades. If more men were demanded than it was practicable to send out on the question of fitness, the least-sick were paraded, and the Japs selected from these men for work. Ofcourse, the very bad, obviously bad, cases were changed to the men less sick sub rosa.

My Force at this time was a ctually a line-laying party on the Burma side, and laid the line from about 26 kilos down to about the 153 kilo mark, where the line met the parties from the other side. The food got very bad. It was very indifferent - vitaminosis was very prevalent. Pellagra showed itself very badly. We made repeated appeals for more drugs and more food, more proteins. There was meat in the country; it was brought up on the hoof; there was no reason at all why better conditions could not have been provided.

From May 1943 the tide of war was rather going against the Japs and the general conditions there were worse, particularly from interference by planes to their shipping lines. It became to the Japs more and more imperative that the Burma-Thailand railway line should be completed - it was a lifeline to them, and they more or less considered it was an honour to die on "the glorious task". Conditions became very bad. Wastage of labour through lack of food, diseases, callous indifference, and sheer stupidity, was rising, and accounted for at least one-third of the casualties we had.

The Japs had no method of saving labour, no planning which would have saved hours of work. It was just coolie labour to them. They were not responsible as to life or death - it just didn't matter to them.

Conditions under which they worked the men were very grim. To give an instance : In one camp of about 1,000 men, 300 men had to work some times up to 14 hours a day under the most appalling conditions - in rain, in great filth, with ~~xxxx~~ insufficient accommodation for rest; and they would be bare-footed and had practically no clothes. Next day they would have to work again, another stretch of 13 or 14 hours. I have known men work 40 hours in a stretch. As we were constructing the railway, there would be about 10 kilos between the different camps; when we had got halfway, we would have to go to the next camp and retrace our steps, instead of proceeding onwards. The simple thing would have been to take the line to the next camp, where the sick and gear would be carried; but no, the Japs decided we all would have to go back to the starting point, and then take the gear and the sick, with sick men carrying sick, right forward again. We would be carrying 10 per cent of our sick. Allegedly fit men had to carry these men and continue the work on the line.

Squalor in the camps was indescribable. We would have to move away dying Burmese coolies with cholera and smallpox. The huts were filthy hovels. Rain fell incessantly, and conditions were terrible.

At Aparong, the 80 kilo camp, was a hospital belonging to No. 5 Group, which was again operating at 100 kilos. We were not under No. 5 Group at that time. We arrived there and found the men there in jungle huts, underfed, without medicines, with ulcers, and in very weak condition. Some men had their legs with the bones showing, from the ulcers. My medical officers - there was no Australian M.O. there - provided what help they could; we gave them some extra food. But it was most difficult to interfere with other Groups and it was only by stealth that we could help our other men. We did it without the Japs knowing. Commander Epetein, a USA Naval doctor, was there, and was replaced by a Dutch halfcaste doctor.

We would not let our sick men get on the ground. If some men were demanded that it was unreasonable to send out on the ground. The Japanese were punished, and the Japanese were very hard on the very hard, obviously had, cases were changed in the way that they were.

By force at this time was a situation a five-finger party on the ground, and that the line from about 20 miles down to about the 100 mile mark, where the line was the parties from the other side. The food was very bad. It was very indigestible - vitamins - it was very greasy. The Japanese showed itself very badly. We made repeated appeals for more food and more food, more protection. There was meat in the country; it was brought up on the boat; there was no reason at all why better conditions could not have been provided.

This is the fourth sheet of the evidence of Lt-Col Charles Groves Wright ANDERSON taken and sworn before me at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 28th day of November, 1945.

Charles Groves Wright Anderson
Depoant

Chairman, Australian Board of Inquiry into War Crimes.

Depoant: I was just some labour to them. They were not responsible as to life or death - it just didn't matter to them.

Conditions under which they worked the men were very strict. To give an instance: in one camp of about 1,000 men, 300 men had to work some times up to 16 hours a day under the most appalling conditions - in rain, in great heat, with some insufficient accommodation for tents; and they would be two-handed and had practically no clothes. Some day they would have to work again, another stretch of 12 or 14 hours. I have known men work 40 hours in a stretch. As we were commencing the railway, there would be about 10 miles between the different camps; when we had got halfway we would have to go to the next camp and return our traps, instead of proceeding onwards. The traps that would have been to take the line to the next camp, where the traps and gear would be carried; but no, the traps decided we all would have to go back to the starting point, and then take the gear and the traps, with some carrying sick, right forward again. We would be carrying 10 per cent of our sick. Allegedly it was had to carry those men and continue the work on the line.

Greater in the camps was indescribable. We would have to have every thing because of the cold and the lack of the huts were filthy hovels. Rain fell incessantly, and conditions were terrible.

At Akyong, the 80 mile camp, was a hospital belonging to No. 5 Group, which was again operating at 100 miles. We were put under No. 5 Group at that time. We arrived there and found the men there in jungle huts, underfed, without medicines, with ulcers, and in very weak condition. Some men had their legs with the bones showing from the ulcers. My medical officers - there was no Australian M.O. there - provided what help they could; we gave them some extra food. But it was most difficult to interfere with other groups and it was only by stealth that we could help our other men. We did it without the Japs knowing. Commander Spence, a USA Army doctor, was there, and was replaced by a Dutch physician doctor.

The men had been left behind there - their camp had moved on and they had been left behind as a base camp for 5 Group - the Japs policy was to abandon the sick and feed the ~~mi~~ healthy.

Dealing with the Thailand POW organisation branches 3, 4 and 5, there were roughly 8,000 odd Australians in the three branches, and the deaths totalled 1,564, on the line, and the total includes a few deaths from bombing. Those three Branches and those figures do not include F or H force. They are Australian figures.

Roughly there were about 50,000 white prisoners (Australian, American, Dutch and British) in the Thailand camps; in March 1945 from Jap reports the deaths amounted to 8,200; but probably 8,500 would be closer the mark. That figure still excludes F and H Forces.

I put the bulk of those deaths down to in the early days dysentery, the greatest killer at that stage, due to unsuitable food and insufficient drugs; after that it was malaria.

From my own knowledge of the position, those deaths in the most part would have been avoidable if the Japs had supplied us with drugs, proper food, and much needed rest from work. The Japs controlled the quinine supplies of the world and made insufficient issued.

I took BRIGADIER Varley's place as Allied commander of No. 3 Branch.

One Commander of the Jap camps was Major General SASA.

He inspected the Burma side in about April or May 1943. One hospital at 30 kilos was closed down - there were not sufficient hospitals as it was, but he told Nagatamo that there were too many sick and that if there were less hospitals there would be less sick. He made his inspection from a truck. Brigadier Varley was in the back of the truck. Repeated requests were made for an interview with SASA, both these were all refused; and Sasa asked for no opinions. He is a trained soldier - such a man who must have observed in every camp the shocking state - the conditions and the food - the men were living under, and made no improvement or ordered no inquiry.

The men had been left behind there - their camp had moved on and they had been left behind as a base camp for 3 Group - the Japanese were to abandon the sick and lead the rest healthy.

Dealing with the Thailand POW organization branches 3, 4 and 5, there were roughly 8,000 odd Australians in the three branches, and the deaths totalled 1,800 on the line, and the total includes a few deaths from bombing. Those three branches and those figures do not include F or H forces. They are Australian figures.

Probably there were about 30,000 white prisoners (Australian, American, Dutch and British) in the Thailand camps; in March 1945 from the reports the deaths amounted to 8,200; but probably 8,500 would be closer the mark. That figure still excludes F and H forces.

I put the bulk of those deaths down to in the early days dysentery, the greatest killer at that stage, due to unsuitable food and insufficient drugs; after that it

This is the fifth sheet of the evidence of Lt-Col Charles Groves Wright ANDERSON taken and sworn before me at Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 26th day of November, 1945.

[Signature]
Deposant

I took ERIKADIER Verley's statement
No. 3 Branch.
.....
Chairman, Australian Board of
Inquiry into War Crimes.

He inspected the Burma side in about April or May 1943. One hospital at 30 miles was closed down - there were not sufficient hospitals as it was, but he told me that there were too many sick and that if there were less hospitals there would be less sick. He made his inspection from a truck. Erikadier Verley was in the back of the truck. Requests were made for an interview with SABA, but these were all refused; and I was asked for no opinions. He is a trained soldier - such a man who must have observed every camp the shocking state - the conditions and the food - the men were living under, and made no improvement or ordered no inquiry.

I double-crossed my camp commander and put out all our eating utensils and food baskets which were in a simply shocking condition, *in a conspicuous place* it was impossible not to see that. The guards are very well treated there. This must have been obvious to General Sasa. He would not allow any interview. We did everything to catch his eye and no man of military experience could fail to see wrong. He did not inspect a man. Only the senior officers were paraded. Brigadier Varley came up from base to the various camps. I was not 2 I/O at that stage. As a military commander, he failed to do anything to alleviate the position. He ordered the closing of the 30th Hospital Camp, which was absolutely vital to us. Instead of improving things he made them worse. He must have seen it. He lessened the number of sick by lessening the hospitals; that is the Japanese method of lessening the sick.

Following him was Col. Nakamura, called "Handlebars" because of his very big mustache. He issued a letter in which he said he took charge of the last stages. His main view was look after your health; that it was a great honour to assist the Japanese in building this railway. He was a very useless incompetent gentleman who did absolutely nothing for us. He was a soldier. The civilian counts nowhere in Japan at all. No alleviation took place due to him.

Col. Sugasa was followed him. His headquarters were at Kamburi then Bangkok, as with others. Kamburi was a British town in Thailand about 90 miles northwest of Bangkok. Sugasa was continued the same policy as the previous people. He was wholly implicated. Tanakan was the camp where 3 Group came to after the withdrawal from Burma in March, 1944. It was alongside the war memorial the Japanese erected to the dead on the Thai railway. There were two bridges there -- one concrete and steel and the other a wooden bridge. The camp was absolutely alongside it and on the boundaries of the camp was a Japanese Ack Ack Battery of medium ack ack guns. The bridges were subject to bombing several times. The first bombing caused us 18 killed 34 wounded. I was camp commander 2 group at the time. I had as a matter of fact very strong influence in that camp because it was an old camp I was at, and Col. Williamson and I worked in very harmoniously. Col. Williamson saw Sugasawa and requested that the camp be moved to Chungkai, four miles away from the military objective, and also advised him that we had insufficient trench protection for the strength of the camp. He refused to listen to any petitions and told us we must take the chances. Col. Ishii saw fit to move his HQ immediately to Chungkai; with one day of bombing he and his senior staff left us and moved to Chungkai. Next month the strength of the camp *increased* from 3,000 to 5400 at a peak period. Actually, accommodation on the very low Japanese standards could only carry 3,500 men. It was quite possible to put these men in other camps. I have no hesitation in saying it was a deliberate attempt of the Japanese to expose the prisoners to casualties from the air. That is a definite accusation. Sugasawa intended the men to be killed there. There was no possible reason why the men should have been taken there. People coming back from the jungle could have gone to Chungkai just as easily as to us. He has sufficient men to protect the objective. The deduction is that by increasing the number of men and still not allowing further trenches to be dug for protection the desire was to kill the prisoners with their own bombs. I think you will get a similar opinion from practically any officer in that camp. Sugasawa was the commander at that stage. He was the Thailand Group Commander. The branch commander was Col. Ishii. All he did was to get out. He had two or three camps. Chungkai was his camp too. That camp Tanakan was bombed and machine gunned 8 even or eight times. Latterly, the bombing was very good; early it was not so good. The total bombing casualties in the Prisoner-of-war camp was I think 2300 200 killed. That included Tambisart Camp. At Nompaduk 100 were killed in one day. Subordinate to these commanders were the branch commanders. At No. 3 was Lt.-Col. Nagatomo who had a great deal of association with Brigadier Varley and myself. There succeeded Col. Nagatomo, Lt.-Col. Ishii, previously commander at No. 4

subsequently at No. 2 branch. Subsequently at Nakompaton was Capt. Mizdani, who was subsequently a Major on the Commander's staff at Bangkok. He was known as "Ming the Merciless". He is regarded as one of the worst; in fact, I would put him down as the worst. I had no close association with him. He is the man who would be responsible for the camp of abandoned sick at Analong. Of a group of young Americans, national Guardsmen, which was divided into two parties, one party came under Col. Nagatomo in 3 Branch and the other party under Capt. Mizdani at 5 branch. The former had 5 per cent casualties and the latter over 23 per cent.

This is the seventh
of Lt.-Col. Anderson taken and shown before me at
Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 23rd
day of November, 1945.

.....
District, Australian Board of
The City of New Orleans

.....
Department

A handwritten signature in dark ink is written over a rectangular stamp. The signature is slanted and appears to be "J. H. ...". The stamp is mostly obscured by the signature but has some faint markings.

and the latter over 25 per cent.
Capt. Hubbard of B branch. The former had 6 per cent casualties
under Col. Ferguson in B branch and the other party under
Capt. Hubbard of B branch. The former had 6 per cent casualties
at along. Of a group of young Americans, additional
men who would be responsible for the camp of abandoned sick
the worst. I had no close association with him. He is the
regarded as one of the worst in fact I would put him down as
staff at Bangkok. He was known as "King the Hellions". He is
Capt. Hubbard, who was subsequently a Major on the 100th Airborne
independently of No. 8 branch.

This is the seventh sheet of the evidence
of Lt.-Col. Anderson taken and sworn before me at
Sydney in the State of New South Wales this 26th
day of November, 1945.

John L. Anderson
Deponent

.....
Chairman, Australian Board of
Inquiry into War Crimes.

In my opinion Capt Mizdani would be to a large extent responsible for the higher death rate. His policy must be responsible for that.

The Commander of No. 2 Branch was Lt-Col Yamagida. He subsequently became the commander of Makompaton Hospital. He is referred to in Colonel Coates evidence as Yamagita. The Camp Commanders with Anderson Force and No. 1 Mobile Force were Lieut Matsasaki and Lieut Maite. I regard both of those as being responsible for the deaths of the men.

I wish to mention a Korean known as "Dillinger". Some time either in November or December 1942 a working party was operating on the line close to 18 Kilo Camp. A guard named Taimoto, alias "Dillinger", left the working party in the afternoon with Sgt O'Donnell, 2/10 Pd Regt. About four o'clock in the afternoon three shots were heard. Shortly afterwards Taimoto came back into camp and appeared fairly excited. An immediate roll call was ordered. By that time all the working party were back in camp. They were working on contract work and had finished early. Roll call was ordered and we checked one man missing, the man being Sgt O'Donnell. He reported that he had left the working party with Taimoto.

There was obvious excitement among the Japanese. About half past 5 Lieut Yamada, the Camp Commander at 35 Kilo Camp, came into our camp. He sent for me and he told me that one man had escaped and asked me if I knew anything about it. I said that nobody had escaped. At 9 o'clock that night I was taken off with the interpreter, Capt W. Brown, and an armed party into the bush, about a kilometer southwest of the camp, and there found the body of Sgt O'Donnell lying in some heavy undergrowth. Lieut Yamada told me that he had been on shot trying to escape. The body was nearly cold.

I got Yamada's torch and examined the body and found three wounds. One went through the higher part of the chest, the bullet emerging low down in the back. The bullet had hit a bone and turned. The point of exit at the back was a very big wound. The other two wounds were through the lower part of the jaw and through the top of the head. On both exits were signs of brains and blood. The inference was that the first wound dropped the boy and the other wounds were caused by subsequent shooting. I pointed this out to Yamada, pointing out that the first wound was obvious and, as the shot entered from the front, pointed out that the boy could not have been escaping. I do not know the motive for that murder, but Taimoto was in the habit of going round a few native huts that were dotted about the bush and stealing chickens and bananas and so on. He took O'Donnell with him to carry the stuff back. I rather think that he was running along chasing chickens and suddenly missed O'Donnell. He then suddenly came upon him face to face and shot him. That was one reason we put it down to: that the boy could not keep up in bare feet and Taimoto got excited and killed him. The only other inference was that it was just a desire to kill on Taimoto's part.

I told Yamada that I had searched the boy's gear when I heard he was missing and he had a tin of bully beef and a tin of milk there, and pointed out that, if he was trying to escape, he would not leave his boots and his clothes behind. Yamada, incidentally, was a very efficient Japanese officer and the only one we had any respect for. I believe the Japanese instituted inquiries and we heard that "Dillinger" had been badly beaten by the Japanese, but he appeared in our camps later on. After the Japanese surrender they paid off most of their Koreans and told them to go. We found "Dillinger" in Bangkok. He was arrested and put in

our camp lookout and handed over to the Commission that was handling war crimes. We heard that he committed suicide. He was under arrest at the time.

At the end of 1943 we were brought back into Thailand and conditions were not so bad. They were not good, but there was sufficient food. An occasional jungle party was sent out. In April 1945 some 1000 men were turned out of Nakompaton Base Hospital and sent out to a place called Prachuab Kirikan to build a road, which went to Mergui. They were operating under shocking conditions and the death rate increased from two per day in the last week of July to 5.7 per day in the first fortnight of August. Out of a thousand men 250 died during that short period from April to August and 250 of the survivors would not have survived another week. Fifteen of them died after release. They were worked to death and were not properly fed and worked under shocking conditions. A full report of that has been put in. I think the Australian deaths in that party numbered about 30 to 35. The party was comprised mainly of Dutch and British. The total Australian strength in that party was about 120 men. That is only a guess, but it is very close to the mark. The proportion of deaths among the Australians was a little less than the proportion of the others.

Major J. Stringer, 2/26 Battalion, went down to investigate the position in September 1945. The information I have just given really comes from his reports. The full account of that has been handed in to the R.A.F.W.I. at Bangkok. Early after the capitulation we heard of this party and we got on to Sugawara. He sent down Capt Mizudani to make a report on it. He sent in a rather stiff report which was anti-Japanese, giving a fair, clear indication of what took place. In a paragraph headed "Responsibility", he named Major-General Katari (?), Commander Japanese 33 Division, as the principal person responsible. From him the responsibility went down to two major-generals who commanded mixed brigades. One was Sato. It then went down to four colonels. He left it at that, but he added a rider to the effect that the Major-General commanding the division was actually at Kanburi at the time. That incident was more grim than anything that happened on the line. There were no officers except three or four British doctors.

This is the 2nd sheet of the evidence of
General Anderson taken and
to state in the case of
New South Wales this 23rd day of November, 1945.

.....
To be used in the case of
Anderson v. the Commonwealth

.....
Signed: G.C.W. Anderson

At Sungkri, 131 Kilo, near Nieski, Private Derkin, of 2/2 Pioneers, was killed on 14 August 1945. We did not get information of this until about 23 or 25 August 1945. Dispositions were then taken of all men who came from that camp who knew the case and these were handed in to the War Crimes Commission at Bangkok. From hearsay, I know that the unit engaged in digging defence positions at Nieski were forcing sick men out to work. Derkin had a high temperature at the time and was probably delirious, and he left the working party and was in the bush for three or four days. He was recovered and brought back into the camp and was then tied to a tree for 14 days. A grave was then dug and he was bayoneted and buried.

In 1944, Nagatoma left Kanburi, as far as I know, in chains and as I was told in July 1945 by Capt. Naguchi, Commander of No. 7 Branch, that Nagatoma had died from a disease. I can only infer that he had stolen funds. He was always polite and listened very carefully to our requests but the pressure on the sick and lack of supplies of food still went on. This could have been due to corrupt practices on his part. I hold the view that the prisoners-of-war were on coolie rations but that the Branch Commanders had funds to supplement these rations. Our rations came from the Railway Engineers and meat was bought by Nagatoma and supplied through the prisoner-of-war administration. In February 1944 there was a big inquiry. Ishi was Commander of No. 3 Group then in Burma and suddenly he dashed back to Moulmein and sent large quantities of meat to our camp. This took three days to come by train to Moulmein and arrived eventually in a shocking condition as no arrangements had been made to preserve it. The anxiety which he showed to try and produce meat rapidly to us indicated that there had been a big inquiry. Then he improved his methods and brought us salted beef. Then, suddenly, all beef rations stopped. The only interpretation I can give is that as he suddenly produced meat, he had the funds, which then supported the theory that Nagatoma was buying meat from his funds; so that if the rations were below the scale it might be an indication that the money went into his own pocket.

With regard to Railway Engineers guilty of crimes.

The Japanese ~~were~~ unable to conceal two young Lieutenants who were actually engaged on the laying of the line from Burma. These were two Japanese lieutenants actually engaged in controlling the laying of the line and they were responsible for the shocking conditions and hours of work that No. 1 Mobile Camp suffered. These two men can be located because they were in charge of the line-laying. I have no indication as to who the Japanese ~~to~~ regimental commander was except that I think he was called Hyashi, as the work was done under the control of the Hyashi Butai. One of the Japanese lieutenants was Sato.

It was an instruction of the Japanese that we had to have a night watchman at either end of our huts to be responsible for anybody leaving the hut for private purposes and, in case of escape, those watchmen would be held responsible. In about the last quarter of 1943, at 2 o'clock in the morning, Sgt. Lynch was the night watchman at my end of the hut. He had gone to call his relief down a very dark passage, and just as he left, one of the worst guards on the line arrived. He was Arai, alias "The Stormtrooper". ~~He did not wait but immediately awakened the officers.~~ Lynch then came back and I called out to him to call after Arai and tell him that he had been changing guards and had returned. Lynch followed him up the hill a little and called out to him but received no reply.

On this Twentyseventh day of March One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows :-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX.12595, rank Lt-Col, and Unit 2/19 Bn.

I have made full reports of various war crimes of which I have knowledge to Justice Sir William Webb, and have been interrogated by him.

The particular instance of Lt Naito's ill treatment of Capt W.M. Drower, British Army, was not raised as to my certain knowledge this was fully dealt with in Siam.

At your request I now submit the following details :-

I was camp commander of No.1. Mobile Camp operating in Burma from March 1943 onwards.

At 26 KM Camp (KUNWITWAY) about April 1943 when Lt Naito on the staff of THAILAND PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS, was my Japanese camp commander.

Captain W.M.Drower British Army was my interpreter. At the time he was suffering from a very severe tropical ulcer on his ankle, and our camp Doctor, Captain R.Richards, A.A.M.C. ordered that Captain Drower must rest, or his leg would be endangered. Captain Drower was sent for by Lt NAITO for interpreting duty, and a message was sent back that Captain Drower was ordered off duty by a medical officer. Shortly afterwards an agitated Japanese camp clerk approached me with the duty work sheets submitted by my office, and asked me to alter the duty cypher in respect of Captain Drower's name, to a no duty cypher. This I refused to do as the report had been submitted. For the guidance of the court daily work returns were submitted by the POW camp office separately for PW officers and other ranks. The PW other ranks were accurately prepared, as these sheets were the basis of their pay, but as officers were paid irrespective of work (supervisory) these officers records were usually shown as duty. Without my knowledge the Japanese clerk induced one of my orderly room sergeants to make the alteration.

Shortly afterwards I was sent for by Lt Naito, and he produced the officers work sheet, and asked me whether I thought an alteration had been made opposite Captain Drower's name for that day.

It had obviously been altered, and I had no alternative but to admit it.

G. Wright Anderson

G. Wright Anderson

My Orderly Room Sergeant (SGT L.CROWE) had told me of the alteration on my way to the office. Naito asked me whether it had been altered on my instructions, and I told him I accepted full responsibility for my office. We were working without an interpreter. Captain Richards Medical Officer was sent for by Lt Naito, and he was told that in conjunction with me he was concealing the fact that Captain Drower had contracted smallpox, and we were both stood up in front of the Japanese commanders office for two hours, and were both lightly struck by a Korean private.

There was a virulent case of smallpox of a British soldier of my force in this camp, and he was isolated in the little attap hut, size about 10 ft by 7 ft in the corner of the camp.

Lt Naito sent two armed guards to produce Captain Drower, and on his arrival Lt Naito accused him of concealing the fact that he had small pox, and then personally took Captain Drower with the escort to the isolation hut. I watched what was apparently a discussion outside the hut, and saw Captain Drower go in. I was fully aware that the hut contained a virulent smallpox case in its most infective stage. Captain Drower was held there for a week or longer. I sent a message to him and received advice about him subrosa through the British medical orderly (Pte Fitzgerald?) attending to patient. This medical orderly had told me that Lt Naito had forced Captain Drower in spite of his protests in to the close confinement of the isolation hut.

Captain Drower was held there till I was able to make representations at the base camp to the Japanese branch commander Lt-Col NAGATOMO, as a result of which Captain Drower was returned to base, isolated for a time, and then sent back to my camp.

Lt Naito was not seen for a month after this incident, and from Korean guards who lived in terror of Lt Naito, I was told that Lt Naito had been sent to MOULMBIN Japanese hospital.

Capt Drower at the time of his confinement was only allowed the clothes he had on him. The remainder of his gear was ordered to be burnt by Lt Naito. It was set on fire, but after Lt Naito's back was turned a few things were salvaged by a friendly Korean.

Captain Drower told me that Lt Naito had warned him that he would be bayoneted if he refused to enter the isolation hut. I have no doubt in my mind that Lt Naito was fully aware that Captain Drower had not contracted smallpox, but it was an oriental method of evening his refusal of duty.

SWORN by the abovenamed deponent
Charles Groves Wright Anderson
at YOUNG on the Twentyseventh
day of March One thousand nine
hundred and forty-six.

BEFORE ME

Charles Groves Wright Anderson
A Justice of the Peace.

Charles Groves Wright Anderson


B2 17/7

On this Fifth day of July One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows :-

The Korean whose photograph numbered T213 is attached hereto is identical with the Korean referred to as MORIMOTO (Greenpents) in affidavit made by me at Young on the Twenty-ninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six.

SWORN by the abovenamed deponent)
Charles Groves Wright Anderson)
at YOUNG on the Fifth day of)
July One thousand nine hundred)
and forty-six.)

BEFORE ME


A Justice of the Peace.

2
M 19/6

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of Crother, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows:-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NZ12595, rank Lt-Col., and Unit 2/19 Bn.

HAYASHI (The Maggot) a Korean Guard, was a member of the Japanese Camp Staff of No. 1 Mobile Camp which I commanded between April 1943 and December, 1943. I do not recall him in connection with the murder of L/Sgt. Whitfield. I can testify that he was a very brutal guard and was responsible for beating and beating my prisoners. One of his favourite methods was kicking either the shins or privates of his victims. I have seen him striking many P.O.W. and recall a particularly vicious assault on a dangerously sick man at NIKKE 131 KM Burma. Shin kicking was a particularly vicious practice when a very high proportion of P.O.W. suffered from Tropical Ulcers, either aggravating existing ulcers or starting new ones. Tropical Ulcers under conditions suffered by P.O.W. on the Burma-Thai Railway was an extremely dangerous condition.

SWORN by the abovesaid Deponent)
Charles Groves Wright Anderson)
at YOUNG on the Twenty-ninth day)
of May One thousand nine hundred)
and forty-six.)

Charles Groves Wright Anderson

BEFORE ME

Malcolm J. Boyd J.P.

A Justice of the Peace.

HAYASHI - Liston - T 288 -

M 19/6

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Gosier, makes oath and says as follows:-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12595, rank Lt-Col., and Unit 2/19 Bn.

MORIMOTO (Greenpants) a Korean Guard was the Works Clerk of No. 1. Mobile Camp which I commanded between April, 1943 and December, 1945. His task was the checking of P.O.Ws for work parade. He took a sadistic delight in hounding out sick prisoners to work. My Administrative Staff and I regarded him as the greatest obstacle we had to overcome in trying to reduce the numbers of our working parties, and I testify without hesitation that it was due to his inhuman efforts that many sick P.O.W were forced out to work and to their death. Although not responsible for as many beatings as other guards, I witnessed him assaulting Sapper Shaw 2/12 Fd. Coy. A.I.F. at NIKES 131 K.M. Camp Burma. The assault was the most brutal and savage one that I had ever witnessed; he used a heavy billet of wood, striking Shaw all over the body with powerful blows about thirty times. Sapper Shaw was an exceptionally strong man which probably saved him from either permanent injury or death.

SWORN by the abovesaid deponent)
Charles Groves Wright Anderson)
at YOUNG on the Twenty-ninth day)
of May onethousand nine hundred)
and forty-six.)



BEFORE ME

Malcolm Wood J.P.

A Justice of the Peace.

MORIMOTO - Kinei T 213

Am 19/6

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of Growth, in the State of New South Wales, Crazier, makes oath and says as follows:-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12595, rank L.-Col., and Unit 2/19 Bn.

NAKAGAWA (FRANKENSTEIN) A Korean Guard, was a member of the Japanese Camp Staff of No. 1 Mobile Camp which I commanded between April, 1945 and December, 1945. He was one of the most brutal guards we had, and I have witnessed innumerable beatings and assaults by this man, and I can say with confidence that he struck more P.O.Ws than any other guard that I had any contact with. He was also known as the "Black Cook" or "Concerto". He had a Salute Complex.

SWORN by the abovesaid deponent
Charles Groves Wright Anderson
at YOUNG on the Twenty-ninth day
of May One thousand nine hundred
and forty-six.)



BEFORE ME

Walter W. Ford J.P.
A Justice of the Peace.

NAKAGAWA. — Hideyoshi ?

M 1946

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six Charles Groves Wright Anderson, of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows :-

I was a member of the Australian Military Forces in the Malayan campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX.12595, rank Lt-Col, and Unit 2/19 Bn.

KANEATSU, known as "Boofhead" a Korean Guard who was mainly employed as cook for the Japanese Guards was responsible for many lashings of P.O.W's in No.1 Mobile Camp, between April 1943 - Dec. 1943.

I can testify to seeing him strike at least 30 P.O.W's at various times.

SWORN by the abovesamed deponent
Charles Groves Wright Anderson
at YOUNG on the Twentyninth
day of May One thousand nine
hundred and forty-six.

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BEFORE ME

Malcolm Wood, J.P.
A Justice of the Peace.

KANEATSU.

No. 446.

Am 19/6

On this Twentyninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six, Charles Groves Wright Anderson of Crowther, in the State of New South Wales, Grazier, makes oath and says as follows:-

I was a member of the Australian Military Force in the Malayan Campaign, who became P.O.W. on the fall of Singapore, my Army number being NX12595, rank Lt.Col., and Unit 2/19 Bn.

ARAI Shokai (Jungle Jim Stormtrooper), a Korean Guard attached to the Camp Staff of No. 1 Mobile Camp which I commanded between April 1943 and December 1943. He was also known as "The Bull" previous to joining No. 1 Mobile Camp. He was Lt.Col. HAGOTOMO'S Batman. This Korean was, in my opinion, the most brutal guard that I ever came in contact with. He created a reign of terror wherever he was. An extremely strong man with a very powerful voice; nothing was safe from his savage attentions, he had innumerable brutal beatings credited against him. I witnessed him striking dying men carried on stretchers at 70 K.M. Camp Burma (MEZALI). I was knocked unconscious by him at 2 a.m. at NIKKE CAMP 131 K.M. Burma about October 1943 when trying to intervene in the interests of Sgt. J. Lynch, 2/15 Pd Regt. A.I.F. and Sgt. Hill - or Smith - of the same Unit, whom he was savagely assaulting for a completely trumped up charge of failure of duty on night picket. Sgt. J. Lynch, a Sydney Barrister-at-Law, died within three weeks. He was a sick man at the time of the assault and the assault was undoubtedly a contributory cause. I made numerous complaints against this conduct but most of the Japanese Staff were themselves frightened of ARAI. I can best describe him as an evil inhuman monster. I had continual dealings with this man and except for the one incident I have mentioned against myself, I personally had no other trouble with him. I know that he was severely punished for striking me, but in our subsequent relations he showed no malice. I mention this in order that whilst making these charges I have no feelings of personal animus against him.

SWORN by the abovesigned deponent Charles Groves Wright Anderson at YOUNG on the Twenty-ninth day of May One thousand nine hundred and forty-six.



BEFORE ME

Walter Wood Jr.
A Justice of the Peace.

ARAI Shokai T 334

HAGOTOMO ← NO 158

Mv. 13/9

On this *second* day of *September* one thousand nine hundred and forty-six, Charles Groves Wright Anderson of Fernhill, Crowther in the state of New South Wales, grazier, makes oath, says as follows:-

1. AS NX12595 Lt-Col. C.G.W. Anderson of 2/19 Bn I, was taken PW at Singapore on 15 Feb 1942. Later I was moved to 18 Kilo Camp.

2. *Evening* I recall an incident of the 26th Dec 1942. At about 9 in the ~~evening~~ I was told that QX13768 Sgt. O'Donnell had ~~suffered~~ ~~injury in an accident~~. I was taken out to the scene of the happening. I saw a wound, high up in the chest slightly on left side in front. The exit to the wound was in the back lower down on the right side, a very large hole of exit. The shot was fired from a height, from a bank about 8' high. The bullet entered the body from the front. The position of the bullet entering the front indicated that Sgt. O'Donnell was not making an attempt to escape, the undergrowth was very heavy so it must have been fired from a very close range as the jungle was very thick. *Sgt.* O'Donnell apparently dropped immediately there was no disturbance on the ground where he fell, indicating that there was no movement, meaning that the shot killed the man instantly. There were still more bullet wounds, one in the jaw after death which came out on the back of the base of the skull shattering brain matter over the ground. The second wound entered under the chin and came out near the top of the skull also shattering brain matter over the surrounding grounds. There were powder marks on the wounds where the bullets penetrated, indicating they had been fired at very close range. In the immediate vicinity of the exits of wounds there were clear indications of brain matter and blood on the ground which showed that the body had not moved. The first wound in *my* opinion caused instant death, the other two were fired after death. The ground was fairly moist and it was very simple to read the signs of what took place.

*my
tried to
escape
my*

my

Anderson, the abovesaid deponent, Charles Groves Wright
at Sydney, this
second day of *September*
One thousand nine hundred and forty-six.

BEFORE ME. *Walter J. Wood*
A Justice of the Peace.

Chas. G. W. Anderson
RECEIVED
& SE
LAWYER
REGISTERED

WAR OF 1939-45

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Claim No. 1010/4/4

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